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nfsd: Lower NFSv4.1 callback message size limit
The maximum size of a backchannel message on RPC-over-RDMA depends on the connection's inline threshold. Today that threshold is typically 1024 bytes, making the maximum message size 996 bytes. The Linux server's CREATE_SESSION operation checks that the size of callback Calls can be as large as 1044 bytes, to accommodate RPCSEC_GSS. Thus CREATE_SESSION fails if a client advertises the true message size maximum of 996 bytes. But the server's backchannel currently does not support RPCSEC_GSS. The actual maximum size it needs is much smaller. It is safe to reduce the limit to enable NFSv4.1 on RDMA backchannel operation. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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@ -2587,21 +2587,26 @@ static __be32 check_forechannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca, struct nfs
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return nfs_ok;
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}
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/*
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* Server's NFSv4.1 backchannel support is AUTH_SYS-only for now.
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* These are based on similar macros in linux/sunrpc/msg_prot.h .
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*/
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#define RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS \
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(RPC_CALLHDRSIZE + 2 * (2 + UNX_CALLSLACK))
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#define RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS \
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(RPC_REPHDRSIZE + (2 + NUL_REPLYSLACK))
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#define NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ ((NFS4_enc_cb_recall_sz + \
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RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH) * sizeof(__be32))
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RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS) * sizeof(__be32))
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#define NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ ((NFS4_dec_cb_recall_sz + \
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RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH) * sizeof(__be32))
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RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS) * \
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sizeof(__be32))
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static __be32 check_backchannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca)
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{
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ca->headerpadsz = 0;
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/*
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* These RPC_MAX_HEADER macros are overkill, especially since we
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* don't even do gss on the backchannel yet. But this is still
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* less than 1k. Tighten up this estimate in the unlikely event
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* it turns out to be a problem for some client:
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*/
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if (ca->maxreq_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ)
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return nfserr_toosmall;
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if (ca->maxresp_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ)
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@ -20,11 +20,18 @@
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#include <linux/uidgid.h>
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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/*
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* Maximum size of AUTH_NONE authentication information, in XDR words.
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*/
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#define NUL_CALLSLACK (4)
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#define NUL_REPLYSLACK (2)
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/*
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* Size of the nodename buffer. RFC1831 specifies a hard limit of 255 bytes,
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* but Linux hostnames are actually limited to __NEW_UTS_LEN bytes.
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*/
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#define UNX_MAXNODENAME __NEW_UTS_LEN
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#define UNX_CALLSLACK (21 + XDR_QUADLEN(UNX_MAXNODENAME))
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struct rpcsec_gss_info;
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@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ const struct rpc_authops authnull_ops = {
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static
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struct rpc_auth null_auth = {
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.au_cslack = 4,
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.au_rslack = 2,
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.au_cslack = NUL_CALLSLACK,
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.au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK,
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.au_ops = &authnull_ops,
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.au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL,
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.au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
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@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ struct unx_cred {
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};
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#define uc_uid uc_base.cr_uid
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#define UNX_WRITESLACK (21 + XDR_QUADLEN(UNX_MAXNODENAME))
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
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# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
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#endif
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@ -228,8 +226,8 @@ const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = {
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static
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struct rpc_auth unix_auth = {
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.au_cslack = UNX_WRITESLACK,
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.au_rslack = 2, /* assume AUTH_NULL verf */
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.au_cslack = UNX_CALLSLACK,
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.au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK,
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.au_ops = &authunix_ops,
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.au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX,
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.au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
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