linux/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c

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/* SCTP kernel implementation
* (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2004
* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Intel Corp.
*
* This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation
*
* These functions work with the state functions in sctp_sm_statefuns.c
* to implement the state operations. These functions implement the
* steps which require modifying existing data structures.
*
* This SCTP implementation is free software;
* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
* This SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
* will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
* ************************
* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
* See the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
* email address(es):
* lksctp developers <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org>
*
* Written or modified by:
* La Monte H.P. Yarroll <piggy@acm.org>
* Karl Knutson <karl@athena.chicago.il.us>
* C. Robin <chris@hundredacre.ac.uk>
* Jon Grimm <jgrimm@us.ibm.com>
* Xingang Guo <xingang.guo@intel.com>
* Dajiang Zhang <dajiang.zhang@nokia.com>
* Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
* Daisy Chang <daisyc@us.ibm.com>
* Ardelle Fan <ardelle.fan@intel.com>
* Kevin Gao <kevin.gao@intel.com>
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/random.h> /* for get_random_bytes */
#include <net/sctp/sctp.h>
#include <net/sctp/sm.h>
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_control(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 type, __u8 flags, int paylen,
gfp_t gfp);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 flags, int paylen, gfp_t gfp);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 type, __u8 flags, int paylen,
gfp_t gfp);
static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *init_chunk,
int *cookie_len,
const __u8 *raw_addrs, int addrs_len);
static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp);
static void *sctp_addto_param(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len,
const void *data);
static void *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *, int len,
const void *data);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
/* Control chunk destructor */
static void sctp_control_release_owner(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/*TODO: do memory release */
}
static void sctp_control_set_owner_w(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = chunk->asoc;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
/* TODO: properly account for control chunks.
* To do it right we'll need:
* 1) endpoint if association isn't known.
* 2) proper memory accounting.
*
* For now don't do anything for now.
*/
skb->sk = asoc ? asoc->base.sk : NULL;
skb->destructor = sctp_control_release_owner;
}
/* What was the inbound interface for this chunk? */
int sctp_chunk_iif(const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
return SCTP_INPUT_CB(skb)->af->skb_iif(skb);
}
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 2: The ECN capable field is reserved for future use of
* Explicit Congestion Notification.
*/
static const struct sctp_paramhdr ecap_param = {
SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE,
cpu_to_be16(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
};
static const struct sctp_paramhdr prsctp_param = {
SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT,
cpu_to_be16(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
};
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
/* A helper to initialize an op error inside a
* provided chunk, as most cause codes will be embedded inside an
* abort chunk.
*/
void sctp_init_cause(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code,
size_t paylen)
{
sctp_errhdr_t err;
__u16 len;
/* Cause code constants are now defined in network order. */
err.cause = cause_code;
len = sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen;
err.length = htons(len);
chunk->subh.err_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t), &err);
}
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
/* A helper to initialize an op error inside a
* provided chunk, as most cause codes will be embedded inside an
* abort chunk. Differs from sctp_init_cause in that it won't oops
* if there isn't enough space in the op error chunk
*/
static int sctp_init_cause_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code,
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
size_t paylen)
{
sctp_errhdr_t err;
__u16 len;
/* Cause code constants are now defined in network order. */
err.cause = cause_code;
len = sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen;
err.length = htons(len);
if (skb_tailroom(chunk->skb) < len)
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
return -ENOSPC;
chunk->subh.err_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(chunk,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t),
&err);
return 0;
}
/* 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* This chunk is used to initiate a SCTP association between two
* endpoints. The format of the INIT chunk is shown below:
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 1 | Chunk Flags | Chunk Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Initiate Tag |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Advertised Receiver Window Credit (a_rwnd) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of Outbound Streams | Number of Inbound Streams |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Initial TSN |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* \ \
* / Optional/Variable-Length Parameters /
* \ \
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*
* The INIT chunk contains the following parameters. Unless otherwise
* noted, each parameter MUST only be included once in the INIT chunk.
*
* Fixed Parameters Status
* ----------------------------------------------
* Initiate Tag Mandatory
* Advertised Receiver Window Credit Mandatory
* Number of Outbound Streams Mandatory
* Number of Inbound Streams Mandatory
* Initial TSN Mandatory
*
* Variable Parameters Status Type Value
* -------------------------------------------------------------
* IPv4 Address (Note 1) Optional 5
* IPv6 Address (Note 1) Optional 6
* Cookie Preservative Optional 9
* Reserved for ECN Capable (Note 2) Optional 32768 (0x8000)
* Host Name Address (Note 3) Optional 11
* Supported Address Types (Note 4) Optional 12
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_bind_addr *bp,
gfp_t gfp, int vparam_len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
struct sctp_inithdr init;
union sctp_params addrs;
size_t chunksize;
struct sctp_chunk *retval = NULL;
int num_types, addrs_len = 0;
struct sctp_sock *sp;
sctp_supported_addrs_param_t sat;
__be16 types[2];
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
int num_ext = 0;
__u8 extensions[3];
struct sctp_paramhdr *auth_chunks = NULL,
*auth_hmacs = NULL;
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 1: The INIT chunks can contain multiple addresses that
* can be IPv4 and/or IPv6 in any combination.
*/
retval = NULL;
/* Convert the provided bind address list to raw format. */
addrs = sctp_bind_addrs_to_raw(bp, &addrs_len, gfp);
init.init_tag = htonl(asoc->c.my_vtag);
init.a_rwnd = htonl(asoc->rwnd);
init.num_outbound_streams = htons(asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams);
init.num_inbound_streams = htons(asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams);
init.initial_tsn = htonl(asoc->c.initial_tsn);
/* How many address types are needed? */
sp = sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk);
num_types = sp->pf->supported_addrs(sp, types);
sctp: fix to calc the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length correctly is set When calculating the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length, we should not only account the length of parameters, but also the parameters zero padding length, such as AUTH HMACS parameter and CHUNKS parameter. Without the parameters zero padding length we may get following oops. skb_over_panic: text:ce2068d2 len:130 put:6 head:cac3fe00 data:cac3fe00 tail:0xcac3fe82 end:0xcac3fe80 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:127! invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/module/aes_generic/initstate Modules linked in: authenc ...... Pid: 4102, comm: sctp_darn Tainted: G D 2.6.34-rc2 #6 EIP: 0060:[<c0607630>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0 EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e EAX: 00000078 EBX: c07c024b ECX: c07c02b9 EDX: cb607b78 ESI: 00000000 EDI: cac3fe7a EBP: 00000002 ESP: cb607b74 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sctp_darn (pid: 4102, ti=cb607000 task=cabdc990 task.ti=cb607000) Stack: c07c02b9 ce2068d2 00000082 00000006 cac3fe00 cac3fe00 cac3fe82 cac3fe80 <0> c07c024b cac3fe7c cac3fe7a c0608dec ca986e80 ce2068d2 00000006 0000007a <0> cb8120ca ca986e80 cb812000 00000003 cb8120c4 ce208a25 cb8120ca cadd9400 Call Trace: [<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp] [<c0608dec>] ? skb_put+0x2e/0x32 [<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp] [<ce208a25>] ? sctp_make_init+0x279/0x28c [sctp] [<c0686a92>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30 [<ce1fdc0b>] ? sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc+0x2b/0x7b [sctp] [<ce202823>] ? sctp_do_sm+0xa0/0x14a [sctp] [<ce2133b9>] ? sctp_pname+0x0/0x14 [sctp] [<ce211d72>] ? sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x2b/0x31 [sctp] [<ce20f3cf>] ? sctp_sendmsg+0x7a0/0x9eb [sctp] [<c064eb1e>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x3b/0x43 [<c04244b7>] ? task_tick_fair+0x2d/0xd9 [<c06031e1>] ? sock_sendmsg+0xa7/0xc1 [<c0416afe>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x75 [<c0425123>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x34/0x19b [<c0446abb>] ? sched_clock_local+0x17/0x11e [<c052ea87>] ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x10c [<c060ab3a>] ? verify_iovec+0x3c/0x6a [<c06035ca>] ? sys_sendmsg+0x186/0x1e2 [<c042176b>] ? __wake_up_common+0x34/0x5b [<c04240c2>] ? __wake_up+0x2c/0x3b [<c057e35c>] ? tty_wakeup+0x43/0x47 [<c04430f2>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x16/0x24 [<c0580c94>] ? n_tty_read+0x5b8/0x65e [<c042be02>] ? default_wake_function+0x0/0x8 [<c0604e0e>] ? sys_socketcall+0x17f/0x1cd [<c040264c>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22 Code: 0f 45 de 53 ff b0 98 00 00 00 ff b0 94 ...... EIP: [<c0607630>] skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e SS:ESP 0068:cb607b74 To reproduce: # modprobe sctp # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable # sctp_test -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 800 -l # sctp_darn -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 900 -h 192.168.0.21 -p 800 -I -s -t sctp_darn ready to send... 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.0.21 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.1.21 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> snd=10 ------------------------------------------------------------------ eth0 has addresses: 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e and 192.168.0.21 eth1 has addresses: 192.168.1.21 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Reported-by: George Cheimonidis <gchimon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 16:47:21 +08:00
chunksize = sizeof(init) + addrs_len;
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types));
chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
if (asoc->prsctp_enable)
chunksize += sizeof(prsctp_param);
/* ADDIP: Section 4.2.7:
* An implementation supporting this extension [ADDIP] MUST list
* the ASCONF,the ASCONF-ACK, and the AUTH chunks in its INIT and
* INIT-ACK parameters.
*/
if (net->sctp.addip_enable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
extensions[num_ext+1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
num_ext += 2;
}
if (asoc->reconf_enable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_RECONF;
num_ext += 1;
}
if (sp->adaptation_ind)
chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
chunksize += vparam_len;
/* Account for AUTH related parameters */
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (ep->auth_enable) {
/* Add random parameter length*/
chunksize += sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random);
/* Add HMACS parameter length if any were defined */
auth_hmacs = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs;
if (auth_hmacs->length)
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length));
else
auth_hmacs = NULL;
/* Add CHUNKS parameter length */
auth_chunks = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
if (auth_chunks->length)
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_chunks->length));
else
auth_chunks = NULL;
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_AUTH;
num_ext += 1;
}
/* If we have any extensions to report, account for that */
if (num_ext)
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) +
num_ext);
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 3: An INIT chunk MUST NOT contain more than one Host
* Name address parameter. Moreover, the sender of the INIT
* MUST NOT combine any other address types with the Host Name
* address in the INIT. The receiver of INIT MUST ignore any
* other address types if the Host Name address parameter is
* present in the received INIT chunk.
*
* PLEASE DO NOT FIXME [This version does not support Host Name.]
*/
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_INIT, 0, chunksize, gfp);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.init_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(init), &init);
retval->param_hdr.v =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addrs_len, addrs.v);
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 4: This parameter, when present, specifies all the
* address types the sending endpoint can support. The absence
* of this parameter indicates that the sending endpoint can
* support any address type.
*/
sat.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES;
sat.param_hdr.length = htons(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types));
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sat), &sat);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, num_types * sizeof(__u16), &types);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
/* Add the supported extensions parameter. Be nice and add this
* fist before addiding the parameters for the extensions themselves
*/
if (num_ext) {
ext_param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT;
ext_param.param_hdr.length =
htons(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t),
&ext_param);
sctp_addto_param(retval, num_ext, extensions);
}
if (asoc->prsctp_enable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(prsctp_param), &prsctp_param);
if (sp->adaptation_ind) {
aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sp->adaptation_ind);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
}
/* Add SCTP-AUTH chunks to the parameter list */
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (ep->auth_enable) {
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random),
asoc->c.auth_random);
if (auth_hmacs)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_hmacs->length),
auth_hmacs);
if (auth_chunks)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_chunks->length),
auth_chunks);
}
nodata:
kfree(addrs.v);
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
gfp_t gfp, int unkparam_len)
{
struct sctp_inithdr initack;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
union sctp_params addrs;
struct sctp_sock *sp;
int addrs_len;
sctp_cookie_param_t *cookie;
int cookie_len;
size_t chunksize;
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
int num_ext = 0;
__u8 extensions[3];
struct sctp_paramhdr *auth_chunks = NULL,
*auth_hmacs = NULL,
*auth_random = NULL;
retval = NULL;
/* Note: there may be no addresses to embed. */
addrs = sctp_bind_addrs_to_raw(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &addrs_len, gfp);
initack.init_tag = htonl(asoc->c.my_vtag);
initack.a_rwnd = htonl(asoc->rwnd);
initack.num_outbound_streams = htons(asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams);
initack.num_inbound_streams = htons(asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams);
initack.initial_tsn = htonl(asoc->c.initial_tsn);
/* FIXME: We really ought to build the cookie right
* into the packet instead of allocating more fresh memory.
*/
cookie = sctp_pack_cookie(asoc->ep, asoc, chunk, &cookie_len,
addrs.v, addrs_len);
if (!cookie)
goto nomem_cookie;
/* Calculate the total size of allocation, include the reserved
* space for reporting unknown parameters if it is specified.
*/
sp = sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk);
chunksize = sizeof(initack) + addrs_len + cookie_len + unkparam_len;
/* Tell peer that we'll do ECN only if peer advertised such cap. */
if (asoc->peer.ecn_capable)
chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
if (asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
chunksize += sizeof(prsctp_param);
if (asoc->peer.asconf_capable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
extensions[num_ext+1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
num_ext += 2;
}
if (asoc->peer.reconf_capable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_RECONF;
num_ext += 1;
}
if (sp->adaptation_ind)
chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
if (asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
auth_random = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)asoc->c.auth_random;
chunksize += ntohs(auth_random->length);
auth_hmacs = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs;
if (auth_hmacs->length)
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length));
else
auth_hmacs = NULL;
auth_chunks = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
if (auth_chunks->length)
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_chunks->length));
else
auth_chunks = NULL;
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_AUTH;
num_ext += 1;
}
if (num_ext)
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) +
num_ext);
/* Now allocate and fill out the chunk. */
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK, 0, chunksize, gfp);
if (!retval)
goto nomem_chunk;
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [INIT ACK back to where the INIT came from.]
*/
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
retval->subh.init_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(initack), &initack);
retval->param_hdr.v = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addrs_len, addrs.v);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, cookie_len, cookie);
if (asoc->peer.ecn_capable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
if (num_ext) {
ext_param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT;
ext_param.param_hdr.length =
htons(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t),
&ext_param);
sctp_addto_param(retval, num_ext, extensions);
}
if (asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(prsctp_param), &prsctp_param);
if (sp->adaptation_ind) {
aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sp->adaptation_ind);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
}
if (asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_random->length),
auth_random);
if (auth_hmacs)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_hmacs->length),
auth_hmacs);
if (auth_chunks)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_chunks->length),
auth_chunks);
}
/* We need to remove the const qualifier at this point. */
retval->asoc = (struct sctp_association *) asoc;
nomem_chunk:
kfree(cookie);
nomem_cookie:
kfree(addrs.v);
return retval;
}
/* 3.3.11 Cookie Echo (COOKIE ECHO) (10):
*
* This chunk is used only during the initialization of an association.
* It is sent by the initiator of an association to its peer to complete
* the initialization process. This chunk MUST precede any DATA chunk
* sent within the association, but MAY be bundled with one or more DATA
* chunks in the same packet.
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 10 |Chunk Flags | Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* / Cookie /
* \ \
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Chunk Flags: 8 bit
*
* Set to zero on transmit and ignored on receipt.
*
* Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
*
* Set to the size of the chunk in bytes, including the 4 bytes of
* the chunk header and the size of the Cookie.
*
* Cookie: variable size
*
* This field must contain the exact cookie received in the
* State Cookie parameter from the previous INIT ACK.
*
* An implementation SHOULD make the cookie as small as possible
* to insure interoperability.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cookie_echo(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
void *cookie;
int cookie_len;
cookie = asoc->peer.cookie;
cookie_len = asoc->peer.cookie_len;
/* Build a cookie echo chunk. */
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO, 0,
cookie_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.cookie_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, cookie_len, cookie);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [COOKIE ECHO back to where the INIT ACK came from.]
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* 3.3.12 Cookie Acknowledgement (COOKIE ACK) (11):
*
* This chunk is used only during the initialization of an
* association. It is used to acknowledge the receipt of a COOKIE
* ECHO chunk. This chunk MUST precede any DATA or SACK chunk sent
* within the association, but MAY be bundled with one or more DATA
* chunks or SACK chunk in the same SCTP packet.
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 11 |Chunk Flags | Length = 4 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Chunk Flags: 8 bits
*
* Set to zero on transmit and ignored on receipt.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cookie_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [COOKIE ACK back to where the COOKIE ECHO came from.]
*/
if (retval && chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
return retval;
}
/*
* Appendix A: Explicit Congestion Notification:
* CWR:
*
* RFC 2481 details a specific bit for a sender to send in the header of
* its next outbound TCP segment to indicate to its peer that it has
* reduced its congestion window. This is termed the CWR bit. For
* SCTP the same indication is made by including the CWR chunk.
* This chunk contains one data element, i.e. the TSN number that
* was sent in the ECNE chunk. This element represents the lowest
* TSN number in the datagram that was originally marked with the
* CE bit.
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Chunk Type=13 | Flags=00000000| Chunk Length = 8 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Lowest TSN Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Note: The CWR is considered a Control chunk.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cwr(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const __u32 lowest_tsn,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
sctp_cwrhdr_t cwr;
cwr.lowest_tsn = htonl(lowest_tsn);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ECN_CWR, 0,
sizeof(sctp_cwrhdr_t), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.ecn_cwr_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(cwr), &cwr);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [Report a reduced congestion window back to where the ECNE
* came from.]
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Make an ECNE chunk. This is a congestion experienced report. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_ecne(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const __u32 lowest_tsn)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
sctp_ecnehdr_t ecne;
ecne.lowest_tsn = htonl(lowest_tsn);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ECN_ECNE, 0,
sizeof(sctp_ecnehdr_t), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.ecne_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecne), &ecne);
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Make a DATA chunk for the given association from the provided
* parameters. However, do not populate the data payload.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_datafrag_empty(struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo,
int data_len, __u8 flags, __u16 ssn,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
struct sctp_datahdr dp;
int chunk_len;
/* We assign the TSN as LATE as possible, not here when
* creating the chunk.
*/
dp.tsn = 0;
dp.stream = htons(sinfo->sinfo_stream);
dp.ppid = sinfo->sinfo_ppid;
/* Set the flags for an unordered send. */
if (sinfo->sinfo_flags & SCTP_UNORDERED) {
flags |= SCTP_DATA_UNORDERED;
dp.ssn = 0;
} else
dp.ssn = htons(ssn);
chunk_len = sizeof(dp) + data_len;
retval = sctp_make_data(asoc, flags, chunk_len, gfp);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.data_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(dp), &dp);
memcpy(&retval->sinfo, sinfo, sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo));
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Create a selective ackowledgement (SACK) for the given
* association. This reports on which TSN's we've seen to date,
* including duplicates and gaps.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_sack(const struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
struct sctp_sackhdr sack;
int len;
__u32 ctsn;
__u16 num_gabs, num_dup_tsns;
sctp: be more restrictive in transport selection on bundled sacks It was noticed recently that when we send data on a transport, its possible that we might bundle a sack that arrived on a different transport. While this isn't a major problem, it does go against the SHOULD requirement in section 6.4 of RFC 2960: An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying. This rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk. This patch seeks to correct that. It restricts the bundling of sack operations to only those transports which have moved the ctsn of the association forward since the last sack. By doing this we guarantee that we only bundle outbound saks on a transport that has received a chunk since the last sack. This brings us into stricter compliance with the RFC. Vlad had initially suggested that we strictly allow only sack bundling on the transport that last moved the ctsn forward. While this makes sense, I was concerned that doing so prevented us from bundling in the case where we had received chunks that moved the ctsn on multiple transports. In those cases, the RFC allows us to select any of the transports having received chunks to bundle the sack on. so I've modified the approach to allow for that, by adding a state variable to each transport that tracks weather it has moved the ctsn since the last sack. This I think keeps our behavior (and performance), close enough to our current profile that I think we can do this without a sysctl knob to enable/disable it. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Vlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@redhat.com> Reported-by: sorin serban <sserban@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-06-30 11:04:26 +08:00
struct sctp_association *aptr = (struct sctp_association *)asoc;
struct sctp_tsnmap *map = (struct sctp_tsnmap *)&asoc->peer.tsn_map;
struct sctp_gap_ack_block gabs[SCTP_MAX_GABS];
sctp: be more restrictive in transport selection on bundled sacks It was noticed recently that when we send data on a transport, its possible that we might bundle a sack that arrived on a different transport. While this isn't a major problem, it does go against the SHOULD requirement in section 6.4 of RFC 2960: An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying. This rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk. This patch seeks to correct that. It restricts the bundling of sack operations to only those transports which have moved the ctsn of the association forward since the last sack. By doing this we guarantee that we only bundle outbound saks on a transport that has received a chunk since the last sack. This brings us into stricter compliance with the RFC. Vlad had initially suggested that we strictly allow only sack bundling on the transport that last moved the ctsn forward. While this makes sense, I was concerned that doing so prevented us from bundling in the case where we had received chunks that moved the ctsn on multiple transports. In those cases, the RFC allows us to select any of the transports having received chunks to bundle the sack on. so I've modified the approach to allow for that, by adding a state variable to each transport that tracks weather it has moved the ctsn since the last sack. This I think keeps our behavior (and performance), close enough to our current profile that I think we can do this without a sysctl knob to enable/disable it. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Vlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@redhat.com> Reported-by: sorin serban <sserban@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-06-30 11:04:26 +08:00
struct sctp_transport *trans;
memset(gabs, 0, sizeof(gabs));
ctsn = sctp_tsnmap_get_ctsn(map);
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
pr_debug("%s: sackCTSNAck sent:0x%x\n", __func__, ctsn);
/* How much room is needed in the chunk? */
num_gabs = sctp_tsnmap_num_gabs(map, gabs);
num_dup_tsns = sctp_tsnmap_num_dups(map);
/* Initialize the SACK header. */
sack.cum_tsn_ack = htonl(ctsn);
sack.a_rwnd = htonl(asoc->a_rwnd);
sack.num_gap_ack_blocks = htons(num_gabs);
sack.num_dup_tsns = htons(num_dup_tsns);
len = sizeof(sack)
+ sizeof(struct sctp_gap_ack_block) * num_gabs
+ sizeof(__u32) * num_dup_tsns;
/* Create the chunk. */
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_SACK, 0, len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it received the DATA or control chunk to
* which it is replying. This rule should also be followed if
* the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the
* reply chunk.
*
* However, when acknowledging multiple DATA chunks received
* in packets from different source addresses in a single
* SACK, the SACK chunk may be transmitted to one of the
* destination transport addresses from which the DATA or
* control chunks being acknowledged were received.
*
* [BUG: We do not implement the following paragraph.
* Perhaps we should remember the last transport we used for a
* SACK and avoid that (if possible) if we have seen any
* duplicates. --piggy]
*
* When a receiver of a duplicate DATA chunk sends a SACK to a
* multi- homed endpoint it MAY be beneficial to vary the
* destination address and not use the source address of the
* DATA chunk. The reason being that receiving a duplicate
* from a multi-homed endpoint might indicate that the return
* path (as specified in the source address of the DATA chunk)
* for the SACK is broken.
*
* [Send to the address from which we last received a DATA chunk.]
*/
retval->transport = asoc->peer.last_data_from;
retval->subh.sack_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sack), &sack);
/* Add the gap ack block information. */
if (num_gabs)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(__u32) * num_gabs,
gabs);
/* Add the duplicate TSN information. */
sctp: Add support to per-association statistics via a new SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris' SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS. Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on this. V4: - Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons - Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid returning bogus RTO values - return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed V3: - Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well - Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push() - return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call V2: - Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion - Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway - Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out of sequence unexpected TSNs - Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts - Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check - Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks - Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0) - Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs - Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API - Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for future struct growth - Move association statistics in their own struct - Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs - return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the transport when max_rto last changed. Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-12-01 12:49:42 +08:00
if (num_dup_tsns) {
aptr->stats.idupchunks += num_dup_tsns;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(__u32) * num_dup_tsns,
sctp_tsnmap_get_dups(map));
sctp: Add support to per-association statistics via a new SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris' SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS. Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on this. V4: - Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons - Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid returning bogus RTO values - return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed V3: - Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well - Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push() - return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call V2: - Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion - Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway - Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out of sequence unexpected TSNs - Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts - Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check - Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks - Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0) - Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs - Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API - Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for future struct growth - Move association statistics in their own struct - Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs - return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the transport when max_rto last changed. Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-12-01 12:49:42 +08:00
}
sctp: be more restrictive in transport selection on bundled sacks It was noticed recently that when we send data on a transport, its possible that we might bundle a sack that arrived on a different transport. While this isn't a major problem, it does go against the SHOULD requirement in section 6.4 of RFC 2960: An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying. This rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk. This patch seeks to correct that. It restricts the bundling of sack operations to only those transports which have moved the ctsn of the association forward since the last sack. By doing this we guarantee that we only bundle outbound saks on a transport that has received a chunk since the last sack. This brings us into stricter compliance with the RFC. Vlad had initially suggested that we strictly allow only sack bundling on the transport that last moved the ctsn forward. While this makes sense, I was concerned that doing so prevented us from bundling in the case where we had received chunks that moved the ctsn on multiple transports. In those cases, the RFC allows us to select any of the transports having received chunks to bundle the sack on. so I've modified the approach to allow for that, by adding a state variable to each transport that tracks weather it has moved the ctsn since the last sack. This I think keeps our behavior (and performance), close enough to our current profile that I think we can do this without a sysctl knob to enable/disable it. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Vlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@redhat.com> Reported-by: sorin serban <sserban@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-06-30 11:04:26 +08:00
/* Once we have a sack generated, check to see what our sack
* generation is, if its 0, reset the transports to 0, and reset
* the association generation to 1
*
* The idea is that zero is never used as a valid generation for the
* association so no transport will match after a wrap event like this,
* Until the next sack
*/
if (++aptr->peer.sack_generation == 0) {
list_for_each_entry(trans, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports)
trans->sack_generation = 0;
aptr->peer.sack_generation = 1;
}
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Make a SHUTDOWN chunk. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_shutdown(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
sctp_shutdownhdr_t shut;
__u32 ctsn;
ctsn = sctp_tsnmap_get_ctsn(&asoc->peer.tsn_map);
shut.cum_tsn_ack = htonl(ctsn);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN, 0,
sizeof(sctp_shutdownhdr_t), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.shutdown_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(shut), &shut);
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_shutdown_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK, 0, 0,
GFP_ATOMIC);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [ACK back to where the SHUTDOWN came from.]
*/
if (retval && chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_shutdown_complete(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
__u8 flags = 0;
/* Set the T-bit if we have no association (vtag will be
* reflected)
*/
flags |= asoc ? 0 : SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE, flags,
0, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [Report SHUTDOWN COMPLETE back to where the SHUTDOWN ACK
* came from.]
*/
if (retval && chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
return retval;
}
/* Create an ABORT. Note that we set the T bit if we have no
* association, except when responding to an INIT (sctpimpguide 2.41).
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const size_t hint)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
__u8 flags = 0;
/* Set the T-bit if we have no association and 'chunk' is not
* an INIT (vtag will be reflected).
*/
if (!asoc) {
if (chunk && chunk->chunk_hdr &&
chunk->chunk_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_INIT)
flags = 0;
else
flags = SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T;
}
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ABORT, flags, hint,
GFP_ATOMIC);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [ABORT back to where the offender came from.]
*/
if (retval && chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
return retval;
}
/* Helper to create ABORT with a NO_USER_DATA error. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_no_data(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __u32 tsn)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
__be32 payload;
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)
+ sizeof(tsn));
if (!retval)
goto no_mem;
/* Put the tsn back into network byte order. */
payload = htonl(tsn);
sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_NO_DATA, sizeof(payload));
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(payload), (const void *)&payload);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [ABORT back to where the offender came from.]
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
no_mem:
return retval;
}
/* Helper to create ABORT with a SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT error. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_user(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct msghdr *msg,
size_t paylen)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
void *payload = NULL;
int err;
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, NULL, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen);
if (!retval)
goto err_chunk;
if (paylen) {
/* Put the msg_iov together into payload. */
payload = kmalloc(paylen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto err_payload;
err = memcpy_from_msg(payload, msg, paylen);
if (err < 0)
goto err_copy;
}
sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT, paylen);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
if (paylen)
kfree(payload);
return retval;
err_copy:
kfree(payload);
err_payload:
sctp_chunk_free(retval);
retval = NULL;
err_chunk:
return retval;
}
/* Append bytes to the end of a parameter. Will panic if chunk is not big
* enough.
*/
static void *sctp_addto_param(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len,
const void *data)
{
void *target;
int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len);
if (data)
memcpy(target, data, len);
else
memset(target, 0, len);
/* Adjust the chunk length field. */
chunk->chunk_hdr->length = htons(chunklen + len);
chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
return target;
}
/* Make an ABORT chunk with a PROTOCOL VIOLATION cause code. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_violation(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const __u8 *payload,
const size_t paylen)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
struct sctp_paramhdr phdr;
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen +
sizeof(phdr));
if (!retval)
goto end;
sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, paylen +
sizeof(phdr));
phdr.type = htons(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
phdr.length = chunk->chunk_hdr->length;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
sctp_addto_param(retval, sizeof(phdr), &phdr);
end:
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_paramlen(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_paramhdr *param)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
static const char error[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";
size_t payload_len = sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) +
sizeof(*param);
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION,
sizeof(error) + sizeof(*param));
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(error), error);
sctp_addto_param(retval, sizeof(*param), param);
nodata:
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_max_retrans(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
static const char error[] = "Association exceeded its max_retans count";
size_t payload_len = sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t);
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION, sizeof(error));
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(error), error);
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Make a HEARTBEAT chunk. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_transport *transport)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
sctp_sender_hb_info_t hbinfo;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT, 0,
sizeof(hbinfo), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
hbinfo.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO;
hbinfo.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t));
hbinfo.daddr = transport->ipaddr;
hbinfo.sent_at = jiffies;
hbinfo.hb_nonce = transport->hb_nonce;
/* Cast away the 'const', as this is just telling the chunk
* what transport it belongs to.
*/
retval->transport = (struct sctp_transport *) transport;
retval->subh.hbs_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(hbinfo),
&hbinfo);
nodata:
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const void *payload, const size_t paylen)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT_ACK, 0, paylen,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.hbs_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [HBACK back to where the HEARTBEAT came from.]
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Create an Operation Error chunk with the specified space reserved.
* This routine can be used for containing multiple causes in the chunk.
*/
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error_space(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
size_t size)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ERROR, 0,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
/* Create an Operation Error chunk of a fixed size,
* specifically, max(asoc->pathmtu, SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT)
* This is a helper function to allocate an error chunk for
* for those invalid parameter codes in which we may not want
* to report all the errors, if the incoming chunk is large
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
*/
static inline struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error_fixed(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
size_t size = asoc ? asoc->pathmtu : 0;
if (!size)
size = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT;
return sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, size);
}
/* Create an Operation Error chunk. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
__be16 cause_code, const void *payload,
size_t paylen, size_t reserve_tail)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, paylen + reserve_tail);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
sctp_init_cause(retval, cause_code, paylen + reserve_tail);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
if (reserve_tail)
sctp_addto_param(retval, reserve_tail, NULL);
nodata:
return retval;
}
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_auth(const struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
struct sctp_hmac *hmac_desc;
struct sctp_authhdr auth_hdr;
__u8 *hmac;
/* Get the first hmac that the peer told us to use */
hmac_desc = sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac(asoc);
if (unlikely(!hmac_desc))
return NULL;
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_AUTH, 0,
hmac_desc->hmac_len + sizeof(sctp_authhdr_t),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
auth_hdr.hmac_id = htons(hmac_desc->hmac_id);
auth_hdr.shkey_id = htons(asoc->active_key_id);
retval->subh.auth_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_authhdr_t),
&auth_hdr);
hmac = skb_put_zero(retval->skb, hmac_desc->hmac_len);
/* Adjust the chunk header to include the empty MAC */
retval->chunk_hdr->length =
htons(ntohs(retval->chunk_hdr->length) + hmac_desc->hmac_len);
retval->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(retval->skb);
return retval;
}
/********************************************************************
* 2nd Level Abstractions
********************************************************************/
/* Turn an skb into a chunk.
* FIXME: Eventually move the structure directly inside the skb->cb[].
*
* sctpimpguide-05.txt Section 2.8.2
* M1) Each time a new DATA chunk is transmitted
* set the 'TSN.Missing.Report' count for that TSN to 0. The
* 'TSN.Missing.Report' count will be used to determine missing chunks
* and when to fast retransmit.
*
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_chunkify(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sock *sk, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = kmem_cache_zalloc(sctp_chunk_cachep, gfp);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
if (!sk)
pr_debug("%s: chunkifying skb:%p w/o an sk\n", __func__, skb);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&retval->list);
retval->skb = skb;
retval->asoc = (struct sctp_association *)asoc;
retval->singleton = 1;
retval->fast_retransmit = SCTP_CAN_FRTX;
/* Polish the bead hole. */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&retval->transmitted_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&retval->frag_list);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_INC(chunk);
refcount_set(&retval->refcnt, 1);
nodata:
return retval;
}
/* Set chunk->source and dest based on the IP header in chunk->skb. */
void sctp_init_addrs(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, union sctp_addr *src,
union sctp_addr *dest)
{
memcpy(&chunk->source, src, sizeof(union sctp_addr));
memcpy(&chunk->dest, dest, sizeof(union sctp_addr));
}
/* Extract the source address from a chunk. */
const union sctp_addr *sctp_source(const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
/* If we have a known transport, use that. */
if (chunk->transport) {
return &chunk->transport->ipaddr;
} else {
/* Otherwise, extract it from the IP header. */
return &chunk->source;
}
}
/* Create a new chunk, setting the type and flags headers from the
* arguments, reserving enough space for a 'paylen' byte payload.
*/
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 type, __u8 flags, int paylen,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
struct sctp_chunkhdr *chunk_hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk;
/* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */
skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(*chunk_hdr) + paylen), gfp);
if (!skb)
goto nodata;
/* Make room for the chunk header. */
chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*chunk_hdr));
chunk_hdr->type = type;
chunk_hdr->flags = flags;
chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(*chunk_hdr));
sk = asoc ? asoc->base.sk : NULL;
retval = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk, gfp);
if (!retval) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto nodata;
}
retval->chunk_hdr = chunk_hdr;
retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(*chunk_hdr);
/* Determine if the chunk needs to be authenticated */
if (sctp_auth_send_cid(type, asoc))
retval->auth = 1;
return retval;
nodata:
return NULL;
}
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 flags, int paylen, gfp_t gfp)
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
{
return _sctp_make_chunk(asoc, SCTP_CID_DATA, flags, paylen, gfp);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
}
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_control(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u8 type, __u8 flags, int paylen,
gfp_t gfp)
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
chunk = _sctp_make_chunk(asoc, type, flags, paylen, gfp);
net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do memory accounting for control chunks. Real accounting code will follow. This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ... [ 553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813! [ 553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...] [ 553.110259] uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc [ 553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #2 [ 553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW (3.10 ) 09/17/2009 [ 553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti: ffff880204ed0000 [ 553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>] [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15: ffff880202158000 [ 553.110487] FS: 00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [ 553.110487] Stack: [ 553.110487] ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000 ffffffff81cb7900 [ 553.110487] 0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40 000000000000000f [ 553.110487] Call Trace: [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0 [sctp] [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 553.110487] [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...] [ 553.110487] RIP [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp] [ 553.110487] RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8> [ 553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]--- The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks creation a bit. Data chunks already have memory accounting so noting needs to happen. For control chunks, add stubs handlers. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-10 10:05:36 +08:00
if (chunk)
sctp_control_set_owner_w(chunk);
return chunk;
}
/* Release the memory occupied by a chunk. */
static void sctp_chunk_destroy(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&chunk->list));
list_del_init(&chunk->transmitted_list);
net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk While working on ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb memory leakage in the error path. Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48a9 and by unconditionally jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone: Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256): comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..u^..X......... backtrace: [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210 [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0 [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp] [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp] [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp] [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210 [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180 [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue] [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink] [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0 [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink] [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250 [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0 [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0 [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380 What happens is that commit bbd0d59809f9 clones the skb containing the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ----------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o freeing it. The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy() handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there, so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify() allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled. While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor), usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function sctp_chunk_destroy() though. Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-04 23:35:51 +08:00
consume_skb(chunk->skb);
consume_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(chunk);
kmem_cache_free(sctp_chunk_cachep, chunk);
}
/* Possibly, free the chunk. */
void sctp_chunk_free(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
/* Release our reference on the message tracker. */
if (chunk->msg)
sctp_datamsg_put(chunk->msg);
sctp_chunk_put(chunk);
}
/* Grab a reference to the chunk. */
void sctp_chunk_hold(struct sctp_chunk *ch)
{
refcount_inc(&ch->refcnt);
}
/* Release a reference to the chunk. */
void sctp_chunk_put(struct sctp_chunk *ch)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ch->refcnt))
sctp_chunk_destroy(ch);
}
/* Append bytes to the end of a chunk. Will panic if chunk is not big
* enough.
*/
void *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data)
{
void *target;
int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
int padlen = SCTP_PAD4(chunklen) - chunklen;
skb_put_zero(chunk->skb, padlen);
target = skb_put_data(chunk->skb, data, len);
/* Adjust the chunk length field. */
chunk->chunk_hdr->length = htons(chunklen + padlen + len);
chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
return target;
}
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
/* Append bytes to the end of a chunk. Returns NULL if there isn't sufficient
* space in the chunk
*/
static void *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
int len, const void *data)
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
{
if (skb_tailroom(chunk->skb) >= len)
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
return sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, len, data);
else
return NULL;
}
/* Append bytes from user space to the end of a chunk. Will panic if
* chunk is not big enough.
* Returns a kernel err value.
*/
int sctp_user_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len,
struct iov_iter *from)
{
void *target;
/* Make room in chunk for data. */
target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len);
/* Copy data (whole iovec) into chunk */
if (!copy_from_iter_full(target, len, from))
return -EFAULT;
/* Adjust the chunk length field. */
chunk->chunk_hdr->length =
htons(ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) + len);
chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
return 0;
}
/* Helper function to assign a TSN if needed. This assumes that both
* the data_hdr and association have already been assigned.
*/
void sctp_chunk_assign_ssn(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_datamsg *msg;
struct sctp_chunk *lchunk;
struct sctp_stream *stream;
__u16 ssn;
__u16 sid;
if (chunk->has_ssn)
return;
/* All fragments will be on the same stream */
sid = ntohs(chunk->subh.data_hdr->stream);
stream = &chunk->asoc->stream;
/* Now assign the sequence number to the entire message.
* All fragments must have the same stream sequence number.
*/
msg = chunk->msg;
list_for_each_entry(lchunk, &msg->chunks, frag_list) {
if (lchunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_UNORDERED) {
ssn = 0;
} else {
if (lchunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_LAST_FRAG)
ssn = sctp_ssn_next(stream, out, sid);
else
ssn = sctp_ssn_peek(stream, out, sid);
}
lchunk->subh.data_hdr->ssn = htons(ssn);
lchunk->has_ssn = 1;
}
}
/* Helper function to assign a TSN if needed. This assumes that both
* the data_hdr and association have already been assigned.
*/
void sctp_chunk_assign_tsn(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
if (!chunk->has_tsn) {
/* This is the last possible instant to
* assign a TSN.
*/
chunk->subh.data_hdr->tsn =
htonl(sctp_association_get_next_tsn(chunk->asoc));
chunk->has_tsn = 1;
}
}
/* Create a CLOSED association to use with an incoming packet. */
struct sctp_association *sctp_make_temp_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sk_buff *skb;
sctp_scope_t scope;
/* Create the bare association. */
scope = sctp_scope(sctp_source(chunk));
asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, ep->base.sk, scope, gfp);
if (!asoc)
goto nodata;
asoc->temp = 1;
skb = chunk->skb;
/* Create an entry for the source address of the packet. */
SCTP_INPUT_CB(skb)->af->from_skb(&asoc->c.peer_addr, skb, 1);
nodata:
return asoc;
}
/* Build a cookie representing asoc.
* This INCLUDES the param header needed to put the cookie in the INIT ACK.
*/
static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *init_chunk,
int *cookie_len,
const __u8 *raw_addrs, int addrs_len)
{
sctp_cookie_param_t *retval;
struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;
int headersize, bodysize;
/* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including
* any padding.
*/
headersize = sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) +
(sizeof(struct sctp_signed_cookie) -
sizeof(struct sctp_cookie));
bodysize = sizeof(struct sctp_cookie)
+ ntohs(init_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) + addrs_len;
/* Pad out the cookie to a multiple to make the signature
* functions simpler to write.
*/
if (bodysize % SCTP_COOKIE_MULTIPLE)
bodysize += SCTP_COOKIE_MULTIPLE
- (bodysize % SCTP_COOKIE_MULTIPLE);
*cookie_len = headersize + bodysize;
/* Clear this memory since we are sending this data structure
* out on the network.
*/
retval = kzalloc(*cookie_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
cookie = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *) retval->body;
/* Set up the parameter header. */
retval->p.type = SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE;
retval->p.length = htons(*cookie_len);
/* Copy the cookie part of the association itself. */
cookie->c = asoc->c;
/* Save the raw address list length in the cookie. */
cookie->c.raw_addr_list_len = addrs_len;
/* Remember PR-SCTP capability. */
cookie->c.prsctp_capable = asoc->peer.prsctp_capable;
/* Save adaptation indication in the cookie. */
cookie->c.adaptation_ind = asoc->peer.adaptation_ind;
/* Set an expiration time for the cookie. */
cookie->c.expiration = ktime_add(asoc->cookie_life,
ktime_get_real());
/* Copy the peer's init packet. */
memcpy(&cookie->c.peer_init[0], init_chunk->chunk_hdr,
ntohs(init_chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
/* Copy the raw local address list of the association. */
memcpy((__u8 *)&cookie->c.peer_init[0] +
ntohs(init_chunk->chunk_hdr->length), raw_addrs, addrs_len);
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac) {
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
int err;
/* Sign the message. */
desc->tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc->flags = 0;
err = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, ep->secret_key,
sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ?:
crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)&cookie->c, bodysize,
cookie->signature);
shash_desc_zero(desc);
if (err)
goto free_cookie;
}
return retval;
free_cookie:
kfree(retval);
nodata:
*cookie_len = 0;
return NULL;
}
/* Unpack the cookie from COOKIE ECHO chunk, recreating the association. */
struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk, gfp_t gfp,
int *error, struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
struct sctp_association *retval = NULL;
struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;
struct sctp_cookie *bear_cookie;
int headersize, bodysize, fixed_size;
__u8 *digest = ep->digest;
unsigned int len;
sctp_scope_t scope;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
ktime_t kt;
/* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including
* any padding.
*/
headersize = sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) +
(sizeof(struct sctp_signed_cookie) -
sizeof(struct sctp_cookie));
bodysize = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - headersize;
fixed_size = headersize + sizeof(struct sctp_cookie);
/* Verify that the chunk looks like it even has a cookie.
* There must be enough room for our cookie and our peer's
* INIT chunk.
*/
len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (len < fixed_size + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))
goto malformed;
/* Verify that the cookie has been padded out. */
if (bodysize % SCTP_COOKIE_MULTIPLE)
goto malformed;
/* Process the cookie. */
cookie = chunk->subh.cookie_hdr;
bear_cookie = &cookie->c;
if (!sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac)
goto no_hmac;
/* Check the signature. */
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
int err;
desc->tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc->flags = 0;
err = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, ep->secret_key,
sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ?:
crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)bear_cookie, bodysize,
digest);
shash_desc_zero(desc);
if (err) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
goto fail;
}
}
if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
goto fail;
}
no_hmac:
/* IG Section 2.35.2:
* 3) Compare the port numbers and the verification tag contained
* within the COOKIE ECHO chunk to the actual port numbers and the
* verification tag within the SCTP common header of the received
* packet. If these values do not match the packet MUST be silently
* discarded,
*/
if (ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag) != bear_cookie->my_vtag) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_TAG;
goto fail;
}
if (chunk->sctp_hdr->source != bear_cookie->peer_addr.v4.sin_port ||
ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->dest) != bear_cookie->my_port) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_PORTS;
goto fail;
}
/* Check to see if the cookie is stale. If there is already
* an association, there is no need to check cookie's expiration
* for init collision case of lost COOKIE ACK.
* If skb has been timestamped, then use the stamp, otherwise
* use current time. This introduces a small possibility that
* that a cookie may be considered expired, but his would only slow
* down the new association establishment instead of every packet.
*/
if (sock_flag(ep->base.sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP))
kt = skb_get_ktime(skb);
else
kt = ktime_get_real();
if (!asoc && ktime_before(bear_cookie->expiration, kt)) {
/*
* Section 3.3.10.3 Stale Cookie Error (3)
*
* Cause of error
* ---------------
* Stale Cookie Error: Indicates the receipt of a valid State
* Cookie that has expired.
*/
len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
if (*errp) {
suseconds_t usecs = ktime_to_us(ktime_sub(kt, bear_cookie->expiration));
__be32 n = htonl(usecs);
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE,
sizeof(n));
sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(n), &n);
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE;
} else
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/* Make a new base association. */
scope = sctp_scope(sctp_source(chunk));
retval = sctp_association_new(ep, ep->base.sk, scope, gfp);
if (!retval) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/* Set up our peer's port number. */
retval->peer.port = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source);
/* Populate the association from the cookie. */
memcpy(&retval->c, bear_cookie, sizeof(*bear_cookie));
if (sctp_assoc_set_bind_addr_from_cookie(retval, bear_cookie,
GFP_ATOMIC) < 0) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/* Also, add the destination address. */
if (list_empty(&retval->base.bind_addr.address_list)) {
sctp_add_bind_addr(&retval->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest,
sizeof(chunk->dest), SCTP_ADDR_SRC,
GFP_ATOMIC);
}
retval->next_tsn = retval->c.initial_tsn;
retval->ctsn_ack_point = retval->next_tsn - 1;
retval->addip_serial = retval->c.initial_tsn;
retval->strreset_outseq = retval->c.initial_tsn;
retval->adv_peer_ack_point = retval->ctsn_ack_point;
retval->peer.prsctp_capable = retval->c.prsctp_capable;
retval->peer.adaptation_ind = retval->c.adaptation_ind;
/* The INIT stuff will be done by the side effects. */
return retval;
fail:
if (retval)
sctp_association_free(retval);
return NULL;
malformed:
/* Yikes! The packet is either corrupt or deliberately
* malformed.
*/
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_MALFORMED;
goto fail;
}
/********************************************************************
* 3rd Level Abstractions
********************************************************************/
struct __sctp_missing {
__be32 num_missing;
__be16 type;
} __packed;
/*
* Report a missing mandatory parameter.
*/
static int sctp_process_missing_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
enum sctp_param paramtype,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
struct __sctp_missing report;
__u16 len;
len = SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(report));
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
*/
if (!*errp)
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
if (*errp) {
report.num_missing = htonl(1);
report.type = paramtype;
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_MISS_PARAM,
sizeof(report));
sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(report), &report);
}
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
}
/* Report an Invalid Mandatory Parameter. */
static int sctp_process_inv_mandatory(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
/* Invalid Mandatory Parameter Error has no payload. */
if (!*errp)
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, 0);
if (*errp)
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM, 0);
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
}
static int sctp_process_inv_paramlength(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_paramhdr *param,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
/* This is a fatal error. Any accumulated non-fatal errors are
* not reported.
*/
if (*errp)
sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
/* Create an error chunk and fill it in with our payload. */
*errp = sctp_make_violation_paramlen(asoc, chunk, param);
return 0;
}
/* Do not attempt to handle the HOST_NAME parm. However, do
* send back an indicator to the peer.
*/
static int sctp_process_hn_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
__u16 len = ntohs(param.p->length);
/* Processing of the HOST_NAME parameter will generate an
* ABORT. If we've accumulated any non-fatal errors, they
* would be unrecognized parameters and we should not include
* them in the ABORT.
*/
if (*errp)
sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
if (*errp) {
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED, len);
sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, len, param.v);
}
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
}
static int sctp_verify_ext_param(struct net *net, union sctp_params param)
{
__u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
int have_auth = 0;
int have_asconf = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) {
case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
have_auth = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
have_asconf = 1;
break;
}
}
/* ADD-IP Security: The draft requires us to ABORT or ignore the
* INIT/INIT-ACK if ADD-IP is listed, but AUTH is not. Do this
* only if ADD-IP is turned on and we are not backward-compatible
* mode.
*/
if (net->sctp.addip_noauth)
return 1;
if (net->sctp.addip_enable && !have_auth && have_asconf)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
__u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) {
case SCTP_CID_RECONF:
if (asoc->reconf_enable &&
!asoc->peer.reconf_capable)
asoc->peer.reconf_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_FWD_TSN:
if (asoc->prsctp_enable && !asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
/* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he
* supports AUTH.
*/
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (asoc->ep->auth_enable)
asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
if (net->sctp.addip_enable)
asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
/* RFC 3.2.1 & the Implementers Guide 2.2.
*
* The Parameter Types are encoded such that the
* highest-order two bits specify the action that must be
* taken if the processing endpoint does not recognize the
* Parameter Type.
*
* 00 - Stop processing this parameter; do not process any further
* parameters within this chunk
*
* 01 - Stop processing this parameter, do not process any further
* parameters within this chunk, and report the unrecognized
* parameter in an 'Unrecognized Parameter' ERROR chunk.
*
* 10 - Skip this parameter and continue processing.
*
* 11 - Skip this parameter and continue processing but
* report the unrecognized parameter in an
* 'Unrecognized Parameter' ERROR chunk.
*
* Return value:
* SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
* SCTP_IERROR_ERROR - stop and report an error.
* SCTP_IERROR_NOMEME - out of memory.
*/
static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
switch (param.p->type & SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_MASK) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD:
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP:
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
/* Fall through */
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP_ERR:
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
*/
if (NULL == *errp)
sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) Ok, version 4 Change Notes: 1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes Summary: Hey- Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the following way: <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91! <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1] <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U) vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5 ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod <5> CPU: 0 <5> EIP: 0060:[<c02bff27>] Not tainted VLI <5> EFLAGS: 00010216 (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d <5> eax: 0000002c ebx: c033f461 ecx: c0357d96 edx: c040fd44 <5> esi: c033f461 edi: df653280 ebp: 00000000 esp: c040fd40 <5> ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0) <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180 e0c2947d <5> 00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004 df653490 <5> 00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e 00000004 <5> Call Trace: <5> [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp] <5> [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp] <5> [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp] <5> [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp] <5> [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233 <5> [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp] <5> [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp] <5> [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp] <5> [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter] <5> [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151 <5> [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5 <5> [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9 <5> [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151 <5> [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4 <5> [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b <5> [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd] <5> [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9 <5> [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8 <5> [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79 <5> [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f <5> [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed. The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param: if (NULL == *errp) *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); if (*errp) { sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length))); sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally, given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately, we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data. The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173 I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't have space to report. Tested by me successfully Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-28 18:30:59 +08:00
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_fixed(asoc, chunk);
if (*errp) {
if (!sctp_init_cause_fixed(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(param.p->length))))
sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(*errp,
SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(param.p->length)),
param.v);
} else {
/* If there is no memory for generating the ERROR
* report as specified, an ABORT will be triggered
* to the peer and the association won't be
* established.
*/
retval = SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return retval;
}
/* Verify variable length parameters
* Return values:
* SCTP_IERROR_ABORT - trigger an ABORT
* SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM - out of memory (abort)
* SCTP_IERROR_ERROR - stop processing, trigger an ERROR
* SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
*/
static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
enum sctp_cid cid,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
{
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
__u16 n_elt, id = 0;
int i;
/* FIXME - This routine is not looking at each parameter per the
* chunk type, i.e., unrecognized parameters should be further
* identified based on the chunk id.
*/
switch (param.p->type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
if (!sctp_verify_ext_param(net, param))
return SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
if (net->sctp.addip_enable)
break;
goto fallthrough;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
/* Tell the peer, we won't support this param. */
sctp_process_hn_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (ep->prsctp_enable)
break;
goto fallthrough;
case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fallthrough;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Secion 6.1
* If the random number is not 32 byte long the association
* MUST be aborted. The ABORT chunk SHOULD contain the error
* cause 'Protocol Violation'.
*/
if (SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH !=
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
chunk, err_chunk);
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fallthrough;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.2
* The CHUNKS parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or
* INIT-ACK chunk if the sender wants to receive authenticated
* chunks. Its maximum length is 260 bytes.
*/
if (260 < ntohs(param.p->length)) {
sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
chunk, err_chunk);
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fallthrough;
hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p;
n_elt = (ntohs(param.p->length) -
sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) >> 1;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Section 6.1
* The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
* included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.
*/
for (i = 0; i < n_elt; i++) {
id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
if (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1)
break;
}
if (id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk,
err_chunk);
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
}
break;
fallthrough:
default:
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
pr_debug("%s: unrecognized param:%d for chunk:%d\n",
__func__, ntohs(param.p->type), cid);
retval = sctp_process_unk_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
break;
}
return retval;
}
/* Verify the INIT packet before we process it. */
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc, enum sctp_cid cid,
struct sctp_init_chunk *peer_init,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk, struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
union sctp_params param;
bool has_cookie = false;
int result;
/* Check for missing mandatory parameters. Note: Initial TSN is
* also mandatory, but is not checked here since the valid range
* is 0..2**32-1. RFC4960, section 3.3.3.
*/
if (peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams == 0 ||
peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams == 0 ||
peer_init->init_hdr.init_tag == 0 ||
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.a_rwnd) < SCTP_DEFAULT_MINWINDOW)
return sctp_process_inv_mandatory(asoc, chunk, errp);
sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
if (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE)
has_cookie = true;
}
/* There is a possibility that a parameter length was bad and
* in that case we would have stoped walking the parameters.
* The current param.p would point at the bad one.
* Current consensus on the mailing list is to generate a PROTOCOL
* VIOLATION error. We build the ERROR chunk here and let the normal
* error handling code build and send the packet.
*/
if (param.v != (void *)chunk->chunk_end)
return sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp);
/* The only missing mandatory param possible today is
* the state cookie for an INIT-ACK chunk.
*/
if ((SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK == cid) && !has_cookie)
return sctp_process_missing_param(asoc, SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE,
chunk, errp);
/* Verify all the variable length parameters */
sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
result = sctp_verify_param(net, ep, asoc, param, cid,
chunk, errp);
switch (result) {
case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT:
case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
return 0;
case SCTP_IERROR_ERROR:
return 1;
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
default:
break;
}
} /* for (loop through all parameters) */
return 1;
}
/* Unpack the parameters in an INIT packet into an association.
* Returns 0 on failure, else success.
* FIXME: This is an association method.
*/
int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
struct sctp_init_chunk *peer_init, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
union sctp_params param;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
char *cookie;
int src_match = 0;
/* We must include the address that the INIT packet came from.
* This is the only address that matters for an INIT packet.
* When processing a COOKIE ECHO, we retrieve the from address
* of the INIT from the cookie.
*/
/* This implementation defaults to making the first transport
* added as the primary transport. The source address seems to
* be a a better choice than any of the embedded addresses.
*/
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE))
goto nomem;
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), peer_addr))
src_match = 1;
/* Process the initialization parameters. */
sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
if (!src_match && (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||
param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)) {
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr,
chunk->sctp_hdr->source, 0);
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), &addr))
src_match = 1;
}
if (!sctp_process_param(asoc, param, peer_addr, gfp))
goto clean_up;
}
/* source address of chunk may not match any valid address */
if (!src_match)
goto clean_up;
/* AUTH: After processing the parameters, make sure that we
* have all the required info to potentially do authentications.
*/
if (asoc->peer.auth_capable && (!asoc->peer.peer_random ||
!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs))
asoc->peer.auth_capable = 0;
/* In a non-backward compatible mode, if the peer claims
* support for ADD-IP but not AUTH, the ADD-IP spec states
* that we MUST ABORT the association. Section 6. The section
* also give us an option to silently ignore the packet, which
* is what we'll do here.
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth &&
(asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) {
asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |= (SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP |
SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP |
SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY);
asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0;
goto clean_up;
}
/* Walk list of transports, removing transports in the UNKNOWN state. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (transport->state == SCTP_UNKNOWN) {
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
}
}
/* The fixed INIT headers are always in network byte
* order.
*/
asoc->peer.i.init_tag =
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.init_tag);
asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd =
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.a_rwnd);
asoc->peer.i.num_outbound_streams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams);
asoc->peer.i.num_inbound_streams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams);
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn =
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.initial_tsn);
asoc->strreset_inseq = asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn;
/* Apply the upper bounds for output streams based on peer's
* number of inbound streams.
*/
if (asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams >
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams)) {
asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams);
}
if (asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams >
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams)) {
asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams);
}
/* Copy Initiation tag from INIT to VT_peer in cookie. */
asoc->c.peer_vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
/* Peer Rwnd : Current calculated value of the peer's rwnd. */
asoc->peer.rwnd = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
/* Copy cookie in case we need to resend COOKIE-ECHO. */
cookie = asoc->peer.cookie;
if (cookie) {
asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(cookie, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
goto clean_up;
}
/* RFC 2960 7.2.1 The initial value of ssthresh MAY be arbitrarily
* high (for example, implementations MAY use the size of the receiver
* advertised window).
*/
list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
transport->ssthresh = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
}
/* Set up the TSN tracking pieces. */
if (!sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, gfp))
goto clean_up;
/* RFC 2960 6.5 Stream Identifier and Stream Sequence Number
*
* The stream sequence number in all the streams shall start
* from 0 when the association is established. Also, when the
* stream sequence number reaches the value 65535 the next
* stream sequence number shall be set to 0.
*/
if (sctp_stream_init(&asoc->stream, asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams,
asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams, gfp))
goto clean_up;
if (!asoc->temp && sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, gfp))
goto clean_up;
/* ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF Chunk Procedures
*
* When an endpoint has an ASCONF signaled change to be sent to the
* remote endpoint it should do the following:
* ...
* A2) A serial number should be assigned to the Chunk. The serial
* number should be a monotonically increasing number. All serial
* numbers are defined to be initialized at the start of the
* association to the same value as the Initial TSN.
*/
asoc->peer.addip_serial = asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn - 1;
return 1;
clean_up:
/* Release the transport structures. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (transport->state != SCTP_ACTIVE)
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
}
nomem:
return 0;
}
/* Update asoc with the option described in param.
*
* RFC2960 3.3.2.1 Optional/Variable Length Parameters in INIT
*
* asoc is the association to update.
* param is the variable length parameter to use for update.
* cid tells us if this is an INIT, INIT ACK or COOKIE ECHO.
* If the current packet is an INIT we want to minimize the amount of
* work we do. In particular, we should not build transport
* structures for the addresses.
*/
static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
union sctp_addr addr;
int i;
__u16 sat;
int retval = 1;
sctp_scope_t scope;
u32 stale;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
struct sctp_transport *t;
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
/* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the
* time. This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters
* came from a fresh INIT, and INIT ACK, or were stored in a cookie.
*/
switch (param.p->type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 != asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
break;
goto do_addr_param;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
/* v4 addresses are not allowed on v6-only socket */
if (ipv6_only_sock(asoc->base.sk))
break;
do_addr_param:
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
scope = sctp_scope(peer_addr);
if (sctp_in_scope(net, &addr, scope))
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, gfp, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED))
return 0;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
if (!net->sctp.cookie_preserve_enable)
break;
stale = ntohl(param.life->lifespan_increment);
/* Suggested Cookie Life span increment's unit is msec,
* (1/1000sec).
*/
asoc->cookie_life = ktime_add_ms(asoc->cookie_life, stale);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
pr_debug("%s: unimplemented SCTP_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS\n", __func__);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
/* Turn off the default values first so we'll know which
* ones are really set by the peer.
*/
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 0;
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 0;
/* Assume that peer supports the address family
* by which it sends a packet.
*/
if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
else if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
if (sat)
sat /= sizeof(__u16);
for (i = 0; i < sat; ++i) {
switch (param.sat->types[i]) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 == asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.hostname_address = 1;
break;
default: /* Just ignore anything else. */
break;
}
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
asoc->peer.cookie_len =
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
asoc->peer.cookie = param.cookie->body;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
/* Would be odd to receive, but it causes no problems. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
/* Rejected during verify stage. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
asoc->peer.ecn_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = ntohl(param.aind->adaptation_ind);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
goto fall_through;
addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type));
net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death in the form of: ------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------> While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address parameter. So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0 and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param(). The trace for the log: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078 IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp] PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [...] Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp] [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [...] A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could possibly return with NULL. Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-11-11 00:54:26 +08:00
if (af == NULL)
break;
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param,
htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
/* if the address is invalid, we can't process it.
* XXX: see spec for what to do.
*/
if (!af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, NULL))
break;
t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!t)
break;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, t);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
sctp_process_ext_param(asoc, param);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (asoc->prsctp_enable) {
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
}
/* Fall Through */
goto fall_through;
case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's random parameter */
asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's HMAC list */
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
/* Set the default HMAC the peer requested*/
sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac(asoc, param.hmac_algo);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect: Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1 task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80 [<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4 [<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c [<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8 [<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214 [<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630 [<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24 [<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440 [<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564 [<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c [<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210 [<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac [<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0 [<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4 [<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48 [<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148 [<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398 Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0 03e00008 00000000 ---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs() when endpoint is being created. After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1, the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init() via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk, the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through, but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus, dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint initialization phase. The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate from the very first days. Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-17 23:26:50 +08:00
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
retval = 0;
break;
fall_through:
default:
/* Any unrecognized parameters should have been caught
* and handled by sctp_verify_param() which should be
* called prior to this routine. Simply log the error
* here.
*/
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
pr_debug("%s: ignoring param:%d for association:%p.\n",
__func__, ntohs(param.p->type), asoc);
break;
}
return retval;
}
/* Select a new verification tag. */
__u32 sctp_generate_tag(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
/* I believe that this random number generator complies with RFC1750.
* A tag of 0 is reserved for special cases (e.g. INIT).
*/
__u32 x;
do {
get_random_bytes(&x, sizeof(__u32));
} while (x == 0);
return x;
}
/* Select an initial TSN to send during startup. */
__u32 sctp_generate_tsn(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
__u32 retval;
get_random_bytes(&retval, sizeof(__u32));
return retval;
}
/*
* ADDIP 3.1.1 Address Configuration Change Chunk (ASCONF)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 0xC1 | Chunk Flags | Chunk Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Serial Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Address Parameter |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF Parameter #1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* \ \
* / .... /
* \ \
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF Parameter #N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Address Parameter and other parameter will not be wrapped in this function
*/
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_addr *addr,
int vparam_len)
{
sctp_addiphdr_t asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
int length = sizeof(asconf) + vparam_len;
union sctp_addr_param addrparam;
int addrlen;
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addrlen = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addrparam);
if (!addrlen)
return NULL;
length += addrlen;
/* Create the chunk. */
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ASCONF, 0, length,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
asconf.serial = htonl(asoc->addip_serial++);
retval->subh.addip_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asconf), &asconf);
retval->param_hdr.v =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addrlen, &addrparam);
return retval;
}
/* ADDIP
* 3.2.1 Add IP Address
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 0xC001 | Length = Variable |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF-Request Correlation ID |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Address Parameter |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* 3.2.2 Delete IP Address
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 0xC002 | Length = Variable |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF-Request Correlation ID |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Address Parameter |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_addr *laddr,
struct sockaddr *addrs,
int addrcnt,
__be16 flags)
{
sctp_addip_param_t param;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
union sctp_addr_param addr_param;
union sctp_addr *addr;
void *addr_buf;
struct sctp_af *af;
int paramlen = sizeof(param);
int addr_param_len = 0;
int totallen = 0;
int i;
int del_pickup = 0;
/* Get total length of all the address parameters. */
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addr_param_len = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addr_param);
totallen += paramlen;
totallen += addr_param_len;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending && !del_pickup) {
/* reuse the parameter length from the same scope one */
totallen += paramlen;
totallen += addr_param_len;
del_pickup = 1;
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
pr_debug("%s: picked same-scope del_pending addr, "
"totallen for all addresses is %d\n",
__func__, totallen);
}
}
/* Create an asconf chunk with the required length. */
retval = sctp_make_asconf(asoc, laddr, totallen);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
/* Add the address parameters to the asconf chunk. */
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addr_param_len = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addr_param);
param.param_hdr.type = flags;
param.param_hdr.length = htons(paramlen + addr_param_len);
param.crr_id = i;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paramlen, &param);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addr_param_len, &addr_param);
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
if (flags == SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP && del_pickup) {
addr = asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addr_param_len = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addr_param);
param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP;
param.param_hdr.length = htons(paramlen + addr_param_len);
param.crr_id = i;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paramlen, &param);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addr_param_len, &addr_param);
}
return retval;
}
/* ADDIP
* 3.2.4 Set Primary IP Address
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type =0xC004 | Length = Variable |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF-Request Correlation ID |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Address Parameter |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Create an ASCONF chunk with Set Primary IP address parameter.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_addr *addr)
{
sctp_addip_param_t param;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
int len = sizeof(param);
union sctp_addr_param addrparam;
int addrlen;
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addrlen = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addrparam);
if (!addrlen)
return NULL;
len += addrlen;
/* Create the chunk and make asconf header. */
retval = sctp_make_asconf(asoc, addr, len);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY;
param.param_hdr.length = htons(len);
param.crr_id = 0;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(param), &param);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addrlen, &addrparam);
return retval;
}
/* ADDIP 3.1.2 Address Configuration Acknowledgement Chunk (ASCONF-ACK)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 0x80 | Chunk Flags | Chunk Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Serial Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF Parameter Response#1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* \ \
* / .... /
* \ \
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ASCONF Parameter Response#N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Create an ASCONF_ACK chunk with enough space for the parameter responses.
*/
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 serial, int vparam_len)
{
sctp_addiphdr_t asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
int length = sizeof(asconf) + vparam_len;
/* Create the chunk. */
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK, 0, length,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
asconf.serial = htonl(serial);
retval->subh.addip_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asconf), &asconf);
return retval;
}
/* Add response parameters to an ASCONF_ACK chunk. */
static void sctp_add_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be32 crr_id,
__be16 err_code, sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param)
{
sctp_addip_param_t ack_param;
sctp_errhdr_t err_param;
int asconf_param_len = 0;
int err_param_len = 0;
__be16 response_type;
if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR == err_code) {
response_type = SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT;
} else {
response_type = SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE;
err_param_len = sizeof(err_param);
if (asconf_param)
asconf_param_len =
ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
}
/* Add Success Indication or Error Cause Indication parameter. */
ack_param.param_hdr.type = response_type;
ack_param.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(ack_param) +
err_param_len +
asconf_param_len);
ack_param.crr_id = crr_id;
sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, sizeof(ack_param), &ack_param);
if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR == err_code)
return;
/* Add Error Cause parameter. */
err_param.cause = err_code;
err_param.length = htons(err_param_len + asconf_param_len);
sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, err_param_len, &err_param);
/* Add the failed TLV copied from ASCONF chunk. */
if (asconf_param)
sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, asconf_param_len, asconf_param);
}
/* Process a asconf parameter. */
static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf,
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param)
{
struct sctp_transport *peer;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
addr_param = (void *)asconf_param + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
if (asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP &&
asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP &&
asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY)
return SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM;
switch (addr_param->p.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (!asoc->peer.ipv6_address)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
if (!asoc->peer.ipv4_address)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
break;
default:
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
}
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type));
if (unlikely(!af))
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
/* ADDIP 4.2.1 This parameter MUST NOT contain a broadcast
* or multicast address.
* (note: wildcard is permitted and requires special handling so
* make sure we check for that)
*/
if (!af->is_any(&addr) && !af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, asconf->skb))
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
switch (asconf_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
/* Section 4.2.1:
* If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, the source
* address of the packet MUST be added.
*/
if (af->is_any(&addr))
memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
/* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
* request and does not have the local resources to add this
* new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
* Cause TLV set to the new error code 'Operation Refused
* Due to Resource Shortage'.
*/
peer = sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, GFP_ATOMIC, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED);
if (!peer)
return SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW;
/* Start the heartbeat timer. */
sctp: avoid refreshing heartbeat timer too often Currently on high rate SCTP streams the heartbeat timer refresh can consume quite a lot of resources as timer updates are costly and it contains a random factor, which a) is also costly and b) invalidates mod_timer() optimization for not editing a timer to the same value. It may even cause the timer to be slightly advanced, for no good reason. As suggested by David Laight this patch now removes this timer update from hot path by leaving the timer on and re-evaluating upon its expiration if the heartbeat is still needed or not, similarly to what is done for TCP. If it's not needed anymore the timer is re-scheduled to the new timeout, considering the time already elapsed. For this, we now record the last tx timestamp per transport, updated in the same spots as hb timer was restarted on tx. Also split up sctp_transport_reset_timers into sctp_transport_reset_t3_rtx and sctp_transport_reset_hb_timer, so we can re-arm T3 without re-arming the heartbeat one. On loopback with MTU of 65535 and data chunks with 1636, so that we have a considerable amount of chunks without stressing system calls, netperf -t SCTP_STREAM -l 30, perf looked like this before: Samples: 103K of event 'cpu-clock', Event count (approx.): 25833000000 Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol + 6,15% netperf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] copy_user_enhanced_fast_string - 5,43% netperf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore - _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore - 96,54% _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore - 36,14% mod_timer + 97,24% sctp_transport_reset_timers + 2,76% sctp_do_sm + 33,65% __wake_up_sync_key + 28,77% sctp_ulpq_tail_event + 1,40% del_timer - 1,84% mod_timer + 99,03% sctp_transport_reset_timers + 0,97% sctp_do_sm + 1,50% sctp_ulpq_tail_event And after this patch, now with netperf -l 60: Samples: 230K of event 'cpu-clock', Event count (approx.): 57707250000 Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol + 5,65% netperf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] memcpy_erms + 5,59% netperf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] copy_user_enhanced_fast_string - 5,05% netperf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore - _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore + 49,89% __wake_up_sync_key + 45,68% sctp_ulpq_tail_event - 2,85% mod_timer + 76,51% sctp_transport_reset_t3_rtx + 23,49% sctp_do_sm + 1,55% del_timer + 2,50% netperf [sctp] [k] sctp_datamsg_from_user + 2,26% netperf [sctp] [k] sctp_sendmsg Throughput-wise, from 6800mbps without the patch to 7050mbps with it, ~3.7%. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 02:15:19 +08:00
sctp_transport_reset_hb_timer(peer);
asoc->new_transport = peer;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
/* ADDIP 4.3 D7) If a request is received to delete the
* last remaining IP address of a peer endpoint, the receiver
* MUST send an Error Cause TLV with the error cause set to the
* new error code 'Request to Delete Last Remaining IP Address'.
*/
if (asoc->peer.transport_count == 1)
return SCTP_ERROR_DEL_LAST_IP;
/* ADDIP 4.3 D8) If a request is received to delete an IP
* address which is also the source address of the IP packet
* which contained the ASCONF chunk, the receiver MUST reject
* this request. To reject the request the receiver MUST send
* an Error Cause TLV set to the new error code 'Request to
* Delete Source IP Address'
*/
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&asconf->source, &addr))
return SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP;
/* Section 4.2.2
* If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, all
* addresses of the peer except the source address of the
* packet MUST be deleted.
*/
if (af->is_any(&addr)) {
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, asconf->transport);
sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(asoc,
asconf->transport);
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
/* If the address is not part of the association, the
* ASCONF-ACK with Error Cause Indication Parameter
* which including cause of Unresolvable Address should
* be sent.
*/
peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!peer)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, peer);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
/* ADDIP Section 4.2.4
* If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, the receiver
* MAY mark the source address of the packet as its
* primary.
*/
if (af->is_any(&addr))
memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!peer)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, peer);
break;
}
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it. */
bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,
struct sctp_paramhdr **errp)
{
sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
union sctp_params param;
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
bool addr_param_seen = false;
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {
size_t length = ntohs(param.p->length);
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
*errp = param.p;
switch (param.p->type) {
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE:
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv4addr_param_t))
return false;
/* ensure there is only one addr param and it's in the
* beginning of addip_hdr params, or we reject it.
*/
if (param.v != addip->addip_hdr.params)
return false;
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
addr_param_seen = true;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t))
return false;
if (param.v != addip->addip_hdr.params)
return false;
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
addr_param_seen = true;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
/* In ASCONF chunks, these need to be first. */
if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)
return false;
length = ntohs(param.addip->param_hdr.length);
if (length < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +
sizeof(**errp))
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
if (length != sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t))
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
return false;
break;
default:
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
/* This is unkown to us, reject! */
return false;
}
}
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
/* Remaining sanity checks. */
if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)
return false;
if (!addr_param_needed && addr_param_seen)
return false;
if (param.v != chunk->chunk_end)
return false;
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
return true;
}
/* Process an incoming ASCONF chunk with the next expected serial no. and
* return an ASCONF_ACK chunk to be sent in response.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf)
{
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) asconf->chunk_hdr;
bool all_param_pass = true;
union sctp_params param;
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack;
__be16 err_code;
int length = 0;
int chunk_len;
__u32 serial;
chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
/* Skip the addiphdr and store a pointer to address parameter. */
length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf->skb->data + length);
chunk_len -= length;
/* Skip the address parameter and store a pointer to the first
* asconf parameter.
*/
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
chunk_len -= length;
/* create an ASCONF_ACK chunk.
* Based on the definitions of parameters, we know that the size of
sctp: malloc enough room for asconf-ack chunk Sometime the ASCONF_ACK parameters can equal to the fourfold of ASCONF parameters, this only happend in some special case: ASCONF parameter is : Unrecognized Parameter (4 bytes) ASCONF_ACK parameter should be: Error Cause Indication parameter (8 bytes header) + Error Cause (4 bytes header) + Unrecognized Parameter (4bytes) Four 4bytes Unrecognized Parameters in ASCONF chunk will cause panic. Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.38-next+ #22 Bochs Bochs EIP: 0060:[<c0717eae>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0 EIP is at skb_put+0x60/0x70 EAX: 00000077 EBX: c09060e2 ECX: dec1dc30 EDX: c09469c0 ESI: 00000000 EDI: de3c8d40 EBP: dec1dc58 ESP: dec1dc2c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=dec1c000 task=c09aef20 task.ti=c0980000) Stack: c09469c0 e1894fa4 00000044 00000004 de3c8d00 de3c8d00 de3c8d44 de3c8d40 c09060e2 de25dd80 de3c8d40 dec1dc7c e1894fa4 dec1dcb0 00000040 00000004 00000000 00000800 00000004 00000004 dec1dce0 e1895a2b dec1dcb4 de25d960 Call Trace: [<e1894fa4>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x4e/0x89 [sctp] [<e1894fa4>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x4e/0x89 [sctp] [<e1895a2b>] sctp_process_asconf+0x32f/0x3d1 [sctp] [<e188d554>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0xf8/0x173 [sctp] [<e1890b02>] sctp_do_sm+0xb8/0x159 [sctp] [<e18a2248>] ? sctp_cname+0x0/0x52 [sctp] [<e189392d>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xac/0xe3 [sctp] [<e1897d76>] sctp_inq_push+0x2d/0x30 [sctp] [<e18a21b2>] sctp_rcv+0x7a7/0x83d [sctp] [<c077a95c>] ? ipv4_confirm+0x118/0x125 [<c073a970>] ? nf_iterate+0x34/0x62 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c0747992>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf5/0x194 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c0747a6e>] NF_HOOK.clone.1+0x3d/0x44 [<c0747ab3>] ip_local_deliver+0x3e/0x44 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c074775c>] ip_rcv_finish+0x29f/0x2c7 [<c07474bd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x0/0x2c7 [<c0747a6e>] NF_HOOK.clone.1+0x3d/0x44 [<c0747cae>] ip_rcv+0x1f5/0x233 [<c07474bd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x0/0x2c7 [<c071dce3>] __netif_receive_skb+0x310/0x336 [<c07221f3>] netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x51 [<e0a4ed3d>] cp_rx_poll+0x1e7/0x29c [8139cp] [<c072275e>] net_rx_action+0x65/0x13a [<c0445a54>] __do_softirq+0xa1/0x149 [<c04459b3>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x149 <IRQ> [<c0445891>] ? irq_exit+0x37/0x72 [<c040a7e9>] ? do_IRQ+0x81/0x95 [<c07b3670>] ? common_interrupt+0x30/0x38 [<c0428058>] ? native_safe_halt+0xa/0xc [<c040f5d7>] ? default_idle+0x58/0x92 [<c0408fb0>] ? cpu_idle+0x96/0xb2 [<c0797989>] ? rest_init+0x5d/0x5f [<c09fd90c>] ? start_kernel+0x34b/0x350 [<c09fd0cb>] ? i386_start_kernel+0xba/0xc1 Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-01 07:42:55 +08:00
* ASCONF_ACK parameters are less than or equal to the fourfold of ASCONF
* parameters.
*/
sctp: malloc enough room for asconf-ack chunk Sometime the ASCONF_ACK parameters can equal to the fourfold of ASCONF parameters, this only happend in some special case: ASCONF parameter is : Unrecognized Parameter (4 bytes) ASCONF_ACK parameter should be: Error Cause Indication parameter (8 bytes header) + Error Cause (4 bytes header) + Unrecognized Parameter (4bytes) Four 4bytes Unrecognized Parameters in ASCONF chunk will cause panic. Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.38-next+ #22 Bochs Bochs EIP: 0060:[<c0717eae>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0 EIP is at skb_put+0x60/0x70 EAX: 00000077 EBX: c09060e2 ECX: dec1dc30 EDX: c09469c0 ESI: 00000000 EDI: de3c8d40 EBP: dec1dc58 ESP: dec1dc2c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=dec1c000 task=c09aef20 task.ti=c0980000) Stack: c09469c0 e1894fa4 00000044 00000004 de3c8d00 de3c8d00 de3c8d44 de3c8d40 c09060e2 de25dd80 de3c8d40 dec1dc7c e1894fa4 dec1dcb0 00000040 00000004 00000000 00000800 00000004 00000004 dec1dce0 e1895a2b dec1dcb4 de25d960 Call Trace: [<e1894fa4>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x4e/0x89 [sctp] [<e1894fa4>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x4e/0x89 [sctp] [<e1895a2b>] sctp_process_asconf+0x32f/0x3d1 [sctp] [<e188d554>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0xf8/0x173 [sctp] [<e1890b02>] sctp_do_sm+0xb8/0x159 [sctp] [<e18a2248>] ? sctp_cname+0x0/0x52 [sctp] [<e189392d>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xac/0xe3 [sctp] [<e1897d76>] sctp_inq_push+0x2d/0x30 [sctp] [<e18a21b2>] sctp_rcv+0x7a7/0x83d [sctp] [<c077a95c>] ? ipv4_confirm+0x118/0x125 [<c073a970>] ? nf_iterate+0x34/0x62 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c0747992>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf5/0x194 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c0747a6e>] NF_HOOK.clone.1+0x3d/0x44 [<c0747ab3>] ip_local_deliver+0x3e/0x44 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194 [<c074775c>] ip_rcv_finish+0x29f/0x2c7 [<c07474bd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x0/0x2c7 [<c0747a6e>] NF_HOOK.clone.1+0x3d/0x44 [<c0747cae>] ip_rcv+0x1f5/0x233 [<c07474bd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x0/0x2c7 [<c071dce3>] __netif_receive_skb+0x310/0x336 [<c07221f3>] netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x51 [<e0a4ed3d>] cp_rx_poll+0x1e7/0x29c [8139cp] [<c072275e>] net_rx_action+0x65/0x13a [<c0445a54>] __do_softirq+0xa1/0x149 [<c04459b3>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x149 <IRQ> [<c0445891>] ? irq_exit+0x37/0x72 [<c040a7e9>] ? do_IRQ+0x81/0x95 [<c07b3670>] ? common_interrupt+0x30/0x38 [<c0428058>] ? native_safe_halt+0xa/0xc [<c040f5d7>] ? default_idle+0x58/0x92 [<c0408fb0>] ? cpu_idle+0x96/0xb2 [<c0797989>] ? rest_init+0x5d/0x5f [<c09fd90c>] ? start_kernel+0x34b/0x350 [<c09fd0cb>] ? i386_start_kernel+0xba/0xc1 Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-01 07:42:55 +08:00
asconf_ack = sctp_make_asconf_ack(asoc, serial, chunk_len * 4);
if (!asconf_ack)
goto done;
/* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {
/* Skip preceeding address parameters. */
if (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||
param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)
continue;
err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf,
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
param.addip);
/* ADDIP 4.1 A7)
* If an error response is received for a TLV parameter,
* all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are
* considered successful if not reported. All TLVs after
* the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless
* a specific success indication is present for the parameter.
*/
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
if (err_code != SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR)
all_param_pass = false;
if (!all_param_pass)
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack, param.addip->crr_id,
err_code, param.addip);
/* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add
* an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it
* MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled
* in the ASCONF.
*/
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
if (err_code == SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW)
goto done;
}
done:
asoc->peer.addip_serial++;
/* If we are sending a new ASCONF_ACK hold a reference to it in assoc
* after freeing the reference to old asconf ack if any.
*/
if (asconf_ack) {
sctp_chunk_hold(asconf_ack);
list_add_tail(&asconf_ack->transmitted_list,
&asoc->asconf_ack_list);
}
return asconf_ack;
}
/* Process a asconf parameter that is successfully acked. */
static void sctp_asconf_param_success(struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param)
{
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *saddr;
addr_param = (void *)asconf_param + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
/* We have checked the packet before, so we do not check again. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(bp->port), 0);
switch (asconf_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
/* This is always done in BH context with a socket lock
* held, so the list can not change.
*/
local_bh_disable();
list_for_each_entry(saddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&saddr->a, &addr))
saddr->state = SCTP_ADDR_SRC;
}
local_bh_enable();
list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
sctp_transport_dst_release(transport);
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
local_bh_disable();
sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, &addr);
if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending != NULL &&
sctp_cmp_addr_exact(asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending, &addr)) {
kfree(asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending);
asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending = NULL;
}
local_bh_enable();
list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
sctp_transport_dst_release(transport);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Get the corresponding ASCONF response error code from the ASCONF_ACK chunk
* for the given asconf parameter. If there is no response for this parameter,
* return the error code based on the third argument 'no_err'.
* ADDIP 4.1
* A7) If an error response is received for a TLV parameter, all TLVs with no
* response before the failed TLV are considered successful if not reported.
* All TLVs after the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless a
* specific success indication is present for the parameter.
*/
static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack,
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param,
int no_err)
{
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_ack_param;
sctp_errhdr_t *err_param;
int length;
int asconf_ack_len;
__be16 err_code;
if (no_err)
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
else
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
asconf_ack_len = ntohs(asconf_ack->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
/* Skip the addiphdr from the asconf_ack chunk and store a pointer to
* the first asconf_ack parameter.
*/
length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t);
asconf_ack_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)(asconf_ack->skb->data +
length);
asconf_ack_len -= length;
while (asconf_ack_len > 0) {
if (asconf_ack_param->crr_id == asconf_param->crr_id) {
switch (asconf_ack_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE:
length = sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
err_param = (void *)asconf_ack_param + length;
asconf_ack_len -= length;
if (asconf_ack_len > 0)
return err_param->cause;
else
return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
break;
default:
return SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
}
}
length = ntohs(asconf_ack_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_ack_param = (void *)asconf_ack_param + length;
asconf_ack_len -= length;
}
return err_code;
}
/* Process an incoming ASCONF_ACK chunk against the cached last ASCONF chunk. */
int sctp_process_asconf_ack(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf = asoc->addip_last_asconf;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
int length = 0;
int asconf_len = asconf->skb->len;
int all_param_pass = 0;
int no_err = 1;
int retval = 0;
__be16 err_code = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
/* Skip the chunkhdr and addiphdr from the last asconf sent and store
* a pointer to address parameter.
*/
length = sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf->skb->data + length);
asconf_len -= length;
/* Skip the address parameter in the last asconf sent and store a
* pointer to the first asconf parameter.
*/
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
asconf_param = (void *)addr_param + length;
asconf_len -= length;
/* ADDIP 4.1
* A8) If there is no response(s) to specific TLV parameter(s), and no
* failures are indicated, then all request(s) are considered
* successful.
*/
if (asconf_ack->skb->len == sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t))
all_param_pass = 1;
/* Process the TLVs contained in the last sent ASCONF chunk. */
while (asconf_len > 0) {
if (all_param_pass)
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
else {
err_code = sctp_get_asconf_response(asconf_ack,
asconf_param,
no_err);
if (no_err && (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code))
no_err = 0;
}
switch (err_code) {
case SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR:
sctp_asconf_param_success(asoc, asconf_param);
break;
case SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW:
retval = 1;
break;
case SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM:
/* Disable sending this type of asconf parameter in
* future.
*/
asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |=
asconf_param->param_hdr.type;
break;
case SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED:
case SCTP_ERROR_DEL_LAST_IP:
case SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP:
default:
break;
}
/* Skip the processed asconf parameter and move to the next
* one.
*/
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
asconf_len -= length;
}
if (no_err && asoc->src_out_of_asoc_ok) {
asoc->src_out_of_asoc_ok = 0;
sctp_transport_immediate_rtx(asoc->peer.primary_path);
}
/* Free the cached last sent asconf chunk. */
list_del_init(&asconf->transmitted_list);
sctp_chunk_free(asconf);
asoc->addip_last_asconf = NULL;
return retval;
}
/* Make a FWD TSN chunk. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_fwdtsn(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 new_cum_tsn, size_t nstreams,
struct sctp_fwdtsn_skip *skiplist)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval = NULL;
struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr ftsn_hdr;
struct sctp_fwdtsn_skip skip;
size_t hint;
int i;
hint = (nstreams + 1) * sizeof(__u32);
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_FWD_TSN, 0, hint, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
ftsn_hdr.new_cum_tsn = htonl(new_cum_tsn);
retval->subh.fwdtsn_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ftsn_hdr), &ftsn_hdr);
for (i = 0; i < nstreams; i++) {
skip.stream = skiplist[i].stream;
skip.ssn = skiplist[i].ssn;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(skip), &skip);
}
return retval;
}
/* RE-CONFIG 3.1 (RE-CONFIG chunk)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Type = 130 | Chunk Flags | Chunk Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* \ \
* / Re-configuration Parameter /
* \ \
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* \ \
* / Re-configuration Parameter (optional) /
* \ \
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_reconf(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
int length)
{
struct sctp_reconf_chunk *reconf;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_RECONF, 0, length,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
reconf = (struct sctp_reconf_chunk *)retval->chunk_hdr;
retval->param_hdr.v = reconf->params;
return retval;
}
/* RE-CONFIG 4.1 (STREAM OUT RESET)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Parameter Type = 13 | Parameter Length = 16 + 2 * N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Request Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Response Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Sender's Last Assigned TSN |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Stream Number 1 (optional) | Stream Number 2 (optional) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* / ...... /
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Stream Number N-1 (optional) | Stream Number N (optional) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* RE-CONFIG 4.2 (STREAM IN RESET)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Parameter Type = 14 | Parameter Length = 8 + 2 * N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Request Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Stream Number 1 (optional) | Stream Number 2 (optional) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* / ...... /
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Stream Number N-1 (optional) | Stream Number N (optional) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_req(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u16 stream_num, __u16 *stream_list,
bool out, bool in)
{
struct sctp_strreset_outreq outreq;
__u16 stream_len = stream_num * 2;
struct sctp_strreset_inreq inreq;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
__u16 outlen, inlen;
outlen = (sizeof(outreq) + stream_len) * out;
inlen = (sizeof(inreq) + stream_len) * in;
retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, outlen + inlen);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
if (outlen) {
outreq.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_OUT_REQUEST;
outreq.param_hdr.length = htons(outlen);
outreq.request_seq = htonl(asoc->strreset_outseq);
outreq.response_seq = htonl(asoc->strreset_inseq - 1);
outreq.send_reset_at_tsn = htonl(asoc->next_tsn - 1);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(outreq), &outreq);
if (stream_len)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, stream_len, stream_list);
}
if (inlen) {
inreq.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_IN_REQUEST;
inreq.param_hdr.length = htons(inlen);
inreq.request_seq = htonl(asoc->strreset_outseq + out);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(inreq), &inreq);
if (stream_len)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, stream_len, stream_list);
}
return retval;
}
/* RE-CONFIG 4.3 (SSN/TSN RESET ALL)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Parameter Type = 15 | Parameter Length = 8 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Request Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_tsnreq(
const struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_strreset_tsnreq tsnreq;
__u16 length = sizeof(tsnreq);
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, length);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
tsnreq.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_TSN_REQUEST;
tsnreq.param_hdr.length = htons(length);
tsnreq.request_seq = htonl(asoc->strreset_outseq);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(tsnreq), &tsnreq);
return retval;
}
/* RE-CONFIG 4.5/4.6 (ADD STREAM)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Parameter Type = 17 | Parameter Length = 12 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Request Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of new streams | Reserved |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_addstrm(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u16 out, __u16 in)
{
struct sctp_strreset_addstrm addstrm;
__u16 size = sizeof(addstrm);
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, (!!out + !!in) * size);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
if (out) {
addstrm.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_OUT_STREAMS;
addstrm.param_hdr.length = htons(size);
addstrm.number_of_streams = htons(out);
addstrm.request_seq = htonl(asoc->strreset_outseq);
addstrm.reserved = 0;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, size, &addstrm);
}
if (in) {
addstrm.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_IN_STREAMS;
addstrm.param_hdr.length = htons(size);
addstrm.number_of_streams = htons(in);
addstrm.request_seq = htonl(asoc->strreset_outseq + !!out);
addstrm.reserved = 0;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, size, &addstrm);
}
return retval;
}
/* RE-CONFIG 4.4 (RESP)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Parameter Type = 16 | Parameter Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Response Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Result |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_resp(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 result, __u32 sn)
{
struct sctp_strreset_resp resp;
__u16 length = sizeof(resp);
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, length);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
resp.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_RESPONSE;
resp.param_hdr.length = htons(length);
resp.response_seq = htonl(sn);
resp.result = htonl(result);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(resp), &resp);
return retval;
}
/* RE-CONFIG 4.4 OPTIONAL (TSNRESP)
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Parameter Type = 16 | Parameter Length |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Re-configuration Response Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Result |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Sender's Next TSN (optional) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Receiver's Next TSN (optional) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_tsnresp(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 result, __u32 sn,
__u32 sender_tsn, __u32 receiver_tsn)
{
struct sctp_strreset_resptsn tsnresp;
__u16 length = sizeof(tsnresp);
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_reconf(asoc, length);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
tsnresp.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_RESET_RESPONSE;
tsnresp.param_hdr.length = htons(length);
tsnresp.response_seq = htonl(sn);
tsnresp.result = htonl(result);
tsnresp.senders_next_tsn = htonl(sender_tsn);
tsnresp.receivers_next_tsn = htonl(receiver_tsn);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(tsnresp), &tsnresp);
return retval;
}
bool sctp_verify_reconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_paramhdr **errp)
{
struct sctp_reconf_chunk *hdr;
union sctp_params param;
__u16 last = 0, cnt = 0;
hdr = (struct sctp_reconf_chunk *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
sctp_walk_params(param, hdr, params) {
__u16 length = ntohs(param.p->length);
*errp = param.p;
if (cnt++ > 2)
return false;
switch (param.p->type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_RESET_OUT_REQUEST:
if (length < sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_outreq) ||
(last && last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_RESPONSE &&
last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_IN_REQUEST))
return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_RESET_IN_REQUEST:
if (length < sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_inreq) ||
(last && last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_OUT_REQUEST))
return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_RESET_RESPONSE:
if ((length != sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_resp) &&
length != sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_resptsn)) ||
(last && last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_RESPONSE &&
last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_OUT_REQUEST))
return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_RESET_TSN_REQUEST:
if (length !=
sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_tsnreq) || last)
return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_IN_STREAMS:
if (length != sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_addstrm) ||
(last && last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_OUT_STREAMS))
return false;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_OUT_STREAMS:
if (length != sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_addstrm) ||
(last && last != SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_IN_STREAMS))
return false;
break;
default:
return false;
}
last = param.p->type;
}
return true;
}