linux/net/sunrpc/auth.c

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/*
* linux/net/sunrpc/auth.c
*
* Generic RPC client authentication API.
*
* Copyright (C) 1996, Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de>
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
#define RPC_CREDCACHE_DEFAULT_HASHBITS (4)
struct rpc_cred_cache {
struct hlist_head *hashtable;
unsigned int hashbits;
spinlock_t lock;
};
static unsigned int auth_hashbits = RPC_CREDCACHE_DEFAULT_HASHBITS;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rpc_authflavor_lock);
static const struct rpc_authops *auth_flavors[RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR] = {
&authnull_ops, /* AUTH_NULL */
&authunix_ops, /* AUTH_UNIX */
NULL, /* others can be loadable modules */
};
static LIST_HEAD(cred_unused);
static unsigned long number_cred_unused;
#define MAX_HASHTABLE_BITS (14)
static int param_set_hashtbl_sz(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
unsigned long num;
unsigned int nbits;
int ret;
if (!val)
goto out_inval;
ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num);
if (ret)
goto out_inval;
nbits = fls(num - 1);
if (nbits > MAX_HASHTABLE_BITS || nbits < 2)
goto out_inval;
*(unsigned int *)kp->arg = nbits;
return 0;
out_inval:
return -EINVAL;
}
static int param_get_hashtbl_sz(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
unsigned int nbits;
nbits = *(unsigned int *)kp->arg;
return sprintf(buffer, "%u", 1U << nbits);
}
#define param_check_hashtbl_sz(name, p) __param_check(name, p, unsigned int);
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_hashtbl_sz = {
.set = param_set_hashtbl_sz,
.get = param_get_hashtbl_sz,
};
module_param_named(auth_hashtable_size, auth_hashbits, hashtbl_sz, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(auth_hashtable_size, "RPC credential cache hashtable size");
static unsigned long auth_max_cred_cachesize = ULONG_MAX;
module_param(auth_max_cred_cachesize, ulong, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(auth_max_cred_cachesize, "RPC credential maximum total cache size");
static u32
pseudoflavor_to_flavor(u32 flavor) {
if (flavor > RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR)
return RPC_AUTH_GSS;
return flavor;
}
int
rpcauth_register(const struct rpc_authops *ops)
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor;
int ret = -EPERM;
if ((flavor = ops->au_flavor) >= RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
if (auth_flavors[flavor] == NULL) {
auth_flavors[flavor] = ops;
ret = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_register);
int
rpcauth_unregister(const struct rpc_authops *ops)
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor;
int ret = -EPERM;
if ((flavor = ops->au_flavor) >= RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
if (auth_flavors[flavor] == ops) {
auth_flavors[flavor] = NULL;
ret = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_unregister);
/**
* rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor - check if security flavor is supported
* @flavor: a security flavor
* @info: a GSS mech OID, quality of protection, and service value
*
* Verifies that an appropriate kernel module is available or already loaded.
* Returns an equivalent pseudoflavor, or RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if "flavor" is
* not supported locally.
*/
rpc_authflavor_t
rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor(rpc_authflavor_t flavor, struct rpcsec_gss_info *info)
{
const struct rpc_authops *ops;
rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor;
ops = auth_flavors[flavor];
if (ops == NULL)
request_module("rpc-auth-%u", flavor);
spin_lock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
ops = auth_flavors[flavor];
if (ops == NULL || !try_module_get(ops->owner)) {
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
return RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR;
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
pseudoflavor = flavor;
if (ops->info2flavor != NULL)
pseudoflavor = ops->info2flavor(info);
module_put(ops->owner);
return pseudoflavor;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor);
/**
* rpcauth_get_gssinfo - find GSS tuple matching a GSS pseudoflavor
* @pseudoflavor: GSS pseudoflavor to match
* @info: rpcsec_gss_info structure to fill in
*
* Returns zero and fills in "info" if pseudoflavor matches a
* supported mechanism.
*/
int
rpcauth_get_gssinfo(rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor, struct rpcsec_gss_info *info)
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor = pseudoflavor_to_flavor(pseudoflavor);
const struct rpc_authops *ops;
int result;
if (flavor >= RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR)
return -EINVAL;
ops = auth_flavors[flavor];
if (ops == NULL)
request_module("rpc-auth-%u", flavor);
spin_lock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
ops = auth_flavors[flavor];
if (ops == NULL || !try_module_get(ops->owner)) {
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
result = -ENOENT;
if (ops->flavor2info != NULL)
result = ops->flavor2info(pseudoflavor, info);
module_put(ops->owner);
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_get_gssinfo);
/**
* rpcauth_list_flavors - discover registered flavors and pseudoflavors
* @array: array to fill in
* @size: size of "array"
*
* Returns the number of array items filled in, or a negative errno.
*
* The returned array is not sorted by any policy. Callers should not
* rely on the order of the items in the returned array.
*/
int
rpcauth_list_flavors(rpc_authflavor_t *array, int size)
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor;
int result = 0;
spin_lock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
for (flavor = 0; flavor < RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR; flavor++) {
const struct rpc_authops *ops = auth_flavors[flavor];
rpc_authflavor_t pseudos[4];
int i, len;
if (result >= size) {
result = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
if (ops == NULL)
continue;
if (ops->list_pseudoflavors == NULL) {
array[result++] = ops->au_flavor;
continue;
}
len = ops->list_pseudoflavors(pseudos, ARRAY_SIZE(pseudos));
if (len < 0) {
result = len;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (result >= size) {
result = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
array[result++] = pseudos[i];
}
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
dprintk("RPC: %s returns %d\n", __func__, result);
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_list_flavors);
struct rpc_auth *
rpcauth_create(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
{
struct rpc_auth *auth;
const struct rpc_authops *ops;
u32 flavor = pseudoflavor_to_flavor(args->pseudoflavor);
auth = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (flavor >= RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR)
goto out;
if ((ops = auth_flavors[flavor]) == NULL)
request_module("rpc-auth-%u", flavor);
spin_lock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
ops = auth_flavors[flavor];
if (ops == NULL || !try_module_get(ops->owner)) {
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
goto out;
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_authflavor_lock);
auth = ops->create(args, clnt);
module_put(ops->owner);
if (IS_ERR(auth))
return auth;
if (clnt->cl_auth)
rpcauth_release(clnt->cl_auth);
clnt->cl_auth = auth;
out:
return auth;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_create);
void
rpcauth_release(struct rpc_auth *auth)
{
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&auth->au_count))
return;
auth->au_ops->destroy(auth);
}
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rpc_credcache_lock);
static void
rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked(struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
hlist_del_rcu(&cred->cr_hash);
smp_mb__before_atomic();
clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &cred->cr_flags);
}
static int
rpcauth_unhash_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
spinlock_t *cache_lock;
int ret;
cache_lock = &cred->cr_auth->au_credcache->lock;
spin_lock(cache_lock);
ret = atomic_read(&cred->cr_count) == 0;
if (ret)
rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked(cred);
spin_unlock(cache_lock);
return ret;
}
/*
* Initialize RPC credential cache
*/
int
rpcauth_init_credcache(struct rpc_auth *auth)
{
struct rpc_cred_cache *new;
unsigned int hashsize;
new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
goto out_nocache;
new->hashbits = auth_hashbits;
hashsize = 1U << new->hashbits;
new->hashtable = kcalloc(hashsize, sizeof(new->hashtable[0]), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new->hashtable)
goto out_nohashtbl;
spin_lock_init(&new->lock);
auth->au_credcache = new;
return 0;
out_nohashtbl:
kfree(new);
out_nocache:
return -ENOMEM;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_init_credcache);
SUNRPC new rpc_credops to test credential expiry This patch provides the RPC layer helper functions to allow NFS to manage data in the face of expired credentials - such as avoiding buffered WRITEs and COMMITs when the gss context will expire before the WRITEs are flushed and COMMITs are sent. These helper functions enable checking the expiration of an underlying credential key for a generic rpc credential, e.g. the gss_cred gss context gc_expiry which for Kerberos is set to the remaining TGT lifetime. A new rpc_authops key_timeout is only defined for the generic auth. A new rpc_credops crkey_to_expire is only defined for the generic cred. A new rpc_credops crkey_timeout is only defined for the gss cred. Set a credential key expiry watermark, RPC_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO set to 240 seconds as a default and can be set via a module parameter as we need to ensure there is time for any dirty data to be flushed. If key_timeout is called on a credential with an underlying credential key that will expire within watermark seconds, we set the RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag in the generic_cred acred so that the NFS layer can clean up prior to key expiration. Checking a generic credential's underlying credential involves a cred lookup. To avoid this lookup in the normal case when the underlying credential has a key that is valid (before the watermark), a notify flag is set in the generic credential the first time the key_timeout is called. The generic credential then stops checking the underlying credential key expiry, and the underlying credential (gss_cred) match routine then checks the key expiration upon each normal use and sets a flag in the associated generic credential only when the key expiration is within the watermark. This in turn signals the generic credential key_timeout to perform the extra credential lookup thereafter. Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-08-14 23:59:15 +08:00
/*
* Setup a credential key lifetime timeout notification
*/
int
rpcauth_key_timeout_notify(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
if (!cred->cr_auth->au_ops->key_timeout)
return 0;
return cred->cr_auth->au_ops->key_timeout(auth, cred);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_key_timeout_notify);
bool
sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K NFS_FILE_SYNC writes. This can be reproduced as follows: 1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys. They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine. $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5 $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys 2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket expires), e.g. $ kinit -l 10m -r 60m 3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are wsize, UNSTABLE: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1 6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this point will have no effect either. Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused) and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally, add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire. Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
2016-06-08 03:14:48 +08:00
rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred)
SUNRPC new rpc_credops to test credential expiry This patch provides the RPC layer helper functions to allow NFS to manage data in the face of expired credentials - such as avoiding buffered WRITEs and COMMITs when the gss context will expire before the WRITEs are flushed and COMMITs are sent. These helper functions enable checking the expiration of an underlying credential key for a generic rpc credential, e.g. the gss_cred gss context gc_expiry which for Kerberos is set to the remaining TGT lifetime. A new rpc_authops key_timeout is only defined for the generic auth. A new rpc_credops crkey_to_expire is only defined for the generic cred. A new rpc_credops crkey_timeout is only defined for the gss cred. Set a credential key expiry watermark, RPC_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO set to 240 seconds as a default and can be set via a module parameter as we need to ensure there is time for any dirty data to be flushed. If key_timeout is called on a credential with an underlying credential key that will expire within watermark seconds, we set the RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag in the generic_cred acred so that the NFS layer can clean up prior to key expiration. Checking a generic credential's underlying credential involves a cred lookup. To avoid this lookup in the normal case when the underlying credential has a key that is valid (before the watermark), a notify flag is set in the generic credential the first time the key_timeout is called. The generic credential then stops checking the underlying credential key expiry, and the underlying credential (gss_cred) match routine then checks the key expiration upon each normal use and sets a flag in the associated generic credential only when the key expiration is within the watermark. This in turn signals the generic credential key_timeout to perform the extra credential lookup thereafter. Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-08-14 23:59:15 +08:00
{
sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K NFS_FILE_SYNC writes. This can be reproduced as follows: 1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys. They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine. $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5 $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys 2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket expires), e.g. $ kinit -l 10m -r 60m 3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are wsize, UNSTABLE: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1 6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this point will have no effect either. Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused) and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally, add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire. Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
2016-06-08 03:14:48 +08:00
if (auth->au_flags & RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT)
return false;
SUNRPC new rpc_credops to test credential expiry This patch provides the RPC layer helper functions to allow NFS to manage data in the face of expired credentials - such as avoiding buffered WRITEs and COMMITs when the gss context will expire before the WRITEs are flushed and COMMITs are sent. These helper functions enable checking the expiration of an underlying credential key for a generic rpc credential, e.g. the gss_cred gss context gc_expiry which for Kerberos is set to the remaining TGT lifetime. A new rpc_authops key_timeout is only defined for the generic auth. A new rpc_credops crkey_to_expire is only defined for the generic cred. A new rpc_credops crkey_timeout is only defined for the gss cred. Set a credential key expiry watermark, RPC_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO set to 240 seconds as a default and can be set via a module parameter as we need to ensure there is time for any dirty data to be flushed. If key_timeout is called on a credential with an underlying credential key that will expire within watermark seconds, we set the RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag in the generic_cred acred so that the NFS layer can clean up prior to key expiration. Checking a generic credential's underlying credential involves a cred lookup. To avoid this lookup in the normal case when the underlying credential has a key that is valid (before the watermark), a notify flag is set in the generic credential the first time the key_timeout is called. The generic credential then stops checking the underlying credential key expiry, and the underlying credential (gss_cred) match routine then checks the key expiration upon each normal use and sets a flag in the associated generic credential only when the key expiration is within the watermark. This in turn signals the generic credential key_timeout to perform the extra credential lookup thereafter. Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-08-14 23:59:15 +08:00
if (!cred->cr_ops->crkey_to_expire)
return false;
return cred->cr_ops->crkey_to_expire(cred);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire);
char *
rpcauth_stringify_acceptor(struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
if (!cred->cr_ops->crstringify_acceptor)
return NULL;
return cred->cr_ops->crstringify_acceptor(cred);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_stringify_acceptor);
/*
* Destroy a list of credentials
*/
static inline
void rpcauth_destroy_credlist(struct list_head *head)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred;
while (!list_empty(head)) {
cred = list_entry(head->next, struct rpc_cred, cr_lru);
list_del_init(&cred->cr_lru);
put_rpccred(cred);
}
}
/*
* Clear the RPC credential cache, and delete those credentials
* that are not referenced.
*/
void
rpcauth_clear_credcache(struct rpc_cred_cache *cache)
{
LIST_HEAD(free);
struct hlist_head *head;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
unsigned int hashsize = 1U << cache->hashbits;
int i;
spin_lock(&rpc_credcache_lock);
spin_lock(&cache->lock);
for (i = 0; i < hashsize; i++) {
head = &cache->hashtable[i];
while (!hlist_empty(head)) {
cred = hlist_entry(head->first, struct rpc_cred, cr_hash);
get_rpccred(cred);
if (!list_empty(&cred->cr_lru)) {
list_del(&cred->cr_lru);
number_cred_unused--;
}
list_add_tail(&cred->cr_lru, &free);
rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked(cred);
}
}
spin_unlock(&cache->lock);
spin_unlock(&rpc_credcache_lock);
rpcauth_destroy_credlist(&free);
}
/*
* Destroy the RPC credential cache
*/
void
rpcauth_destroy_credcache(struct rpc_auth *auth)
{
struct rpc_cred_cache *cache = auth->au_credcache;
if (cache) {
auth->au_credcache = NULL;
rpcauth_clear_credcache(cache);
kfree(cache->hashtable);
kfree(cache);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_destroy_credcache);
#define RPC_AUTH_EXPIRY_MORATORIUM (60 * HZ)
/*
* Remove stale credentials. Avoid sleeping inside the loop.
*/
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
static long
rpcauth_prune_expired(struct list_head *free, int nr_to_scan)
{
spinlock_t *cache_lock;
struct rpc_cred *cred, *next;
unsigned long expired = jiffies - RPC_AUTH_EXPIRY_MORATORIUM;
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
long freed = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(cred, next, &cred_unused, cr_lru) {
if (nr_to_scan-- == 0)
break;
/*
* Enforce a 60 second garbage collection moratorium
* Note that the cred_unused list must be time-ordered.
*/
if (time_in_range(cred->cr_expire, expired, jiffies) &&
test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &cred->cr_flags) != 0) {
freed = SHRINK_STOP;
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
break;
}
list_del_init(&cred->cr_lru);
number_cred_unused--;
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
freed++;
if (atomic_read(&cred->cr_count) != 0)
continue;
cache_lock = &cred->cr_auth->au_credcache->lock;
spin_lock(cache_lock);
if (atomic_read(&cred->cr_count) == 0) {
get_rpccred(cred);
list_add_tail(&cred->cr_lru, free);
rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked(cred);
}
spin_unlock(cache_lock);
}
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
return freed;
}
static unsigned long
rpcauth_cache_do_shrink(int nr_to_scan)
{
LIST_HEAD(free);
unsigned long freed;
spin_lock(&rpc_credcache_lock);
freed = rpcauth_prune_expired(&free, nr_to_scan);
spin_unlock(&rpc_credcache_lock);
rpcauth_destroy_credlist(&free);
return freed;
}
/*
* Run memory cache shrinker.
*/
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
static unsigned long
rpcauth_cache_shrink_scan(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
if ((sc->gfp_mask & GFP_KERNEL) != GFP_KERNEL)
return SHRINK_STOP;
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
/* nothing left, don't come back */
if (list_empty(&cred_unused))
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
return SHRINK_STOP;
return rpcauth_cache_do_shrink(sc->nr_to_scan);
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
}
static unsigned long
rpcauth_cache_shrink_count(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
return number_cred_unused * sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure / 100;
}
static void
rpcauth_cache_enforce_limit(void)
{
unsigned long diff;
unsigned int nr_to_scan;
if (number_cred_unused <= auth_max_cred_cachesize)
return;
diff = number_cred_unused - auth_max_cred_cachesize;
nr_to_scan = 100;
if (diff < nr_to_scan)
nr_to_scan = diff;
rpcauth_cache_do_shrink(nr_to_scan);
}
/*
* Look up a process' credentials in the authentication cache
*/
struct rpc_cred *
rpcauth_lookup_credcache(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred * acred,
int flags, gfp_t gfp)
{
LIST_HEAD(free);
struct rpc_cred_cache *cache = auth->au_credcache;
struct rpc_cred *cred = NULL,
*entry, *new;
unsigned int nr;
nr = auth->au_ops->hash_cred(acred, cache->hashbits);
rcu_read_lock();
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, &cache->hashtable[nr], cr_hash) {
if (!entry->cr_ops->crmatch(acred, entry, flags))
continue;
if (flags & RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &entry->cr_flags) &&
!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &entry->cr_flags))
cred = entry;
break;
}
spin_lock(&cache->lock);
if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &entry->cr_flags) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&cache->lock);
continue;
}
cred = get_rpccred(entry);
spin_unlock(&cache->lock);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (cred != NULL)
goto found;
if (flags & RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_RCU)
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
new = auth->au_ops->crcreate(auth, acred, flags, gfp);
if (IS_ERR(new)) {
cred = new;
goto out;
}
spin_lock(&cache->lock);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
hlist_for_each_entry(entry, &cache->hashtable[nr], cr_hash) {
if (!entry->cr_ops->crmatch(acred, entry, flags))
continue;
cred = get_rpccred(entry);
break;
}
if (cred == NULL) {
cred = new;
set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &cred->cr_flags);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&cred->cr_hash, &cache->hashtable[nr]);
} else
list_add_tail(&new->cr_lru, &free);
spin_unlock(&cache->lock);
rpcauth_cache_enforce_limit();
found:
if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags) &&
cred->cr_ops->cr_init != NULL &&
!(flags & RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_NEW)) {
int res = cred->cr_ops->cr_init(auth, cred);
if (res < 0) {
put_rpccred(cred);
cred = ERR_PTR(res);
}
}
rpcauth_destroy_credlist(&free);
out:
return cred;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_lookup_credcache);
struct rpc_cred *
rpcauth_lookupcred(struct rpc_auth *auth, int flags)
{
struct auth_cred acred;
struct rpc_cred *ret;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
dprintk("RPC: looking up %s cred\n",
auth->au_ops->au_name);
memset(&acred, 0, sizeof(acred));
acred.uid = cred->fsuid;
acred.gid = cred->fsgid;
acred.group_info = cred->group_info;
ret = auth->au_ops->lookup_cred(auth, &acred, flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_lookupcred);
void
rpcauth_init_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred, const struct auth_cred *acred,
struct rpc_auth *auth, const struct rpc_credops *ops)
{
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&cred->cr_hash);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cred->cr_lru);
atomic_set(&cred->cr_count, 1);
cred->cr_auth = auth;
cred->cr_ops = ops;
cred->cr_expire = jiffies;
cred->cr_uid = acred->uid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_init_cred);
struct rpc_cred *
rpcauth_generic_bind_cred(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, int lookupflags)
{
dprintk("RPC: %5u holding %s cred %p\n", task->tk_pid,
cred->cr_auth->au_ops->au_name, cred);
return get_rpccred(cred);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_generic_bind_cred);
static struct rpc_cred *
rpcauth_bind_root_cred(struct rpc_task *task, int lookupflags)
{
struct rpc_auth *auth = task->tk_client->cl_auth;
struct auth_cred acred = {
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
};
dprintk("RPC: %5u looking up %s cred\n",
task->tk_pid, task->tk_client->cl_auth->au_ops->au_name);
return auth->au_ops->lookup_cred(auth, &acred, lookupflags);
}
static struct rpc_cred *
rpcauth_bind_new_cred(struct rpc_task *task, int lookupflags)
{
struct rpc_auth *auth = task->tk_client->cl_auth;
dprintk("RPC: %5u looking up %s cred\n",
task->tk_pid, auth->au_ops->au_name);
return rpcauth_lookupcred(auth, lookupflags);
}
static int
rpcauth_bindcred(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, int flags)
{
struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp;
struct rpc_cred *new;
int lookupflags = 0;
if (flags & RPC_TASK_ASYNC)
lookupflags |= RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_NEW;
if (cred != NULL)
new = cred->cr_ops->crbind(task, cred, lookupflags);
else if (flags & RPC_TASK_ROOTCREDS)
new = rpcauth_bind_root_cred(task, lookupflags);
else
new = rpcauth_bind_new_cred(task, lookupflags);
if (IS_ERR(new))
return PTR_ERR(new);
put_rpccred(req->rq_cred);
req->rq_cred = new;
return 0;
}
void
put_rpccred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
if (cred == NULL)
return;
/* Fast path for unhashed credentials */
if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &cred->cr_flags) == 0) {
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&cred->cr_count))
cred->cr_ops->crdestroy(cred);
return;
}
if (!atomic_dec_and_lock(&cred->cr_count, &rpc_credcache_lock))
return;
if (!list_empty(&cred->cr_lru)) {
number_cred_unused--;
list_del_init(&cred->cr_lru);
}
if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &cred->cr_flags) != 0) {
if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags) != 0) {
cred->cr_expire = jiffies;
list_add_tail(&cred->cr_lru, &cred_unused);
number_cred_unused++;
goto out_nodestroy;
}
if (!rpcauth_unhash_cred(cred)) {
/* We were hashed and someone looked us up... */
goto out_nodestroy;
}
}
spin_unlock(&rpc_credcache_lock);
cred->cr_ops->crdestroy(cred);
return;
out_nodestroy:
spin_unlock(&rpc_credcache_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(put_rpccred);
__be32 *
rpcauth_marshcred(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
dprintk("RPC: %5u marshaling %s cred %p\n",
task->tk_pid, cred->cr_auth->au_ops->au_name, cred);
return cred->cr_ops->crmarshal(task, p);
}
__be32 *
rpcauth_checkverf(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
dprintk("RPC: %5u validating %s cred %p\n",
task->tk_pid, cred->cr_auth->au_ops->au_name, cred);
return cred->cr_ops->crvalidate(task, p);
}
static void rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(kxdreproc_t encode, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
__be32 *data, void *obj)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_snd_buf, data);
encode(rqstp, &xdr, obj);
}
int
rpcauth_wrap_req(struct rpc_task *task, kxdreproc_t encode, void *rqstp,
__be32 *data, void *obj)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
dprintk("RPC: %5u using %s cred %p to wrap rpc data\n",
task->tk_pid, cred->cr_ops->cr_name, cred);
if (cred->cr_ops->crwrap_req)
return cred->cr_ops->crwrap_req(task, encode, rqstp, data, obj);
/* By default, we encode the arguments normally. */
rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(encode, rqstp, data, obj);
return 0;
}
static int
rpcauth_unwrap_req_decode(kxdrdproc_t decode, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
__be32 *data, void *obj)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, data);
return decode(rqstp, &xdr, obj);
}
int
rpcauth_unwrap_resp(struct rpc_task *task, kxdrdproc_t decode, void *rqstp,
__be32 *data, void *obj)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
dprintk("RPC: %5u using %s cred %p to unwrap rpc data\n",
task->tk_pid, cred->cr_ops->cr_name, cred);
if (cred->cr_ops->crunwrap_resp)
return cred->cr_ops->crunwrap_resp(task, decode, rqstp,
data, obj);
/* By default, we decode the arguments normally. */
return rpcauth_unwrap_req_decode(decode, rqstp, data, obj);
}
bool
rpcauth_xmit_need_reencode(struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
if (!cred || !cred->cr_ops->crneed_reencode)
return false;
return cred->cr_ops->crneed_reencode(task);
}
int
rpcauth_refreshcred(struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred;
int err;
cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
if (cred == NULL) {
err = rpcauth_bindcred(task, task->tk_msg.rpc_cred, task->tk_flags);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
}
dprintk("RPC: %5u refreshing %s cred %p\n",
task->tk_pid, cred->cr_auth->au_ops->au_name, cred);
err = cred->cr_ops->crrefresh(task);
out:
if (err < 0)
task->tk_status = err;
return err;
}
void
rpcauth_invalcred(struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
dprintk("RPC: %5u invalidating %s cred %p\n",
task->tk_pid, cred->cr_auth->au_ops->au_name, cred);
if (cred)
clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
}
int
rpcauth_uptodatecred(struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
return cred == NULL ||
test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags) != 0;
}
static struct shrinker rpc_cred_shrinker = {
shrinker: convert remaining shrinkers to count/scan API Convert the remaining couple of random shrinkers in the tree to the new API. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-08-28 08:18:14 +08:00
.count_objects = rpcauth_cache_shrink_count,
.scan_objects = rpcauth_cache_shrink_scan,
.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS,
};
int __init rpcauth_init_module(void)
{
int err;
err = rpc_init_authunix();
if (err < 0)
goto out1;
err = rpc_init_generic_auth();
if (err < 0)
goto out2;
err = register_shrinker(&rpc_cred_shrinker);
if (err < 0)
goto out3;
return 0;
out3:
rpc_destroy_generic_auth();
out2:
rpc_destroy_authunix();
out1:
return err;
}
void rpcauth_remove_module(void)
{
rpc_destroy_authunix();
rpc_destroy_generic_auth();
unregister_shrinker(&rpc_cred_shrinker);
}