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userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY
[ Upstream commitabec3d015f
] Since userfaultfd doesn't implement a write operation, it is more appropriate to open it read-only. When userfaultfds are opened read-write like it is now, and such fd is passed from one process to another, SELinux will check both read and write permissions for the target process, even though it can't actually do any write operation on the fd later. Inspired by the following bug report, which has hit the SELinux scenario described above: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1974559 Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <roc@ocallahan.org> Fixes:86039bd3b4
("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new,
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int fd;
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fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
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O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
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O_RDONLY | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
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if (fd < 0)
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return fd;
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@ -2097,7 +2097,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
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mmgrab(ctx->mm);
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fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
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O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
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O_RDONLY | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
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if (fd < 0) {
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mmdrop(ctx->mm);
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kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
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