2019-05-19 21:51:43 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
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/*
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* elf.c - ELF access library
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*
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* Adapted from kpatch (https://github.com/dynup/kpatch):
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* Copyright (C) 2013-2015 Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2014 Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
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*/
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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2018-01-15 22:17:08 +08:00
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#include <errno.h>
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2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
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#include <linux/interval_tree_generic.h>
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2020-11-13 07:03:32 +08:00
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#include <objtool/builtin.h>
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objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
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2020-11-13 07:03:32 +08:00
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#include <objtool/elf.h>
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#include <objtool/warn.h>
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objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-12 16:32:10 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline u32 str_hash(const char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return jhash(str, strlen(str), 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __elf_table(name) (elf->name##_hash)
|
|
|
|
#define __elf_bits(name) (elf->name##_bits)
|
2020-03-12 21:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __elf_table_entry(name, key) \
|
|
|
|
__elf_table(name)[hash_min(key, __elf_bits(name))]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define elf_hash_add(name, node, key) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
struct elf_hash_node *__node = node; \
|
|
|
|
__node->next = __elf_table_entry(name, key); \
|
|
|
|
__elf_table_entry(name, key) = __node; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void __elf_hash_del(struct elf_hash_node *node,
|
|
|
|
struct elf_hash_node **head)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct elf_hash_node *cur, *prev;
|
2020-03-12 21:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (node == *head) {
|
|
|
|
*head = node->next;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (prev = NULL, cur = *head; cur; prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (cur == node) {
|
|
|
|
prev->next = cur->next;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define elf_hash_del(name, node, key) \
|
|
|
|
__elf_hash_del(node, &__elf_table_entry(name, key))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define elf_list_entry(ptr, type, member) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
typeof(ptr) __ptr = (ptr); \
|
|
|
|
__ptr ? container_of(__ptr, type, member) : NULL; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define elf_hash_for_each_possible(name, obj, member, key) \
|
|
|
|
for (obj = elf_list_entry(__elf_table_entry(name, key), typeof(*obj), member); \
|
|
|
|
obj; \
|
|
|
|
obj = elf_list_entry(obj->member.next, typeof(*(obj)), member))
|
2020-03-12 21:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
#define elf_alloc_hash(name, size) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
__elf_bits(name) = max(10, ilog2(size)); \
|
2023-05-31 01:21:11 +08:00
|
|
|
__elf_table(name) = mmap(NULL, sizeof(struct elf_hash_node *) << __elf_bits(name), \
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, \
|
|
|
|
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON, -1, 0); \
|
|
|
|
if (__elf_table(name) == (void *)-1L) { \
|
|
|
|
WARN("mmap fail " #name); \
|
|
|
|
__elf_table(name) = NULL; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
__elf_table(name); \
|
|
|
|
})
|
2020-03-12 21:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long __sym_start(struct symbol *s)
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return s->offset;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long __sym_last(struct symbol *s)
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return s->offset + s->len - 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
INTERVAL_TREE_DEFINE(struct symbol, node, unsigned long, __subtree_last,
|
|
|
|
__sym_start, __sym_last, static, __sym)
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __sym_for_each(_iter, _tree, _start, _end) \
|
|
|
|
for (_iter = __sym_iter_first((_tree), (_start), (_end)); \
|
|
|
|
_iter; _iter = __sym_iter_next(_iter, (_start), (_end)))
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-08 23:30:46 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol_hole {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long key;
|
|
|
|
const struct symbol *sym;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Find !section symbol where @offset is after it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int symbol_hole_by_offset(const void *key, const struct rb_node *node)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct symbol *s = rb_entry(node, struct symbol, node);
|
|
|
|
struct symbol_hole *sh = (void *)key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sh->key < s->offset)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sh->key >= s->offset + s->len) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->type != STT_SECTION)
|
|
|
|
sh->sym = s;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-22 18:32:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *find_section_by_name(const struct elf *elf, const char *name)
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct section *sec;
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_for_each_possible(section_name, sec, name_hash, str_hash(name)) {
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(sec->name, name))
|
|
|
|
return sec;
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct section *find_section_by_index(struct elf *elf,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct section *sec;
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_for_each_possible(section, sec, hash, idx) {
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec->idx == idx)
|
|
|
|
return sec;
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct symbol *find_symbol_by_index(struct elf *elf, unsigned int idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym;
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_for_each_possible(symbol, sym, hash, idx) {
|
2020-03-11 01:39:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sym->idx == idx)
|
|
|
|
return sym;
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *find_symbol_by_offset(struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct rb_root_cached *tree = (struct rb_root_cached *)&sec->symbol_tree;
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__sym_for_each(iter, tree, offset, offset) {
|
|
|
|
if (iter->offset == offset && iter->type != STT_SECTION)
|
|
|
|
return iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-18 11:41:54 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *find_func_by_offset(struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct rb_root_cached *tree = (struct rb_root_cached *)&sec->symbol_tree;
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *iter;
|
2020-02-18 11:41:54 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__sym_for_each(iter, tree, offset, offset) {
|
|
|
|
if (iter->offset == offset && iter->type == STT_FUNC)
|
|
|
|
return iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 22:30:42 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *find_symbol_containing(const struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
|
2018-05-10 11:39:15 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct rb_root_cached *tree = (struct rb_root_cached *)&sec->symbol_tree;
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__sym_for_each(iter, tree, offset, offset) {
|
|
|
|
if (iter->type != STT_SECTION)
|
|
|
|
return iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-10 11:39:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-08 23:30:46 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Returns size of hole starting at @offset.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int find_symbol_hole_containing(const struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct symbol_hole hole = {
|
|
|
|
.key = offset,
|
|
|
|
.sym = NULL,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *n;
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Find the rightmost symbol for which @offset is after it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
n = rb_find(&hole, &sec->symbol_tree.rb_root, symbol_hole_by_offset);
|
2022-03-08 23:30:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* found a symbol that contains @offset */
|
|
|
|
if (n)
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* not a hole */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* didn't find a symbol for which @offset is after it */
|
|
|
|
if (!hole.sym)
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* not a hole */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* @offset >= sym->offset + sym->len, find symbol after it */
|
|
|
|
n = rb_next(&hole.sym->node);
|
|
|
|
if (!n)
|
|
|
|
return -1; /* until end of address space */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* hole until start of next symbol */
|
|
|
|
s = rb_entry(n, struct symbol, node);
|
|
|
|
return s->offset - offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-16 17:36:53 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *find_func_containing(struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct rb_root_cached *tree = (struct rb_root_cached *)&sec->symbol_tree;
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__sym_for_each(iter, tree, offset, offset) {
|
|
|
|
if (iter->type == STT_FUNC)
|
|
|
|
return iter;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-22 18:32:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *find_symbol_by_name(const struct elf *elf, const char *name)
|
2017-03-03 06:57:23 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym;
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_for_each_possible(symbol_name, sym, name_hash, str_hash(name)) {
|
2020-03-12 17:17:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(sym->name, name))
|
|
|
|
return sym;
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-03 06:57:23 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
struct reloc *find_reloc_by_dest_range(const struct elf *elf, struct section *sec,
|
2020-03-12 18:23:36 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long offset, unsigned int len)
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
struct reloc *reloc, *r = NULL;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *rsec;
|
2016-03-09 14:07:00 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long o;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec = sec->rsec;
|
|
|
|
if (!rsec)
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-12 18:30:50 +08:00
|
|
|
for_offset_range(o, offset, offset + len) {
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_for_each_possible(reloc, reloc, hash,
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_offset_hash(rsec, o)) {
|
|
|
|
if (reloc->sec != rsec)
|
2020-03-12 18:30:50 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (reloc_offset(reloc) >= offset &&
|
|
|
|
reloc_offset(reloc) < offset + len) {
|
|
|
|
if (!r || reloc_offset(reloc) < reloc_offset(r))
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
r = reloc;
|
2020-03-12 18:30:50 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-12 18:23:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-12 18:30:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (r)
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
2020-03-12 18:23:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
struct reloc *find_reloc_by_dest(const struct elf *elf, struct section *sec, unsigned long offset)
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
return find_reloc_by_dest_range(elf, sec, offset, 1);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool is_dwarf_section(struct section *sec)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return !strncmp(sec->name, ".debug_", 7);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static int read_sections(struct elf *elf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Elf_Scn *s = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct section *sec;
|
|
|
|
size_t shstrndx, sections_nr;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (elf_getshdrnum(elf->elf, §ions_nr)) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getshdrnum");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (elf_getshdrstrndx(elf->elf, &shstrndx)) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getshdrstrndx");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!elf_alloc_hash(section, sections_nr) ||
|
|
|
|
!elf_alloc_hash(section_name, sections_nr))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-28 00:00:59 +08:00
|
|
|
elf->section_data = calloc(sections_nr, sizeof(*sec));
|
|
|
|
if (!elf->section_data) {
|
|
|
|
perror("calloc");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sections_nr; i++) {
|
2022-12-28 00:00:59 +08:00
|
|
|
sec = &elf->section_data[i];
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 14:06:57 +08:00
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sec->symbol_list);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!s) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->idx = elf_ndxscn(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!gelf_getshdr(s, &sec->sh)) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("gelf_getshdr");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->name = elf_strptr(elf->elf, shstrndx, sec->sh.sh_name);
|
|
|
|
if (!sec->name) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_strptr");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec->sh.sh_size != 0 && !is_dwarf_section(sec)) {
|
2017-09-15 15:15:05 +08:00
|
|
|
sec->data = elf_getdata(s, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!sec->data) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getdata");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sec->data->d_off != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
sec->data->d_size != sec->sh.sh_size) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("unexpected data attributes for %s",
|
|
|
|
sec->name);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-11 01:43:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&sec->list, &elf->sections);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(section, &sec->hash, sec->idx);
|
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(section_name, &sec->name_hash, str_hash(sec->name));
|
2023-05-31 01:20:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_reloc_sec(sec))
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
elf->num_relocs += sec_num_entries(sec);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-19 00:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (opts.stats) {
|
2020-03-12 16:26:29 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("nr_sections: %lu\n", (unsigned long)sections_nr);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("section_bits: %d\n", elf->section_bits);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-12 16:26:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/* sanity check, one more call to elf_nextscn() should return NULL */
|
|
|
|
if (elf_nextscn(elf->elf, s)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("section entry mismatch");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
static void elf_add_symbol(struct elf *elf, struct symbol *sym)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *entry;
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *pnode;
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *iter;
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sym->pv_target);
|
|
|
|
sym->alias = sym;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
sym->type = GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->sym.st_info);
|
|
|
|
sym->bind = GELF_ST_BIND(sym->sym.st_info);
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-19 00:50:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sym->type == STT_FILE)
|
|
|
|
elf->num_files++;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
sym->offset = sym->sym.st_value;
|
|
|
|
sym->len = sym->sym.st_size;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__sym_for_each(iter, &sym->sec->symbol_tree, sym->offset, sym->offset) {
|
|
|
|
if (iter->offset == sym->offset && iter->type == sym->type)
|
|
|
|
iter->alias = sym;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__sym_insert(sym, &sym->sec->symbol_tree);
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
pnode = rb_prev(&sym->node);
|
|
|
|
if (pnode)
|
|
|
|
entry = &rb_entry(pnode, struct symbol, node)->list;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
entry = &sym->sec->symbol_list;
|
|
|
|
list_add(&sym->list, entry);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(symbol, &sym->hash, sym->idx);
|
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(symbol_name, &sym->name_hash, str_hash(sym->name));
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Don't store empty STT_NOTYPE symbols in the rbtree. They
|
|
|
|
* can exist within a function, confusing the sorting.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!sym->len)
|
2022-09-15 19:11:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__sym_remove(sym, &sym->sec->symbol_tree);
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static int read_symbols(struct elf *elf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-22 06:08:42 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *symtab, *symtab_shndx, *sec;
|
2020-03-12 16:34:42 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym, *pfunc;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
int symbols_nr, i;
|
2018-05-10 11:39:15 +08:00
|
|
|
char *coldstr;
|
2020-04-22 06:08:42 +08:00
|
|
|
Elf_Data *shndx_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Elf32_Word shndx;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
symtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab");
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (symtab) {
|
|
|
|
symtab_shndx = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab_shndx");
|
|
|
|
if (symtab_shndx)
|
|
|
|
shndx_data = symtab_shndx->data;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
symbols_nr = sec_num_entries(symtab);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-01-15 06:14:01 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A missing symbol table is actually possible if it's an empty
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* .o file. This can happen for thunk_64.o. Make sure to at
|
|
|
|
* least allocate the symbol hash tables so we can do symbol
|
|
|
|
* lookups without crashing.
|
2021-01-15 06:14:01 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
symbols_nr = 0;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!elf_alloc_hash(symbol, symbols_nr) ||
|
|
|
|
!elf_alloc_hash(symbol_name, symbols_nr))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-12-28 00:00:59 +08:00
|
|
|
elf->symbol_data = calloc(symbols_nr, sizeof(*sym));
|
|
|
|
if (!elf->symbol_data) {
|
|
|
|
perror("calloc");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < symbols_nr; i++) {
|
2022-12-28 00:00:59 +08:00
|
|
|
sym = &elf->symbol_data[i];
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym->idx = i;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-22 06:08:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!gelf_getsymshndx(symtab->data, shndx_data, i, &sym->sym,
|
|
|
|
&shndx)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("gelf_getsymshndx");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym->name = elf_strptr(elf->elf, symtab->sh.sh_link,
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_name);
|
|
|
|
if (!sym->name) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_strptr");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-22 06:08:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((sym->sym.st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF &&
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_shndx < SHN_LORESERVE) ||
|
|
|
|
(shndx_data && sym->sym.st_shndx == SHN_XINDEX)) {
|
|
|
|
if (sym->sym.st_shndx != SHN_XINDEX)
|
|
|
|
shndx = sym->sym.st_shndx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym->sec = find_section_by_index(elf, shndx);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!sym->sec) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("couldn't find section for symbol %s",
|
|
|
|
sym->name);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->sym.st_info) == STT_SECTION) {
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
sym->name = sym->sec->name;
|
|
|
|
sym->sec->sym = sym;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
sym->sec = find_section_by_index(elf, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 23:12:10 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_add_symbol(elf, sym);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-19 00:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (opts.stats) {
|
2020-03-12 16:26:29 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("nr_symbols: %lu\n", (unsigned long)symbols_nr);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("symbol_bits: %d\n", elf->symbol_bits);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-12 16:26:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-10 11:39:15 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Create parent/child links for any cold subfunctions */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(sec, &elf->sections, list) {
|
2023-04-13 03:03:19 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_for_each_sym(sec, sym) {
|
2023-10-05 08:08:19 +08:00
|
|
|
char *pname;
|
2018-11-21 01:52:16 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t pnamelen;
|
2018-05-10 11:39:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sym->type != STT_FUNC)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2020-04-16 05:04:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sym->pfunc == NULL)
|
|
|
|
sym->pfunc = sym;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sym->cfunc == NULL)
|
|
|
|
sym->cfunc = sym;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-01 10:57:30 +08:00
|
|
|
coldstr = strstr(sym->name, ".cold");
|
2018-06-28 06:03:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!coldstr)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-21 01:52:16 +08:00
|
|
|
pnamelen = coldstr - sym->name;
|
2023-10-05 08:08:19 +08:00
|
|
|
pname = strndup(sym->name, pnamelen);
|
|
|
|
if (!pname) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("%s(): failed to allocate memory",
|
|
|
|
sym->name);
|
2018-11-21 01:52:16 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pfunc = find_symbol_by_name(elf, pname);
|
2023-10-05 08:08:19 +08:00
|
|
|
free(pname);
|
2018-06-28 06:03:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pfunc) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("%s(): can't find parent function",
|
|
|
|
sym->name);
|
2018-11-21 01:52:15 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2018-06-28 06:03:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym->pfunc = pfunc;
|
|
|
|
pfunc->cfunc = sym;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unfortunately, -fnoreorder-functions puts the child
|
|
|
|
* inside the parent. Remove the overlap so we can
|
|
|
|
* have sane assumptions.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note that pfunc->len now no longer matches
|
|
|
|
* pfunc->sym.st_size.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sym->sec == pfunc->sec &&
|
|
|
|
sym->offset >= pfunc->offset &&
|
|
|
|
sym->offset + sym->len == pfunc->offset + pfunc->len) {
|
|
|
|
pfunc->len -= sym->len;
|
2018-05-10 11:39:15 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
free(sym);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2023-05-31 01:21:00 +08:00
|
|
|
* @sym's idx has changed. Update the relocs which reference it.
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-05-31 01:21:00 +08:00
|
|
|
static int elf_update_sym_relocs(struct elf *elf, struct symbol *sym)
|
2021-03-26 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-11-03 05:31:19 +08:00
|
|
|
struct reloc *reloc;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:12 +08:00
|
|
|
for (reloc = sym->relocs; reloc; reloc = reloc->sym_next_reloc)
|
|
|
|
set_reloc_sym(elf, reloc, reloc->sym->idx);
|
2023-05-31 01:21:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
* The libelf API is terrible; gelf_update_sym*() takes a data block relative
|
|
|
|
* index value, *NOT* the symbol index. As such, iterate the data blocks and
|
|
|
|
* adjust index until it fits.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If no data block is found, allow adding a new data block provided the index
|
|
|
|
* is only one past the end.
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
static int elf_update_symbol(struct elf *elf, struct section *symtab,
|
|
|
|
struct section *symtab_shndx, struct symbol *sym)
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
Elf32_Word shndx = sym->sec ? sym->sec->idx : SHN_UNDEF;
|
|
|
|
Elf_Data *symtab_data = NULL, *shndx_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Elf64_Xword entsize = symtab->sh.sh_entsize;
|
|
|
|
int max_idx, idx = sym->idx;
|
|
|
|
Elf_Scn *s, *t = NULL;
|
2022-09-09 05:54:58 +08:00
|
|
|
bool is_special_shndx = sym->sym.st_shndx >= SHN_LORESERVE &&
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_shndx != SHN_XINDEX;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_special_shndx)
|
|
|
|
shndx = sym->sym.st_shndx;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab->idx);
|
|
|
|
if (!s) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (symtab_shndx) {
|
|
|
|
t = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab_shndx->idx);
|
|
|
|
if (!t) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
/* get next data descriptor for the relevant sections */
|
|
|
|
symtab_data = elf_getdata(s, symtab_data);
|
|
|
|
if (t)
|
|
|
|
shndx_data = elf_getdata(t, shndx_data);
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* end-of-list */
|
|
|
|
if (!symtab_data) {
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Over-allocate to avoid O(n^2) symbol creation
|
|
|
|
* behaviour. The down side is that libelf doesn't
|
|
|
|
* like this; see elf_truncate_section() for the fixup.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int num = max(1U, sym->idx/3);
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buf;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (idx) {
|
|
|
|
/* we don't do holes in symbol tables */
|
|
|
|
WARN("index out of range");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* if @idx == 0, it's the next contiguous entry, create it */
|
|
|
|
symtab_data = elf_newdata(s);
|
|
|
|
if (t)
|
|
|
|
shndx_data = elf_newdata(t);
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
buf = calloc(num, entsize);
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!buf) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
symtab_data->d_buf = buf;
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
symtab_data->d_size = num * entsize;
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
symtab_data->d_align = 1;
|
|
|
|
symtab_data->d_type = ELF_T_SYM;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, symtab, true);
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
symtab->truncate = true;
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (t) {
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
buf = calloc(num, sizeof(Elf32_Word));
|
|
|
|
if (!buf) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shndx_data->d_buf = buf;
|
|
|
|
shndx_data->d_size = num * sizeof(Elf32_Word);
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
shndx_data->d_align = sizeof(Elf32_Word);
|
|
|
|
shndx_data->d_type = ELF_T_WORD;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, symtab_shndx, true);
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
symtab_shndx->truncate = true;
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* empty blocks should not happen */
|
|
|
|
if (!symtab_data->d_size) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("zero size data");
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2021-03-26 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* is this the right block? */
|
|
|
|
max_idx = symtab_data->d_size / entsize;
|
|
|
|
if (idx < max_idx)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* adjust index and try again */
|
|
|
|
idx -= max_idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* something went side-ways */
|
|
|
|
if (idx < 0) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("negative index");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* setup extended section index magic and write the symbol */
|
2022-09-09 05:54:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((shndx >= SHN_UNDEF && shndx < SHN_LORESERVE) || is_special_shndx) {
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_shndx = shndx;
|
|
|
|
if (!shndx_data)
|
|
|
|
shndx = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_shndx = SHN_XINDEX;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!shndx_data) {
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN("no .symtab_shndx");
|
2021-03-26 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-26 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!gelf_update_symshndx(symtab_data, shndx_data, idx, &sym->sym, shndx)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("gelf_update_symshndx");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct symbol *
|
2022-10-28 21:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
__elf_create_symbol(struct elf *elf, struct symbol *sym)
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct section *symtab, *symtab_shndx;
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
Elf32_Word first_non_local, new_idx;
|
2022-10-28 21:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *old;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
symtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab");
|
|
|
|
if (symtab) {
|
|
|
|
symtab_shndx = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab_shndx");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
WARN("no .symtab");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
new_idx = sec_num_entries(symtab);
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-28 21:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (GELF_ST_BIND(sym->sym.st_info) != STB_LOCAL)
|
|
|
|
goto non_local;
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Move the first global symbol, as per sh_info, into a new, higher
|
|
|
|
* symbol index. This fees up a spot for a new local symbol.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
first_non_local = symtab->sh.sh_info;
|
|
|
|
old = find_symbol_by_index(elf, first_non_local);
|
|
|
|
if (old) {
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:11 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_del(symbol, &old->hash, old->idx);
|
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(symbol, &old->hash, new_idx);
|
|
|
|
old->idx = new_idx;
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (elf_update_symbol(elf, symtab, symtab_shndx, old)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("elf_update_symbol move");
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (elf_update_sym_relocs(elf, old))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
new_idx = first_non_local;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-28 21:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Either way, we will add a LOCAL symbol.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
symtab->sh.sh_info += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
non_local:
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
sym->idx = new_idx;
|
|
|
|
if (elf_update_symbol(elf, symtab, symtab_shndx, sym)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("elf_update_symbol");
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
symtab->sh.sh_size += symtab->sh.sh_entsize;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, symtab, true);
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (symtab_shndx) {
|
|
|
|
symtab_shndx->sh.sh_size += sizeof(Elf32_Word);
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, symtab_shndx, true);
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-28 21:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return sym;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct symbol *
|
|
|
|
elf_create_section_symbol(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym = calloc(1, sizeof(*sym));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sym) {
|
|
|
|
perror("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-17 23:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-28 21:49:26 +08:00
|
|
|
sym->name = sec->name;
|
|
|
|
sym->sec = sec;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// st_name 0
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_info = GELF_ST_INFO(STB_LOCAL, STT_SECTION);
|
|
|
|
// st_other 0
|
|
|
|
// st_value 0
|
|
|
|
// st_size 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym = __elf_create_symbol(elf, sym);
|
|
|
|
if (sym)
|
|
|
|
elf_add_symbol(elf, sym);
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sym;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-28 21:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
static int elf_add_string(struct elf *elf, struct section *strtab, char *str);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *
|
|
|
|
elf_create_prefix_symbol(struct elf *elf, struct symbol *orig, long size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym = calloc(1, sizeof(*sym));
|
|
|
|
size_t namelen = strlen(orig->name) + sizeof("__pfx_");
|
|
|
|
char *name = malloc(namelen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sym || !name) {
|
|
|
|
perror("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(name, namelen, "__pfx_%s", orig->name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym->name = name;
|
|
|
|
sym->sec = orig->sec;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_name = elf_add_string(elf, NULL, name);
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_info = orig->sym.st_info;
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_value = orig->sym.st_value - size;
|
|
|
|
sym->sym.st_size = size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym = __elf_create_symbol(elf, sym);
|
|
|
|
if (sym)
|
|
|
|
elf_add_symbol(elf, sym);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sym;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct reloc *elf_init_reloc(struct elf *elf, struct section *rsec,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int reloc_idx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long offset, struct symbol *sym,
|
|
|
|
s64 addend, unsigned int type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-05-31 01:21:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct reloc *reloc, empty = { 0 };
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (reloc_idx >= sec_num_entries(rsec)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("%s: bad reloc_idx %u for %s with %d relocs",
|
|
|
|
__func__, reloc_idx, rsec->name, sec_num_entries(rsec));
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
reloc = &rsec->relocs[reloc_idx];
|
2023-05-31 01:21:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(reloc, &empty, sizeof(empty))) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("%s: %s: reloc %d already initialized!",
|
|
|
|
__func__, rsec->name, reloc_idx);
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reloc->sec = rsec;
|
|
|
|
reloc->sym = sym;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:12 +08:00
|
|
|
set_reloc_offset(elf, reloc, offset);
|
|
|
|
set_reloc_sym(elf, reloc, sym->idx);
|
|
|
|
set_reloc_type(elf, reloc, type);
|
|
|
|
set_reloc_addend(elf, reloc, addend);
|
2023-05-31 01:21:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(reloc, &reloc->hash, reloc_hash(reloc));
|
2023-05-31 01:21:10 +08:00
|
|
|
reloc->sym_next_reloc = sym->relocs;
|
|
|
|
sym->relocs = reloc;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return reloc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct reloc *elf_init_reloc_text_sym(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long offset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int reloc_idx,
|
|
|
|
struct section *insn_sec,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long insn_off)
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym = insn_sec->sym;
|
|
|
|
int addend = insn_off;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(insn_sec->sh.sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("bad call to %s() for data symbol %s",
|
|
|
|
__func__, sym->name);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!sym) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Due to how weak functions work, we must use section based
|
|
|
|
* relocations. Symbol based relocations would result in the
|
|
|
|
* weak and non-weak function annotations being overlaid on the
|
|
|
|
* non-weak function after linking.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sym = elf_create_section_symbol(elf, insn_sec);
|
|
|
|
if (!sym)
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
objtool: Fix code relocs vs weak symbols
Occasionally objtool driven code patching (think .static_call_sites
.retpoline_sites etc..) goes sideways and it tries to patch an
instruction that doesn't match.
Much head-scatching and cursing later the problem is as outlined below
and affects every section that objtool generates for us, very much
including the ORC data. The below uses .static_call_sites because it's
convenient for demonstration purposes, but as mentioned the ORC
sections, .retpoline_sites and __mount_loc are all similarly affected.
Consider:
foo-weak.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
__attribute__((weak)) void foo(void)
{
return __SCT__foo();
}
foo.c:
extern void __SCT__foo(void);
extern void my_foo(void);
void foo(void)
{
my_foo();
return __SCT__foo();
}
These generate the obvious code
(gcc -O2 -fcf-protection=none -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -c foo*.c):
foo-weak.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo+0x5> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
foo.o:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 9 <foo+0x9> 5: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
9: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 12 <foo+0x12> e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Now, when we link these two files together, you get something like
(ld -r -o foos.o foo-weak.o foo.o):
foos.o:
0000000000000000 <foo-0x10>:
0: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 5 <foo-0xb> 1: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
5: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
f: 90 nop
0000000000000010 <foo>:
10: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp
14: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 19 <foo+0x9> 15: R_X86_64_PLT32 my_foo-0x4
19: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp
1d: e9 00 00 00 00 jmpq 22 <foo+0x12> 1e: R_X86_64_PLT32 __SCT__foo-0x4
Noting that ld preserves the weak function text, but strips the symbol
off of it (hence objdump doing that funny negative offset thing). This
does lead to 'interesting' unused code issues with objtool when ran on
linked objects, but that seems to be working (fingers crossed).
So far so good.. Now lets consider the objtool static_call output
section (readelf output, old binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 .text + 1d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
So we have two patch sites, one in the dead code of the weak foo and one
in the real foo. All is well.
*HOWEVER*, when the toolchain strips unused section symbols it
generates things like this (using new enough binutils):
foo-weak.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x2c8 contains 1 entry:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foo.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x310 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000200000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
foos.o:
Relocation section '.rela.static_call_sites' at offset 0x430 contains 4 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + 0
0000000000000004 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
0000000000000008 0000000100000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 foo + d
000000000000000c 0000000d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32 0000000000000000 __SCT__foo + 1
And now we can see how that foos.o .static_call_sites goes side-ways, we
now have _two_ patch sites in foo. One for the weak symbol at foo+0
(which is no longer a static_call site!) and one at foo+d which is in
fact the right location.
This seems to happen when objtool cannot find a section symbol, in which
case it falls back to any other symbol to key off of, however in this
case that goes terribly wrong!
As such, teach objtool to create a section symbol when there isn't
one.
Fixes: 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.655552918@infradead.org
2022-04-17 23:03:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
insn_sec->sym = sym;
|
2021-03-26 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return elf_init_reloc(elf, sec->rsec, reloc_idx, offset, sym, addend,
|
|
|
|
elf_text_rela_type(elf));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct reloc *elf_init_reloc_data_sym(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long offset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int reloc_idx,
|
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym,
|
|
|
|
s64 addend)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (sym->sec && (sec->sh.sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("bad call to %s() for text symbol %s",
|
|
|
|
__func__, sym->name);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return elf_init_reloc(elf, sec->rsec, reloc_idx, offset, sym, addend,
|
|
|
|
elf_data_rela_type(elf));
|
2020-03-12 21:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
static int read_relocs(struct elf *elf)
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-05-31 01:20:57 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long nr_reloc, max_reloc = 0;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *rsec;
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
struct reloc *reloc;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int symndx;
|
2022-11-03 05:31:19 +08:00
|
|
|
struct symbol *sym;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!elf_alloc_hash(reloc, elf->num_relocs))
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(rsec, &elf->sections, list) {
|
2023-05-31 01:20:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!is_reloc_sec(rsec))
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->base = find_section_by_index(elf, rsec->sh.sh_info);
|
|
|
|
if (!rsec->base) {
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN("can't find base section for reloc section %s",
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->name);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->base->rsec = rsec;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
nr_reloc = 0;
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->relocs = calloc(sec_num_entries(rsec), sizeof(*reloc));
|
|
|
|
if (!rsec->relocs) {
|
2022-12-28 00:00:59 +08:00
|
|
|
perror("calloc");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sec_num_entries(rsec); i++) {
|
|
|
|
reloc = &rsec->relocs[i];
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
reloc->sec = rsec;
|
2023-05-31 01:21:12 +08:00
|
|
|
symndx = reloc_sym(reloc);
|
2022-11-03 05:31:19 +08:00
|
|
|
reloc->sym = sym = find_symbol_by_index(elf, symndx);
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!reloc->sym) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("can't find reloc entry symbol %d for %s",
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
symndx, rsec->name);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-09 14:07:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(reloc, &reloc->hash, reloc_hash(reloc));
|
2023-05-31 01:21:10 +08:00
|
|
|
reloc->sym_next_reloc = sym->relocs;
|
|
|
|
sym->relocs = reloc;
|
2021-03-26 23:12:06 +08:00
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
nr_reloc++;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
max_reloc = max(max_reloc, nr_reloc);
|
2020-03-12 16:26:29 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-19 00:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (opts.stats) {
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("max_reloc: %lu\n", max_reloc);
|
2023-05-31 01:20:57 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("num_relocs: %lu\n", elf->num_relocs);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("reloc_bits: %d\n", elf->reloc_bits);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-22 18:32:04 +08:00
|
|
|
struct elf *elf_open_read(const char *name, int flags)
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct elf *elf;
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
Elf_Cmd cmd;
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elf_version(EV_CURRENT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elf = malloc(sizeof(*elf));
|
|
|
|
if (!elf) {
|
|
|
|
perror("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-06-29 18:05:05 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(elf, 0, sizeof(*elf));
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&elf->sections);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
elf->fd = open(name, flags);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (elf->fd == -1) {
|
2018-01-15 22:17:08 +08:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "objtool: Can't open '%s': %s\n",
|
|
|
|
name, strerror(errno));
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
|
|
|
|
cmd = ELF_C_READ_MMAP;
|
|
|
|
else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)
|
|
|
|
cmd = ELF_C_RDWR;
|
|
|
|
else /* O_WRONLY */
|
|
|
|
cmd = ELF_C_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
elf->elf = elf_begin(elf->fd, cmd, NULL);
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!elf->elf) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_begin");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!gelf_getehdr(elf->elf, &elf->ehdr)) {
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("gelf_getehdr");
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (read_sections(elf))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (read_symbols(elf))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Rename rela to reloc
Before supporting additional relocation types rename the relevant
types and functions from "rela" to "reloc". This work be done with
the following regex:
sed -e 's/struct rela/struct reloc/g' \
-e 's/\([_\*]\)rela\(s\{0,1\}\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/tmprela\(s\{0,1\}\)/tmpreloc\1/g' \
-e 's/relasec/relocsec/g' \
-e 's/rela_list/reloc_list/g' \
-e 's/rela_hash/reloc_hash/g' \
-e 's/add_rela/add_reloc/g' \
-e 's/rela->/reloc->/g' \
-e '/rela[,\.]/{ s/\([^\.>]\)rela\([\.,]\)/\1reloc\2/g ; }' \
-e 's/rela =/reloc =/g' \
-e 's/relas =/relocs =/g' \
-e 's/relas\[/relocs[/g' \
-e 's/relaname =/relocname =/g' \
-e 's/= rela\;/= reloc\;/g' \
-e 's/= relas\;/= relocs\;/g' \
-e 's/= relaname\;/= relocname\;/g' \
-e 's/, rela)/, reloc)/g' \
-e 's/\([ @]\)rela\([ "]\)/\1reloc\2/g' \
-e 's/ rela$/ reloc/g' \
-e 's/, relaname/, relocname/g' \
-e 's/sec->rela/sec->reloc/g' \
-e 's/(\(!\{0,1\}\)rela/(\1reloc/g' \
-i \
arch.h \
arch/x86/decode.c \
check.c \
check.h \
elf.c \
elf.h \
orc_gen.c \
special.c
Notable exceptions which complicate the regex include gelf_*
library calls and standard/expected section names which still use
"rela" because they encode the type of relocation expected. Also, keep
"rela" in the struct because it encodes a specific type of relocation
we currently expect.
It will eventually turn into a member of an anonymous union when a
susequent patch adds implicit addend, or "rel", relocation support.
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <mhelsley@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-05-30 05:01:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (read_relocs(elf))
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return elf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
elf_close(elf);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 23:12:09 +08:00
|
|
|
static int elf_add_string(struct elf *elf, struct section *strtab, char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Elf_Data *data;
|
|
|
|
Elf_Scn *s;
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strtab)
|
|
|
|
strtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".strtab");
|
|
|
|
if (!strtab) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("can't find .strtab section");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, strtab->idx);
|
|
|
|
if (!s) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data = elf_newdata(s);
|
|
|
|
if (!data) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_newdata");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data->d_buf = str;
|
|
|
|
data->d_size = strlen(str) + 1;
|
|
|
|
data->d_align = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-23 06:50:37 +08:00
|
|
|
len = strtab->sh.sh_size;
|
|
|
|
strtab->sh.sh_size += data->d_size;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, strtab, true);
|
2021-03-26 23:12:09 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *elf_create_section(struct elf *elf, const char *name,
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t entsize, unsigned int nr)
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct section *sec, *shstrtab;
|
|
|
|
size_t size = entsize * nr;
|
2019-07-11 05:17:35 +08:00
|
|
|
Elf_Scn *s;
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec = malloc(sizeof(*sec));
|
|
|
|
if (!sec) {
|
|
|
|
perror("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(sec, 0, sizeof(*sec));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sec->symbol_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = elf_newscn(elf->elf);
|
|
|
|
if (!s) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_newscn");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->name = strdup(name);
|
|
|
|
if (!sec->name) {
|
|
|
|
perror("strdup");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->idx = elf_ndxscn(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->data = elf_newdata(s);
|
|
|
|
if (!sec->data) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_newdata");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->data->d_size = size;
|
|
|
|
sec->data->d_align = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (size) {
|
|
|
|
sec->data->d_buf = malloc(size);
|
|
|
|
if (!sec->data->d_buf) {
|
|
|
|
perror("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(sec->data->d_buf, 0, size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!gelf_getshdr(s, &sec->sh)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("gelf_getshdr");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec->sh.sh_size = size;
|
|
|
|
sec->sh.sh_entsize = entsize;
|
|
|
|
sec->sh.sh_type = SHT_PROGBITS;
|
|
|
|
sec->sh.sh_addralign = 1;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:54 +08:00
|
|
|
sec->sh.sh_flags = SHF_ALLOC;
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-10 00:17:22 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Add section name to .shstrtab (or .strtab for Clang) */
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
shstrtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".shstrtab");
|
2018-07-10 00:17:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!shstrtab)
|
|
|
|
shstrtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".strtab");
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!shstrtab) {
|
2018-07-10 00:17:22 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN("can't find .shstrtab or .strtab section");
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-26 23:12:09 +08:00
|
|
|
sec->sh.sh_name = elf_add_string(elf, shstrtab, sec->name);
|
|
|
|
if (sec->sh.sh_name == -1)
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-11 01:43:35 +08:00
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&sec->list, &elf->sections);
|
objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing
Currently objtool has 5 hashtables and sizes them 16 or 20 bits
depending on the --vmlinux argument.
However, a single side doesn't really work well for the 5 tables,
which among them, cover 3 different uses. Also, while vmlinux is
larger, there is still a very wide difference between a defconfig and
allyesconfig build, which again isn't optimally covered by a single
size.
Another aspect is the cost of elf_hash_init(), which for large tables
dominates the runtime for small input files. It turns out that all it
does it assign NULL, something that is required when using malloc().
However, when we allocate memory using mmap(), we're guaranteed to get
zero filled pages.
Therefore, rewrite the whole thing to:
1) use more dynamic sized tables, depending on the input file,
2) avoid the need for elf_hash_init() entirely by using mmap().
This speeds up a regular kernel build (100s to 98s for
x86_64-defconfig), and potentially dramatically speeds up vmlinux
processing.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506194157.452881700@infradead.org
2021-05-07 03:33:53 +08:00
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(section, &sec->hash, sec->idx);
|
|
|
|
elf_hash_add(section_name, &sec->name_hash, str_hash(sec->name));
|
2020-03-11 01:43:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, sec, true);
|
2020-04-18 05:15:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
return sec;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct section *elf_create_rela_section(struct elf *elf,
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *sec,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int reloc_nr)
|
2020-05-30 05:01:14 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *rsec;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
char *rsec_name;
|
2020-05-30 05:01:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec_name = malloc(strlen(sec->name) + strlen(".rela") + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!rsec_name) {
|
2020-05-30 05:01:14 +08:00
|
|
|
perror("malloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
strcpy(rsec_name, ".rela");
|
|
|
|
strcat(rsec_name, sec->name);
|
2020-05-30 05:01:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec = elf_create_section(elf, rsec_name, elf_rela_size(elf), reloc_nr);
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
free(rsec_name);
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!rsec)
|
2020-05-30 05:01:14 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->data->d_type = ELF_T_RELA;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->sh.sh_type = SHT_RELA;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->sh.sh_addralign = elf_addr_size(elf);
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->sh.sh_link = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab")->idx;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->sh.sh_info = sec->idx;
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->sh.sh_flags = SHF_INFO_LINK;
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:21:04 +08:00
|
|
|
rsec->relocs = calloc(sec_num_entries(rsec), sizeof(struct reloc));
|
|
|
|
if (!rsec->relocs) {
|
2023-05-31 01:21:03 +08:00
|
|
|
perror("calloc");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
sec->rsec = rsec;
|
|
|
|
rsec->base = sec;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return rsec;
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:59 +08:00
|
|
|
struct section *elf_create_section_pair(struct elf *elf, const char *name,
|
|
|
|
size_t entsize, unsigned int nr,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int reloc_nr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct section *sec;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec = elf_create_section(elf, name, entsize, nr);
|
|
|
|
if (!sec)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!elf_create_rela_section(elf, sec, reloc_nr))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sec;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-12 21:43:00 +08:00
|
|
|
int elf_write_insn(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long offset, unsigned int len,
|
|
|
|
const char *insn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Elf_Data *data = sec->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->d_type != ELF_T_BYTE || data->d_off) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("write to unexpected data for section: %s", sec->name);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data->d_buf + offset, insn, len);
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, sec, true);
|
2020-06-12 21:43:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When Elf_Scn::sh_size is smaller than the combined Elf_Data::d_size
|
|
|
|
* do you:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* A) adhere to the section header and truncate the data, or
|
|
|
|
* B) ignore the section header and write out all the data you've got?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Yes, libelf sucks and we need to manually truncate if we over-allocate data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int elf_truncate_section(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u64 size = sec->sh.sh_size;
|
|
|
|
bool truncated = false;
|
|
|
|
Elf_Data *data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Elf_Scn *s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, sec->idx);
|
|
|
|
if (!s) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
/* get next data descriptor for the relevant section */
|
|
|
|
data = elf_getdata(s, data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!data) {
|
|
|
|
if (size) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("end of section data but non-zero size left\n");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (truncated) {
|
|
|
|
/* when we remove symbols */
|
|
|
|
WARN("truncated; but more data\n");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!data->d_size) {
|
|
|
|
WARN("zero size data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->d_size > size) {
|
|
|
|
truncated = true;
|
|
|
|
data->d_size = size;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size -= data->d_size;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 05:15:00 +08:00
|
|
|
int elf_write(struct elf *elf)
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct section *sec;
|
|
|
|
Elf_Scn *s;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-19 00:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (opts.dryrun)
|
2022-03-08 23:30:13 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 23:12:06 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Update changed relocation sections and section headers: */
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(sec, &elf->sections, list) {
|
2022-10-29 02:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec->truncate)
|
|
|
|
elf_truncate_section(elf, sec);
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec_changed(sec)) {
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, sec->idx);
|
|
|
|
if (!s) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_getscn");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Note this also flags the section dirty */
|
2017-09-15 15:17:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!gelf_update_shdr(s, &sec->sh)) {
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("gelf_update_shdr");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-18 05:15:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-31 01:20:58 +08:00
|
|
|
mark_sec_changed(elf, sec, false);
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-15 15:17:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Make sure the new section header entries get updated properly. */
|
|
|
|
elf_flagelf(elf->elf, ELF_C_SET, ELF_F_DIRTY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Write all changes to the file. */
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (elf_update(elf->elf, ELF_C_WRITE) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ELF("elf_update");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-18 05:15:00 +08:00
|
|
|
elf->changed = false;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-11 23:33:42 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
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|
void elf_close(struct elf *elf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-06-28 23:11:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (elf->elf)
|
|
|
|
elf_end(elf->elf);
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
if (elf->fd > 0)
|
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close(elf->fd);
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2023-05-31 01:21:01 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: All remaining allocations are leaked on purpose. Objtool is
|
|
|
|
* about to exit anyway.
|
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|
|
*/
|
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata. It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:
a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels
Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes. They allow runtime
code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
code.
For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER. For some other architectures they may be
required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").
For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.
But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
hand, which most people don't do. So the end result is that
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.
For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
and update the frame pointer. If a first function doesn't properly
create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.
For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
pointers enabled:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
seq_read().
If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
what it looks like instead:
[<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
[<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
[<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
[<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
[<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
skipped. Instead the stack trace seems to show that
cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().
The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
*all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
be skipped on a stack trace.
[*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
destroyed. This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.
b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
This is not yet implemented. For more details about what is planned,
see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:
1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
function type. In asm code, this is typically done using the
ENTRY/ENDPROC macros. If objtool finds a return instruction
outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
callable code which should be annotated accordingly.
This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.
2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
be annotated as an ELF function. The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
in this case.
This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.
3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
the architecture's back chain rules. This can by done in asm code
with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.
This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
designed. If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
trace.
4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:
a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or
b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
the same value it had on function entry.
This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
function's code paths. If a function jumps to code in another file,
and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
because it only analyzes a single file at a time.
5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.
This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
return normally.
It currently only supports x86_64. I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.
On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time. It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|