linux/fs/proc/kcore.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/proc/kcore.c kernel ELF core dumper
*
* Modelled on fs/exec.c:aout_core_dump()
* Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@sw.oz.au>
* ELF version written by David Howells <David.Howells@nexor.co.uk>
* Modified and incorporated into 2.3.x by Tigran Aivazian <tigran@veritas.com>
* Support to dump vmalloc'd areas (ELF only), Tigran Aivazian <tigran@veritas.com>
* Safe accesses to vmalloc/direct-mapped discontiguous areas, Kanoj Sarcar <kanoj@sgi.com>
*/
#include <linux/crash_core.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/kcore.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
mm: remove include/linux/bootmem.h Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header. The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h> @@ @@ - #include <linux/bootmem.h> + #include <linux/memblock.h> [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-31 06:09:49 +08:00
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define CORE_STR "CORE"
#ifndef ELF_CORE_EFLAGS
#define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS 0
#endif
static struct proc_dir_entry *proc_root_kcore;
#ifndef kc_vaddr_to_offset
#define kc_vaddr_to_offset(v) ((v) - PAGE_OFFSET)
#endif
#ifndef kc_offset_to_vaddr
#define kc_offset_to_vaddr(o) ((o) + PAGE_OFFSET)
#endif
static LIST_HEAD(kclist_head);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(kclist_lock);
static int kcore_need_update = 1;
/*
* Returns > 0 for RAM pages, 0 for non-RAM pages, < 0 on error
* Same as oldmem_pfn_is_ram in vmcore
*/
static int (*mem_pfn_is_ram)(unsigned long pfn);
int __init register_mem_pfn_is_ram(int (*fn)(unsigned long pfn))
{
if (mem_pfn_is_ram)
return -EBUSY;
mem_pfn_is_ram = fn;
return 0;
}
static int pfn_is_ram(unsigned long pfn)
{
if (mem_pfn_is_ram)
return mem_pfn_is_ram(pfn);
else
return 1;
}
/* This doesn't grab kclist_lock, so it should only be used at init time. */
void __init kclist_add(struct kcore_list *new, void *addr, size_t size,
int type)
{
new->addr = (unsigned long)addr;
new->size = size;
new->type = type;
list_add_tail(&new->list, &kclist_head);
}
static size_t get_kcore_size(int *nphdr, size_t *phdrs_len, size_t *notes_len,
size_t *data_offset)
{
size_t try, size;
struct kcore_list *m;
*nphdr = 1; /* PT_NOTE */
size = 0;
list_for_each_entry(m, &kclist_head, list) {
try = kc_vaddr_to_offset((size_t)m->addr + m->size);
if (try > size)
size = try;
*nphdr = *nphdr + 1;
}
*phdrs_len = *nphdr * sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
*notes_len = (4 * sizeof(struct elf_note) +
3 * ALIGN(sizeof(CORE_STR), 4) +
VMCOREINFO_NOTE_NAME_BYTES +
ALIGN(sizeof(struct elf_prstatus), 4) +
ALIGN(sizeof(struct elf_prpsinfo), 4) +
ALIGN(arch_task_struct_size, 4) +
ALIGN(vmcoreinfo_size, 4));
*data_offset = PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct elfhdr) + *phdrs_len +
*notes_len);
return *data_offset + size;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
/*
* If no highmem, we can assume [0...max_low_pfn) continuous range of memory
* because memory hole is not as big as !HIGHMEM case.
* (HIGHMEM is special because part of memory is _invisible_ from the kernel.)
*/
static int kcore_ram_list(struct list_head *head)
{
struct kcore_list *ent;
ent = kmalloc(sizeof(*ent), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ent)
return -ENOMEM;
ent->addr = (unsigned long)__va(0);
ent->size = max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
ent->type = KCORE_RAM;
list_add(&ent->list, head);
return 0;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_HIGHMEM */
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
/* calculate vmemmap's address from given system ram pfn and register it */
static int
get_sparsemem_vmemmap_info(struct kcore_list *ent, struct list_head *head)
{
unsigned long pfn = __pa(ent->addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long nr_pages = ent->size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start, end;
struct kcore_list *vmm, *tmp;
start = ((unsigned long)pfn_to_page(pfn)) & PAGE_MASK;
end = ((unsigned long)pfn_to_page(pfn + nr_pages)) - 1;
end = PAGE_ALIGN(end);
/* overlap check (because we have to align page */
list_for_each_entry(tmp, head, list) {
if (tmp->type != KCORE_VMEMMAP)
continue;
if (start < tmp->addr + tmp->size)
if (end > tmp->addr)
end = tmp->addr;
}
if (start < end) {
vmm = kmalloc(sizeof(*vmm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmm)
return 0;
vmm->addr = start;
vmm->size = end - start;
vmm->type = KCORE_VMEMMAP;
list_add_tail(&vmm->list, head);
}
return 1;
}
#else
static int
get_sparsemem_vmemmap_info(struct kcore_list *ent, struct list_head *head)
{
return 1;
}
#endif
static int
kclist_add_private(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, void *arg)
{
struct list_head *head = (struct list_head *)arg;
struct kcore_list *ent;
struct page *p;
if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
return 1;
p = pfn_to_page(pfn);
ent = kmalloc(sizeof(*ent), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ent)
return -ENOMEM;
ent->addr = (unsigned long)page_to_virt(p);
ent->size = nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!virt_addr_valid((void *)ent->addr))
goto free_out;
/* cut not-mapped area. ....from ppc-32 code. */
if (ULONG_MAX - ent->addr < ent->size)
ent->size = ULONG_MAX - ent->addr;
/*
* We've already checked virt_addr_valid so we know this address
* is a valid pointer, therefore we can check against it to determine
* if we need to trim
*/
if (VMALLOC_START > ent->addr) {
if (VMALLOC_START - ent->addr < ent->size)
ent->size = VMALLOC_START - ent->addr;
}
ent->type = KCORE_RAM;
list_add_tail(&ent->list, head);
if (!get_sparsemem_vmemmap_info(ent, head)) {
list_del(&ent->list);
goto free_out;
}
return 0;
free_out:
kfree(ent);
return 1;
}
static int kcore_ram_list(struct list_head *list)
{
int nid, ret;
unsigned long end_pfn;
/* Not inialized....update now */
/* find out "max pfn" */
end_pfn = 0;
for_each_node_state(nid, N_MEMORY) {
unsigned long node_end;
node_end = node_end_pfn(nid);
if (end_pfn < node_end)
end_pfn = node_end;
}
/* scan 0 to max_pfn */
ret = walk_system_ram_range(0, end_pfn, list, kclist_add_private);
if (ret)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */
static int kcore_update_ram(void)
{
LIST_HEAD(list);
LIST_HEAD(garbage);
int nphdr;
size_t phdrs_len, notes_len, data_offset;
struct kcore_list *tmp, *pos;
int ret = 0;
down_write(&kclist_lock);
if (!xchg(&kcore_need_update, 0))
goto out;
ret = kcore_ram_list(&list);
if (ret) {
/* Couldn't get the RAM list, try again next time. */
WRITE_ONCE(kcore_need_update, 1);
list_splice_tail(&list, &garbage);
goto out;
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &kclist_head, list) {
if (pos->type == KCORE_RAM || pos->type == KCORE_VMEMMAP)
list_move(&pos->list, &garbage);
}
list_splice_tail(&list, &kclist_head);
proc_root_kcore->size = get_kcore_size(&nphdr, &phdrs_len, &notes_len,
&data_offset);
out:
up_write(&kclist_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &garbage, list) {
list_del(&pos->list);
kfree(pos);
}
return ret;
}
static void append_kcore_note(char *notes, size_t *i, const char *name,
unsigned int type, const void *desc,
size_t descsz)
{
struct elf_note *note = (struct elf_note *)&notes[*i];
note->n_namesz = strlen(name) + 1;
note->n_descsz = descsz;
note->n_type = type;
*i += sizeof(*note);
memcpy(&notes[*i], name, note->n_namesz);
*i = ALIGN(*i + note->n_namesz, 4);
memcpy(&notes[*i], desc, descsz);
*i = ALIGN(*i + descsz, 4);
}
mm: vmalloc: convert vread() to vread_iter() Having previously laid the foundation for converting vread() to an iterator function, pull the trigger and do so. This patch attempts to provide minimal refactoring and to reflect the existing logic as best we can, for example we continue to zero portions of memory not read, as before. Overall, there should be no functional difference other than a performance improvement in /proc/kcore access to vmalloc regions. Now we have eliminated the need for a bounce buffer in read_kcore_iter(), we dispense with it, and try to write to user memory optimistically but with faults disabled via copy_page_to_iter_nofault(). We already have preemption disabled by holding a spin lock. We continue faulting in until the operation is complete. Additionally, we must account for the fact that at any point a copy may fail (most likely due to a fault not being able to occur), we exit indicating fewer bytes retrieved than expected. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix sparc64 warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230320144721.663280c3@canb.auug.org.au [lstoakes@gmail.com: redo Stephen's sparc build fix] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8506cbc667c39205e65a323f750ff9c11a463798.1679566220.git.lstoakes@gmail.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak uio.h includes] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/941f88bc5ab928e6656e1e2593b91bf0f8c81e1b.1679511146.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-23 02:57:04 +08:00
static ssize_t read_kcore_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
{
loff_t *fpos = &iocb->ki_pos;
size_t phdrs_offset, notes_offset, data_offset;
size_t page_offline_frozen = 1;
size_t phdrs_len, notes_len;
struct kcore_list *m;
size_t tsz;
int nphdr;
unsigned long start;
size_t buflen = iov_iter_count(iter);
size_t orig_buflen = buflen;
int ret = 0;
down_read(&kclist_lock);
/*
* Don't race against drivers that set PageOffline() and expect no
* further page access.
*/
page_offline_freeze();
get_kcore_size(&nphdr, &phdrs_len, &notes_len, &data_offset);
phdrs_offset = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
notes_offset = phdrs_offset + phdrs_len;
/* ELF file header. */
if (buflen && *fpos < sizeof(struct elfhdr)) {
struct elfhdr ehdr = {
.e_ident = {
[EI_MAG0] = ELFMAG0,
[EI_MAG1] = ELFMAG1,
[EI_MAG2] = ELFMAG2,
[EI_MAG3] = ELFMAG3,
[EI_CLASS] = ELF_CLASS,
[EI_DATA] = ELF_DATA,
[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT,
[EI_OSABI] = ELF_OSABI,
},
.e_type = ET_CORE,
.e_machine = ELF_ARCH,
.e_version = EV_CURRENT,
.e_phoff = sizeof(struct elfhdr),
.e_flags = ELF_CORE_EFLAGS,
.e_ehsize = sizeof(struct elfhdr),
.e_phentsize = sizeof(struct elf_phdr),
.e_phnum = nphdr,
};
tsz = min_t(size_t, buflen, sizeof(struct elfhdr) - *fpos);
if (copy_to_iter((char *)&ehdr + *fpos, tsz, iter) != tsz) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
buflen -= tsz;
*fpos += tsz;
}
/* ELF program headers. */
if (buflen && *fpos < phdrs_offset + phdrs_len) {
struct elf_phdr *phdrs, *phdr;
phdrs = kzalloc(phdrs_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!phdrs) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
phdrs[0].p_type = PT_NOTE;
phdrs[0].p_offset = notes_offset;
phdrs[0].p_filesz = notes_len;
phdr = &phdrs[1];
list_for_each_entry(m, &kclist_head, list) {
phdr->p_type = PT_LOAD;
phdr->p_flags = PF_R | PF_W | PF_X;
phdr->p_offset = kc_vaddr_to_offset(m->addr) + data_offset;
fs/proc/kcore: drop KCORE_REMAP and KCORE_OTHER Patch series "fs/proc/kcore: don't read offline sections, logically offline pages and hwpoisoned pages", v3. Looking for places where the kernel might unconditionally read PageOffline() pages, I stumbled over /proc/kcore; turns out /proc/kcore needs some more love to not touch some other pages we really don't want to read -- i.e., hwpoisoned ones. Examples for PageOffline() pages are pages inflated in a balloon, memory unplugged via virtio-mem, and partially-present sections in memory added by the Hyper-V balloon. When reading pages inflated in a balloon, we essentially produce unnecessary load in the hypervisor; holes in partially present sections in case of Hyper-V are not accessible and already were a problem for /proc/vmcore, fixed in makedumpfile by detecting PageOffline() pages. In the future, virtio-mem might disallow reading unplugged memory -- marked as PageOffline() -- in some environments, resulting in undefined behavior when accessed; therefore, I'm trying to identify and rework all these (corner) cases. With this series, there is really only access via /dev/mem, /proc/vmcore and kdb left after I ripped out /dev/kmem. kdb is an advanced corner-case use case -- we won't care for now if someone explicitly tries to do nasty things by reading from/writing to physical addresses we better not touch. /dev/mem is a use case we won't support for virtio-mem, at least for now, so we'll simply disallow mapping any virtio-mem memory via /dev/mem next. /proc/vmcore is really only a problem when dumping the old kernel via something that's not makedumpfile (read: basically never), however, we'll try sanitizing that as well in the second kernel in the future. Tested via kcore_dump: https://github.com/schlafwandler/kcore_dump This patch (of 6): Commit db779ef67ffe ("proc/kcore: Remove unused kclist_add_remap()") removed the last user of KCORE_REMAP. Commit 595dd46ebfc1 ("vfs/proc/kcore, x86/mm/kcore: Fix SMAP fault when dumping vsyscall user page") removed the last user of KCORE_OTHER. Let's drop both types. While at it, also drop vaddr in "struct kcore_list", used by KCORE_REMAP only. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-2-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:50:03 +08:00
phdr->p_vaddr = (size_t)m->addr;
if (m->type == KCORE_RAM)
phdr->p_paddr = __pa(m->addr);
else if (m->type == KCORE_TEXT)
phdr->p_paddr = __pa_symbol(m->addr);
else
phdr->p_paddr = (elf_addr_t)-1;
phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = m->size;
phdr->p_align = PAGE_SIZE;
phdr++;
}
tsz = min_t(size_t, buflen, phdrs_offset + phdrs_len - *fpos);
if (copy_to_iter((char *)phdrs + *fpos - phdrs_offset, tsz,
iter) != tsz) {
kfree(phdrs);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
kfree(phdrs);
buflen -= tsz;
*fpos += tsz;
}
/* ELF note segment. */
if (buflen && *fpos < notes_offset + notes_len) {
struct elf_prstatus prstatus = {};
struct elf_prpsinfo prpsinfo = {
.pr_sname = 'R',
.pr_fname = "vmlinux",
};
char *notes;
size_t i = 0;
strscpy(prpsinfo.pr_psargs, saved_command_line,
sizeof(prpsinfo.pr_psargs));
notes = kzalloc(notes_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!notes) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
append_kcore_note(notes, &i, CORE_STR, NT_PRSTATUS, &prstatus,
sizeof(prstatus));
append_kcore_note(notes, &i, CORE_STR, NT_PRPSINFO, &prpsinfo,
sizeof(prpsinfo));
append_kcore_note(notes, &i, CORE_STR, NT_TASKSTRUCT, current,
arch_task_struct_size);
/*
* vmcoreinfo_size is mostly constant after init time, but it
* can be changed by crash_save_vmcoreinfo(). Racing here with a
* panic on another CPU before the machine goes down is insanely
* unlikely, but it's better to not leave potential buffer
* overflows lying around, regardless.
*/
append_kcore_note(notes, &i, VMCOREINFO_NOTE_NAME, 0,
vmcoreinfo_data,
min(vmcoreinfo_size, notes_len - i));
tsz = min_t(size_t, buflen, notes_offset + notes_len - *fpos);
if (copy_to_iter(notes + *fpos - notes_offset, tsz, iter) != tsz) {
kfree(notes);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
kfree(notes);
buflen -= tsz;
*fpos += tsz;
}
/*
* Check to see if our file offset matches with any of
* the addresses in the elf_phdr on our list.
*/
start = kc_offset_to_vaddr(*fpos - data_offset);
if ((tsz = (PAGE_SIZE - (start & ~PAGE_MASK))) > buflen)
tsz = buflen;
m = NULL;
while (buflen) {
fs/proc/kcore: don't read offline sections, logically offline pages and hwpoisoned pages Let's avoid reading: 1) Offline memory sections: the content of offline memory sections is stale as the memory is effectively unused by the kernel. On s390x with standby memory, offline memory sections (belonging to offline storage increments) are not accessible. With virtio-mem and the hyper-v balloon, we can have unavailable memory chunks that should not be accessed inside offline memory sections. Last but not least, offline memory sections might contain hwpoisoned pages which we can no longer identify because the memmap is stale. 2) PG_offline pages: logically offline pages that are documented as "The content of these pages is effectively stale. Such pages should not be touched (read/write/dump/save) except by their owner.". Examples include pages inflated in a balloon or unavailble memory ranges inside hotplugged memory sections with virtio-mem or the hyper-v balloon. 3) PG_hwpoison pages: Reading pages marked as hwpoisoned can be fatal. As documented: "Accessing is not safe since it may cause another machine check. Don't touch!" Introduce is_page_hwpoison(), adding a comment that it is inherently racy but best we can really do. Reading /proc/kcore now performs similar checks as when reading /proc/vmcore for kdump via makedumpfile: problematic pages are exclude. It's also similar to hibernation code, however, we don't skip hwpoisoned pages when processing pages in kernel/power/snapshot.c:saveable_page() yet. Note 1: we can race against memory offlining code, especially memory going offline and getting unplugged: however, we will properly tear down the identity mapping and handle faults gracefully when accessing this memory from kcore code. Note 2: we can race against drivers setting PageOffline() and turning memory inaccessible in the hypervisor. We'll handle this in a follow-up patch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-4-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:50:10 +08:00
struct page *page;
unsigned long pfn;
/*
* If this is the first iteration or the address is not within
* the previous entry, search for a matching entry.
*/
if (!m || start < m->addr || start >= m->addr + m->size) {
struct kcore_list *iter;
m = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(iter, &kclist_head, list) {
if (start >= iter->addr &&
start < iter->addr + iter->size) {
m = iter;
break;
}
}
}
if (page_offline_frozen++ % MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES == 0) {
page_offline_thaw();
cond_resched();
page_offline_freeze();
}
if (!m) {
if (iov_iter_zero(tsz, iter) != tsz) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
goto skip;
}
switch (m->type) {
case KCORE_VMALLOC:
mm: vmalloc: convert vread() to vread_iter() Having previously laid the foundation for converting vread() to an iterator function, pull the trigger and do so. This patch attempts to provide minimal refactoring and to reflect the existing logic as best we can, for example we continue to zero portions of memory not read, as before. Overall, there should be no functional difference other than a performance improvement in /proc/kcore access to vmalloc regions. Now we have eliminated the need for a bounce buffer in read_kcore_iter(), we dispense with it, and try to write to user memory optimistically but with faults disabled via copy_page_to_iter_nofault(). We already have preemption disabled by holding a spin lock. We continue faulting in until the operation is complete. Additionally, we must account for the fact that at any point a copy may fail (most likely due to a fault not being able to occur), we exit indicating fewer bytes retrieved than expected. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix sparc64 warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230320144721.663280c3@canb.auug.org.au [lstoakes@gmail.com: redo Stephen's sparc build fix] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8506cbc667c39205e65a323f750ff9c11a463798.1679566220.git.lstoakes@gmail.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak uio.h includes] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/941f88bc5ab928e6656e1e2593b91bf0f8c81e1b.1679511146.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-23 02:57:04 +08:00
{
const char *src = (char *)start;
size_t read = 0, left = tsz;
/*
* vmalloc uses spinlocks, so we optimistically try to
* read memory. If this fails, fault pages in and try
* again until we are done.
*/
while (true) {
read += vread_iter(iter, src, left);
if (read == tsz)
break;
src += read;
left -= read;
if (fault_in_iov_iter_writeable(iter, left)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
}
break;
mm: vmalloc: convert vread() to vread_iter() Having previously laid the foundation for converting vread() to an iterator function, pull the trigger and do so. This patch attempts to provide minimal refactoring and to reflect the existing logic as best we can, for example we continue to zero portions of memory not read, as before. Overall, there should be no functional difference other than a performance improvement in /proc/kcore access to vmalloc regions. Now we have eliminated the need for a bounce buffer in read_kcore_iter(), we dispense with it, and try to write to user memory optimistically but with faults disabled via copy_page_to_iter_nofault(). We already have preemption disabled by holding a spin lock. We continue faulting in until the operation is complete. Additionally, we must account for the fact that at any point a copy may fail (most likely due to a fault not being able to occur), we exit indicating fewer bytes retrieved than expected. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix sparc64 warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230320144721.663280c3@canb.auug.org.au [lstoakes@gmail.com: redo Stephen's sparc build fix] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8506cbc667c39205e65a323f750ff9c11a463798.1679566220.git.lstoakes@gmail.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak uio.h includes] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/941f88bc5ab928e6656e1e2593b91bf0f8c81e1b.1679511146.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-23 02:57:04 +08:00
}
case KCORE_USER:
/* User page is handled prior to normal kernel page: */
if (copy_to_iter((char *)start, tsz, iter) != tsz) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
case KCORE_RAM:
fs/proc/kcore: don't read offline sections, logically offline pages and hwpoisoned pages Let's avoid reading: 1) Offline memory sections: the content of offline memory sections is stale as the memory is effectively unused by the kernel. On s390x with standby memory, offline memory sections (belonging to offline storage increments) are not accessible. With virtio-mem and the hyper-v balloon, we can have unavailable memory chunks that should not be accessed inside offline memory sections. Last but not least, offline memory sections might contain hwpoisoned pages which we can no longer identify because the memmap is stale. 2) PG_offline pages: logically offline pages that are documented as "The content of these pages is effectively stale. Such pages should not be touched (read/write/dump/save) except by their owner.". Examples include pages inflated in a balloon or unavailble memory ranges inside hotplugged memory sections with virtio-mem or the hyper-v balloon. 3) PG_hwpoison pages: Reading pages marked as hwpoisoned can be fatal. As documented: "Accessing is not safe since it may cause another machine check. Don't touch!" Introduce is_page_hwpoison(), adding a comment that it is inherently racy but best we can really do. Reading /proc/kcore now performs similar checks as when reading /proc/vmcore for kdump via makedumpfile: problematic pages are exclude. It's also similar to hibernation code, however, we don't skip hwpoisoned pages when processing pages in kernel/power/snapshot.c:saveable_page() yet. Note 1: we can race against memory offlining code, especially memory going offline and getting unplugged: however, we will properly tear down the identity mapping and handle faults gracefully when accessing this memory from kcore code. Note 2: we can race against drivers setting PageOffline() and turning memory inaccessible in the hypervisor. We'll handle this in a follow-up patch. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-4-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:50:10 +08:00
pfn = __pa(start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
/*
* Don't read offline sections, logically offline pages
* (e.g., inflated in a balloon), hwpoisoned pages,
* and explicitly excluded physical ranges.
*/
if (!page || PageOffline(page) ||
is_page_hwpoison(page) || !pfn_is_ram(pfn)) {
if (iov_iter_zero(tsz, iter) != tsz) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
}
fallthrough;
case KCORE_VMEMMAP:
case KCORE_TEXT:
mm: remove kern_addr_valid() completely Most architectures (except arm64/x86/sparc) simply return 1 for kern_addr_valid(), which is only used in read_kcore(), and it calls copy_from_kernel_nofault() which could check whether the address is a valid kernel address. So as there is no need for kern_addr_valid(), let's remove it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018074014.185687-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> [parisc] Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> [csky] Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Xuerui Wang <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-10-18 15:40:14 +08:00
/*
* We use _copy_to_iter() to bypass usermode hardening
fs/proc/kcore: avoid bounce buffer for ktext data Patch series "convert read_kcore(), vread() to use iterators", v8. While reviewing Baoquan's recent changes to permit vread() access to vm_map_ram regions of vmalloc allocations, Willy pointed out [1] that it would be nice to refactor vread() as a whole, since its only user is read_kcore() and the existing form of vread() necessitates the use of a bounce buffer. This patch series does exactly that, as well as adjusting how we read the kernel text section to avoid the use of a bounce buffer in this case as well. This has been tested against the test case which motivated Baoquan's changes in the first place [2] which continues to function correctly, as do the vmalloc self tests. This patch (of 4): Commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") introduced the use of a bounce buffer to retrieve kernel text data for /proc/kcore in order to avoid failures arising from hardened user copies enabled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY in check_kernel_text_object(). We can avoid doing this if instead of copy_to_user() we use _copy_to_user() which bypasses the hardening check. This is more efficient than using a bounce buffer and simplifies the code. We do so as part an overall effort to eliminate bounce buffer usage in the function with an eye to converting it an iterator read. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1679566220.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y8WfDSRkc%2FOHP3oD@casper.infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ilk6gos2.fsf@oracle.com/T/#u [2] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fd39b0bfa7edc76d360def7d034baaee71d90158.1679511146.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-23 02:57:01 +08:00
* which would otherwise prevent this operation.
mm: remove kern_addr_valid() completely Most architectures (except arm64/x86/sparc) simply return 1 for kern_addr_valid(), which is only used in read_kcore(), and it calls copy_from_kernel_nofault() which could check whether the address is a valid kernel address. So as there is no need for kern_addr_valid(), let's remove it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018074014.185687-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> [parisc] Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> [csky] Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Xuerui Wang <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-10-18 15:40:14 +08:00
*/
if (_copy_to_iter((char *)start, tsz, iter) != tsz) {
fs/proc/kcore: avoid bounce buffer for ktext data Patch series "convert read_kcore(), vread() to use iterators", v8. While reviewing Baoquan's recent changes to permit vread() access to vm_map_ram regions of vmalloc allocations, Willy pointed out [1] that it would be nice to refactor vread() as a whole, since its only user is read_kcore() and the existing form of vread() necessitates the use of a bounce buffer. This patch series does exactly that, as well as adjusting how we read the kernel text section to avoid the use of a bounce buffer in this case as well. This has been tested against the test case which motivated Baoquan's changes in the first place [2] which continues to function correctly, as do the vmalloc self tests. This patch (of 4): Commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") introduced the use of a bounce buffer to retrieve kernel text data for /proc/kcore in order to avoid failures arising from hardened user copies enabled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY in check_kernel_text_object(). We can avoid doing this if instead of copy_to_user() we use _copy_to_user() which bypasses the hardening check. This is more efficient than using a bounce buffer and simplifies the code. We do so as part an overall effort to eliminate bounce buffer usage in the function with an eye to converting it an iterator read. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1679566220.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y8WfDSRkc%2FOHP3oD@casper.infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ilk6gos2.fsf@oracle.com/T/#u [2] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fd39b0bfa7edc76d360def7d034baaee71d90158.1679511146.git.lstoakes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-23 02:57:01 +08:00
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
default:
pr_warn_once("Unhandled KCORE type: %d\n", m->type);
if (iov_iter_zero(tsz, iter) != tsz) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
}
skip:
buflen -= tsz;
*fpos += tsz;
start += tsz;
tsz = (buflen > PAGE_SIZE ? PAGE_SIZE : buflen);
}
out:
page_offline_thaw();
up_read(&kclist_lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
return orig_buflen - buflen;
}
static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KCORE);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
if (ret)
return ret;
if (kcore_need_update)
kcore_update_ram();
if (i_size_read(inode) != proc_root_kcore->size) {
inode_lock(inode);
i_size_write(inode, proc_root_kcore->size);
inode_unlock(inode);
}
return 0;
}
static const struct proc_ops kcore_proc_ops = {
.proc_read_iter = read_kcore_iter,
.proc_open = open_kcore,
.proc_lseek = default_llseek,
};
/* just remember that we have to update kcore */
static int __meminit kcore_callback(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long action, void *arg)
{
switch (action) {
case MEM_ONLINE:
case MEM_OFFLINE:
kcore_need_update = 1;
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
static struct kcore_list kcore_vmalloc;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
static struct kcore_list kcore_text;
/*
* If defined, special segment is used for mapping kernel text instead of
* direct-map area. We need to create special TEXT section.
*/
static void __init proc_kcore_text_init(void)
{
kcore: add _text to KCORE_TEXT Extend KCORE_TEXT to cover the pages between _text and _stext, to allow examining some important page table pages. `readelf -a` output on x86_64 before and after patch: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr before LOAD 0x00007fff8100c000 0xffffffff81009000 0x0000000000000000 after LOAD 0x00007fff81003000 0xffffffff81000000 0x0000000000000000 The newly covered pages are: 0xffffffff81000000 <startup_64> etc. 0xffffffff81001000 <init_level4_pgt> 0xffffffff81002000 <level3_ident_pgt> 0xffffffff81003000 <level3_kernel_pgt> 0xffffffff81004000 <level2_fixmap_pgt> 0xffffffff81005000 <level1_fixmap_pgt> 0xffffffff81006000 <level2_ident_pgt> 0xffffffff81007000 <level2_kernel_pgt> 0xffffffff81008000 <level2_spare_pgt> Before patch, /proc/kcore shows outdated contents for the above page table pages, for example: (gdb) p level3_ident_pgt $1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xffffffff81002000 <level3_ident_pgt> (gdb) p/x *((pud_t *)&level3_ident_pgt)@512 $2 = {{pud = 0x1006063}, {pud = 0x0} <repeats 511 times>} while the real content is: root@hp /home/wfg# hexdump -s 0x1002000 -n 4096 /dev/mem 1002000 6063 0100 0000 0000 8067 0000 0000 0000 1002010 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 * 1003000 That is, on a x86_64 box with 2GB memory, we can see first-1GB / full-2GB identity mapping before/after patch: (gdb) p/x *((pud_t *)&level3_ident_pgt)@512 before $1 = {{pud = 0x1006063}, {pud = 0x0} <repeats 511 times>} after $1 = {{pud = 0x1006063}, {pud = 0x8067}, {pud = 0x0} <repeats 510 times>} Obviously the content before patch is wrong. Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27 05:43:27 +08:00
kclist_add(&kcore_text, _text, _end - _text, KCORE_TEXT);
}
#else
static void __init proc_kcore_text_init(void)
{
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(MODULES_VADDR)
/*
* MODULES_VADDR has no intersection with VMALLOC_ADDR.
*/
static struct kcore_list kcore_modules;
static void __init add_modules_range(void)
{
if (MODULES_VADDR != VMALLOC_START && MODULES_END != VMALLOC_END) {
kclist_add(&kcore_modules, (void *)MODULES_VADDR,
MODULES_END - MODULES_VADDR, KCORE_VMALLOC);
}
}
#else
static void __init add_modules_range(void)
{
}
#endif
static int __init proc_kcore_init(void)
{
proc_root_kcore = proc_create("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL, &kcore_proc_ops);
if (!proc_root_kcore) {
pr_err("couldn't create /proc/kcore\n");
return 0; /* Always returns 0. */
}
/* Store text area if it's special */
proc_kcore_text_init();
/* Store vmalloc area */
kclist_add(&kcore_vmalloc, (void *)VMALLOC_START,
VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START, KCORE_VMALLOC);
add_modules_range();
/* Store direct-map area from physical memory map */
kcore_update_ram();
hotplug_memory_notifier(kcore_callback, DEFAULT_CALLBACK_PRI);
return 0;
}
fs_initcall(proc_kcore_init);