crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()

commit 0aa171e9b2 upstream.

Pavel reports that commit 17858b140b ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned
accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another:
the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the
target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of
intentional tampering.

So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer
before validating the key further.

Fixes: 17858b140b ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ard Biesheuvel 2021-01-02 14:59:09 +01:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 9540ea23f6
commit 457b67797c

View File

@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
struct ecdh params;
unsigned int ndigits;
if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0 ||
params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key))
return -EINVAL;
ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id);