License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2009-05-21 21:45:19 +08:00
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# KVM common configuration items and defaults
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KVM: introduce CONFIG_KVM_COMMON
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM is currently used by some architectures to either
enabled the KVM config proper, or to enable host-side code that is
not part of the KVM module. However, CONFIG_KVM's "select" statement
in virt/kvm/Kconfig corresponds to a third meaning, namely to
enable common Kconfigs required by all architectures that support
KVM.
These three meanings can be replaced respectively by an
architecture-specific Kconfig, by IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM), or by
a new Kconfig symbol that is in turn selected by the
architecture-specific "config KVM".
Start by introducing such a new Kconfig symbol, CONFIG_KVM_COMMON.
Unlike CONFIG_HAVE_KVM, it is selected by CONFIG_KVM, not by
architecture code, and it brings in all dependencies of common
KVM code. In particular, INTERVAL_TREE was missing in loongarch
and riscv, so that is another thing that is fixed.
Fixes: 8132d887a702 ("KVM: remove CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD", 2023-12-08)
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/44907c6b-c5bd-4e4a-a921-e4d3825539d8@infradead.org/
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-01-05 00:15:07 +08:00
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config KVM_COMMON
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bool
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2023-10-19 00:11:56 +08:00
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select EVENTFD
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KVM: introduce CONFIG_KVM_COMMON
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM is currently used by some architectures to either
enabled the KVM config proper, or to enable host-side code that is
not part of the KVM module. However, CONFIG_KVM's "select" statement
in virt/kvm/Kconfig corresponds to a third meaning, namely to
enable common Kconfigs required by all architectures that support
KVM.
These three meanings can be replaced respectively by an
architecture-specific Kconfig, by IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM), or by
a new Kconfig symbol that is in turn selected by the
architecture-specific "config KVM".
Start by introducing such a new Kconfig symbol, CONFIG_KVM_COMMON.
Unlike CONFIG_HAVE_KVM, it is selected by CONFIG_KVM, not by
architecture code, and it brings in all dependencies of common
KVM code. In particular, INTERVAL_TREE was missing in loongarch
and riscv, so that is another thing that is fixed.
Fixes: 8132d887a702 ("KVM: remove CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD", 2023-12-08)
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/44907c6b-c5bd-4e4a-a921-e4d3825539d8@infradead.org/
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-01-05 00:15:07 +08:00
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select INTERVAL_TREE
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select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
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2009-05-21 21:45:19 +08:00
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KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support
This can be used in two modes. There is an atomic mode where the cached
mapping is accessed while holding the rwlock, and a mode where the
physical address is used by a vCPU in guest mode.
For the latter case, an invalidation will wake the vCPU with the new
KVM_REQ_GPC_INVALIDATE, and the architecture will need to refresh any
caches it still needs to access before entering guest mode again.
Only one vCPU can be targeted by the wake requests; it's simple enough
to make it wake all vCPUs or even a mask but I don't see a use case for
that additional complexity right now.
Invalidation happens from the invalidate_range_start MMU notifier, which
needs to be able to sleep in order to wake the vCPU and wait for it.
This means that revalidation potentially needs to "wait" for the MMU
operation to complete and the invalidate_range_end notifier to be
invoked. Like the vCPU when it takes a page fault in that period, we
just spin — fixing that in a future patch by implementing an actual
*wait* may be another part of shaving this particularly hirsute yak.
As noted in the comments in the function itself, the only case where
the invalidate_range_start notifier is expected to be called *without*
being able to sleep is when the OOM reaper is killing the process. In
that case, we expect the vCPU threads already to have exited, and thus
there will be nothing to wake, and no reason to wait. So we clear the
KVM_REQUEST_WAIT bit and send the request anyway, then complain loudly
if there actually *was* anything to wake up.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211210163625.2886-3-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-12-11 00:36:21 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE
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bool
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2009-05-21 21:45:19 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_IRQCHIP
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bool
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2009-05-20 22:30:49 +08:00
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2013-04-17 19:29:30 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING
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bool
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2021-11-21 20:54:40 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING
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bool
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2022-09-26 22:51:16 +08:00
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# Only strongly ordered architectures can select this, as it doesn't
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# put any explicit constraint on userspace ordering. They can also
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# select the _ACQ_REL version.
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config HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING_TSO
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bool
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select HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING
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depends on X86
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# Weakly ordered architectures can only select this, advertising
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# to userspace the additional ordering requirements.
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config HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING_ACQ_REL
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bool
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select HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING
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2022-11-10 18:49:10 +08:00
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# Allow enabling both the dirty bitmap and dirty ring. Only architectures
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# that need to dirty memory outside of a vCPU context should select this.
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config NEED_KVM_DIRTY_RING_WITH_BITMAP
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bool
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depends on HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING
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2009-12-20 21:00:10 +08:00
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config KVM_MMIO
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bool
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2010-10-14 17:22:46 +08:00
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config KVM_ASYNC_PF
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bool
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2012-03-30 03:14:12 +08:00
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2013-06-06 21:32:37 +08:00
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# Toggle to switch between direct notification and batch job
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config KVM_ASYNC_PF_SYNC
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bool
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2012-03-30 03:14:12 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_MSI
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bool
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2012-07-18 21:37:32 +08:00
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2024-01-11 16:00:34 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM
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bool
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2012-07-18 21:37:32 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_CPU_RELAX_INTERCEPT
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bool
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2013-10-31 01:02:17 +08:00
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config KVM_VFIO
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bool
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2015-01-16 07:58:52 +08:00
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2016-05-13 18:16:35 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_INVALID_WAKEUPS
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bool
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2015-01-16 07:58:53 +08:00
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config KVM_GENERIC_DIRTYLOG_READ_PROTECT
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bool
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2015-02-03 16:35:15 +08:00
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2024-04-11 06:07:28 +08:00
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config KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
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bool
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2015-02-03 16:35:15 +08:00
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config KVM_COMPAT
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def_bool y
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2022-02-01 23:05:45 +08:00
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depends on KVM && COMPAT && !(S390 || ARM64 || RISCV)
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2015-09-18 22:29:43 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_IRQ_BYPASS
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bool
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2024-01-11 16:02:05 +08:00
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select IRQ_BYPASS_MANAGER
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2017-12-13 00:41:34 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_VCPU_ASYNC_IOCTL
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bool
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2018-02-24 00:23:57 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_VCPU_RUN_PID_CHANGE
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bool
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2019-03-05 18:30:01 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_NO_POLL
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bool
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2020-07-23 05:59:59 +08:00
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config KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK
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bool
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2021-06-06 10:10:44 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER
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bool
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2022-12-01 07:09:33 +08:00
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config KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
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bool
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2023-10-28 02:21:49 +08:00
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config KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER
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select MMU_NOTIFIER
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bool
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KVM: Introduce per-page memory attributes
In confidential computing usages, whether a page is private or shared is
necessary information for KVM to perform operations like page fault
handling, page zapping etc. There are other potential use cases for
per-page memory attributes, e.g. to make memory read-only (or no-exec,
or exec-only, etc.) without having to modify memslots.
Introduce the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, advertised by
KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, to allow userspace to set the per-page memory
attributes to a guest memory range.
Use an xarray to store the per-page attributes internally, with a naive,
not fully optimized implementation, i.e. prioritize correctness over
performance for the initial implementation.
Use bit 3 for the PRIVATE attribute so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for RWX
attributes/protections in the future, e.g. to give userspace fine-grained
control over read, write, and execute protections for guest memory.
Provide arch hooks for handling attribute changes before and after common
code sets the new attributes, e.g. x86 will use the "pre" hook to zap all
relevant mappings, and the "post" hook to track whether or not hugepages
can be used to map the range.
To simplify the implementation wrap the entire sequence with
kvm_mmu_invalidate_{begin,end}() even though the operation isn't strictly
guaranteed to be an invalidation. For the initial use case, x86 *will*
always invalidate memory, and preventing arch code from creating new
mappings while the attributes are in flux makes it much easier to reason
about the correctness of consuming attributes.
It's possible that future usages may not require an invalidation, e.g.
if KVM ends up supporting RWX protections and userspace grants _more_
protections, but again opt for simplicity and punt optimizations to
if/when they are needed.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y2WB48kD0J4VGynX@google.com
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-10-28 02:21:55 +08:00
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config KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
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2024-01-06 15:24:00 +08:00
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depends on KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER
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KVM: Introduce per-page memory attributes
In confidential computing usages, whether a page is private or shared is
necessary information for KVM to perform operations like page fault
handling, page zapping etc. There are other potential use cases for
per-page memory attributes, e.g. to make memory read-only (or no-exec,
or exec-only, etc.) without having to modify memslots.
Introduce the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, advertised by
KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, to allow userspace to set the per-page memory
attributes to a guest memory range.
Use an xarray to store the per-page attributes internally, with a naive,
not fully optimized implementation, i.e. prioritize correctness over
performance for the initial implementation.
Use bit 3 for the PRIVATE attribute so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for RWX
attributes/protections in the future, e.g. to give userspace fine-grained
control over read, write, and execute protections for guest memory.
Provide arch hooks for handling attribute changes before and after common
code sets the new attributes, e.g. x86 will use the "pre" hook to zap all
relevant mappings, and the "post" hook to track whether or not hugepages
can be used to map the range.
To simplify the implementation wrap the entire sequence with
kvm_mmu_invalidate_{begin,end}() even though the operation isn't strictly
guaranteed to be an invalidation. For the initial use case, x86 *will*
always invalidate memory, and preventing arch code from creating new
mappings while the attributes are in flux makes it much easier to reason
about the correctness of consuming attributes.
It's possible that future usages may not require an invalidation, e.g.
if KVM ends up supporting RWX protections and userspace grants _more_
protections, but again opt for simplicity and punt optimizations to
if/when they are needed.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y2WB48kD0J4VGynX@google.com
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-10-28 02:21:55 +08:00
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bool
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KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory
Introduce an ioctl(), KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, to allow creating file-based
memory that is tied to a specific KVM virtual machine and whose primary
purpose is to serve guest memory.
A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements
that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic
memory subsystem. With guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also
being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by
establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable
one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict
subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support
creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest
mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely
map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to
harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Decoupling guest and userspace mappings may also allow for a cleaner
alternative to high-granularity mappings for HugeTLB, which has reached a
bit of an impasse and is unlikely to ever be merged.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to mmap() guest memory).
More immediately, being able to map memory into KVM guests without mapping
said memory into the host is critical for Confidential VMs (CoCo VMs), the
initial use case for guest_memfd. While AMD's SEV and Intel's TDX prevent
untrusted software from reading guest private data by encrypting guest
memory with a key that isn't usable by the untrusted host, projects such
as Protected KVM (pKVM) provide confidentiality and integrity *without*
relying on memory encryption. And with SEV-SNP and TDX, accessing guest
private memory can be fatal to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host
userspace from accessing guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Attempt #1 to support CoCo VMs was to add a VMA flag to mark memory as
being mappable only by KVM (or a similarly enlightened kernel subsystem).
That approach was abandoned largely due to it needing to play games with
PROT_NONE to prevent userspace from accessing guest memory.
Attempt #2 to was to usurp PG_hwpoison to prevent the host from mapping
guest private memory into userspace, but that approach failed to meet
several requirements for software-based CoCo VMs, e.g. pKVM, as the kernel
wouldn't easily be able to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association, let alone
a 1:1 pfn:gfn mapping. And using PG_hwpoison does not work for memory
that isn't backed by 'struct page', e.g. if devices gain support for
exposing encrypted memory regions to guests.
Attempt #3 was to extend the memfd() syscall and wrap shmem to provide
dedicated file-based guest memory. That approach made it as far as v10
before feedback from Hugh Dickins and Christian Brauner (and others) led
to it demise.
Hugh's objection was that piggybacking shmem made no sense for KVM's use
case as KVM didn't actually *want* the features provided by shmem. I.e.
KVM was using memfd() and shmem to avoid having to manage memory directly,
not because memfd() and shmem were the optimal solution, e.g. things like
read/write/mmap in shmem were dead weight.
Christian pointed out flaws with implementing a partial overlay (wrapping
only _some_ of shmem), e.g. poking at inode_operations or super_operations
would show shmem stuff, but address_space_operations and file_operations
would show KVM's overlay. Paraphrashing heavily, Christian suggested KVM
stop being lazy and create a proper API.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20201020061859.18385-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211111141352.26311-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ff5c5b97-acdf-9745-ebe5-c6609dd6322e@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230418-anfallen-irdisch-6993a61be10b@brauner
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZEM5Zq8oo+xnApW9@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230306191944.GA15773@monkey
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/ZII1p8ZHlHaQ3dDl@casper.infradead.org
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Maciej Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-17-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-11-13 18:42:34 +08:00
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config KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
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select XARRAY_MULTI
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bool
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2023-10-28 02:22:05 +08:00
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config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
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select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
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select KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
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bool
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2024-05-08 00:54:03 +08:00
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2024-07-12 06:27:47 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
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2024-05-08 00:54:03 +08:00
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bool
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depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
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2023-12-31 01:23:21 +08:00
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2024-07-12 06:27:47 +08:00
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config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
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2023-12-31 01:23:21 +08:00
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bool
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depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
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