korg/linux
0
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://mirrors.bfsu.edu.cn/git/linux.git synced 2024-11-27 14:14:24 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself

Browse Source 
Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself.

Changelog v4:
- use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the
branches - Dmitry
- Use the id mapping - Dmitry

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mimi Zohar 2016-01-15 10:17:12 -05:00
parent 7429b09281
commit 19f8a84713
4 changed files with 24 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View File

@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ enum ima_hooks {
FIRMWARE_CHECK,
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
POLICY_CHECK,
MAX_CHECK
};
@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG 0x04
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,

12
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
View File

@ -325,10 +325,18 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (result < 0)
goto out_free;
if (data[0] == '/')
if (data[0] == '/') {
result = ima_read_policy(data);
else
} else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
pr_err("IMA: signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", "signed policy required",
1, 0);
if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
result = -EACCES;
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
}
mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
kfree(data);

1
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
View File

@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
[READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
};
/**

12
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
@ -618,6 +619,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
== 0)
entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
@ -776,6 +779,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@ -862,7 +867,8 @@ static char *mask_tokens[] = {
enum {
func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs
func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
func_policy
};
static char *func_tokens[] = {
@ -873,6 +879,7 @@ static char *func_tokens[] = {
"FIRMWARE_CHECK",
"KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
"KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
"POLICY_CHECK",
"POST_SETATTR"
};
@ -944,6 +951,9 @@ static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
break;
case POLICY_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
break;
default:
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);