From 2837dd00f8fc69111cd6b1dc8481d2fb490d11c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Kardashevskiy Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 16:37:52 +1000 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SEV-ES: explicitly disable debug SVM/SEV enable debug registers intercepts to skip swapping DRs on entering/exiting the guest. When the guest is in control of debug registers (vcpu->guest_debug == 0), there is an optimisation to reduce the number of context switches: intercepts are cleared and the KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT flag is set to tell KVM to do swapping on guest enter/exit. The same code also executes for SEV-ES, however it has no effect as - it always takes (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) branch; - KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT is set but DR7 intercept is not cleared; - vcpu_enter_guest() writes DRs but VMRUN for SEV-ES swaps them with the values from _encrypted_ VMSA. Be explicit about SEV-ES not supporting debug: - return right away from dr_interception() and skip unnecessary processing; - return an error right away from the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA handler if debugging was already enabled. KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG are failing already after KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is finished due to vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected set to true. Add WARN_ON to kvm_x86::sync_dirty_debug_regs() (saves guest DRs on guest exit) to signify that SEV-ES won't hit that path. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615063757.3039121-5-aik@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index d58a25a92aa3..0299bbe188f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -619,6 +619,11 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); int ret; + if (vcpu->guest_debug) { + pr_warn_once("KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG for SEV-ES guest is not supported"); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */ ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm); if (ret) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index a0e803f2a574..e838cfecc0fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))) return; get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0); @@ -2714,6 +2714,13 @@ static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) unsigned long val; int err = 0; + /* + * SEV-ES intercepts DR7 only to disable guest debugging and the guest issues a VMGEXIT + * for DR7 write only. KVM cannot change DR7 (always swapped as type 'A') so return early. + */ + if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) + return 1; + if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) { /* * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers