ima: Rename internal filter rule functions

[ Upstream commit b8867eedcf ]

Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*()
to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace,
which is typically reserved for general security subsystem
infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Stable-dep-of: c7423dbdbc ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Tyler Hicks 2020-07-10 15:37:50 -05:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 0b7c47b7f3
commit 55e2430e43
2 changed files with 21 additions and 25 deletions

View File

@ -361,24 +361,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else
static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
}
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule)
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}

View File

@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
kfree(entry);
@ -286,10 +286,9 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
goto out_err;
security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
&nentry->lsm[i].rule);
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
&nentry->lsm[i].rule);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
@ -425,18 +424,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
default:
break;
}
@ -821,10 +818,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
return -ENOMEM;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
(char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);