linux/block/blk-crypto.c

414 lines
12 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* Refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst for detailed explanation.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto: " fmt
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h>
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
const struct blk_crypto_mode blk_crypto_modes[] = {
[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
.keysize = 64,
.ivsize = 16,
},
[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC_ESSIV] = {
.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
.keysize = 16,
.ivsize = 16,
},
[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM] = {
.cipher_str = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
.keysize = 32,
.ivsize = 32,
},
};
/*
* This number needs to be at least (the number of threads doing IO
* concurrently) * (maximum recursive depth of a bio), so that we don't
* deadlock on crypt_ctx allocations. The default is chosen to be the same
* as the default number of post read contexts in both EXT4 and F2FS.
*/
static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128;
module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
"Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");
static struct kmem_cache *bio_crypt_ctx_cache;
static mempool_t *bio_crypt_ctx_pool;
static int __init bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
{
size_t i;
bio_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_crypt_ctx, 0);
if (!bio_crypt_ctx_cache)
goto out_no_mem;
bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
bio_crypt_ctx_cache);
if (!bio_crypt_ctx_pool)
goto out_no_mem;
/* This is assumed in various places. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID != 0);
/* Sanity check that no algorithm exceeds the defined limits. */
for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++) {
BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].keysize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].ivsize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
}
return 0;
out_no_mem:
panic("Failed to allocate mem for bio crypt ctxs\n");
}
subsys_initcall(bio_crypt_ctx_init);
void bio_crypt_set_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE], gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc;
/*
* The caller must use a gfp_mask that contains __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so
* that the mempool_alloc() can't fail.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM));
bc = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
bc->bc_key = key;
memcpy(bc->bc_dun, dun, sizeof(bc->bc_dun));
bio->bi_crypt_context = bc;
}
void __bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio)
{
mempool_free(bio->bi_crypt_context, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;
}
int __bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
{
dst->bi_crypt_context = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
if (!dst->bi_crypt_context)
return -ENOMEM;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*dst->bi_crypt_context = *src->bi_crypt_context;
return 0;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__bio_crypt_clone);
/* Increments @dun by @inc, treating @dun as a multi-limb integer. */
void bio_crypt_dun_increment(u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
unsigned int inc)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
dun[i] += inc;
/*
* If the addition in this limb overflowed, then we need to
* carry 1 into the next limb. Else the carry is 0.
*/
if (dun[i] < inc)
inc = 1;
else
inc = 0;
}
}
void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes)
{
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
bio_crypt_dun_increment(bc->bc_dun,
bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits);
}
/*
* Returns true if @bc->bc_dun plus @bytes converted to data units is equal to
* @next_dun, treating the DUNs as multi-limb integers.
*/
bool bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
unsigned int bytes,
const u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
{
int i;
unsigned int carry = bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits;
for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
if (bc->bc_dun[i] + carry != next_dun[i])
return false;
/*
* If the addition in this limb overflowed, then we need to
* carry 1 into the next limb. Else the carry is 0.
*/
if ((bc->bc_dun[i] + carry) < carry)
carry = 1;
else
carry = 0;
}
/* If the DUN wrapped through 0, don't treat it as contiguous. */
return carry == 0;
}
/*
* Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible - i.e. that
* they are mergeable except for data_unit_num continuity.
*/
static bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1,
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2)
{
if (!bc1)
return !bc2;
return bc2 && bc1->bc_key == bc2->bc_key;
}
bool bio_crypt_rq_ctx_compatible(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
{
return bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(rq->crypt_ctx, bio->bi_crypt_context);
}
/*
* Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible, and also
* that their data_unit_nums are continuous (and can hence be merged)
* in the order @bc1 followed by @bc2.
*/
bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1, unsigned int bc1_bytes,
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2)
{
if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(bc1, bc2))
return false;
return !bc1 || bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc1, bc1_bytes, bc2->bc_dun);
}
/* Check that all I/O segments are data unit aligned. */
static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio)
{
const unsigned int data_unit_size =
bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
struct bvec_iter iter;
struct bio_vec bv;
bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter) {
if (!IS_ALIGNED(bv.bv_len | bv.bv_offset, data_unit_size))
return false;
}
return true;
}
blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq)
{
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile,
rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key,
&rq->crypt_keyslot);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
}
/**
* __blk_crypto_free_request - Uninitialize the crypto fields of a request.
*
* @rq: The request whose crypto fields to uninitialize.
*
* Completely uninitializes the crypto fields of a request. If a keyslot has
* been programmed into some inline encryption hardware, that keyslot is
* released. The rq->crypt_ctx is also freed.
*/
void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq)
{
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq);
}
/**
* __blk_crypto_bio_prep - Prepare bio for inline encryption
*
* @bio_ptr: pointer to original bio pointer
*
* If the bio crypt context provided for the bio is supported by the underlying
* device's inline encryption hardware, do nothing.
*
* Otherwise, try to perform en/decryption for this bio by falling back to the
* kernel crypto API. When the crypto API fallback is used for encryption,
* blk-crypto may choose to split the bio into 2 - the first one that will
* continue to be processed and the second one that will be resubmitted via
* submit_bio_noacct. A bounce bio will be allocated to encrypt the contents
* of the aforementioned "first one", and *bio_ptr will be updated to this
* bounce bio.
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*
* Caller must ensure bio has bio_crypt_ctx.
*
* Return: true on success; false on error (and bio->bi_status will be set
* appropriately, and bio_endio() will have been called so bio
* submission should abort).
*/
bool __blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr)
{
struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr;
const struct blk_crypto_key *bc_key = bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key;
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
struct blk_crypto_profile *profile;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
/* Error if bio has no data. */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!bio_has_data(bio))) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
goto fail;
}
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
if (!bio_crypt_check_alignment(bio)) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
goto fail;
}
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
/*
* Success if device supports the encryption context, or if we succeeded
* in falling back to the crypto API.
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*/
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
profile = bdev_get_queue(bio->bi_bdev)->crypto_profile;
if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(profile, &bc_key->crypto_cfg))
return true;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
if (blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(bio_ptr))
return true;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
fail:
bio_endio(*bio_ptr);
return false;
}
int __blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
{
if (!rq->crypt_ctx) {
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
rq->crypt_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
if (!rq->crypt_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
}
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*rq->crypt_ctx = *bio->bi_crypt_context;
return 0;
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
}
/**
* blk_crypto_init_key() - Prepare a key for use with blk-crypto
* @blk_key: Pointer to the blk_crypto_key to initialize.
* @raw_key: Pointer to the raw key. Must be the correct length for the chosen
* @crypto_mode; see blk_crypto_modes[].
* @crypto_mode: identifier for the encryption algorithm to use
* @dun_bytes: number of bytes that will be used to specify the DUN when this
* key is used
* @data_unit_size: the data unit size to use for en/decryption
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure. The caller is responsible for
* zeroizing both blk_key and raw_key when done with them.
*/
int blk_crypto_init_key(struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key, const u8 *raw_key,
enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode,
unsigned int dun_bytes,
unsigned int data_unit_size)
{
const struct blk_crypto_mode *mode;
memset(blk_key, 0, sizeof(*blk_key));
if (crypto_mode >= ARRAY_SIZE(blk_crypto_modes))
return -EINVAL;
mode = &blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode];
if (mode->keysize == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (dun_bytes == 0 || dun_bytes > mode->ivsize)
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
if (!is_power_of_2(data_unit_size))
return -EINVAL;
blk_key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
blk_key->crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = dun_bytes;
blk_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = data_unit_size;
blk_key->data_unit_size_bits = ilog2(data_unit_size);
blk_key->size = mode->keysize;
memcpy(blk_key->raw, raw_key, mode->keysize);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check if bios with @cfg can be en/decrypted by blk-crypto (i.e. either the
* request queue it's submitted to supports inline crypto, or the
* blk-crypto-fallback is enabled and supports the cfg).
*/
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
bool blk_crypto_config_supported(struct request_queue *q,
const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg)
{
return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK) ||
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, cfg);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
}
/**
* blk_crypto_start_using_key() - Start using a blk_crypto_key on a device
* @key: A key to use on the device
* @q: the request queue for the device
*
* Upper layers must call this function to ensure that either the hardware
* supports the key's crypto settings, or the crypto API fallback has transforms
* for the needed mode allocated and ready to go. This function may allocate
* an skcipher, and *should not* be called from the data path, since that might
* cause a deadlock
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*
* Return: 0 on success; -ENOPKG if the hardware doesn't support the key and
* blk-crypto-fallback is either disabled or the needed algorithm
* is disabled in the crypto API; or another -errno code.
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*/
int blk_crypto_start_using_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
struct request_queue *q)
{
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, &key->crypto_cfg))
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
return 0;
return blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
}
/**
* blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from any inline encryption hardware
* it may have been programmed into
* @q: The request queue who's associated inline encryption hardware this key
* might have been programmed into
* @key: The key to evict
*
* Upper layers (filesystems) must call this function to ensure that a key is
* evicted from any hardware that it might have been programmed into. The key
* must not be in use by any in-flight IO when this function is called.
*
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
* Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno on error.
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
*/
int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q,
const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
{
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, &key->crypto_cfg))
return __blk_crypto_evict_key(q->crypto_profile, key);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
/*
blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-19 02:04:52 +08:00
* If the request_queue didn't support the key, then blk-crypto-fallback
* may have been used, so try to evict the key from blk-crypto-fallback.
*/
return blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(key);
block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-05-14 08:37:18 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_evict_key);