linux/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (C) 2000-2001 Qualcomm Incorporated
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
#ifndef __BLUETOOTH_H
#define __BLUETOOTH_H
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#ifndef AF_BLUETOOTH
#define AF_BLUETOOTH 31
#define PF_BLUETOOTH AF_BLUETOOTH
#endif
/* Bluetooth versions */
#define BLUETOOTH_VER_1_1 1
#define BLUETOOTH_VER_1_2 2
#define BLUETOOTH_VER_2_0 3
/* Reserv for core and drivers use */
#define BT_SKB_RESERVE 8
#define BTPROTO_L2CAP 0
#define BTPROTO_HCI 1
#define BTPROTO_SCO 2
#define BTPROTO_RFCOMM 3
#define BTPROTO_BNEP 4
#define BTPROTO_CMTP 5
#define BTPROTO_HIDP 6
#define BTPROTO_AVDTP 7
#define SOL_HCI 0
#define SOL_L2CAP 6
#define SOL_SCO 17
#define SOL_RFCOMM 18
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
#define BT_SECURITY 4
struct bt_security {
__u8 level;
__u8 key_size;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
};
#define BT_SECURITY_SDP 0
#define BT_SECURITY_LOW 1
#define BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM 2
#define BT_SECURITY_HIGH 3
#define BT_SECURITY_FIPS 4
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
#define BT_DEFER_SETUP 7
Bluetooth: Use non-flushable by default L2CAP data packets Modification of Nick Pelly <npelly@google.com> patch. With Bluetooth 2.1 ACL packets can be flushable or non-flushable. This commit makes ACL data packets non-flushable by default on compatible chipsets, and adds the BT_FLUSHABLE socket option to explicitly request flushable ACL data packets for a given L2CAP socket. This is useful for A2DP data which can be safely discarded if it can not be delivered within a short time (while other ACL data should not be discarded). Note that making ACL data flushable has no effect unless the automatic flush timeout for that ACL link is changed from its default of 0 (infinite). Default packet types (for compatible chipsets): Frame 34: 13 bytes on wire (104 bits), 13 bytes captured (104 bits) Bluetooth HCI H4 Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet .... 0000 0000 0010 = Connection Handle: 0x0002 ..00 .... .... .... = PB Flag: First Non-automatically Flushable Packet (0) 00.. .... .... .... = BC Flag: Point-To-Point (0) Data Total Length: 8 Bluetooth L2CAP Packet After setting BT_FLUSHABLE (sock.setsockopt(274 /*SOL_BLUETOOTH*/, 8 /* BT_FLUSHABLE */, 1 /* flush */)) Frame 34: 13 bytes on wire (104 bits), 13 bytes captured (104 bits) Bluetooth HCI H4 Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet .... 0000 0000 0010 = Connection Handle: 0x0002 ..10 .... .... .... = PB Flag: First Automatically Flushable Packet (2) 00.. .... .... .... = BC Flag: Point-To-Point (0) Data Total Length: 8 Bluetooth L2CAP Packet Signed-off-by: Andrei Emeltchenko <andrei.emeltchenko@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
2011-01-03 17:14:36 +08:00
#define BT_FLUSHABLE 8
#define BT_FLUSHABLE_OFF 0
#define BT_FLUSHABLE_ON 1
#define BT_POWER 9
struct bt_power {
__u8 force_active;
};
#define BT_POWER_FORCE_ACTIVE_OFF 0
#define BT_POWER_FORCE_ACTIVE_ON 1
#define BT_CHANNEL_POLICY 10
/* BR/EDR only (default policy)
* AMP controllers cannot be used.
* Channel move requests from the remote device are denied.
* If the L2CAP channel is currently using AMP, move the channel to BR/EDR.
*/
#define BT_CHANNEL_POLICY_BREDR_ONLY 0
/* BR/EDR Preferred
* Allow use of AMP controllers.
* If the L2CAP channel is currently on AMP, move it to BR/EDR.
* Channel move requests from the remote device are allowed.
*/
#define BT_CHANNEL_POLICY_BREDR_PREFERRED 1
/* AMP Preferred
* Allow use of AMP controllers
* If the L2CAP channel is currently on BR/EDR and AMP controller
* resources are available, initiate a channel move to AMP.
* Channel move requests from the remote device are allowed.
* If the L2CAP socket has not been connected yet, try to create
* and configure the channel directly on an AMP controller rather
* than BR/EDR.
*/
#define BT_CHANNEL_POLICY_AMP_PREFERRED 2
#define BT_VOICE 11
struct bt_voice {
__u16 setting;
};
#define BT_VOICE_TRANSPARENT 0x0003
#define BT_VOICE_CVSD_16BIT 0x0060
#define BT_SNDMTU 12
#define BT_RCVMTU 13
__printf(1, 2)
void bt_info(const char *fmt, ...);
__printf(1, 2)
void bt_err(const char *fmt, ...);
#define BT_INFO(fmt, ...) bt_info(fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define BT_ERR(fmt, ...) bt_err(fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define BT_DBG(fmt, ...) pr_debug(fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define bt_dev_info(hdev, fmt, ...) \
BT_INFO("%s: " fmt, (hdev)->name, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define bt_dev_err(hdev, fmt, ...) \
BT_ERR("%s: " fmt, (hdev)->name, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define bt_dev_dbg(hdev, fmt, ...) \
BT_DBG("%s: " fmt, (hdev)->name, ##__VA_ARGS__)
/* Connection and socket states */
enum {
BT_CONNECTED = 1, /* Equal to TCP_ESTABLISHED to make net code happy */
BT_OPEN,
BT_BOUND,
BT_LISTEN,
BT_CONNECT,
BT_CONNECT2,
BT_CONFIG,
BT_DISCONN,
BT_CLOSED
};
/* If unused will be removed by compiler */
static inline const char *state_to_string(int state)
{
switch (state) {
case BT_CONNECTED:
return "BT_CONNECTED";
case BT_OPEN:
return "BT_OPEN";
case BT_BOUND:
return "BT_BOUND";
case BT_LISTEN:
return "BT_LISTEN";
case BT_CONNECT:
return "BT_CONNECT";
case BT_CONNECT2:
return "BT_CONNECT2";
case BT_CONFIG:
return "BT_CONFIG";
case BT_DISCONN:
return "BT_DISCONN";
case BT_CLOSED:
return "BT_CLOSED";
}
return "invalid state";
}
/* BD Address */
typedef struct {
__u8 b[6];
} __packed bdaddr_t;
/* BD Address type */
#define BDADDR_BREDR 0x00
#define BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC 0x01
#define BDADDR_LE_RANDOM 0x02
static inline bool bdaddr_type_is_valid(__u8 type)
{
switch (type) {
case BDADDR_BREDR:
case BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC:
case BDADDR_LE_RANDOM:
return true;
}
return false;
}
static inline bool bdaddr_type_is_le(__u8 type)
{
switch (type) {
case BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC:
case BDADDR_LE_RANDOM:
return true;
}
return false;
}
#define BDADDR_ANY (&(bdaddr_t) {{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}})
#define BDADDR_NONE (&(bdaddr_t) {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}})
/* Copy, swap, convert BD Address */
static inline int bacmp(const bdaddr_t *ba1, const bdaddr_t *ba2)
{
return memcmp(ba1, ba2, sizeof(bdaddr_t));
}
static inline void bacpy(bdaddr_t *dst, const bdaddr_t *src)
{
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(bdaddr_t));
}
void baswap(bdaddr_t *dst, bdaddr_t *src);
/* Common socket structures and functions */
#define bt_sk(__sk) ((struct bt_sock *) __sk)
struct bt_sock {
struct sock sk;
struct list_head accept_q;
struct sock *parent;
unsigned long flags;
void (*skb_msg_name)(struct sk_buff *, void *, int *);
};
enum {
BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP,
BT_SK_SUSPEND,
};
struct bt_sock_list {
struct hlist_head head;
rwlock_t lock;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
int (* custom_seq_show)(struct seq_file *, void *);
#endif
};
int bt_sock_register(int proto, const struct net_proto_family *ops);
void bt_sock_unregister(int proto);
void bt_sock_link(struct bt_sock_list *l, struct sock *s);
void bt_sock_unlink(struct bt_sock_list *l, struct sock *s);
int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags);
int bt_sock_stream_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int flags);
uint bt_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait);
int bt_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
int bt_sock_wait_state(struct sock *sk, int state, unsigned long timeo);
int bt_sock_wait_ready(struct sock *sk, unsigned long flags);
void bt_accept_enqueue(struct sock *parent, struct sock *sk);
void bt_accept_unlink(struct sock *sk);
struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock);
/* Skb helpers */
struct l2cap_ctrl {
__u8 sframe:1,
poll:1,
final:1,
fcs:1,
sar:2,
super:2;
__u16 reqseq;
__u16 txseq;
__u8 retries;
__le16 psm;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
};
struct hci_dev;
typedef void (*hci_req_complete_t)(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, u16 opcode);
typedef void (*hci_req_complete_skb_t)(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status,
u16 opcode, struct sk_buff *skb);
struct req_ctrl {
bool start;
u8 event;
hci_req_complete_t complete;
hci_req_complete_skb_t complete_skb;
};
struct bt_skb_cb {
__u8 pkt_type;
__u8 force_active;
__u16 opcode;
__u16 expect;
__u8 incoming:1;
union {
struct l2cap_ctrl l2cap;
struct req_ctrl req;
};
};
#define bt_cb(skb) ((struct bt_skb_cb *)((skb)->cb))
static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_alloc(unsigned int len, gfp_t how)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = alloc_skb(len + BT_SKB_RESERVE, how);
if (skb) {
skb_reserve(skb, BT_SKB_RESERVE);
bt_cb(skb)->incoming = 0;
}
return skb;
}
static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_send_alloc(struct sock *sk,
unsigned long len, int nb, int *err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, len + BT_SKB_RESERVE, nb, err);
if (skb) {
skb_reserve(skb, BT_SKB_RESERVE);
bt_cb(skb)->incoming = 0;
}
if (!skb && *err)
return NULL;
*err = sock_error(sk);
if (*err)
goto out;
if (sk->sk_shutdown) {
*err = -ECONNRESET;
goto out;
}
return skb;
out:
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
}
int bt_to_errno(__u16 code);
void hci_sock_set_flag(struct sock *sk, int nr);
void hci_sock_clear_flag(struct sock *sk, int nr);
int hci_sock_test_flag(struct sock *sk, int nr);
unsigned short hci_sock_get_channel(struct sock *sk);
int hci_sock_init(void);
void hci_sock_cleanup(void);
int bt_sysfs_init(void);
void bt_sysfs_cleanup(void);
int bt_procfs_init(struct net *net, const char *name,
struct bt_sock_list *sk_list,
int (*seq_show)(struct seq_file *, void *));
void bt_procfs_cleanup(struct net *net, const char *name);
extern struct dentry *bt_debugfs;
int l2cap_init(void);
void l2cap_exit(void);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_BREDR)
int sco_init(void);
void sco_exit(void);
#else
static inline int sco_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void sco_exit(void)
{
}
#endif
int mgmt_init(void);
void mgmt_exit(void);
Bluetooth: silence lockdep warning Since bluetooth uses multiple protocols types, to avoid lockdep warnings, we need to use different lockdep classes (one for each protocol type). This is already done in bt_sock_create but it misses a couple of cases when new connections are created. This patch corrects that to fix the following warning: <4>[ 1864.732366] ======================================================= <4>[ 1864.733030] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] <4>[ 1864.733544] 3.0.16-mid3-00007-gc9a0f62 #3 <4>[ 1864.733883] ------------------------------------------------------- <4>[ 1864.734408] t.android.btclc/4204 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 1864.734869] (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.735541] <4>[ 1864.735549] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 1864.736045] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}, at: [<c1498bf7>] lock_sock+0xa/0xc <4>[ 1864.736732] <4>[ 1864.736740] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 1864.736750] <4>[ 1864.737428] <4>[ 1864.737437] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 1864.738016] <4>[ 1864.738023] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.738549] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.738977] [<c13d35c1>] lock_sock_nested+0x58/0x68 <4>[ 1864.739411] [<c1493c33>] l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x3e/0x76 <4>[ 1864.739858] [<c13d06c3>] __sock_sendmsg+0x50/0x59 <4>[ 1864.740279] [<c13d0ea2>] sock_sendmsg+0x94/0xa8 <4>[ 1864.740687] [<c13d0ede>] kernel_sendmsg+0x28/0x37 <4>[ 1864.741106] [<c14969ca>] rfcomm_send_frame+0x30/0x38 <4>[ 1864.741542] [<c1496a2a>] rfcomm_send_ua+0x58/0x5a <4>[ 1864.741959] [<c1498447>] rfcomm_run+0x441/0xb52 <4>[ 1864.742365] [<c104f095>] kthread+0x63/0x68 <4>[ 1864.742742] [<c14d5182>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0xd <4>[ 1864.743187] <4>[ 1864.743193] -> #0 (rfcomm_mutex){+.+.+.}: <4>[ 1864.743667] [<c1061ada>] __lock_acquire+0x988/0xc00 <4>[ 1864.744100] [<c1062273>] lock_acquire+0x104/0x140 <4>[ 1864.744519] [<c14d2c70>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3b/0x33f <4>[ 1864.744975] [<c14d303e>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2d/0x36 <4>[ 1864.745412] [<c14970ea>] rfcomm_dlc_close+0x15/0x30 <4>[ 1864.745842] [<c14990d9>] __rfcomm_sock_close+0x5f/0x6b <4>[ 1864.746288] [<c1499114>] rfcomm_sock_shutdown+0x2f/0x62 <4>[ 1864.746737] [<c13d275d>] sys_socketcall+0x1db/0x422 <4>[ 1864.747165] [<c14d42f0>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-22 06:28:34 +08:00
void bt_sock_reclassify_lock(struct sock *sk, int proto);
#endif /* __BLUETOOTH_H */