2019-05-21 01:08:01 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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/* General persistent per-UID keyrings register
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*/
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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2017-02-03 00:54:15 +08:00
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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#include "internal.h"
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unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry = 3 * 24 * 3600; /* Expire after 3 days of non-use */
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/*
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* Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace.
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*
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* Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
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*/
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static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns)
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{
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struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register",
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KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
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current_cred(),
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2019-07-11 09:43:43 +08:00
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((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
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KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
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KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:24 +08:00
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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if (IS_ERR(reg))
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return PTR_ERR(reg);
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ns->persistent_keyring_register = reg;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Create the persistent keyring for the specified user.
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*
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* Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
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*/
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static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
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struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
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{
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struct key *persistent;
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key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
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if (!ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
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long err = key_create_persistent_register(ns);
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if (err < 0)
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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} else {
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reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
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persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, index_key);
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if (persistent_ref)
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return persistent_ref;
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}
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persistent = keyring_alloc(index_key->description,
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uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(),
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2019-07-11 09:43:43 +08:00
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((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
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KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
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KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:24 +08:00
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL,
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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ns->persistent_keyring_register);
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if (IS_ERR(persistent))
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return ERR_CAST(persistent);
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return make_key_ref(persistent, true);
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}
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/*
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* Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
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* keyring.
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*/
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static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
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key_ref_t dest_ref)
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{
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struct keyring_index_key index_key;
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struct key *persistent;
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key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
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char buf[32];
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long ret;
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/* Look in the register if it exists */
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2019-06-27 04:02:32 +08:00
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memset(&index_key, 0, sizeof(index_key));
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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index_key.type = &key_type_keyring;
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index_key.description = buf;
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index_key.desc_len = sprintf(buf, "_persistent.%u", from_kuid(ns, uid));
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2019-06-27 04:02:31 +08:00
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key_set_index_key(&index_key);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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if (ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
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reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
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2019-06-27 04:02:32 +08:00
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down_read(&ns->keyring_sem);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, &index_key);
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2019-06-27 04:02:32 +08:00
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up_read(&ns->keyring_sem);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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if (persistent_ref)
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goto found;
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}
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/* It wasn't in the register, so we'll need to create it. We might
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* also need to create the register.
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*/
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2019-06-27 04:02:32 +08:00
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down_write(&ns->keyring_sem);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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persistent_ref = key_create_persistent(ns, uid, &index_key);
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2019-06-27 04:02:32 +08:00
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up_write(&ns->keyring_sem);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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if (!IS_ERR(persistent_ref))
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goto found;
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return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
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found:
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2014-03-15 01:44:49 +08:00
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ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_NEED_LINK);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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if (ret == 0) {
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persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
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ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
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if (ret == 0) {
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key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry);
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2016-06-14 17:29:44 +08:00
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ret = persistent->serial;
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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}
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}
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key_ref_put(persistent_ref);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
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* keyring.
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*/
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long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
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{
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
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key_ref_t dest_ref;
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kuid_t uid;
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long ret;
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/* -1 indicates the current user */
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if (_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
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uid = current_uid();
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} else {
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uid = make_kuid(ns, _uid);
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if (!uid_valid(uid))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* You can only see your own persistent cache if you're not
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* sufficiently privileged.
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*/
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2013-11-06 22:01:51 +08:00
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if (!uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) &&
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!uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) &&
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/* There must be a destination keyring */
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2014-03-15 01:44:49 +08:00
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dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
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2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
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if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
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return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
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if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
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ret = -ENOTDIR;
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goto out_put_dest;
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}
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ret = key_get_persistent(ns, uid, dest_ref);
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out_put_dest:
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key_ref_put(dest_ref);
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return ret;
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}
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