linux/net/sched/sch_frag.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR Linux-OpenIB
#include <linux/if_vlan.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <net/sch_generic.h>
#include <net/pkt_sched.h>
#include <net/dst.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ip6_fib.h>
struct sch_frag_data {
unsigned long dst;
struct qdisc_skb_cb cb;
__be16 inner_protocol;
u16 vlan_tci;
__be16 vlan_proto;
unsigned int l2_len;
u8 l2_data[VLAN_ETH_HLEN];
int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb);
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sch_frag_data, sch_frag_data_storage);
static int sch_frag_xmit(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sch_frag_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&sch_frag_data_storage);
if (skb_cow_head(skb, data->l2_len) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ENOMEM;
}
__skb_dst_copy(skb, data->dst);
*qdisc_skb_cb(skb) = data->cb;
skb->inner_protocol = data->inner_protocol;
if (data->vlan_tci & VLAN_CFI_MASK)
__vlan_hwaccel_put_tag(skb, data->vlan_proto,
data->vlan_tci & ~VLAN_CFI_MASK);
else
__vlan_hwaccel_clear_tag(skb);
/* Reconstruct the MAC header. */
skb_push(skb, data->l2_len);
memcpy(skb->data, &data->l2_data, data->l2_len);
skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, skb->data, data->l2_len);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
return data->xmit(skb);
}
static void sch_frag_prepare_frag(struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb))
{
unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
struct sch_frag_data *data;
data = this_cpu_ptr(&sch_frag_data_storage);
data->dst = skb->_skb_refdst;
data->cb = *qdisc_skb_cb(skb);
data->xmit = xmit;
data->inner_protocol = skb->inner_protocol;
if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb))
data->vlan_tci = skb_vlan_tag_get(skb) | VLAN_CFI_MASK;
else
data->vlan_tci = 0;
data->vlan_proto = skb->vlan_proto;
data->l2_len = hlen;
memcpy(&data->l2_data, skb->data, hlen);
memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
skb_pull(skb, hlen);
}
static unsigned int
sch_frag_dst_get_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
return dst->dev->mtu;
}
static struct dst_ops sch_frag_dst_ops = {
.family = AF_UNSPEC,
.mtu = sch_frag_dst_get_mtu,
};
static int sch_fragment(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 mru, int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb))
{
int ret = -1;
if (skb_network_offset(skb) > VLAN_ETH_HLEN) {
net_warn_ratelimited("L2 header too long to fragment\n");
goto err;
}
if (skb_protocol(skb, true) == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40 tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred] tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0 fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower] tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500 net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0 __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f do_softirq+0x71/0x90 </IRQ> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0 ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120 ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60 __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved) raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 ^ ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph: ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked() the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. Fixes: c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11 Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-28 21:23:14 +08:00
struct rtable sch_frag_rt = { 0 };
unsigned long orig_dst;
sch_frag_prepare_frag(skb, xmit);
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40 tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred] tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0 fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower] tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500 net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0 __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f do_softirq+0x71/0x90 </IRQ> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0 ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120 ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60 __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved) raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 ^ ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph: ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked() the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. Fixes: c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11 Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-28 21:23:14 +08:00
dst_init(&sch_frag_rt.dst, &sch_frag_dst_ops, NULL, 1,
DST_OBSOLETE_NONE, DST_NOCOUNT);
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40 tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred] tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0 fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower] tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500 net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0 __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f do_softirq+0x71/0x90 </IRQ> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0 ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120 ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60 __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved) raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 ^ ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph: ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked() the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. Fixes: c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11 Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-28 21:23:14 +08:00
sch_frag_rt.dst.dev = skb->dev;
orig_dst = skb->_skb_refdst;
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40 tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred] tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0 fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower] tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500 net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0 __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f do_softirq+0x71/0x90 </IRQ> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0 ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120 ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60 __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved) raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 ^ ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph: ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked() the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. Fixes: c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11 Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-28 21:23:14 +08:00
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &sch_frag_rt.dst);
IPCB(skb)->frag_max_size = mru;
ret = ip_do_fragment(net, skb->sk, skb, sch_frag_xmit);
refdst_drop(orig_dst);
} else if (skb_protocol(skb, true) == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
unsigned long orig_dst;
struct rt6_info sch_frag_rt;
sch_frag_prepare_frag(skb, xmit);
memset(&sch_frag_rt, 0, sizeof(sch_frag_rt));
dst_init(&sch_frag_rt.dst, &sch_frag_dst_ops, NULL, 1,
DST_OBSOLETE_NONE, DST_NOCOUNT);
sch_frag_rt.dst.dev = skb->dev;
orig_dst = skb->_skb_refdst;
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &sch_frag_rt.dst);
IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size = mru;
ret = ipv6_stub->ipv6_fragment(net, skb->sk, skb,
sch_frag_xmit);
refdst_drop(orig_dst);
} else {
net_warn_ratelimited("Fail frag %s: eth=%x, MRU=%d, MTU=%d\n",
netdev_name(skb->dev),
ntohs(skb_protocol(skb, true)), mru,
skb->dev->mtu);
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
int sch_frag_xmit_hook(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb))
{
u16 mru = tc_skb_cb(skb)->mru;
int err;
if (mru && skb->len > mru + skb->dev->hard_header_len)
err = sch_fragment(dev_net(skb->dev), skb, mru, xmit);
else
err = xmit(skb);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sch_frag_xmit_hook);