linux/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h

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#ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_CPUID_H
#define ARCH_X86_KVM_CPUID_H
#include "x86.h"
#include <asm/cpu.h>
int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool kvm_mpx_supported(void);
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 function, u32 index);
int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
unsigned int type);
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_cpuid *cpuid,
struct kvm_cpuid_entry __user *entries);
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries);
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries);
void kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx, u32 *edx);
int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static inline int cpuid_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr;
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461) On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN ioctl. invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables ... Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G D 3.2.0-3-686-pae EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0 EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0 task.ti=d7c62000) Stack: 00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000 ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0 c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80 Call Trace: [<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm] ... [<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74 1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01 d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89 EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP 0068:d7c63e70 QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well. Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support. Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
2012-11-07 02:24:07 +08:00
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
return false;
KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461) On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN ioctl. invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables ... Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G D 3.2.0-3-686-pae EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0 EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0 task.ti=d7c62000) Stack: 00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000 ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0 c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80 Call Trace: [<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm] ... [<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74 1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01 d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89 EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP 0068:d7c63e70 QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well. Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support. Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
2012-11-07 02:24:07 +08:00
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1, 0);
return best && (best->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_mtrr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1, 0);
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_MTRR));
}
KVM: x86: Emulate IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR CPUID.7.0.EBX[1]=1 indicates IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR 0x3b is supported Basic design is to emulate the MSR by allowing reads and writes to a guest vcpu specific location to store the value of the emulated MSR while adding the value to the vmcs tsc_offset. In this way the IA32_TSC_ADJUST value will be included in all reads to the TSC MSR whether through rdmsr or rdtsc. This is of course as long as the "use TSC counter offsetting" VM-execution control is enabled as well as the IA32_TSC_ADJUST control. However, because hardware will only return the TSC + IA32_TSC_ADJUST + vmsc tsc_offset for a guest process when it does and rdtsc (with the correct settings) the value of our virtualized IA32_TSC_ADJUST must be stored in one of these three locations. The argument against storing it in the actual MSR is performance. This is likely to be seldom used while the save/restore is required on every transition. IA32_TSC_ADJUST was created as a way to solve some issues with writing TSC itself so that is not an option either. The remaining option, defined above as our solution has the problem of returning incorrect vmcs tsc_offset values (unless we intercept and fix, not done here) as mentioned above. However, more problematic is that storing the data in vmcs tsc_offset will have a different semantic effect on the system than does using the actual MSR. This is illustrated in the following example: The hypervisor set the IA32_TSC_ADJUST, then the guest sets it and a guest process performs a rdtsc. In this case the guest process will get TSC + IA32_TSC_ADJUST_hyperviser + vmsc tsc_offset including IA32_TSC_ADJUST_guest. While the total system semantics changed the semantics as seen by the guest do not and hence this will not cause a problem. Signed-off-by: Will Auld <will.auld@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
2012-11-30 04:42:50 +08:00
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_smep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_smap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_fsgsbase(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_pku(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_PKU));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_longmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000001, 0);
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_LM));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_osvw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000001, 0);
return best && (best->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_OSVW));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1, 0);
return best && (best->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_PCID));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1, 0);
return best && (best->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_is_amd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0, 0);
return best && best->ebx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_ebx;
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_gbpages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000001, 0);
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_rtm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_RTM));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000001, 0);
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP));
}
/*
* NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3
*/
#define BIT_NRIPS 3
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_nrips(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000000a, 0);
/*
* NRIPS is a scattered cpuid feature, so we can't use
* X86_FEATURE_NRIPS here (X86_FEATURE_NRIPS would be bit
* position 8, not 3).
*/
return best && (best->edx & bit(BIT_NRIPS));
}
#undef BIT_NRIPS
static inline int guest_cpuid_family(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0);
if (!best)
return -1;
return x86_family(best->eax);
}
static inline int guest_cpuid_model(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0);
if (!best)
return -1;
return x86_model(best->eax);
}
static inline int guest_cpuid_stepping(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0);
if (!best)
return -1;
return x86_stepping(best->eax);
}
static inline bool supports_cpuid_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
}
static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables &
MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT;
}
#endif