From 3463e51dc337ddd6e608fd595130398e9c60680f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 16:55:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] net/tls: Remove VLA usage on nonce It looks like the prior VLA removal, commit b16520f7493d ("net/tls: Remove VLA usage"), and a new VLA addition, commit c46234ebb4d1e ("tls: RX path for ktls"), passed in the night. This removes the newly added VLA, which happens to have its bounds based on the same max value. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 727433b37bb5..173d8b89072d 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk); struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); - char header[tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size]; + char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE]; struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); size_t cipher_overhead; size_t data_len = 0; @@ -951,6 +951,12 @@ static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) if (rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size > skb->len) return 0; + /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */ + if (WARN_ON(tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size > sizeof(header))) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto read_failure; + } + /* Linearize header to local buffer */ ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size); @@ -1108,7 +1114,7 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx) } /* Sanity-check the IV size for stack allocations. */ - if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE) { + if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE) { rc = -EINVAL; goto free_priv; }