linux/kernel/user.c

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/*
* The "user cache".
*
* (C) Copyright 1991-2000 Linus Torvalds
*
* We have a per-user structure to keep track of how many
* processes, files etc the user has claimed, in order to be
* able to have per-user limits for system resources.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.kref = {
.refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
},
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
.creator = &root_user,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
/*
* UID task count cache, to get fast user lookup in "alloc_uid"
* when changing user ID's (ie setuid() and friends).
*/
#define UIDHASH_MASK (UIDHASH_SZ - 1)
#define __uidhashfn(uid) (((uid >> UIDHASH_BITS) + uid) & UIDHASH_MASK)
#define uidhashentry(ns, uid) ((ns)->uidhash_table + __uidhashfn((uid)))
static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep;
/*
* The uidhash_lock is mostly taken from process context, but it is
* occasionally also taken from softirq/tasklet context, when
* task-structs get RCU-freed. Hence all locking must be softirq-safe.
* But free_uid() is also called with local interrupts disabled, and running
* local_bh_enable() with local interrupts disabled is an error - we'll run
* softirq callbacks, and they can unconditionally enable interrupts, and
* the caller of free_uid() didn't expect that..
*/
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
/* root_user.__count is 2, 1 for init task cred, 1 for init_user_ns->creator */
struct user_struct root_user = {
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
.__count = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
.processes = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
.files = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
.sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
.locked_shm = 0,
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
};
/*
* These routines must be called with the uidhash spinlock held!
*/
static void uid_hash_insert(struct user_struct *up, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
hlist_add_head(&up->uidhash_node, hashent);
}
static void uid_hash_remove(struct user_struct *up)
{
hlist_del_init(&up->uidhash_node);
put_user_ns(up->user_ns);
}
static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(uid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
struct user_struct *user;
struct hlist_node *h;
hlist_for_each_entry(user, h, hashent, uidhash_node) {
if (user->uid == uid) {
atomic_inc(&user->__count);
return user;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* IRQs are disabled and uidhash_lock is held upon function entry.
* IRQ state (as stored in flags) is restored and uidhash_lock released
* upon function exit.
*/
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
static void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
__releases(&uidhash_lock)
{
uid_hash_remove(up);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
key_put(up->uid_keyring);
key_put(up->session_keyring);
kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up);
}
/*
* Locate the user_struct for the passed UID. If found, take a ref on it. The
* caller must undo that ref with free_uid().
*
* If the user_struct could not be found, return NULL.
*/
struct user_struct *find_user(uid_t uid)
{
struct user_struct *ret;
unsigned long flags;
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags);
ret = uid_hash_find(uid, uidhashentry(ns, uid));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
void free_uid(struct user_struct *up)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (!up)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&up->__count, &uidhash_lock))
free_user(up, flags);
else
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
struct user_struct *alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
{
struct hlist_head *hashent = uidhashentry(ns, uid);
struct user_struct *up, *new;
spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
if (!up) {
new = kmem_cache_zalloc(uid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto out_unlock;
new->uid = uid;
atomic_set(&new->__count, 1);
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
new->user_ns = get_user_ns(ns);
/*
* Before adding this, check whether we raced
* on adding the same user already..
*/
spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
if (up) {
key_put(new->uid_keyring);
key_put(new->session_keyring);
kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, new);
} else {
uid_hash_insert(new, hashent);
up = new;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
}
return up;
out_unlock:
return NULL;
}
static int __init uid_cache_init(void)
{
int n;
uid_cachep = kmem_cache_create("uid_cache", sizeof(struct user_struct),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
for(n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(init_user_ns.uidhash_table + n);
/* Insert the root user immediately (init already runs as root) */
spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
uid_hash_insert(&root_user, uidhashentry(&init_user_ns, 0));
spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
return 0;
}
module_init(uid_cache_init);