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Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/boot_acl
thunderbolt: Add support for preboot ACL Preboot ACL is a mechanism that allows connecting Thunderbolt devices boot time in more secure way than the legacy Thunderbolt boot support. As with the legacy boot option, this also needs to be enabled from the BIOS before booting is allowed. Difference to the legacy mode is that the userspace software explicitly adds device UUIDs by sending a special message to the ICM firmware. Only the devices listed in the boot ACL are connected automatically during the boot. This works in both "user" and "secure" security levels. We implement this in Linux by exposing a new sysfs attribute (boot_acl) below each Thunderbolt domain. The userspace software can then update the full list as needed. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
2018-01-21 18:08:04 +08:00
Date: Jun 2018
KernelVersion: 4.17
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: Holds a comma separated list of device unique_ids that
are allowed to be connected automatically during system
startup (e.g boot devices). The list always contains
maximum supported number of unique_ids where unused
entries are empty. This allows the userspace software
to determine how many entries the controller supports.
If there are multiple controllers, each controller has
its own ACL list and size may be different between the
controllers.
System BIOS may have an option "Preboot ACL" or similar
that needs to be selected before this list is taken into
consideration.
Software always updates a full list in each write.
If a device is authorized automatically during boot its
boot attribute is set to 1.
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/deauthorization
thunderbolt: Add support for de-authorizing devices In some cases it is useful to be able de-authorize devices. For example if user logs out the userspace can have a policy that disconnects PCIe devices until logged in again. This is only possible for software based connection manager as it directly controls the tunnels. For this reason make the authorized attribute accept writing 0 which makes the software connection manager to tear down the corresponding PCIe tunnel. Userspace can check if this is supported by reading a new domain attribute deauthorization, that holds 1 in that case. While there correct tb_domain_approve_switch() kernel-doc and description of authorized attribute to mention that it is only about PCIe tunnels. Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2020-11-10 16:47:14 +08:00
Date: May 2021
KernelVersion: 5.12
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: This attribute tells whether the system supports
de-authorization of devices. Value of 1 means user can
de-authorize PCIe tunnel by writing 0 to authorized
attribute under each device.
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/iommu_dma_protection
thunderbolt: Export IOMMU based DMA protection support to userspace Recent systems with Thunderbolt ports may support IOMMU natively. In practice this means that Thunderbolt connected devices are placed behind an IOMMU during the whole time it is connected (including during boot) making Thunderbolt security levels redundant. This is called Kernel DMA protection [1] by Microsoft. Some of these systems still have Thunderbolt security level set to "user" in order to support OS downgrade (the older version of the OS might not support IOMMU based DMA protection so connecting a device still relies on user approval). Export this information to userspace by introducing a new sysfs attribute (iommu_dma_protection). Based on it userspace tools can make more accurate decision whether or not authorize the connected device. In addition update Thunderbolt documentation regarding IOMMU based DMA protection. [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2018-10-31 19:06:52 +08:00
Date: Mar 2019
KernelVersion: 4.21
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute tells whether the system uses IOMMU
for DMA protection. Value of 1 means IOMMU is used 0 means
it is not (DMA protection is solely based on Thunderbolt
security levels).
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/security
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute holds current Thunderbolt security level
set by the system BIOS. Possible values are:
docs: ABI: testing: make the files compatible with ReST output Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx. Fix them. Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:39 +08:00
======= ==================================================
none All devices are automatically authorized
user Devices are only authorized based on writing
appropriate value to the authorized attribute
secure Require devices that support secure connect at
minimum. User needs to authorize each device.
dponly Automatically tunnel Display port (and USB). No
PCIe tunnels are created.
usbonly Automatically tunnel USB controller of the
thunderbolt: Introduce USB only (SL4) security level This new security level works so that it creates one PCIe tunnel to the connected Thunderbolt dock, removing PCIe links downstream of the dock. This leaves only the internal USB controller visible. Display Port tunnels are created normally. While there make sure security sysfs attribute returns "unknown" for any future security level. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
2017-12-08 19:11:39 +08:00
connected Thunderbolt dock (and Display Port). All
PCIe links downstream of the dock are removed.
thunderbolt: Add support for PCIe tunneling disabled (SL5) Recent Intel Thunderbolt firmware connection manager has support for another security level, SL5, that disables PCIe tunneling. This option can be turned on from the BIOS. When this is set the driver exposes a new security level "nopcie" to the userspace and hides the authorized attribute under connected devices. While there we also hide it when "dponly" security level is enabled since it is not really usable in that case anyway. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2020-09-03 18:13:21 +08:00
nopcie USB4 system where PCIe tunneling is disabled from
the BIOS.
docs: ABI: testing: make the files compatible with ReST output Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx. Fix them. Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:39 +08:00
======= ==================================================
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../authorized
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute is used to authorize Thunderbolt devices
after they have been connected. If the device is not
thunderbolt: Add support for de-authorizing devices In some cases it is useful to be able de-authorize devices. For example if user logs out the userspace can have a policy that disconnects PCIe devices until logged in again. This is only possible for software based connection manager as it directly controls the tunnels. For this reason make the authorized attribute accept writing 0 which makes the software connection manager to tear down the corresponding PCIe tunnel. Userspace can check if this is supported by reading a new domain attribute deauthorization, that holds 1 in that case. While there correct tb_domain_approve_switch() kernel-doc and description of authorized attribute to mention that it is only about PCIe tunnels. Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2020-11-10 16:47:14 +08:00
authorized, no PCIe devices are available to the system.
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
Contents of this attribute will be 0 when the device is not
yet authorized.
Possible values are supported:
docs: ABI: testing: make the files compatible with ReST output Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx. Fix them. Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:39 +08:00
thunderbolt: Add support for de-authorizing devices In some cases it is useful to be able de-authorize devices. For example if user logs out the userspace can have a policy that disconnects PCIe devices until logged in again. This is only possible for software based connection manager as it directly controls the tunnels. For this reason make the authorized attribute accept writing 0 which makes the software connection manager to tear down the corresponding PCIe tunnel. Userspace can check if this is supported by reading a new domain attribute deauthorization, that holds 1 in that case. While there correct tb_domain_approve_switch() kernel-doc and description of authorized attribute to mention that it is only about PCIe tunnels. Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2020-11-10 16:47:14 +08:00
== ===================================================
0 The device will be de-authorized (only supported if
deauthorization attribute under domain contains 1)
docs: ABI: testing: make the files compatible with ReST output Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx. Fix them. Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:39 +08:00
1 The device will be authorized and connected
thunderbolt: Add support for de-authorizing devices In some cases it is useful to be able de-authorize devices. For example if user logs out the userspace can have a policy that disconnects PCIe devices until logged in again. This is only possible for software based connection manager as it directly controls the tunnels. For this reason make the authorized attribute accept writing 0 which makes the software connection manager to tear down the corresponding PCIe tunnel. Userspace can check if this is supported by reading a new domain attribute deauthorization, that holds 1 in that case. While there correct tb_domain_approve_switch() kernel-doc and description of authorized attribute to mention that it is only about PCIe tunnels. Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2020-11-10 16:47:14 +08:00
== ===================================================
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
When key attribute contains 32 byte hex string the possible
values are:
docs: ABI: testing: make the files compatible with ReST output Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx. Fix them. Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:39 +08:00
== ========================================================
thunderbolt: Add support for de-authorizing devices In some cases it is useful to be able de-authorize devices. For example if user logs out the userspace can have a policy that disconnects PCIe devices until logged in again. This is only possible for software based connection manager as it directly controls the tunnels. For this reason make the authorized attribute accept writing 0 which makes the software connection manager to tear down the corresponding PCIe tunnel. Userspace can check if this is supported by reading a new domain attribute deauthorization, that holds 1 in that case. While there correct tb_domain_approve_switch() kernel-doc and description of authorized attribute to mention that it is only about PCIe tunnels. Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
2020-11-10 16:47:14 +08:00
0 The device will be de-authorized (only supported if
deauthorization attribute under domain contains 1)
docs: ABI: testing: make the files compatible with ReST output Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx. Fix them. Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:39 +08:00
1 The 32 byte hex string is added to the device NVM and
the device is authorized.
2 Send a challenge based on the 32 byte hex string. If the
challenge response from device is valid, the device is
authorized. In case of failure errno will be ENOKEY if
the device did not contain a key at all, and
EKEYREJECTED if the challenge response did not match.
== ========================================================
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../boot
thunderbolt: Add 'boot' attribute for devices In various cases, Thunderbolt device can be connected by ICM on boot without waiting for approval from user. Most cases are related to OEM-specific BIOS configurations. This information is interesting for user-space as if the device isn't in SW ACL, it may create a friction in the user experience where the device is automatically authorized if it's connected on boot but requires an explicit user action if connected after OS is up. User-space can use this information to suggest adding the device to SW ACL for auto-authorization on later connections. Signed-off-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
2018-01-22 18:50:09 +08:00
Date: Jun 2018
KernelVersion: 4.17
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute contains 1 if Thunderbolt device was already
authorized on boot and 0 otherwise.
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../generation
thunderbolt: Add 'generation' attribute for devices The Thunderbolt standard went through several major iterations, here called generation. USB4, which will be based on Thunderbolt, will be generation 4. Let userspace know the generation of the controller in the devices in order to distinguish between Thunderbolt and USB4, so it can be shown in various user interfaces. Signed-off-by: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2019-10-04 01:32:40 +08:00
Date: Jan 2020
KernelVersion: 5.5
Contact: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>
Description: This attribute contains the generation of the Thunderbolt
controller associated with the device. It will contain 4
for USB4.
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../key
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: When a devices supports Thunderbolt secure connect it will
have this attribute. Writing 32 byte hex string changes
authorization to use the secure connection method instead.
thunderbolt: Allow clearing the key If secure authentication of a devices fails, either because the device already has another key uploaded, or there is some other error sending challenge to the device, and the user only wants to approve the device just once (without a new key being uploaded to the device) the current implementation does not allow this because the key cannot be cleared once set even if we allow it to be changed. Make this scenario possible and allow clearing the key by writing empty string to the key sysfs file. Signed-off-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-15 13:19:20 +08:00
Writing an empty string clears the key and regular connection
method can be used again.
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
thunderbolt: Convert switch to a device Thunderbolt domain consists of switches that are connected to each other, forming a bus. This will convert each switch into a real Linux device structure and adds them to the domain. The advantage here is that we get all the goodies from the driver core, like reference counting and sysfs hierarchy for free. Also expose device identification information to the userspace via new sysfs attributes. In order to support internal connection manager (ICM) we separate switch configuration into its own function (tb_switch_configure()) which is only called by the existing native connection manager implementation used on Macs. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:01 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../device
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute contains id of this device extracted from
the device DROM.
thunderbolt: Read vendor and device name from DROM The device DROM contains name of the vendor and device among other things. Extract this information and expose it to the userspace via two new attributes. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:05 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../device_name
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute contains name of this device extracted from
the device DROM.
thunderbolt: Add support for maxhopid XDomain property USB4 inter-domain spec mandates that the compatible hosts expose a new property "maxhopid" that tells the connection manager on the other side what is the maximum supported input HopID over the connection. Since this is depend on the lane adapter the cable is connected it needs to be filled in dynamically. For this reason we take a copy of the global properties and fill then for each XDomain connection upon first connect, and then keep updating it if the generation changes as services are being added/removed. We also take advantage of this copy to fill in the hostname. We also expose this maxhopid as an attribute under each XDomain device. While there drop kernel-doc entry for property_lock which seems to be left there when the structure was originally introduced. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-01-08 20:57:19 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../maxhopid
Date: Jul 2021
KernelVersion: 5.13
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: Only set for XDomains. The maximum HopID the other host
supports as its input HopID.
thunderbolt: Add support for lane bonding Lane bonding allows aggregating two 10/20 Gb/s (depending on the generation) lanes into a single 20/40 Gb/s bonded link. This allows sharing the full bandwidth more efficiently. In order to establish lane bonding we need to check that lane bonding is possible through link controller and that both ends of the link actually supports 2x widths. This also means that all the paths should be established through the primary port so update tb_path_alloc() to handle this as well. Lane bonding is supported starting from Falcon Ridge (2nd generation) controllers. We also expose the current speed and number of lanes under each device except the host router following similar attribute naming than USB bus. Expose speed and number of lanes for both directions to allow possibility of asymmetric link in the future. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2019-03-22 01:03:00 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../rx_speed
Date: Jan 2020
KernelVersion: 5.5
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: This attribute reports the device RX speed per lane.
All RX lanes run at the same speed.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../rx_lanes
Date: Jan 2020
KernelVersion: 5.5
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: This attribute reports number of RX lanes the device is
using simultaneusly through its upstream port.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../tx_speed
Date: Jan 2020
KernelVersion: 5.5
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: This attribute reports the TX speed per lane.
All TX lanes run at the same speed.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../tx_lanes
Date: Jan 2020
KernelVersion: 5.5
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: This attribute reports number of TX lanes the device is
using simultaneusly through its upstream port.
thunderbolt: Convert switch to a device Thunderbolt domain consists of switches that are connected to each other, forming a bus. This will convert each switch into a real Linux device structure and adds them to the domain. The advantage here is that we get all the goodies from the driver core, like reference counting and sysfs hierarchy for free. Also expose device identification information to the userspace via new sysfs attributes. In order to support internal connection manager (ICM) we separate switch configuration into its own function (tb_switch_configure()) which is only called by the existing native connection manager implementation used on Macs. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:01 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../vendor
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute contains vendor id of this device extracted
from the device DROM.
thunderbolt: Read vendor and device name from DROM The device DROM contains name of the vendor and device among other things. Extract this information and expose it to the userspace via two new attributes. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:05 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../vendor_name
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute contains vendor name of this device extracted
from the device DROM.
thunderbolt: Convert switch to a device Thunderbolt domain consists of switches that are connected to each other, forming a bus. This will convert each switch into a real Linux device structure and adds them to the domain. The advantage here is that we get all the goodies from the driver core, like reference counting and sysfs hierarchy for free. Also expose device identification information to the userspace via new sysfs attributes. In order to support internal connection manager (ICM) we separate switch configuration into its own function (tb_switch_configure()) which is only called by the existing native connection manager implementation used on Macs. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:01 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../unique_id
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This attribute contains unique_id string of this device.
This is either read from hardware registers (UUID on
newer hardware) or based on UID from the device DROM.
Can be used to uniquely identify particular device.
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../nvm_version
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: If the device has upgradeable firmware the version
number is available here. Format: %x.%x, major.minor.
If the device is in safe mode reading the file returns
-ENODATA instead as the NVM version is not available.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../nvm_authenticate
Date: Sep 2017
KernelVersion: 4.13
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: When new NVM image is written to the non-active NVM
area (through non_activeX NVMem device), the
thunderbolt: Add support for separating the flush to SPI and authenticate This allows userspace to have a shorter period of time that the device is unusable and to call it at a more convenient time. For example flushing the image may happen while the user is using the machine and authenticating/rebooting may happen while logging out. Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2020-06-24 00:14:28 +08:00
authentication procedure is started by writing to
this file.
If everything goes well, the device is
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
restarted with the new NVM firmware. If the image
verification fails an error code is returned instead.
thunderbolt: Allow router NVM authenticate separately It may be useful if the actual NVM authentication can be delayed to be run later, for instance when the user logs out. For this reason add a new NVM operation (AUHENTICATE_ONLY) that just triggers the authentication procedure over whatever was written to the NVM storage. This is not supported with Thunderbolt 1-3 devices, though. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-12 20:25:08 +08:00
This file will accept writing values "1", "2" or "3".
docs: ABI: cleanup several ABI documents There are some ABI documents that, while they don't generate any warnings, they have issues when parsed by get_abi.pl script on its output result. Address them, in order to provide a clean output. Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> # for fpga-manager Reviewed-By: Kajol Jain<kjain@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_gpci and sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_24x7 Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> #for IIO Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com> # for Habanalabs Acked-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-papr-pmem Acked-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> # for catpt Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # for rbd Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bc78e5b68ed1e9e39135173857cb2e753be868f.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:50 +08:00
thunderbolt: Add support for separating the flush to SPI and authenticate This allows userspace to have a shorter period of time that the device is unusable and to call it at a more convenient time. For example flushing the image may happen while the user is using the machine and authenticating/rebooting may happen while logging out. Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2020-06-24 00:14:28 +08:00
- Writing "1" will flush the image to the storage
docs: ABI: cleanup several ABI documents There are some ABI documents that, while they don't generate any warnings, they have issues when parsed by get_abi.pl script on its output result. Address them, in order to provide a clean output. Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> # for fpga-manager Reviewed-By: Kajol Jain<kjain@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_gpci and sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_24x7 Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> #for IIO Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com> # for Habanalabs Acked-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-papr-pmem Acked-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> # for catpt Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # for rbd Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bc78e5b68ed1e9e39135173857cb2e753be868f.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:50 +08:00
area and authenticate the image in one action.
thunderbolt: Add support for separating the flush to SPI and authenticate This allows userspace to have a shorter period of time that the device is unusable and to call it at a more convenient time. For example flushing the image may happen while the user is using the machine and authenticating/rebooting may happen while logging out. Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2020-06-24 00:14:28 +08:00
- Writing "2" will run some basic validation on the image
docs: ABI: cleanup several ABI documents There are some ABI documents that, while they don't generate any warnings, they have issues when parsed by get_abi.pl script on its output result. Address them, in order to provide a clean output. Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> # for fpga-manager Reviewed-By: Kajol Jain<kjain@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_gpci and sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_24x7 Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> #for IIO Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com> # for Habanalabs Acked-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-papr-pmem Acked-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> # for catpt Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # for rbd Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bc78e5b68ed1e9e39135173857cb2e753be868f.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:50 +08:00
and flush it to the storage area.
thunderbolt: Allow router NVM authenticate separately It may be useful if the actual NVM authentication can be delayed to be run later, for instance when the user logs out. For this reason add a new NVM operation (AUHENTICATE_ONLY) that just triggers the authentication procedure over whatever was written to the NVM storage. This is not supported with Thunderbolt 1-3 devices, though. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-12 20:25:08 +08:00
- Writing "3" will authenticate the image that is
currently written in the storage area. This is only
thunderbolt: Add WRITE_ONLY and AUTHENTICATE_ONLY NVM operations for retimers The same way we support these two operations for USB4 routers we can extend the retimer NVM operations to support retimers also. Signed-off-by: Rajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-12 20:29:16 +08:00
supported with USB4 devices and retimers.
thunderbolt: Add support for separating the flush to SPI and authenticate This allows userspace to have a shorter period of time that the device is unusable and to call it at a more convenient time. For example flushing the image may happen while the user is using the machine and authenticating/rebooting may happen while logging out. Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2020-06-24 00:14:28 +08:00
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
When read holds status of the last authentication
operation if an error occurred during the process. This
is directly the status value from the DMA configuration
based mailbox before the device is power cycled. Writing
0 here clears the status.
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
Documentation / thunderbolt: Clean up entries Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2021-04-12 19:12:47 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect
Date: Oct 2020
KernelVersion: v5.9
Contact: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
Description: For supported devices, automatically authenticate the new Thunderbolt
image when the device is disconnected from the host system.
This file will accept writing values "1" or "2"
- Writing "1" will flush the image to the storage
area and prepare the device for authentication on disconnect.
- Writing "2" will run some basic validation on the image
and flush it to the storage area.
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<xdomain>.<service>/key
Date: Jan 2018
KernelVersion: 4.15
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This contains name of the property directory the XDomain
service exposes. This entry describes the protocol in
question. Following directories are already reserved by
the Apple XDomain specification:
docs: ABI: cleanup several ABI documents There are some ABI documents that, while they don't generate any warnings, they have issues when parsed by get_abi.pl script on its output result. Address them, in order to provide a clean output. Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> # for fpga-manager Reviewed-By: Kajol Jain<kjain@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_gpci and sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_24x7 Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> #for IIO Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com> # for Habanalabs Acked-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-papr-pmem Acked-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> # for catpt Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # for rbd Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bc78e5b68ed1e9e39135173857cb2e753be868f.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30 15:40:50 +08:00
======== ===============================================
network IP/ethernet over Thunderbolt
targetdm Target disk mode protocol over Thunderbolt
extdisp External display mode protocol over Thunderbolt
======== ===============================================
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<xdomain>.<service>/modalias
Date: Jan 2018
KernelVersion: 4.15
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: Stores the same MODALIAS value emitted by uevent for
the XDomain service. Format: tbtsvc:kSpNvNrN
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<xdomain>.<service>/prtcid
Date: Jan 2018
KernelVersion: 4.15
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This contains XDomain protocol identifier the XDomain
service supports.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<xdomain>.<service>/prtcvers
Date: Jan 2018
KernelVersion: 4.15
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This contains XDomain protocol version the XDomain
service supports.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<xdomain>.<service>/prtcrevs
Date: Jan 2018
KernelVersion: 4.15
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This contains XDomain software version the XDomain
service supports.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<xdomain>.<service>/prtcstns
Date: Jan 2018
KernelVersion: 4.15
Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org
Description: This contains XDomain service specific settings as
bitmask. Format: %x
thunderbolt: Add support for on-board retimers USB4 spec specifies standard access to retimers (both on-board and cable) through USB4 port sideband access. This makes it possible to upgrade their firmware in the same way than we already do with the routers. This enumerates on-board retimers under each USB4 port when the link comes up and adds them to the bus under the router the retimer belongs to. Retimers are exposed in sysfs with name like <device>:<port>.<index> where device is the router the retimer belongs to, port is the USB4 port the retimer is connected to and index is the retimer index under that port (starting from 1). This applies to the upstream USB4 port as well so if there is on-board retimer between the port and the router it is also added accordingly. At this time we do not add cable retimers but there is no techincal restriction to do so in the future if needed. It is not clear whether it makes sense to upgrade their firmwares and at least Thunderbolt 3 cables it has not been done outside of lab environments. The sysfs interface is made to follow the router NVM upgrade to make it easy to extend the existing userspace (fwupd) to handle these as well. Signed-off-by: Kranthi Kuntala <kranthi.kuntala@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2020-03-05 22:39:58 +08:00
thunderbolt: Add USB4 port devices Create devices for each USB4 port. This is needed when we add retimer access when there is no device connected but may be useful for other purposes too following what USB subsystem does. This exports a single attribute "link" that shows the type of the USB4 link (or "none" if there is no cable connected). Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-01 22:34:20 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/usb4_portX/link
Date: Sep 2021
KernelVersion: v5.14
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: Returns the current link mode. Possible values are
"usb4", "tbt" and "none".
thunderbolt: Add support for retimer NVM upgrade when there is no link With help from platform firmware (ACPI) it is possible to power on retimers even when there is no USB4 link (e.g nothing is connected to the USB4 ports). This allows us to bring the USB4 sideband up so that we can access retimers and upgrade their NVM firmware. If the platform has support for this, we expose two additional attributes under USB4 ports: offline and rescan. These can be used to bring the port offline, rescan for the retimers and put the port online again. The retimer NVM upgrade itself works the same way than with cable connected. Signed-off-by: Rajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-01 23:42:38 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/usb4_portX/offline
Date: Sep 2021
KernelVersion: v5.14
Contact: Rajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com>
Description: Writing 1 to this attribute puts the USB4 port into
offline mode. Only allowed when there is nothing
connected to the port (link attribute returns "none").
Once the port is in offline mode it does not receive any
hotplug events. This is used to update NVM firmware of
on-board retimers. Writing 0 puts the port back to
online mode.
This attribute is only visible if the platform supports
powering on retimers when there is no cable connected.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/usb4_portX/rescan
Date: Sep 2021
KernelVersion: v5.14
Contact: Rajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com>
Description: When the USB4 port is in offline mode writing 1 to this
attribute forces rescan of the sideband for on-board
retimers. Each retimer appear under the USB4 port as if
the USB4 link was up. These retimers act in the same way
as if the cable was connected so upgrading their NVM
firmware can be done the usual way.
thunderbolt: Add support for on-board retimers USB4 spec specifies standard access to retimers (both on-board and cable) through USB4 port sideband access. This makes it possible to upgrade their firmware in the same way than we already do with the routers. This enumerates on-board retimers under each USB4 port when the link comes up and adds them to the bus under the router the retimer belongs to. Retimers are exposed in sysfs with name like <device>:<port>.<index> where device is the router the retimer belongs to, port is the USB4 port the retimer is connected to and index is the retimer index under that port (starting from 1). This applies to the upstream USB4 port as well so if there is on-board retimer between the port and the router it is also added accordingly. At this time we do not add cable retimers but there is no techincal restriction to do so in the future if needed. It is not clear whether it makes sense to upgrade their firmwares and at least Thunderbolt 3 cables it has not been done outside of lab environments. The sysfs interface is made to follow the router NVM upgrade to make it easy to extend the existing userspace (fwupd) to handle these as well. Signed-off-by: Kranthi Kuntala <kranthi.kuntala@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2020-03-05 22:39:58 +08:00
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<device>:<port>.<index>/device
Date: Oct 2020
KernelVersion: v5.9
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: Retimer device identifier read from the hardware.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<device>:<port>.<index>/nvm_authenticate
Date: Oct 2020
KernelVersion: v5.9
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: When new NVM image is written to the non-active NVM
area (through non_activeX NVMem device), the
authentication procedure is started by writing 1 to
this file. If everything goes well, the device is
restarted with the new NVM firmware. If the image
verification fails an error code is returned instead.
When read holds status of the last authentication
operation if an error occurred during the process.
Format: %x.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<device>:<port>.<index>/nvm_version
Date: Oct 2020
KernelVersion: v5.9
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: Holds retimer NVM version number. Format: %x.%x, major.minor.
What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/<device>:<port>.<index>/vendor
Date: Oct 2020
KernelVersion: v5.9
Contact: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Description: Retimer vendor identifier read from the hardware.
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