exec: Avoid pathological argc, envc, and bprm->p values

Make sure nothing goes wrong with the string counters or the bprm's
belief about the stack pointer. Add checks and matching self-tests.

Take special care for !CONFIG_MMU, since argmin is not exposed there.

For 32-bit validation, 32-bit UML was used:
$ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \
	--make_options CROSS_COMPILE=i686-linux-gnu- \
	--make_options SUBARCH=i386 \
	exec

For !MMU validation, m68k was used:
$ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \
	--arch m68k --make_option CROSS_COMPILE=m68k-linux-gnu- \
	exec

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240520021615.741800-2-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621205046.4001362-2-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook 2024-06-21 13:50:44 -07:00
parent 084ebf7ca8
commit 21f9310830
2 changed files with 36 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -490,6 +490,9 @@ static inline int bprm_set_stack_limit(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
unsigned long limit) unsigned long limit)
{ {
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
/* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */
if (bprm->p < limit)
return -E2BIG;
bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit; bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit;
#endif #endif
return 0; return 0;
@ -531,6 +534,9 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* of argument strings even with small stacks * of argument strings even with small stacks
*/ */
limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX); limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX);
/* Reject totally pathological counts. */
if (bprm->argc < 0 || bprm->envc < 0)
return -E2BIG;
/* /*
* We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to * We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to
* the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in * the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in
@ -544,7 +550,9 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident.
* See do_execveat_common(). * See do_execveat_common().
*/ */
ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (check_add_overflow(max(bprm->argc, 1), bprm->envc, &ptr_size) ||
check_mul_overflow(ptr_size, sizeof(void *), &ptr_size))
return -E2BIG;
if (limit <= ptr_size) if (limit <= ptr_size)
return -E2BIG; return -E2BIG;
limit -= ptr_size; limit -= ptr_size;

View File

@ -8,9 +8,34 @@ struct bprm_stack_limits_result {
}; };
static const struct bprm_stack_limits_result bprm_stack_limits_results[] = { static const struct bprm_stack_limits_result bprm_stack_limits_results[] = {
/* Giant values produce -E2BIG */ /* Negative argc/envc counts produce -E2BIG */
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = INT_MIN, .envc = INT_MIN }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = 5, .envc = -1 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = -1, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
/* The max value of argc or envc is MAX_ARG_STRINGS. */
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX, { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = INT_MAX, .envc = INT_MAX }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG }, .argc = INT_MAX, .envc = INT_MAX }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = 0, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
/*
* On 32-bit system these argc and envc counts, while likely impossible
* to represent within the associated TASK_SIZE, could overflow the
* limit calculation, and bypass the ptr_size <= limit check.
*/
{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = 0x20000001, .envc = 0x20000001 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
/* Make sure a pathological bprm->p doesn't cause an overflow. */
{ { .p = sizeof(void *), .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
.argc = 10, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
#endif
/* /*
* 0 rlim_stack will get raised to ARG_MAX. With 1 string pointer, * 0 rlim_stack will get raised to ARG_MAX. With 1 string pointer,
* we should see p - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *). * we should see p - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *).
@ -88,6 +113,7 @@ static void exec_test_bprm_stack_limits(struct kunit *test)
/* Double-check the constants. */ /* Double-check the constants. */
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, _STK_LIM, SZ_8M); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, _STK_LIM, SZ_8M);
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ARG_MAX, 32 * SZ_4K); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ARG_MAX, 32 * SZ_4K);
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, MAX_ARG_STRINGS, 0x7FFFFFFF);
for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bprm_stack_limits_results); i++) { for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bprm_stack_limits_results); i++) {
const struct bprm_stack_limits_result *result = &bprm_stack_limits_results[i]; const struct bprm_stack_limits_result *result = &bprm_stack_limits_results[i];