2019-05-19 20:07:45 +08:00
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2011-06-10 04:52:06 +08:00
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#
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# Makefile for drivers that support virtualization
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#
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obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_HV_MANAGER) += fsl_hypervisor.o
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virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID
VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at
<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by
Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper,
<https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as:
If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most
hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind
the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running
a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious
security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows
10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve
a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root
RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the
vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG
system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous
instantiation of the same VM state.
Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by
multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution.
So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly
added add_vmfork_randomness() function.
It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter.
After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state,
then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this
driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is
described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>.
And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in
<https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>.
Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be
an accidental QEMU nuance, per
<https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>,
so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary
blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway,
considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end.
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 20:46:24 +08:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_VMGENID) += vmgenid.o
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2017-12-01 00:01:27 +08:00
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obj-y += vboxguest/
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2020-09-21 20:17:29 +08:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/
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2021-02-07 11:10:27 +08:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/
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2022-04-13 05:21:25 +08:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/
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2022-04-20 22:14:14 +08:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += coco/sev-guest/
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