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selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
/*
*
* mdp - make dummy policy
*
* When pointed at a kernel tree, builds a dummy policy for that kernel
* with exactly one type with full rights to itself.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
*
* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2006
*
* Authors: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
*/
selinux: use the kernel headers when building scripts/selinux Commit 3322d0d64f4e ("selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability definitions") added a check on the defined capabilities without explicitly including the capability header file which caused problems when building genheaders for users of clang/llvm. Resolve this by using the kernel headers when building genheaders, which is arguably the right thing to do regardless, and explicitly including the kernel's capability.h header file in classmap.h. We also update the mdp build, even though it wasn't causing an error we really should be using the headers from the kernel we are building. Reported-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-12-21 23:39:25 +08:00
/* NOTE: we really do want to use the kernel headers here */
#define __EXPORTED_HEADERS__
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
#include <linux/kconfig.h>
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
Fix all -Wmissing-prototypes warnings in x86 defconfig Signed-off-by: Trevor Keith <tsrk@tsrk.net> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:43:38 +08:00
static void usage(char *name)
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
{
printf("usage: %s [-m] policy_file context_file\n", name);
exit(1);
}
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
/* Class/perm mapping support */
struct security_class_mapping {
const char *name;
const char *perms[sizeof(unsigned) * 8 + 1];
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
};
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
#include "classmap.h"
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i, j, mls = 0;
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
int initial_sid_to_string_len;
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
char **arg, *polout, *ctxout;
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
FILE *fout;
if (argc < 3)
usage(argv[0]);
arg = argv+1;
if (argc==4 && strcmp(argv[1], "-m") == 0) {
mls = 1;
arg++;
}
polout = *arg++;
ctxout = *arg;
fout = fopen(polout, "w");
if (!fout) {
printf("Could not open %s for writing\n", polout);
usage(argv[0]);
}
/* print out the classes */
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", secclass_map[i].name);
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "\n");
initial_sid_to_string_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *);
/* print out the sids */
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "sid %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
fprintf(fout, "\n");
/* print out the class permissions */
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", map->name);
fprintf(fout, "{\n");
for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++)
fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", map->perms[j]);
fprintf(fout, "}\n\n");
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
}
fprintf(fout, "\n");
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
/* print out mls declarations and constraints */
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
if (mls) {
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "sensitivity s0;\n");
fprintf(fout, "sensitivity s1;\n");
fprintf(fout, "dominance { s0 s1 }\n");
fprintf(fout, "category c0;\n");
fprintf(fout, "category c1;\n");
fprintf(fout, "level s0:c0.c1;\n");
fprintf(fout, "level s1:c0.c1;\n");
#define SYSTEMLOW "s0"
#define SYSTEMHIGH "s1:c0.c1"
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
fprintf(fout, "mlsconstrain %s {\n", map->name);
for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++)
fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", map->perms[j]);
/*
* This requires all subjects and objects to be
* single-level (l2 eq h2), and that the subject
* level dominate the object level (h1 dom h2)
* in order to have any permissions to it.
*/
fprintf(fout, "} (l2 eq h2 and h1 dom h2);\n\n");
}
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
}
/* types, roles, and allows */
fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n");
selinux: explicitly declare the role "base_r" This fixes the compilation of policy generated by mdp with the recent version of checkpolicy. Signed-off-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@bigon.be> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-08 05:10:52 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "role base_r;\n");
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n");
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n",
secclass_map[i].name);
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r }");
if (mls)
fprintf(fout, " level %s range %s - %s", SYSTEMLOW,
SYSTEMLOW, SYSTEMHIGH);
fprintf(fout, ";\n");
#define SUBJUSERROLETYPE "user_u:base_r:base_t"
#define OBJUSERROLETYPE "user_u:object_r:base_t"
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
/* default sids */
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-01 01:37:50 +08:00
for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "sid %s " SUBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n",
initial_sid_to_string[i], mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "\n");
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
#define FS_USE(behavior, fstype) \
fprintf(fout, "fs_use_%s %s " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s;\n", \
behavior, fstype, mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "")
/*
* Filesystems whose inode labels can be fetched via getxattr.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY
FS_USE("xattr", "ext2");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_USE_FOR_EXT2
FS_USE("xattr", "ext2");
#endif
FS_USE("xattr", "ext3");
FS_USE("xattr", "ext4");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_JFS_SECURITY
FS_USE("xattr", "jfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
FS_USE("xattr", "reiserfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_SECURITY
FS_USE("xattr", "jffs2");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_FS
FS_USE("xattr", "xfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_GFS2_FS
FS_USE("xattr", "gfs2");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS
FS_USE("xattr", "btrfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY
FS_USE("xattr", "f2fs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_OCFS2_FS
FS_USE("xattr", "ocsfs2");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS
FS_USE("xattr", "overlay");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XATTR
FS_USE("xattr", "squashfs");
#endif
/*
* Filesystems whose inodes are labeled from allocating task.
*/
FS_USE("task", "pipefs");
FS_USE("task", "sockfs");
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
/*
* Filesystems whose inode labels are computed from both
* the allocating task and the superblock label.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS
FS_USE("trans", "devpts");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLBFS
FS_USE("trans", "hugetlbfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
FS_USE("trans", "tmpfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEVTMPFS
FS_USE("trans", "devtmpfs");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE
FS_USE("trans", "mqueue");
#endif
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
#define GENFSCON(fstype, prefix) \
fprintf(fout, "genfscon %s %s " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", \
fstype, prefix, mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "")
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
/*
* Filesystems whose inodes are labeled from path prefix match
* relative to the filesystem root. Depending on the filesystem,
* only a single label for all inodes may be supported. Here
* we list the filesystem types for which per-file labeling is
* supported using genfscon; any other filesystem type can also
* be added by only with a single entry for all of its inodes.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
GENFSCON("proc", "/");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
GENFSCON("selinuxfs", "/");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
GENFSCON("sysfs", "/");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
GENFSCON("debugfs", "/");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
GENFSCON("tracefs", "/");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PSTORE
GENFSCON("pstore", "/");
#endif
GENFSCON("cgroup", "/");
GENFSCON("cgroup2", "/");
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
fclose(fout);
fout = fopen(ctxout, "w");
if (!fout) {
printf("Wrote policy, but cannot open %s for writing\n", ctxout);
usage(argv[0]);
}
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift. The MDP example no longer works on modern systems. Fix it. While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it. NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown classes/permissions. This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation, which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions unlike the kernel. The same problem also occurs with XSELinux. Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker should not have this problem. Changes to mdp: Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions. Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints. Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration. Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules. Use object_r for object contexts. Changes to install_policy.sh: Bail immediately on any errors. Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools. Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled. Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one. Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break. Build policy with MLS enabled by default. Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by pam_selinux / libselinux. Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension. Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd. Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel. Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled. Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot. Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 05:31:47 +08:00
fprintf(fout, "/ " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
fprintf(fout, "/.* " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): se interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. (then a few versions later...): The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. Changelog: Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley: 1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy 2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with non-dummy policy 3. don't re-compute policy version 4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean cleans up the mdp directory. Removed a check for file_contexts which is now created in the same file as the check, making it superfluous. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-27 03:47:57 +08:00
fclose(fout);
return 0;
}
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