linux/include/net/ip.h

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/*
* INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
* operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
* interface as the means of communication with the user level.
*
* Definitions for the IP module.
*
* Version: @(#)ip.h 1.0.2 05/07/93
*
* Authors: Ross Biro
* Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG>
* Alan Cox, <gw4pts@gw4pts.ampr.org>
*
* Changes:
* Mike McLagan : Routing by source
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#ifndef _IP_H
#define _IP_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/inet_sock.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/snmp.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#include <net/flow_dissector.h>
struct sock;
struct inet_skb_parm {
int iif;
struct ip_options opt; /* Compiled IP options */
unsigned char flags;
#define IPSKB_FORWARDED BIT(0)
#define IPSKB_XFRM_TUNNEL_SIZE BIT(1)
#define IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED BIT(2)
#define IPSKB_FRAG_COMPLETE BIT(3)
#define IPSKB_REROUTED BIT(4)
#define IPSKB_DOREDIRECT BIT(5)
2015-05-22 22:32:51 +08:00
#define IPSKB_FRAG_PMTU BIT(6)
u16 frag_max_size;
};
static inline unsigned int ip_hdrlen(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4;
}
struct ipcm_cookie {
struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
__be32 addr;
int oif;
struct ip_options_rcu *opt;
__u8 tx_flags;
__u8 ttl;
__s16 tos;
char priority;
};
#define IPCB(skb) ((struct inet_skb_parm*)((skb)->cb))
#define PKTINFO_SKB_CB(skb) ((struct in_pktinfo *)((skb)->cb))
struct ip_ra_chain {
struct ip_ra_chain __rcu *next;
struct sock *sk;
union {
void (*destructor)(struct sock *);
struct sock *saved_sk;
};
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
extern struct ip_ra_chain __rcu *ip_ra_chain;
/* IP flags. */
#define IP_CE 0x8000 /* Flag: "Congestion" */
#define IP_DF 0x4000 /* Flag: "Don't Fragment" */
#define IP_MF 0x2000 /* Flag: "More Fragments" */
#define IP_OFFSET 0x1FFF /* "Fragment Offset" part */
#define IP_FRAG_TIME (30 * HZ) /* fragment lifetime */
struct msghdr;
struct net_device;
struct packet_type;
struct rtable;
struct sockaddr;
int igmp_mc_init(void);
/*
* Functions provided by ip.c
*/
int ip_build_and_send_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sock *sk,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
struct ip_options_rcu *opt);
int ip_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct packet_type *pt,
struct net_device *orig_dev);
int ip_local_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_mr_input(struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_mc_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_do_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*output)(struct net *, struct sock *, struct sk_buff *));
void ip_send_check(struct iphdr *ip);
int __ip_local_out(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_local_out(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_queue_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
void ip_init(void);
int ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int len, int protolen,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc,
struct rtable **rt,
unsigned int flags);
int ip_generic_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
struct sk_buff *skb);
ssize_t ip_append_page(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4, struct page *page,
int offset, size_t size, int flags);
struct sk_buff *__ip_make_skb(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
struct inet_cork *cork);
int ip_send_skb(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4);
void ip_flush_pending_frames(struct sock *sk);
struct sk_buff *ip_make_skb(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc, struct rtable **rtp,
unsigned int flags);
static inline struct sk_buff *ip_finish_skb(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
return __ip_make_skb(sk, fl4, &sk->sk_write_queue, &inet_sk(sk)->cork.base);
}
static inline __u8 get_rttos(struct ipcm_cookie* ipc, struct inet_sock *inet)
{
return (ipc->tos != -1) ? RT_TOS(ipc->tos) : RT_TOS(inet->tos);
}
static inline __u8 get_rtconn_flags(struct ipcm_cookie* ipc, struct sock* sk)
{
return (ipc->tos != -1) ? RT_CONN_FLAGS_TOS(sk, ipc->tos) : RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk);
}
/* datagram.c */
int __ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
void ip4_datagram_release_cb(struct sock *sk);
struct ip_reply_arg {
struct kvec iov[1];
int flags;
__wsum csum;
int csumoffset; /* u16 offset of csum in iov[0].iov_base */
/* -1 if not needed */
int bound_dev_if;
u8 tos;
};
#define IP_REPLY_ARG_NOSRCCHECK 1
static inline __u8 ip_reply_arg_flowi_flags(const struct ip_reply_arg *arg)
{
return (arg->flags & IP_REPLY_ARG_NOSRCCHECK) ? FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC : 0;
}
void ip_send_unicast_reply(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct ip_options *sopt,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
const struct ip_reply_arg *arg,
unsigned int len);
#define IP_INC_STATS(net, field) SNMP_INC_STATS64((net)->mib.ip_statistics, field)
#define __IP_INC_STATS(net, field) __SNMP_INC_STATS64((net)->mib.ip_statistics, field)
#define IP_ADD_STATS(net, field, val) SNMP_ADD_STATS64((net)->mib.ip_statistics, field, val)
#define __IP_ADD_STATS(net, field, val) __SNMP_ADD_STATS64((net)->mib.ip_statistics, field, val)
#define IP_UPD_PO_STATS(net, field, val) SNMP_UPD_PO_STATS64((net)->mib.ip_statistics, field, val)
#define __IP_UPD_PO_STATS(net, field, val) __SNMP_UPD_PO_STATS64((net)->mib.ip_statistics, field, val)
#define NET_INC_STATS(net, field) SNMP_INC_STATS((net)->mib.net_statistics, field)
#define __NET_INC_STATS(net, field) __SNMP_INC_STATS((net)->mib.net_statistics, field)
#define NET_ADD_STATS(net, field, adnd) SNMP_ADD_STATS((net)->mib.net_statistics, field, adnd)
#define __NET_ADD_STATS(net, field, adnd) __SNMP_ADD_STATS((net)->mib.net_statistics, field, adnd)
u64 snmp_get_cpu_field(void __percpu *mib, int cpu, int offct);
unsigned long snmp_fold_field(void __percpu *mib, int offt);
#if BITS_PER_LONG==32
u64 snmp_get_cpu_field64(void __percpu *mib, int cpu, int offct,
size_t syncp_offset);
u64 snmp_fold_field64(void __percpu *mib, int offt, size_t sync_off);
#else
static inline u64 snmp_get_cpu_field64(void __percpu *mib, int cpu, int offct,
size_t syncp_offset)
{
return snmp_get_cpu_field(mib, cpu, offct);
}
static inline u64 snmp_fold_field64(void __percpu *mib, int offt, size_t syncp_off)
{
return snmp_fold_field(mib, offt);
}
#endif
void inet_get_local_port_range(struct net *net, int *low, int *high);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static inline int inet_is_local_reserved_port(struct net *net, int port)
{
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports)
return 0;
return test_bit(port, net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports);
}
static inline bool sysctl_dev_name_is_allowed(const char *name)
{
return strcmp(name, "default") != 0 && strcmp(name, "all") != 0;
}
#else
static inline int inet_is_local_reserved_port(struct net *net, int port)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
__be32 inet_current_timestamp(void);
/* From inetpeer.c */
extern int inet_peer_threshold;
extern int inet_peer_minttl;
extern int inet_peer_maxttl;
void ipfrag_init(void);
void ip_static_sysctl_init(void);
#define IP4_REPLY_MARK(net, mark) \
((net)->ipv4.sysctl_fwmark_reflect ? (mark) : 0)
static inline bool ip_is_fragment(const struct iphdr *iph)
{
return (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_MF | IP_OFFSET)) != 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
#include <net/dst.h>
/* The function in 2.2 was invalid, producing wrong result for
* check=0xFEFF. It was noticed by Arthur Skawina _year_ ago. --ANK(000625) */
static inline
int ip_decrease_ttl(struct iphdr *iph)
{
u32 check = (__force u32)iph->check;
check += (__force u32)htons(0x0100);
iph->check = (__force __sum16)(check + (check>=0xFFFF));
return --iph->ttl;
}
static inline
int ip_dont_fragment(const struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
u8 pmtudisc = READ_ONCE(inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc);
return pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_DO ||
(pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_WANT &&
!(dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU)));
}
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
static inline bool ip_sk_accept_pmtu(const struct sock *sk)
{
return inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc != IP_PMTUDISC_INTERFACE &&
inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc != IP_PMTUDISC_OMIT;
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
}
static inline bool ip_sk_use_pmtu(const struct sock *sk)
{
return inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc < IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE;
}
static inline bool ip_sk_ignore_df(const struct sock *sk)
{
return inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc < IP_PMTUDISC_DO ||
inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_OMIT;
}
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
static inline unsigned int ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(const struct dst_entry *dst,
bool forwarding)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu ||
dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU) ||
!forwarding)
return dst_mtu(dst);
return min(dst->dev->mtu, IP_MAX_MTU);
}
static inline unsigned int ip_skb_dst_mtu(struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
{
if (!sk || !sk_fullsock(sk) || ip_sk_use_pmtu(sk)) {
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
bool forwarding = IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED;
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
return ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(skb_dst(skb), forwarding);
}
return min(skb_dst(skb)->dev->mtu, IP_MAX_MTU);
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 17:01:15 +08:00
}
ip: make IP identifiers less predictable In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-26 14:58:10 +08:00
u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs);
void __ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct iphdr *iph, int segs);
static inline void ip_select_ident_segs(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk, int segs)
{
struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
if ((iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) && !skb->ignore_df) {
/* This is only to work around buggy Windows95/2000
* VJ compression implementations. If the ID field
* does not change, they drop every other packet in
* a TCP stream using header compression.
*/
if (sk && inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) {
iph->id = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_id);
inet_sk(sk)->inet_id += segs;
} else {
iph->id = 0;
}
} else {
__ip_select_ident(net, iph, segs);
}
}
static inline void ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk)
{
ip_select_ident_segs(net, skb, sk, 1);
}
static inline __wsum inet_compute_pseudo(struct sk_buff *skb, int proto)
{
return csum_tcpudp_nofold(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len, proto, 0);
}
/* copy IPv4 saddr & daddr to flow_keys, possibly using 64bit load/store
* Equivalent to : flow->v4addrs.src = iph->saddr;
* flow->v4addrs.dst = iph->daddr;
*/
static inline void iph_to_flow_copy_v4addrs(struct flow_keys *flow,
const struct iphdr *iph)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(typeof(flow->addrs), v4addrs.dst) !=
offsetof(typeof(flow->addrs), v4addrs.src) +
sizeof(flow->addrs.v4addrs.src));
memcpy(&flow->addrs.v4addrs, &iph->saddr, sizeof(flow->addrs.v4addrs));
flow->control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
}
static inline __wsum inet_gro_compute_pseudo(struct sk_buff *skb, int proto)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = skb_gro_network_header(skb);
return csum_tcpudp_nofold(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
skb_gro_len(skb), proto, 0);
}
/*
* Map a multicast IP onto multicast MAC for type ethernet.
*/
static inline void ip_eth_mc_map(__be32 naddr, char *buf)
{
__u32 addr=ntohl(naddr);
buf[0]=0x01;
buf[1]=0x00;
buf[2]=0x5e;
buf[5]=addr&0xFF;
addr>>=8;
buf[4]=addr&0xFF;
addr>>=8;
buf[3]=addr&0x7F;
}
/*
* Map a multicast IP onto multicast MAC for type IP-over-InfiniBand.
* Leave P_Key as 0 to be filled in by driver.
*/
static inline void ip_ib_mc_map(__be32 naddr, const unsigned char *broadcast, char *buf)
{
__u32 addr;
unsigned char scope = broadcast[5] & 0xF;
buf[0] = 0; /* Reserved */
buf[1] = 0xff; /* Multicast QPN */
buf[2] = 0xff;
buf[3] = 0xff;
addr = ntohl(naddr);
buf[4] = 0xff;
buf[5] = 0x10 | scope; /* scope from broadcast address */
buf[6] = 0x40; /* IPv4 signature */
buf[7] = 0x1b;
buf[8] = broadcast[8]; /* P_Key */
buf[9] = broadcast[9];
buf[10] = 0;
buf[11] = 0;
buf[12] = 0;
buf[13] = 0;
buf[14] = 0;
buf[15] = 0;
buf[19] = addr & 0xff;
addr >>= 8;
buf[18] = addr & 0xff;
addr >>= 8;
buf[17] = addr & 0xff;
addr >>= 8;
buf[16] = addr & 0x0f;
}
static inline void ip_ipgre_mc_map(__be32 naddr, const unsigned char *broadcast, char *buf)
{
if ((broadcast[0] | broadcast[1] | broadcast[2] | broadcast[3]) != 0)
memcpy(buf, broadcast, 4);
else
memcpy(buf, &naddr, sizeof(naddr));
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#endif
static __inline__ void inet_reset_saddr(struct sock *sk)
{
inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr = inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
memset(&np->saddr, 0, sizeof(np->saddr));
memset(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, 0, sizeof(sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr));
}
#endif
}
#endif
static inline unsigned int ipv4_addr_hash(__be32 ip)
{
return (__force unsigned int) ip;
}
bool ip_call_ra_chain(struct sk_buff *skb);
/*
* Functions provided by ip_fragment.c
*/
enum ip_defrag_users {
IP_DEFRAG_LOCAL_DELIVER,
IP_DEFRAG_CALL_RA_CHAIN,
IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_IN,
__IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_IN_END = IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_IN + USHRT_MAX,
IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_OUT,
__IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_OUT_END = IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_OUT + USHRT_MAX,
IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_BRIDGE_IN,
__IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_BRIDGE_IN = IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_BRIDGE_IN + USHRT_MAX,
IP_DEFRAG_VS_IN,
IP_DEFRAG_VS_OUT,
IP_DEFRAG_VS_FWD,
IP_DEFRAG_AF_PACKET,
IP_DEFRAG_MACVLAN,
};
/* Return true if the value of 'user' is between 'lower_bond'
* and 'upper_bond' inclusively.
*/
static inline bool ip_defrag_user_in_between(u32 user,
enum ip_defrag_users lower_bond,
enum ip_defrag_users upper_bond)
{
return user >= lower_bond && user <= upper_bond;
}
int ip_defrag(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user);
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
struct sk_buff *ip_check_defrag(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user);
#else
static inline struct sk_buff *ip_check_defrag(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
{
return skb;
}
#endif
int ip_frag_mem(struct net *net);
/*
* Functions provided by ip_forward.c
*/
int ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb);
/*
* Functions provided by ip_options.c
*/
void ip_options_build(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_options *opt,
__be32 daddr, struct rtable *rt, int is_frag);
int __ip_options_echo(struct ip_options *dopt, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct ip_options *sopt);
static inline int ip_options_echo(struct ip_options *dopt, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return __ip_options_echo(dopt, skb, &IPCB(skb)->opt);
}
void ip_options_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_options_compile(struct net *net, struct ip_options *opt,
struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_options_get(struct net *net, struct ip_options_rcu **optp,
unsigned char *data, int optlen);
int ip_options_get_from_user(struct net *net, struct ip_options_rcu **optp,
unsigned char __user *data, int optlen);
void ip_options_undo(struct ip_options *opt);
void ip_forward_options(struct sk_buff *skb);
int ip_options_rcv_srr(struct sk_buff *skb);
/*
* Functions provided by ip_sockglue.c
*/
void ipv4_pktinfo_prepare(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
void ip_cmsg_recv_offset(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb, int offset);
int ip_cmsg_send(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc, bool allow_ipv6);
int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen);
int ip_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen);
int compat_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen);
int compat_ip_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen);
int ip_ra_control(struct sock *sk, unsigned char on,
void (*destructor)(struct sock *));
int ip_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int *addr_len);
void ip_icmp_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int err, __be16 port,
u32 info, u8 *payload);
void ip_local_error(struct sock *sk, int err, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport,
u32 info);
static inline void ip_cmsg_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
ip_cmsg_recv_offset(msg, skb, 0);
}
bool icmp_global_allow(void);
extern int sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec;
extern int sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
int ip_misc_proc_init(void);
#endif
#endif /* _IP_H */