linux/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst

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=====================================
The Linux kernel user-space API guide
=====================================
.. _man-pages: https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
While much of the kernel's user-space API is documented elsewhere
(particularly in the man-pages_ project), some user-space information can
also be found in the kernel tree itself. This manual is intended to be the
place where this information is gathered.
System calls
============
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
unshare
futex2
ebpf/index
ioctl/index
mseal
Security-related interfaces
===========================
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
no_new_privs
seccomp_filter
landlock
lsm
mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was introduced, there was one big mistake: it didn't have proper documentation. This led to a lot of confusion, especially about whether or not memfd created with the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag is sealable. Before MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, memfd had to explicitly set MFD_ALLOW_SEALING to be sealable, so it's a fair question. As one might have noticed, unlike other flags in memfd_create, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is actually a combination of multiple flags. The idea is to make it easier to use memfd in the most common way, which is NOEXEC + F_SEAL_EXEC + MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. This works with sysctl vm.noexec to help existing applications move to a more secure way of using memfd. Proposals have been made to put MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL non-sealable, unless MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is set, to be consistent with other flags [1], Those are based on the viewpoint that each flag is an atomic unit, which is a reasonable assumption. However, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was designed with the intent of promoting the most secure method of using memfd, therefore a combination of multiple functionalities into one bit. Furthermore, the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL has been added for more than one year, and multiple applications and distributions have backported and utilized it. Altering ABI now presents a degree of risk and may lead to disruption. MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is a new flag, and applications must change their code to use it. There is no backward compatibility problem. When sysctl vm.noexec == 1 or 2, applications that don't set MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL or MFD_EXEC will get MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL memfd. And old-application might break, that is by-design, in such a system vm.noexec = 0 shall be used. Also no backward compatibility problem. I propose to include this documentation patch to assist in clarifying the semantics of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, thereby preventing any potential future confusion. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to David Rheinsberg and Barnabás Pőcze for initiating the discussion on the topic of sealability. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@readahead.eu/ [jeffxu@chromium.org: updates per Randy] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240611034903.3456796-2-jeffxu@chromium.org [jeffxu@chromium.org: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240611231409.3899809-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240607203543.2151433-2-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@protonmail.com> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: David Rheinsberg <david@readahead.eu> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-06-08 04:35:41 +08:00
mfd_noexec
prctl: Add speculation control prctls Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations. PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning: Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. The common return values are: EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values: ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2018-04-29 21:20:11 +08:00
spec_ctrl
tee
Devices and I/O
===============
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
accelerators/ocxl
dma-buf-alloc-exchange
gpio/index
iommufd
media/index
dcdbas
vduse
isapnp
Everything else
===============
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
ELF
netlink/index
sysfs-platform_profile
vduse
futex2
perf_ring_buffer
.. only:: subproject and html
Indices
=======
* :ref:`genindex`