linux/kernel/panic.c

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/*
* linux/kernel/panic.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* This function is used through-out the kernel (including mm and fs)
* to indicate a major problem.
*/
#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sysrq.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
#define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE;
static unsigned long tainted_mask;
static int pause_on_oops;
static int pause_on_oops_flag;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:50 +08:00
int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 17:16:30 +08:00
ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
static long no_blink(int state)
{
return 0;
}
/* Returns how long it waited in ms */
long (*panic_blink)(int state);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_blink);
/*
* Stop ourself in panic -- architecture code may override this
*/
void __weak panic_smp_self_stop(void)
{
while (1)
cpu_relax();
}
panic, x86: Allow CPUs to save registers even if looping in NMI context Currently, kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus(), a subroutine of crash_kexec(), sends an NMI IPI to CPUs which haven't called panic() to stop them, save their register information and do some cleanups for crash dumping. However, if such a CPU is infinitely looping in NMI context, we fail to save its register information into the crash dump. For example, this can happen when unknown NMIs are broadcast to all CPUs as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 =========================== ========================== receive an unknown NMI unknown_nmi_error() panic() receive an unknown NMI spin_trylock(&panic_lock) unknown_nmi_error() crash_kexec() panic() spin_trylock(&panic_lock) panic_smp_self_stop() infinite loop kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() issue NMI IPI -----------> blocked until IRET infinite loop... Here, since CPU 1 is in NMI context, the second NMI from CPU 0 is blocked until CPU 1 executes IRET. However, CPU 1 never executes IRET, so the NMI is not handled and the callback function to save registers is never called. In practice, this can happen on some servers which broadcast NMIs to all CPUs when the NMI button is pushed. To save registers in this case, we need to: a) Return from NMI handler instead of looping infinitely or b) Call the callback function directly from the infinite loop Inherently, a) is risky because NMI is also used to prevent corrupted data from being propagated to devices. So, we chose b). This patch does the following: 1. Move the infinite looping of CPUs which haven't called panic() in NMI context (actually done by panic_smp_self_stop()) outside of panic() to enable us to refer pt_regs. Please note that panic_smp_self_stop() is still used for normal context. 2. Call a callback of kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() directly to save registers and do some cleanups after setting waiting_for_crash_ipi which is used for counting down the number of CPUs which handled the callback Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014628.25437.75256.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:10 +08:00
/*
* Stop ourselves in NMI context if another CPU has already panicked. Arch code
* may override this to prepare for crash dumping, e.g. save regs info.
*/
void __weak nmi_panic_self_stop(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
panic_smp_self_stop();
}
x86/panic: replace smp_send_stop() with kdump friendly version in panic path Daniel Walker reported problems which happens when crash_kexec_post_notifiers kernel option is enabled (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/24/44). In that case, smp_send_stop() is called before entering kdump routines which assume other CPUs are still online. As the result, for x86, kdump routines fail to save other CPUs' registers and disable virtualization extensions. To fix this problem, call a new kdump friendly function, crash_smp_send_stop(), instead of the smp_send_stop() when crash_kexec_post_notifiers is enabled. crash_smp_send_stop() is a weak function, and it just call smp_send_stop(). Architecture codes should override it so that kdump can work appropriately. This patch only provides x86-specific version. For Xen's PV kernel, just keep the current behavior. NOTES: - Right solution would be to place crash_smp_send_stop() before __crash_kexec() invocation in all cases and remove smp_send_stop(), but we can't do that until all architectures implement own crash_smp_send_stop() - crash_smp_send_stop()-like work is still needed by machine_crash_shutdown() because crash_kexec() can be called without entering panic() Fixes: f06e5153f4ae (kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160810080948.11028.15344.stgit@sysi4-13.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Reported-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xpang@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Cc: "Steven J. Hill" <steven.hill@cavium.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-12 04:54:23 +08:00
/*
* Stop other CPUs in panic. Architecture dependent code may override this
* with more suitable version. For example, if the architecture supports
* crash dump, it should save registers of each stopped CPU and disable
* per-CPU features such as virtualization extensions.
*/
void __weak crash_smp_send_stop(void)
{
static int cpus_stopped;
/*
* This function can be called twice in panic path, but obviously
* we execute this only once.
*/
if (cpus_stopped)
return;
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a panic
* situation.
*/
smp_send_stop();
cpus_stopped = 1;
}
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
atomic_t panic_cpu = ATOMIC_INIT(PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
panic: change nmi_panic from macro to function Commit 1717f2096b54 ("panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI") and commit 58c5661f2144 ("panic, x86: Allow CPUs to save registers even if looping in NMI context") introduced nmi_panic() which prevents concurrent/recursive execution of panic(). It also saves registers for the crash dump on x86. However, there are some cases where NMI handlers still use panic(). This patch set partially replaces them with nmi_panic() in those cases. Even this patchset is applied, some NMI or similar handlers (e.g. MCE handler) continue to use panic(). This is because I can't test them well and actual problems won't happen. For example, the possibility that normal panic and panic on MCE happen simultaneously is very low. This patch (of 3): Convert nmi_panic() to a proper function and export it instead of exporting internal implementation details to modules, for obvious reasons. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 05:27:17 +08:00
/*
* A variant of panic() called from NMI context. We return if we've already
* panicked on this CPU. If another CPU already panicked, loop in
* nmi_panic_self_stop() which can provide architecture dependent code such
* as saving register state for crash dump.
*/
void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg)
{
int old_cpu, cpu;
cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
old_cpu = atomic_cmpxchg(&panic_cpu, PANIC_CPU_INVALID, cpu);
if (old_cpu == PANIC_CPU_INVALID)
panic("%s", msg);
else if (old_cpu != cpu)
nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
/**
* panic - halt the system
* @fmt: The text string to print
*
* Display a message, then perform cleanups.
*
* This function never returns.
*/
void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
{
static char buf[1024];
va_list args;
long i, i_next = 0;
int state = 0;
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
int old_cpu, this_cpu;
bool _crash_kexec_post_notifiers = crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
/*
* Disable local interrupts. This will prevent panic_smp_self_stop
* from deadlocking the first cpu that invokes the panic, since
* there is nothing to prevent an interrupt handler (that runs
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
* after setting panic_cpu) from invoking panic() again.
*/
local_irq_disable();
/*
* It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and
* not have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want
* preempt to be disabled. No point enabling it later though...
*
* Only one CPU is allowed to execute the panic code from here. For
* multiple parallel invocations of panic, all other CPUs either
* stop themself or will wait until they are stopped by the 1st CPU
* with smp_send_stop().
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
*
* `old_cpu == PANIC_CPU_INVALID' means this is the 1st CPU which
* comes here, so go ahead.
* `old_cpu == this_cpu' means we came from nmi_panic() which sets
* panic_cpu to this CPU. In this case, this is also the 1st CPU.
*/
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
this_cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
old_cpu = atomic_cmpxchg(&panic_cpu, PANIC_CPU_INVALID, this_cpu);
if (old_cpu != PANIC_CPU_INVALID && old_cpu != this_cpu)
panic_smp_self_stop();
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
pr_emerg("Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n", buf);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
/*
* Avoid nested stack-dumping if a panic occurs during oops processing
*/
if (!test_taint(TAINT_DIE) && oops_in_progress <= 1)
dump_stack();
#endif
/*
* If we have crashed and we have a crash kernel loaded let it handle
* everything else.
* If we want to run this after calling panic_notifiers, pass
* the "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option to the kernel.
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
*
* Bypass the panic_cpu check and call __crash_kexec directly.
*/
if (!_crash_kexec_post_notifiers) {
printk/nmi: flush NMI messages on the system panic In NMI context, printk() messages are stored into per-CPU buffers to avoid a possible deadlock. They are normally flushed to the main ring buffer via an IRQ work. But the work is never called when the system calls panic() in the very same NMI handler. This patch tries to flush NMI buffers before the crash dump is generated. In this case it does not risk a double release and bails out when the logbuf_lock is already taken. The aim is to get the messages into the main ring buffer when possible. It makes them better accessible in the vmcore. Then the patch tries to flush the buffers second time when other CPUs are down. It might be more aggressive and reset logbuf_lock. The aim is to get the messages available for the consequent kmsg_dump() and console_flush_on_panic() calls. The patch causes vprintk_emit() to be called even in NMI context again. But it is done via printk_deferred() so that the console handling is skipped. Consoles use internal locks and we could not prevent a deadlock easily. They are explicitly called later when the crash dump is not generated, see console_flush_on_panic(). Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 08:00:42 +08:00
printk_nmi_flush_on_panic();
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
__crash_kexec(NULL);
x86/panic: replace smp_send_stop() with kdump friendly version in panic path Daniel Walker reported problems which happens when crash_kexec_post_notifiers kernel option is enabled (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/24/44). In that case, smp_send_stop() is called before entering kdump routines which assume other CPUs are still online. As the result, for x86, kdump routines fail to save other CPUs' registers and disable virtualization extensions. To fix this problem, call a new kdump friendly function, crash_smp_send_stop(), instead of the smp_send_stop() when crash_kexec_post_notifiers is enabled. crash_smp_send_stop() is a weak function, and it just call smp_send_stop(). Architecture codes should override it so that kdump can work appropriately. This patch only provides x86-specific version. For Xen's PV kernel, just keep the current behavior. NOTES: - Right solution would be to place crash_smp_send_stop() before __crash_kexec() invocation in all cases and remove smp_send_stop(), but we can't do that until all architectures implement own crash_smp_send_stop() - crash_smp_send_stop()-like work is still needed by machine_crash_shutdown() because crash_kexec() can be called without entering panic() Fixes: f06e5153f4ae (kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160810080948.11028.15344.stgit@sysi4-13.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Reported-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xpang@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Cc: "Steven J. Hill" <steven.hill@cavium.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-12 04:54:23 +08:00
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a
* panic situation.
*/
smp_send_stop();
} else {
/*
* If we want to do crash dump after notifier calls and
* kmsg_dump, we will need architecture dependent extra
* works in addition to stopping other CPUs.
*/
crash_smp_send_stop();
}
/*
* Run any panic handlers, including those that might need to
* add information to the kmsg dump output.
*/
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 17:16:30 +08:00
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&panic_notifier_list, 0, buf);
printk/nmi: flush NMI messages on the system panic In NMI context, printk() messages are stored into per-CPU buffers to avoid a possible deadlock. They are normally flushed to the main ring buffer via an IRQ work. But the work is never called when the system calls panic() in the very same NMI handler. This patch tries to flush NMI buffers before the crash dump is generated. In this case it does not risk a double release and bails out when the logbuf_lock is already taken. The aim is to get the messages into the main ring buffer when possible. It makes them better accessible in the vmcore. Then the patch tries to flush the buffers second time when other CPUs are down. It might be more aggressive and reset logbuf_lock. The aim is to get the messages available for the consequent kmsg_dump() and console_flush_on_panic() calls. The patch causes vprintk_emit() to be called even in NMI context again. But it is done via printk_deferred() so that the console handling is skipped. Consoles use internal locks and we could not prevent a deadlock easily. They are explicitly called later when the crash dump is not generated, see console_flush_on_panic(). Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 08:00:42 +08:00
/* Call flush even twice. It tries harder with a single online CPU */
printk_nmi_flush_on_panic();
kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_PANIC);
/*
* If you doubt kdump always works fine in any situation,
* "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" offers you a chance to run
* panic_notifiers and dumping kmsg before kdump.
* Note: since some panic_notifiers can make crashed kernel
* more unstable, it can increase risks of the kdump failure too.
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
*
* Bypass the panic_cpu check and call __crash_kexec directly.
*/
if (_crash_kexec_post_notifiers)
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
__crash_kexec(NULL);
bust_spinlocks(0);
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
/*
* We may have ended up stopping the CPU holding the lock (in
* smp_send_stop()) while still having some valuable data in the console
* buffer. Try to acquire the lock then release it regardless of the
* result. The release will also print the buffers out. Locks debug
* should be disabled to avoid reporting bad unlock balance when
* panic() is not being callled from OOPS.
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
*/
debug_locks_off();
printk: do cond_resched() between lines while outputting to consoles @console_may_schedule tracks whether console_sem was acquired through lock or trylock. If the former, we're inside a sleepable context and console_conditional_schedule() performs cond_resched(). This allows console drivers which use console_lock for synchronization to yield while performing time-consuming operations such as scrolling. However, the actual console outputting is performed while holding irq-safe logbuf_lock, so console_unlock() clears @console_may_schedule before starting outputting lines. Also, only a few drivers call console_conditional_schedule() to begin with. This means that when a lot of lines need to be output by console_unlock(), for example on a console registration, the task doing console_unlock() may not yield for a long time on a non-preemptible kernel. If this happens with a slow console devices, for example a serial console, the outputting task may occupy the cpu for a very long time. Long enough to trigger softlockup and/or RCU stall warnings, which in turn pile more messages, sometimes enough to trigger the next cycle of warnings incapacitating the system. Fix it by making console_unlock() insert cond_resched() between lines if @console_may_schedule. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-16 08:58:24 +08:00
console_flush_on_panic();
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
if (!panic_blink)
panic_blink = no_blink;
if (panic_timeout > 0) {
/*
* Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine.
* We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked.
*/
pr_emerg("Rebooting in %d seconds..\n", panic_timeout);
for (i = 0; i < panic_timeout * 1000; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
if (i >= i_next) {
i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
}
mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
}
}
if (panic_timeout != 0) {
/*
* This will not be a clean reboot, with everything
* shutting down. But if there is a chance of
* rebooting the system it will be rebooted.
*/
emergency_restart();
}
#ifdef __sparc__
{
extern int stop_a_enabled;
/* Make sure the user can actually press Stop-A (L1-A) */
stop_a_enabled = 1;
pr_emerg("Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom\n");
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_S390)
{
unsigned long caller;
caller = (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0);
disabled_wait(caller);
}
#endif
pr_emerg("---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n", buf);
local_irq_enable();
for (i = 0; ; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
touch_softlockup_watchdog();
if (i >= i_next) {
i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
}
mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-09-21 19:47:22 +08:00
/*
* TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD could be a per-module flag but the module
* is being removed anyway.
*/
const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
{ 'P', 'G', true }, /* TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE */
{ 'F', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_FORCED_MODULE */
{ 'S', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC */
{ 'R', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD */
{ 'M', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK */
{ 'B', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_BAD_PAGE */
{ 'U', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_USER */
{ 'D', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_DIE */
{ 'A', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE */
{ 'W', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_WARN */
{ 'C', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_CRAP */
{ 'I', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND */
{ 'O', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_OOT_MODULE */
{ 'E', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE */
{ 'L', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP */
{ 'K', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_LIVEPATCH */
};
/**
* print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
*
* 'P' - Proprietary module has been loaded.
* 'F' - Module has been forcibly loaded.
* 'S' - SMP with CPUs not designed for SMP.
* 'R' - User forced a module unload.
* 'M' - System experienced a machine check exception.
* 'B' - System has hit bad_page.
* 'U' - Userspace-defined naughtiness.
* 'D' - Kernel has oopsed before
* 'A' - ACPI table overridden.
* 'W' - Taint on warning.
* 'C' - modules from drivers/staging are loaded.
* 'I' - Working around severe firmware bug.
* 'O' - Out-of-tree module has been loaded.
* 'E' - Unsigned module has been loaded.
* 'L' - A soft lockup has previously occurred.
* 'K' - Kernel has been live patched.
*
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted().
*/
const char *print_tainted(void)
{
taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-09-21 19:47:22 +08:00
static char buf[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT + sizeof("Tainted: ")];
if (tainted_mask) {
char *s;
int i;
s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: ");
taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-09-21 19:47:22 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) {
const struct taint_flag *t = &taint_flags[i];
*s++ = test_bit(i, &tainted_mask) ?
t->c_true : t->c_false;
}
*s = 0;
} else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted");
return buf;
}
int test_taint(unsigned flag)
{
return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
unsigned long get_taint(void)
{
return tainted_mask;
}
/**
* add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set.
* @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants.
* @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK.
*
* If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for
* some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true.
*/
void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off())
pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
static void spin_msec(int msecs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < msecs; i++) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
mdelay(1);
}
}
/*
* It just happens that oops_enter() and oops_exit() are identically
* implemented...
*/
static void do_oops_enter_exit(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
static int spin_counter;
if (!pause_on_oops)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
if (pause_on_oops_flag == 0) {
/* This CPU may now print the oops message */
pause_on_oops_flag = 1;
} else {
/* We need to stall this CPU */
if (!spin_counter) {
/* This CPU gets to do the counting */
spin_counter = pause_on_oops;
do {
spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
spin_msec(MSEC_PER_SEC);
spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
} while (--spin_counter);
pause_on_oops_flag = 0;
} else {
/* This CPU waits for a different one */
while (spin_counter) {
spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
spin_msec(1);
spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
}
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
}
/*
* Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info.
* This is a bit racy..
*/
int oops_may_print(void)
{
return pause_on_oops_flag == 0;
}
/*
* Called when the architecture enters its oops handler, before it prints
* anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first
* time then let it proceed.
*
* This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all
* this to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the
* side-effect of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display,
* too.
*
* It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for
* the right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long:
* once in oops_enter(), once in oops_exit().
*/
void oops_enter(void)
{
tracing_off();
/* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */
debug_locks_off();
do_oops_enter_exit();
}
debug: add end-of-oops marker Right now it's nearly impossible for parsers that collect kernel crashes from logs or emails (such as www.kerneloops.org) to detect the end-of-oops condition. In addition, it's not currently possible to detect whether or not 2 oopses that look alike are actually the same oops reported twice, or are truly two unique oopses. This patch adds an end-of-oops marker, and makes the end marker include a very simple 64-bit random ID to be able to detect duplicate reports. Normally, this ID is calculated as a late_initcall() (in the hope that at that time there is enough entropy to get a unique enough ID); however for early oopses the oops_exit() function needs to generate the ID on the fly. We do this all at the _end_ of an oops printout, so this does not impact our ability to get the most important portions of a crash out to the console first. [ Sidenote: the already existing oopses-since-bootup counter we print during crashes serves as the differentiator between multiple oopses that trigger during the same bootup. ] Tested on 32-bit and 64-bit x86. Artificially injected very early crashes as well, as expected they result in this constant ID after multiple bootups: ---[ end trace ca143223eefdc828 ]--- ---[ end trace ca143223eefdc828 ]--- because the random pools are still all zero. But it all still works fine and causes no additional problems (which is the main goal of instrumentation code). Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2007-12-20 22:01:17 +08:00
/*
* 64-bit random ID for oopses:
*/
static u64 oops_id;
static int init_oops_id(void)
{
if (!oops_id)
get_random_bytes(&oops_id, sizeof(oops_id));
else
oops_id++;
debug: add end-of-oops marker Right now it's nearly impossible for parsers that collect kernel crashes from logs or emails (such as www.kerneloops.org) to detect the end-of-oops condition. In addition, it's not currently possible to detect whether or not 2 oopses that look alike are actually the same oops reported twice, or are truly two unique oopses. This patch adds an end-of-oops marker, and makes the end marker include a very simple 64-bit random ID to be able to detect duplicate reports. Normally, this ID is calculated as a late_initcall() (in the hope that at that time there is enough entropy to get a unique enough ID); however for early oopses the oops_exit() function needs to generate the ID on the fly. We do this all at the _end_ of an oops printout, so this does not impact our ability to get the most important portions of a crash out to the console first. [ Sidenote: the already existing oopses-since-bootup counter we print during crashes serves as the differentiator between multiple oopses that trigger during the same bootup. ] Tested on 32-bit and 64-bit x86. Artificially injected very early crashes as well, as expected they result in this constant ID after multiple bootups: ---[ end trace ca143223eefdc828 ]--- ---[ end trace ca143223eefdc828 ]--- because the random pools are still all zero. But it all still works fine and causes no additional problems (which is the main goal of instrumentation code). Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2007-12-20 22:01:17 +08:00
return 0;
}
late_initcall(init_oops_id);
void print_oops_end_marker(void)
{
init_oops_id();
pr_warn("---[ end trace %016llx ]---\n", (unsigned long long)oops_id);
}
/*
* Called when the architecture exits its oops handler, after printing
* everything.
*/
void oops_exit(void)
{
do_oops_enter_exit();
print_oops_end_marker();
kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_OOPS);
}
struct warn_args {
const char *fmt;
va_list args;
};
void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
struct pt_regs *regs, struct warn_args *args)
{
disable_trace_on_warning();
pr_warn("------------[ cut here ]------------\n");
if (file)
pr_warn("WARNING: CPU: %d PID: %d at %s:%d %pS\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(), current->pid, file, line,
caller);
else
pr_warn("WARNING: CPU: %d PID: %d at %pS\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(), current->pid, caller);
if (args)
vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:50 +08:00
if (panic_on_warn) {
/*
* This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
* Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
* system on this thread. Other threads are blocked by the
* panic_mutex in panic().
*/
panic_on_warn = 0;
panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
}
print_modules();
if (regs)
show_regs(regs);
else
dump_stack();
print_oops_end_marker();
/* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
#ifdef WANT_WARN_ON_SLOWPATH
void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct warn_args args;
args.fmt = fmt;
va_start(args.args, fmt);
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), TAINT_WARN, NULL,
&args);
va_end(args.args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt);
void warn_slowpath_fmt_taint(const char *file, int line,
unsigned taint, const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct warn_args args;
args.fmt = fmt;
va_start(args.args, fmt);
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), taint, NULL, &args);
va_end(args.args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt_taint);
void warn_slowpath_null(const char *file, int line)
{
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), TAINT_WARN, NULL, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_null);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
/*
* Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and
* gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value
*/
__visible void __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %p\n",
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
#endif
core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:50 +08:00
core_param(panic_on_warn, panic_on_warn, int, 0644);
core_param(crash_kexec_post_notifiers, crash_kexec_post_notifiers, bool, 0644);
static int __init oops_setup(char *s)
{
if (!s)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(s, "panic"))
panic_on_oops = 1;
return 0;
}
early_param("oops", oops_setup);