korg/linux
0
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git synced 2024-12-22 10:34:55 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

bnxt_en: Propagate trusted VF attribute to firmware.

Browse Source 
Newer firmware understands the concept of a trusted VF, so propagate the
trusted VF attribute set by the PF admin. to the firmware.  Also, check
the firmware trusted setting when considering the VF MAC address change
and reporting the trusted setting to the user.

Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Michael Chan 2019-02-19 05:31:14 -05:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent c6cc32a213
commit 2a51644443
3 changed files with 60 additions and 4 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
View File

@ -6683,6 +6683,10 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_ver_get(struct bnxt *bp)
VER_GET_RESP_DEV_CAPS_CFG_FLOW_HANDLE_64BIT_SUPPORTED)
bp->fw_cap |= BNXT_FW_CAP_OVS_64BIT_HANDLE;
if (dev_caps_cfg &
VER_GET_RESP_DEV_CAPS_CFG_TRUSTED_VF_SUPPORTED)
bp->fw_cap |= BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF;
hwrm_ver_get_exit:
mutex_unlock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
return rc;

2
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h
View File

@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ struct bnxt_vf_info {
* stored by PF.
*/
u16 vlan;
u16 func_qcfg_flags;
u32 flags;
#define BNXT_VF_QOS 0x1
#define BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK 0x2
@ -1478,6 +1479,7 @@ struct bnxt {
#define BNXT_FW_CAP_IF_CHANGE 0x00000010
#define BNXT_FW_CAP_KONG_MB_CHNL 0x00000080
#define BNXT_FW_CAP_OVS_64BIT_HANDLE 0x00000400
#define BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF 0x00000800
#define BNXT_NEW_RM(bp) ((bp)->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_NEW_RM)
u32 hwrm_spec_code;

58
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
View File

@ -121,6 +121,54 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool setting)
return rc;
}
static int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
{
struct hwrm_func_qcfg_output *resp = bp->hwrm_cmd_resp_addr;
struct hwrm_func_qcfg_input req = {0};
int rc;
bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(bp, &req, HWRM_FUNC_QCFG, -1, -1);
req.fid = cpu_to_le16(vf->fw_fid);
mutex_lock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
rc = _hwrm_send_message(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT);
if (rc) {
mutex_unlock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
return -EIO;
}
vf->func_qcfg_flags = le16_to_cpu(resp->flags);
mutex_unlock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
return 0;
}
static bool bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
{
if (!(bp->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
return !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST);
bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(bp, vf);
return !!(vf->func_qcfg_flags & FUNC_QCFG_RESP_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF);
}
static int bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
{
struct hwrm_func_cfg_input req = {0};
int rc;
if (!(bp->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
return 0;
bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(bp, &req, HWRM_FUNC_CFG, -1, -1);
req.fid = cpu_to_le16(vf->fw_fid);
if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST)
req.flags = cpu_to_le32(FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_ENABLE);
else
req.flags = cpu_to_le32(FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_DISABLE);
rc = hwrm_send_message(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT);
if (rc)
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trusted)
{
struct bnxt *bp = netdev_priv(dev);
@ -135,6 +183,7 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trusted)
else
vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(bp, vf);
return 0;
}
@ -164,7 +213,7 @@ int bnxt_get_vf_config(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id,
else
ivi->qos = 0;
ivi->spoofchk = !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK);
ivi->trusted = !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST);
ivi->trusted = bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf);
if (!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_LINK_FORCED))
ivi->linkstate = IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_AUTO;
else if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_LINK_UP)
@ -935,9 +984,10 @@ static int bnxt_vf_configure_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
* if the PF assigned MAC address is zero
*/
if (req->enables & cpu_to_le32(FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_DFLT_MAC_ADDR)) {
bool trust = bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf);
if (is_valid_ether_addr(req->dflt_mac_addr) &&
((vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) ||
!is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr) ||
(trust || !is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr) ||
ether_addr_equal(req->dflt_mac_addr, vf->mac_addr))) {
ether_addr_copy(vf->vf_mac_addr, req->dflt_mac_addr);
return bnxt_hwrm_exec_fwd_resp(bp, vf, msg_size);
@ -962,7 +1012,7 @@ static int bnxt_vf_validate_set_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
* Otherwise, it must match the VF MAC address if firmware spec >=
* 1.2.2
*/
if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) {
if (bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf)) {
mac_ok = true;
} else if (is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr)) {
if (ether_addr_equal((const u8 *)req->l2_addr, vf->mac_addr))