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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
Create arch/Kconfig Puts the content of arch/Kconfig in the "General setup" menu. Linus: > Should it come with a re-duplication of it's content into each > architecture, which was the case previously ? The oprofile and kprobes > menu entries were litteraly cut and pasted from one architecture to > another. Should we put its content in init/Kconfig then ? I don't think it's a good idea to go back to making it per-architecture, although that extensive "depends on <list-of-archiectures-here>" might indicate that there certainly is room for cleanup there. And I don't think it's wrong keeping it in kernel/Kconfig.xyz per se, I just think it's wrong to (a) lump the code together when it really doesn't necessarily need to and (b) show it to users as some kind of choice that is tied together (whether it then has common code or not). On the per-architecture side, I do think it would be better to *not* have internal architecture knowledge in a generic file, and as such a line like depends on X86_32 || IA64 || PPC || S390 || SPARC64 || X86_64 || AVR32 really shouldn't exist in a file like kernel/Kconfig.instrumentation. It would be much better to do depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_KPROBES in that generic file, and then architectures that do support it would just have a bool ARCH_SUPPORTS_KPROBES default y in *their* architecture files. That would seem to be much more logical, and is readable both for arch maintainers *and* for people who have no clue - and don't care - about which architecture is supposed to support which interface... Sam Ravnborg: Stuff it into a new file: arch/Kconfig We can then extend this file to include all the 'trailing' Kconfig things that are anyway equal for all ARCHs. But it should be kept clean - so if we introduce such a file then we should use ARCH_HAS_whatever in the arch specific Kconfig files to enable stuff that is not shared. [...] The above suggestion is actually not exactly the best way to do it... First the naming.. A quick grep shows following usage today (in Kconfig files) ARCH_HAS 51 ARCH_SUPPORTS 4 HAVE_ARCH 7 ARCH_HAS is the clear winner. In the common Kconfig file do: config FOO depends on ARCH_HAS_FOO bool "bla bla" config ARCH_HAS_FOO def_bool n In the arch specific Kconfig file in a suitable place do: config SUITABLE_OPTION select ARCH_HAS_FOO The naming of ARCH_HAS_ is fixed and shall be: ARCH_HAS_<config option it will enable> Only a single line added pr. architecture. And we will end up with a (maybe even commented) list of trivial selects. - Yet another update : Moving to HAVE_* now. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-02-03 04:10:33 +08:00
#
# General architecture dependent options
#
Move Kconfig.instrumentation to arch/Kconfig and init/Kconfig Move the instrumentation Kconfig to arch/Kconfig for architecture dependent options - oprofile - kprobes and init/Kconfig for architecture independent options - profiling - markers Remove the "Instrumentation Support" menu. Everything moves to "General setup". Delete the kernel/Kconfig.instrumentation file. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-02-03 04:10:36 +08:00
kconfig: include common Kconfig files from top-level Kconfig Instead of duplicating the source statements in every architecture just do it once in the toplevel Kconfig file. Note that with this the inclusion of arch/$(SRCARCH/Kconfig moves out of the top-level Kconfig into arch/Kconfig so that don't violate ordering constraits while keeping a sensible menu structure. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2018-07-31 19:39:30 +08:00
#
# Note: arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig needs to be included first so that it can
# override the default values in this file.
#
source "arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig"
kconfig: use a menu in arch/Kconfig to reduce clutter Put everything in arch/Kconfig into a General options menu so that they don't clutter up the main/major/primary list of menu options. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2018-07-31 19:39:33 +08:00
menu "General architecture-dependent options"
mm: Add fault_in_subpage_writeable() to probe at sub-page granularity On hardware with features like arm64 MTE or SPARC ADI, an access fault can be triggered at sub-page granularity. Depending on how the fault_in_writeable() function is used, the caller can get into a live-lock by continuously retrying the fault-in on an address different from the one where the uaccess failed. In the majority of cases progress is ensured by the following conditions: 1. copy_to_user_nofault() guarantees at least one byte access if the user address is not faulting. 2. The fault_in_writeable() loop is resumed from the first address that could not be accessed by copy_to_user_nofault(). If the loop iteration is restarted from an earlier (initial) point, the loop is repeated with the same conditions and it would live-lock. Introduce an arch-specific probe_subpage_writeable() and call it from the newly added fault_in_subpage_writeable() function. The arch code with sub-page faults will have to implement the specific probing functionality. Note that no other fault_in_subpage_*() functions are added since they have no callers currently susceptible to a live-lock. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220423100751.1870771-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2022-04-23 18:07:49 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS
bool
help
Select if the architecture can check permissions at sub-page
granularity (e.g. arm64 MTE). The probe_user_*() functions
must be implemented.
cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT. The command line options are: 'nosmt': Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them 'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration via MP table and ACPI/MADT. The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write): 'on': SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined 'off': SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated cannot be onlined 'forceoff': SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control file are rejected. 'notsupported': SMT is not supported by the CPU The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime. The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to 'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime. When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread later on are rejected. When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -> 'on' transition does not automatically online the secondary threads. When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to the control file are rejected. When the control status is 'notsupported' then writes to the control file are rejected. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-29 23:48:27 +08:00
config HOTPLUG_SMT
bool
cpu/SMT: Create topology_smt_thread_allowed() Some architectures allows partial SMT states, i.e. when not all SMT threads are brought online. To support that, add an architecture helper which checks whether a given CPU is allowed to be brought online depending on how many SMT threads are currently enabled. Since this is only applicable to architecture supporting partial SMT, only these architectures should select the new configuration variable CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC. For the other architectures, not supporting the partial SMT states, there is no need to define topology_cpu_smt_allowed(), the generic code assumed that all the threads are allowed or only the primary ones. Call the helper from cpu_smt_enable(), and cpu_smt_allowed() when SMT is enabled, to check if the particular thread should be onlined. Notably, also call it from cpu_smt_disable() if CPU_SMT_ENABLED, to allow offlining some threads to move from a higher to lower number of threads online. [ ldufour: Slightly reword the commit's description ] [ ldufour: Introduce CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC ] Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705145143.40545-7-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
2023-07-05 22:51:39 +08:00
config SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC
bool
cpu/hotplug: Add CPU state tracking and synchronization The CPU state tracking and synchronization mechanism in smpboot.c is completely independent of the hotplug code and all logic around it is implemented in architecture specific code. Except for the state reporting of the AP there is absolutely nothing architecture specific and the sychronization and decision functions can be moved into the generic hotplug core code. Provide an integrated variant and add the core synchronization and decision points. This comes in two flavours: 1) DEAD state synchronization Updated by the architecture code once the AP reaches the point where it is ready to be torn down by the control CPU, e.g. by removing power or clocks or tear down via the hypervisor. The control CPU waits for this state to be reached with a timeout. If the state is reached an architecture specific cleanup function is invoked. 2) Full state synchronization This extends #1 with AP alive synchronization. This is new functionality, which allows to replace architecture specific wait mechanims, e.g. cpumasks, completely. It also prevents that an AP which is in a limbo state can be brought up again. This can happen when an AP failed to report dead state during a previous off-line operation. The dead synchronization is what most architectures use. Only x86 makes a bringup decision based on that state at the moment. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205256.476305035@linutronix.de
2023-05-13 05:07:27 +08:00
# Selected by HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD or HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL
config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC
bool
# Basic CPU dead synchronization selected by architecture
config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD
bool
select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC
# Full CPU synchronization with alive state selected by architecture
config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL
bool
select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD if HOTPLUG_CPU
select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC
cpu/hotplug: Provide a split up CPUHP_BRINGUP mechanism The bring up logic of a to be onlined CPU consists of several parts, which are considered to be a single hotplug state: 1) Control CPU issues the wake-up 2) To be onlined CPU starts up, does the minimal initialization, reports to be alive and waits for release into the complete bring-up. 3) Control CPU waits for the alive report and releases the upcoming CPU for the complete bring-up. Allow to split this into two states: 1) Control CPU issues the wake-up After that the to be onlined CPU starts up, does the minimal initialization, reports to be alive and waits for release into the full bring-up. As this can run after the control CPU dropped the hotplug locks the code which is executed on the AP before it reports alive has to be carefully audited to not violate any of the hotplug constraints, especially not modifying any of the various cpumasks. This is really only meant to avoid waiting for the AP to react on the wake-up. Of course an architecture can move strict CPU related setup functionality, e.g. microcode loading, with care before the synchronization point to save further pointless waiting time. 2) Control CPU waits for the alive report and releases the upcoming CPU for the complete bring-up. This allows that the two states can be split up to run all to be onlined CPUs up to state #1 on the control CPU and then at a later point run state #2. This spares some of the latencies of the full serialized per CPU bringup by avoiding the per CPU wakeup/wait serialization. The assumption is that the first AP already waits when the last AP has been woken up. This obvioulsy depends on the hardware latencies and depending on the timings this might still not completely eliminate all wait scenarios. This split is just a preparatory step for enabling the parallel bringup later. The boot time bringup is still fully serialized. It has a separate config switch so that architectures which want to support parallel bringup can test the split of the CPUHP_BRINGUG step separately. To enable this the architecture must support the CPU hotplug core sync mechanism and has to be audited that there are no implicit hotplug state dependencies which require a fully serialized bringup. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205257.080801387@linutronix.de
2023-05-13 05:07:45 +08:00
config HOTPLUG_SPLIT_STARTUP
bool
select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL
cpu/hotplug: Allow "parallel" bringup up to CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP_STATE There is often significant latency in the early stages of CPU bringup, and time is wasted by waking each CPU (e.g. with SIPI/INIT/INIT on x86) and then waiting for it to respond before moving on to the next. Allow a platform to enable parallel setup which brings all to be onlined CPUs up to the CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP state. While this state advancement on the control CPU (BP) is single-threaded the important part is the last state CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP which wakes the to be onlined CPUs up. This allows the CPUs to run up to the first sychronization point cpuhp_ap_sync_alive() where they wait for the control CPU to release them one by one for the full onlining procedure. This parallelism depends on the CPU hotplug core sync mechanism which ensures that the parallel brought up CPUs wait for release before touching any state which would make the CPU visible to anything outside the hotplug control mechanism. To handle the SMT constraints of X86 correctly the bringup happens in two iterations when CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT is enabled. The control CPU brings up the primary SMT threads of each core first, which can load the microcode without the need to rendevouz with the thread siblings. Once that's completed it brings up the secondary SMT threads. Co-developed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205257.240231377@linutronix.de
2023-05-13 05:07:50 +08:00
config HOTPLUG_PARALLEL
bool
select HOTPLUG_SPLIT_STARTUP
entry: Provide generic syscall entry functionality On syscall entry certain work needs to be done: - Establish state (lockdep, context tracking, tracing) - Conditional work (ptrace, seccomp, audit...) This code is needlessly duplicated and different in all architectures. Provide a generic version based on the x86 implementation which has all the RCU and instrumentation bits right. As interrupt/exception entry from user space needs parts of the same functionality, provide a function for this as well. syscall_enter_from_user_mode() and irqentry_enter_from_user_mode() must be called right after the low level ASM entry. The calling code must be non-instrumentable. After the functions returns state is correct and the subsequent functions can be instrumented. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.513463269@linutronix.de
2020-07-23 05:59:56 +08:00
config GENERIC_ENTRY
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
bool
entry: Provide generic syscall entry functionality On syscall entry certain work needs to be done: - Establish state (lockdep, context tracking, tracing) - Conditional work (ptrace, seccomp, audit...) This code is needlessly duplicated and different in all architectures. Provide a generic version based on the x86 implementation which has all the RCU and instrumentation bits right. As interrupt/exception entry from user space needs parts of the same functionality, provide a function for this as well. syscall_enter_from_user_mode() and irqentry_enter_from_user_mode() must be called right after the low level ASM entry. The calling code must be non-instrumentable. After the functions returns state is correct and the subsequent functions can be instrumented. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.513463269@linutronix.de
2020-07-23 05:59:56 +08:00
Move Kconfig.instrumentation to arch/Kconfig and init/Kconfig Move the instrumentation Kconfig to arch/Kconfig for architecture dependent options - oprofile - kprobes and init/Kconfig for architecture independent options - profiling - markers Remove the "Instrumentation Support" menu. Everything moves to "General setup". Delete the kernel/Kconfig.instrumentation file. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-02-03 04:10:36 +08:00
config KPROBES
bool "Kprobes"
kprobes: Fix Kconfig dependency Fix Kconfig dependency among Kprobes, optprobe and kallsyms. Kprobes uses kallsyms_lookup for finding target function and checking instruction boundary, thus CONFIG_KPROBES should select CONFIG_KALLSYMS. Optprobe is an optional feature which is supported on x86 arch, and it also uses kallsyms_lookup for checking instructions in the target function. Since KALLSYMS_ALL just adds symbols of kernel variables, it doesn't need to select KALLSYMS_ALL. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>, Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Felipe Contreras <felipe.contreras@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: akpm <akpm@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <20100913102541.20260.85700.stgit@ltc236.sdl.hitachi.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-09-13 18:25:41 +08:00
depends on MODULES
Move Kconfig.instrumentation to arch/Kconfig and init/Kconfig Move the instrumentation Kconfig to arch/Kconfig for architecture dependent options - oprofile - kprobes and init/Kconfig for architecture independent options - profiling - markers Remove the "Instrumentation Support" menu. Everything moves to "General setup". Delete the kernel/Kconfig.instrumentation file. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-02-03 04:10:36 +08:00
depends on HAVE_KPROBES
kprobes: Fix Kconfig dependency Fix Kconfig dependency among Kprobes, optprobe and kallsyms. Kprobes uses kallsyms_lookup for finding target function and checking instruction boundary, thus CONFIG_KPROBES should select CONFIG_KALLSYMS. Optprobe is an optional feature which is supported on x86 arch, and it also uses kallsyms_lookup for checking instructions in the target function. Since KALLSYMS_ALL just adds symbols of kernel variables, it doesn't need to select KALLSYMS_ALL. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>, Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Felipe Contreras <felipe.contreras@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: akpm <akpm@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <20100913102541.20260.85700.stgit@ltc236.sdl.hitachi.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-09-13 18:25:41 +08:00
select KALLSYMS
rcu: Make the TASKS_RCU Kconfig option be selected Currently, any kernel built with CONFIG_PREEMPTION=y also gets CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y, which is not helpful to people trying to build preemptible kernels of minimal size. Because CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y is needed only in kernels doing tracing of one form or another, this commit moves from TASKS_RCU deciding when it should be enabled to the tracing Kconfig options explicitly selecting it. This allows building preemptible kernels without TASKS_RCU, if desired. This commit also updates the SRCU-N and TREE09 rcutorture scenarios in order to avoid Kconfig errors that would otherwise result from CONFIG_TASKS_RCU being selected without its CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT dependency being met. [ paulmck: Apply BPF_SYSCALL feedback from Andrii Nakryiko. ] Reported-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Tested-by: Zhouyi Zhou <zhouzhouyi@gmail.com> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2022-03-18 02:05:09 +08:00
select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION
Move Kconfig.instrumentation to arch/Kconfig and init/Kconfig Move the instrumentation Kconfig to arch/Kconfig for architecture dependent options - oprofile - kprobes and init/Kconfig for architecture independent options - profiling - markers Remove the "Instrumentation Support" menu. Everything moves to "General setup". Delete the kernel/Kconfig.instrumentation file. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-02-03 04:10:36 +08:00
help
Kprobes allows you to trap at almost any kernel address and
execute a callback function. register_kprobe() establishes
a probepoint and specifies the callback. Kprobes is useful
for kernel debugging, non-intrusive instrumentation and testing.
If in doubt, say "N".
jump label: Add work around to i386 gcc asm goto bug On i386 (not x86_64) early implementations of gcc would have a bug with asm goto causing it to produce code like the following: (This was noticed by Peter Zijlstra) 56 pushl 0 67 nopl jmp 0x6f popl jmp 0x8c 6f mov test je 0x8c 8c mov call *(%esp) The jump added in the asm goto skipped over the popl that matched the pushl 0, which lead up to a quick crash of the system when the jump was enabled. The nopl is defined in the asm goto () statement and when tracepoints are enabled, the nop changes to a jump to the label that was specified by the asm goto. asm goto is suppose to tell gcc that the code in the asm might jump to an external label. Here gcc obviously fails to make that work. The bug report for gcc is here: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46226 The bug only appears on x86 when not compiled with -maccumulate-outgoing-args. This option is always set on x86_64 and it is also the work around for a function graph tracer i386 bug. (See commit: 746357d6a526d6da9d89a2ec645b28406e959c2e) This explains why the bug only showed up on i386 when function graph tracer was not enabled. This patch now adds a CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL option that is default off instead of using jump labels by default. When jump labels are enabled, the -maccumulate-outgoing-args will be used (causing a slightly larger kernel image on i386). This option will exist until we have a way to detect if the gcc compiler in use is safe to use on all configurations without the work around. Note, there exists such a test, but for now we will keep the enabling of jump label as a manual option. Archs that know the compiler is safe with asm goto, may choose to select JUMP_LABEL and enable it by default. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cause-discovered-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1288028746.3673.11.camel@laptop> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-10-30 00:33:43 +08:00
config JUMP_LABEL
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in coding style with command like: $ sed -e 's/^ / /' -i */Kconfig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574306573-10886-1-git-send-email-krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 08:50:26 +08:00
bool "Optimize very unlikely/likely branches"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
objtool: Make jump label hack optional Objtool secretly does a jump label hack to overcome the limitations of the toolchain. Make the hack explicit (and optional for other arches) by turning it into a cmdline option and kernel config option. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3bdcbfdd27ecb01ddec13c04bdf756a583b13d24.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:39 +08:00
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in coding style with command like: $ sed -e 's/^ / /' -i */Kconfig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574306573-10886-1-git-send-email-krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 08:50:26 +08:00
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
This option enables a transparent branch optimization that
makes certain almost-always-true or almost-always-false branch
conditions even cheaper to execute within the kernel.
static keys: Introduce 'struct static_key', static_key_true()/false() and static_key_slow_[inc|dec]() So here's a boot tested patch on top of Jason's series that does all the cleanups I talked about and turns jump labels into a more intuitive to use facility. It should also address the various misconceptions and confusions that surround jump labels. Typical usage scenarios: #include <linux/static_key.h> struct static_key key = STATIC_KEY_INIT_TRUE; if (static_key_false(&key)) do unlikely code else do likely code Or: if (static_key_true(&key)) do likely code else do unlikely code The static key is modified via: static_key_slow_inc(&key); ... static_key_slow_dec(&key); The 'slow' prefix makes it abundantly clear that this is an expensive operation. I've updated all in-kernel code to use this everywhere. Note that I (intentionally) have not pushed through the rename blindly through to the lowest levels: the actual jump-label patching arch facility should be named like that, so we want to decouple jump labels from the static-key facility a bit. On non-jump-label enabled architectures static keys default to likely()/unlikely() branches. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: ddaney.cavm@gmail.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120222085809.GA26397@elte.hu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-24 15:31:31 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
Certain performance-sensitive kernel code, such as trace points,
scheduler functionality, networking code and KVM have such
branches and include support for this optimization technique.
static keys: Introduce 'struct static_key', static_key_true()/false() and static_key_slow_[inc|dec]() So here's a boot tested patch on top of Jason's series that does all the cleanups I talked about and turns jump labels into a more intuitive to use facility. It should also address the various misconceptions and confusions that surround jump labels. Typical usage scenarios: #include <linux/static_key.h> struct static_key key = STATIC_KEY_INIT_TRUE; if (static_key_false(&key)) do unlikely code else do likely code Or: if (static_key_true(&key)) do likely code else do unlikely code The static key is modified via: static_key_slow_inc(&key); ... static_key_slow_dec(&key); The 'slow' prefix makes it abundantly clear that this is an expensive operation. I've updated all in-kernel code to use this everywhere. Note that I (intentionally) have not pushed through the rename blindly through to the lowest levels: the actual jump-label patching arch facility should be named like that, so we want to decouple jump labels from the static-key facility a bit. On non-jump-label enabled architectures static keys default to likely()/unlikely() branches. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: ddaney.cavm@gmail.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120222085809.GA26397@elte.hu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-24 15:31:31 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
If it is detected that the compiler has support for "asm goto",
the kernel will compile such branches with just a nop
instruction. When the condition flag is toggled to true, the
nop will be converted to a jump instruction to execute the
conditional block of instructions.
static keys: Introduce 'struct static_key', static_key_true()/false() and static_key_slow_[inc|dec]() So here's a boot tested patch on top of Jason's series that does all the cleanups I talked about and turns jump labels into a more intuitive to use facility. It should also address the various misconceptions and confusions that surround jump labels. Typical usage scenarios: #include <linux/static_key.h> struct static_key key = STATIC_KEY_INIT_TRUE; if (static_key_false(&key)) do unlikely code else do likely code Or: if (static_key_true(&key)) do likely code else do unlikely code The static key is modified via: static_key_slow_inc(&key); ... static_key_slow_dec(&key); The 'slow' prefix makes it abundantly clear that this is an expensive operation. I've updated all in-kernel code to use this everywhere. Note that I (intentionally) have not pushed through the rename blindly through to the lowest levels: the actual jump-label patching arch facility should be named like that, so we want to decouple jump labels from the static-key facility a bit. On non-jump-label enabled architectures static keys default to likely()/unlikely() branches. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: ddaney.cavm@gmail.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120222085809.GA26397@elte.hu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-24 15:31:31 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
This technique lowers overhead and stress on the branch prediction
of the processor and generally makes the kernel faster. The update
of the condition is slower, but those are always very rare.
jump label: Add work around to i386 gcc asm goto bug On i386 (not x86_64) early implementations of gcc would have a bug with asm goto causing it to produce code like the following: (This was noticed by Peter Zijlstra) 56 pushl 0 67 nopl jmp 0x6f popl jmp 0x8c 6f mov test je 0x8c 8c mov call *(%esp) The jump added in the asm goto skipped over the popl that matched the pushl 0, which lead up to a quick crash of the system when the jump was enabled. The nopl is defined in the asm goto () statement and when tracepoints are enabled, the nop changes to a jump to the label that was specified by the asm goto. asm goto is suppose to tell gcc that the code in the asm might jump to an external label. Here gcc obviously fails to make that work. The bug report for gcc is here: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46226 The bug only appears on x86 when not compiled with -maccumulate-outgoing-args. This option is always set on x86_64 and it is also the work around for a function graph tracer i386 bug. (See commit: 746357d6a526d6da9d89a2ec645b28406e959c2e) This explains why the bug only showed up on i386 when function graph tracer was not enabled. This patch now adds a CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL option that is default off instead of using jump labels by default. When jump labels are enabled, the -maccumulate-outgoing-args will be used (causing a slightly larger kernel image on i386). This option will exist until we have a way to detect if the gcc compiler in use is safe to use on all configurations without the work around. Note, there exists such a test, but for now we will keep the enabling of jump label as a manual option. Archs that know the compiler is safe with asm goto, may choose to select JUMP_LABEL and enable it by default. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cause-discovered-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1288028746.3673.11.camel@laptop> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-10-30 00:33:43 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
( On 32-bit x86, the necessary options added to the compiler
flags may increase the size of the kernel slightly. )
jump label: Add work around to i386 gcc asm goto bug On i386 (not x86_64) early implementations of gcc would have a bug with asm goto causing it to produce code like the following: (This was noticed by Peter Zijlstra) 56 pushl 0 67 nopl jmp 0x6f popl jmp 0x8c 6f mov test je 0x8c 8c mov call *(%esp) The jump added in the asm goto skipped over the popl that matched the pushl 0, which lead up to a quick crash of the system when the jump was enabled. The nopl is defined in the asm goto () statement and when tracepoints are enabled, the nop changes to a jump to the label that was specified by the asm goto. asm goto is suppose to tell gcc that the code in the asm might jump to an external label. Here gcc obviously fails to make that work. The bug report for gcc is here: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46226 The bug only appears on x86 when not compiled with -maccumulate-outgoing-args. This option is always set on x86_64 and it is also the work around for a function graph tracer i386 bug. (See commit: 746357d6a526d6da9d89a2ec645b28406e959c2e) This explains why the bug only showed up on i386 when function graph tracer was not enabled. This patch now adds a CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL option that is default off instead of using jump labels by default. When jump labels are enabled, the -maccumulate-outgoing-args will be used (causing a slightly larger kernel image on i386). This option will exist until we have a way to detect if the gcc compiler in use is safe to use on all configurations without the work around. Note, there exists such a test, but for now we will keep the enabling of jump label as a manual option. Archs that know the compiler is safe with asm goto, may choose to select JUMP_LABEL and enable it by default. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cause-discovered-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1288028746.3673.11.camel@laptop> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-10-30 00:33:43 +08:00
locking/static_keys: Add selftest Add a little selftest that validates all combinations. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-28 00:32:09 +08:00
config STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST
bool "Static key selftest"
depends on JUMP_LABEL
help
Boot time self-test of the branch patching code.
static_call: Add simple self-test for static calls Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200818135804.922581202@infradead.org
2020-08-18 21:57:46 +08:00
config STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST
bool "Static call selftest"
depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
help
Boot time self-test of the call patching code.
kprobes: Introduce kprobes jump optimization Introduce kprobes jump optimization arch-independent parts. Kprobes uses breakpoint instruction for interrupting execution flow, on some architectures, it can be replaced by a jump instruction and interruption emulation code. This gains kprobs' performance drastically. To enable this feature, set CONFIG_OPTPROBES=y (default y if the arch supports OPTPROBE). Changes in v9: - Fix a bug to optimize probe when enabling. - Check nearby probes can be optimize/unoptimize when disarming/arming kprobes, instead of registering/unregistering. This will help kprobe-tracer because most of probes on it are usually disabled. Changes in v6: - Cleanup coding style for readability. - Add comments around get/put_online_cpus(). Changes in v5: - Use get_online_cpus()/put_online_cpus() for avoiding text_mutex deadlock. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: systemtap <systemtap@sources.redhat.com> Cc: DLE <dle-develop@lists.sourceforge.net> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Anders Kaseorg <andersk@ksplice.com> Cc: Tim Abbott <tabbott@ksplice.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <compudj@krystal.dyndns.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20100225133407.6725.81992.stgit@localhost6.localdomain6> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-02-25 21:34:07 +08:00
config OPTPROBES
kprobes: Hide CONFIG_OPTPROBES and set if arch supports optimized kprobes Hide CONFIG_OPTPROBES and set if the arch supports optimized kprobes (IOW, HAVE_OPTPROBES=y), since this option doesn't change the major behavior of kprobes, and workarounds for minor changes are documented. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: systemtap <systemtap@sources.redhat.com> Cc: DLE <dle-develop@lists.sourceforge.net> Cc: Dieter Ries <mail@dieterries.net> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <20100315170054.31593.3153.stgit@localhost6.localdomain6> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-03-16 01:00:54 +08:00
def_bool y
depends on KPROBES && HAVE_OPTPROBES
rcu: Use CONFIG_PREEMPTION CONFIG_PREEMPTION is selected by CONFIG_PREEMPT and by CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT. Both PREEMPT and PREEMPT_RT require the same functionality which today depends on CONFIG_PREEMPT. Switch the conditionals in RCU to use CONFIG_PREEMPTION. That's the first step towards RCU on RT. The further tweaks are work in progress. This neither touches the selftest bits which need a closer look by Paul. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726212124.210156346@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-07-27 05:19:38 +08:00
select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION
kprobes: Introduce kprobes jump optimization Introduce kprobes jump optimization arch-independent parts. Kprobes uses breakpoint instruction for interrupting execution flow, on some architectures, it can be replaced by a jump instruction and interruption emulation code. This gains kprobs' performance drastically. To enable this feature, set CONFIG_OPTPROBES=y (default y if the arch supports OPTPROBE). Changes in v9: - Fix a bug to optimize probe when enabling. - Check nearby probes can be optimize/unoptimize when disarming/arming kprobes, instead of registering/unregistering. This will help kprobe-tracer because most of probes on it are usually disabled. Changes in v6: - Cleanup coding style for readability. - Add comments around get/put_online_cpus(). Changes in v5: - Use get_online_cpus()/put_online_cpus() for avoiding text_mutex deadlock. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: systemtap <systemtap@sources.redhat.com> Cc: DLE <dle-develop@lists.sourceforge.net> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Anders Kaseorg <andersk@ksplice.com> Cc: Tim Abbott <tabbott@ksplice.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <compudj@krystal.dyndns.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20100225133407.6725.81992.stgit@localhost6.localdomain6> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-02-25 21:34:07 +08:00
kprobes/x86: Move ftrace-based kprobe code into kprobes-ftrace.c Split ftrace-based kprobes code from kprobes, and introduce CONFIG_(HAVE_)KPROBES_ON_FTRACE Kconfig flags. For the cleanup reason, this also moves kprobe_ftrace check into skip_singlestep. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120928081520.3560.25624.stgit@ltc138.sdl.hitachi.co.jp Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-09-28 16:15:20 +08:00
config KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
def_bool y
depends on KPROBES && HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
If function tracer is enabled and the arch supports full
passing of pt_regs to function tracing, then kprobes can
optimize on top of function tracing.
kprobes/x86: Move ftrace-based kprobe code into kprobes-ftrace.c Split ftrace-based kprobes code from kprobes, and introduce CONFIG_(HAVE_)KPROBES_ON_FTRACE Kconfig flags. For the cleanup reason, this also moves kprobe_ftrace check into skip_singlestep. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120928081520.3560.25624.stgit@ltc138.sdl.hitachi.co.jp Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-09-28 16:15:20 +08:00
uprobes, mm, x86: Add the ability to install and remove uprobes breakpoints Add uprobes support to the core kernel, with x86 support. This commit adds the kernel facilities, the actual uprobes user-space ABI and perf probe support comes in later commits. General design: Uprobes are maintained in an rb-tree indexed by inode and offset (the offset here is from the start of the mapping). For a unique (inode, offset) tuple, there can be at most one uprobe in the rb-tree. Since the (inode, offset) tuple identifies a unique uprobe, more than one user may be interested in the same uprobe. This provides the ability to connect multiple 'consumers' to the same uprobe. Each consumer defines a handler and a filter (optional). The 'handler' is run every time the uprobe is hit, if it matches the 'filter' criteria. The first consumer of a uprobe causes the breakpoint to be inserted at the specified address and subsequent consumers are appended to this list. On subsequent probes, the consumer gets appended to the existing list of consumers. The breakpoint is removed when the last consumer unregisters. For all other unregisterations, the consumer is removed from the list of consumers. Given a inode, we get a list of the mms that have mapped the inode. Do the actual registration if mm maps the page where a probe needs to be inserted/removed. We use a temporary list to walk through the vmas that map the inode. - The number of maps that map the inode, is not known before we walk the rmap and keeps changing. - extending vm_area_struct wasn't recommended, it's a size-critical data structure. - There can be more than one maps of the inode in the same mm. We add callbacks to the mmap methods to keep an eye on text vmas that are of interest to uprobes. When a vma of interest is mapped, we insert the breakpoint at the right address. Uprobe works by replacing the instruction at the address defined by (inode, offset) with the arch specific breakpoint instruction. We save a copy of the original instruction at the uprobed address. This is needed for: a. executing the instruction out-of-line (xol). b. instruction analysis for any subsequent fixups. c. restoring the instruction back when the uprobe is unregistered. We insert or delete a breakpoint instruction, and this breakpoint instruction is assumed to be the smallest instruction available on the platform. For fixed size instruction platforms this is trivially true, for variable size instruction platforms the breakpoint instruction is typically the smallest (often a single byte). Writing the instruction is done by COWing the page and changing the instruction during the copy, this even though most platforms allow atomic writes of the breakpoint instruction. This also mirrors the behaviour of a ptrace() memory write to a PRIVATE file map. The core worker is derived from KSM's replace_page() logic. In essence, similar to KSM: a. allocate a new page and copy over contents of the page that has the uprobed vaddr b. modify the copy and insert the breakpoint at the required address c. switch the original page with the copy containing the breakpoint d. flush page tables. replace_page() is being replicated here because of some minor changes in the type of pages and also because Hugh Dickins had plans to improve replace_page() for KSM specific work. Instruction analysis on x86 is based on instruction decoder and determines if an instruction can be probed and determines the necessary fixups after singlestep. Instruction analysis is done at probe insertion time so that we avoid having to repeat the same analysis every time a probe is hit. A lot of code here is due to the improvement/suggestions/inputs from Peter Zijlstra. Changelog: (v10): - Add code to clear REX.B prefix as suggested by Denys Vlasenko and Masami Hiramatsu. (v9): - Use insn_offset_modrm as suggested by Masami Hiramatsu. (v7): Handle comments from Peter Zijlstra: - Dont take reference to inode. (expect inode to uprobe_register to be sane). - Use PTR_ERR to set the return value. - No need to take reference to inode. - use PTR_ERR to return error value. - register and uprobe_unregister share code. (v5): - Modified del_consumer as per comments from Peter. - Drop reference to inode before dropping reference to uprobe. - Use i_size_read(inode) instead of inode->i_size. - Ensure uprobe->consumers is NULL, before __uprobe_unregister() is called. - Includes errno.h as recommended by Stephen Rothwell to fix a build issue on sparc defconfig - Remove restrictions while unregistering. - Earlier code leaked inode references under some conditions while registering/unregistering. - Continue the vma-rmap walk even if the intermediate vma doesnt meet the requirements. - Validate the vma found by find_vma before inserting/removing the breakpoint - Call del_consumer under mutex_lock. - Use hash locks. - Handle mremap. - Introduce find_least_offset_node() instead of close match logic in find_uprobe - Uprobes no more depends on MM_OWNER; No reference to task_structs while inserting/removing a probe. - Uses read_mapping_page instead of grab_cache_page so that the pages have valid content. - pass NULL to get_user_pages for the task parameter. - call SetPageUptodate on the new page allocated in write_opcode. - fix leaking a reference to the new page under certain conditions. - Include Instruction Decoder if Uprobes gets defined. - Remove const attributes for instruction prefix arrays. - Uses mm_context to know if the application is 32 bit. Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Also-written-by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120209092642.GE16600@linux.vnet.ibm.com [ Made various small edits to the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-09 17:26:42 +08:00
config UPROBES
uprobes: Kconfig dependency fix Suggested change from Oleg Nesterov. Fixes incomplete dependencies for uprobes feature. Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2014-03-07 23:32:22 +08:00
def_bool n
sparc64:Support User Probes for sparc Signed-off-by: Eric Saint Etienne <eric.saint.etienne@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-13 12:36:13 +08:00
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
uprobes, mm, x86: Add the ability to install and remove uprobes breakpoints Add uprobes support to the core kernel, with x86 support. This commit adds the kernel facilities, the actual uprobes user-space ABI and perf probe support comes in later commits. General design: Uprobes are maintained in an rb-tree indexed by inode and offset (the offset here is from the start of the mapping). For a unique (inode, offset) tuple, there can be at most one uprobe in the rb-tree. Since the (inode, offset) tuple identifies a unique uprobe, more than one user may be interested in the same uprobe. This provides the ability to connect multiple 'consumers' to the same uprobe. Each consumer defines a handler and a filter (optional). The 'handler' is run every time the uprobe is hit, if it matches the 'filter' criteria. The first consumer of a uprobe causes the breakpoint to be inserted at the specified address and subsequent consumers are appended to this list. On subsequent probes, the consumer gets appended to the existing list of consumers. The breakpoint is removed when the last consumer unregisters. For all other unregisterations, the consumer is removed from the list of consumers. Given a inode, we get a list of the mms that have mapped the inode. Do the actual registration if mm maps the page where a probe needs to be inserted/removed. We use a temporary list to walk through the vmas that map the inode. - The number of maps that map the inode, is not known before we walk the rmap and keeps changing. - extending vm_area_struct wasn't recommended, it's a size-critical data structure. - There can be more than one maps of the inode in the same mm. We add callbacks to the mmap methods to keep an eye on text vmas that are of interest to uprobes. When a vma of interest is mapped, we insert the breakpoint at the right address. Uprobe works by replacing the instruction at the address defined by (inode, offset) with the arch specific breakpoint instruction. We save a copy of the original instruction at the uprobed address. This is needed for: a. executing the instruction out-of-line (xol). b. instruction analysis for any subsequent fixups. c. restoring the instruction back when the uprobe is unregistered. We insert or delete a breakpoint instruction, and this breakpoint instruction is assumed to be the smallest instruction available on the platform. For fixed size instruction platforms this is trivially true, for variable size instruction platforms the breakpoint instruction is typically the smallest (often a single byte). Writing the instruction is done by COWing the page and changing the instruction during the copy, this even though most platforms allow atomic writes of the breakpoint instruction. This also mirrors the behaviour of a ptrace() memory write to a PRIVATE file map. The core worker is derived from KSM's replace_page() logic. In essence, similar to KSM: a. allocate a new page and copy over contents of the page that has the uprobed vaddr b. modify the copy and insert the breakpoint at the required address c. switch the original page with the copy containing the breakpoint d. flush page tables. replace_page() is being replicated here because of some minor changes in the type of pages and also because Hugh Dickins had plans to improve replace_page() for KSM specific work. Instruction analysis on x86 is based on instruction decoder and determines if an instruction can be probed and determines the necessary fixups after singlestep. Instruction analysis is done at probe insertion time so that we avoid having to repeat the same analysis every time a probe is hit. A lot of code here is due to the improvement/suggestions/inputs from Peter Zijlstra. Changelog: (v10): - Add code to clear REX.B prefix as suggested by Denys Vlasenko and Masami Hiramatsu. (v9): - Use insn_offset_modrm as suggested by Masami Hiramatsu. (v7): Handle comments from Peter Zijlstra: - Dont take reference to inode. (expect inode to uprobe_register to be sane). - Use PTR_ERR to set the return value. - No need to take reference to inode. - use PTR_ERR to return error value. - register and uprobe_unregister share code. (v5): - Modified del_consumer as per comments from Peter. - Drop reference to inode before dropping reference to uprobe. - Use i_size_read(inode) instead of inode->i_size. - Ensure uprobe->consumers is NULL, before __uprobe_unregister() is called. - Includes errno.h as recommended by Stephen Rothwell to fix a build issue on sparc defconfig - Remove restrictions while unregistering. - Earlier code leaked inode references under some conditions while registering/unregistering. - Continue the vma-rmap walk even if the intermediate vma doesnt meet the requirements. - Validate the vma found by find_vma before inserting/removing the breakpoint - Call del_consumer under mutex_lock. - Use hash locks. - Handle mremap. - Introduce find_least_offset_node() instead of close match logic in find_uprobe - Uprobes no more depends on MM_OWNER; No reference to task_structs while inserting/removing a probe. - Uses read_mapping_page instead of grab_cache_page so that the pages have valid content. - pass NULL to get_user_pages for the task parameter. - call SetPageUptodate on the new page allocated in write_opcode. - fix leaking a reference to the new page under certain conditions. - Include Instruction Decoder if Uprobes gets defined. - Remove const attributes for instruction prefix arrays. - Uses mm_context to know if the application is 32 bit. Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Also-written-by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120209092642.GE16600@linux.vnet.ibm.com [ Made various small edits to the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-09 17:26:42 +08:00
help
uprobes/core: Clean up, refactor and improve the code Make the uprobes code readable to me: - improve the Kconfig text so that a mere mortal gets some idea what CONFIG_UPROBES=y is really about - do trivial renames to standardize around the uprobes_*() namespace - clean up and simplify various code flow details - separate basic blocks of functionality - line break artifact and white space related removal - use standard local varible definition blocks - use vertical spacing to make things more readable - remove unnecessary volatile - restructure comment blocks to make them more uniform and more readable in general Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-ewbwhb8o6navvllsauu7k07p@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-17 16:27:41 +08:00
Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they
enable instrumentation applications (such as 'perf probe')
to establish unintrusive probes in user-space binaries and
libraries, by executing handler functions when the probes
are hit by user-space applications.
( These probes come in the form of single-byte breakpoints,
managed by the kernel and kept transparent to the probed
application. )
uprobes, mm, x86: Add the ability to install and remove uprobes breakpoints Add uprobes support to the core kernel, with x86 support. This commit adds the kernel facilities, the actual uprobes user-space ABI and perf probe support comes in later commits. General design: Uprobes are maintained in an rb-tree indexed by inode and offset (the offset here is from the start of the mapping). For a unique (inode, offset) tuple, there can be at most one uprobe in the rb-tree. Since the (inode, offset) tuple identifies a unique uprobe, more than one user may be interested in the same uprobe. This provides the ability to connect multiple 'consumers' to the same uprobe. Each consumer defines a handler and a filter (optional). The 'handler' is run every time the uprobe is hit, if it matches the 'filter' criteria. The first consumer of a uprobe causes the breakpoint to be inserted at the specified address and subsequent consumers are appended to this list. On subsequent probes, the consumer gets appended to the existing list of consumers. The breakpoint is removed when the last consumer unregisters. For all other unregisterations, the consumer is removed from the list of consumers. Given a inode, we get a list of the mms that have mapped the inode. Do the actual registration if mm maps the page where a probe needs to be inserted/removed. We use a temporary list to walk through the vmas that map the inode. - The number of maps that map the inode, is not known before we walk the rmap and keeps changing. - extending vm_area_struct wasn't recommended, it's a size-critical data structure. - There can be more than one maps of the inode in the same mm. We add callbacks to the mmap methods to keep an eye on text vmas that are of interest to uprobes. When a vma of interest is mapped, we insert the breakpoint at the right address. Uprobe works by replacing the instruction at the address defined by (inode, offset) with the arch specific breakpoint instruction. We save a copy of the original instruction at the uprobed address. This is needed for: a. executing the instruction out-of-line (xol). b. instruction analysis for any subsequent fixups. c. restoring the instruction back when the uprobe is unregistered. We insert or delete a breakpoint instruction, and this breakpoint instruction is assumed to be the smallest instruction available on the platform. For fixed size instruction platforms this is trivially true, for variable size instruction platforms the breakpoint instruction is typically the smallest (often a single byte). Writing the instruction is done by COWing the page and changing the instruction during the copy, this even though most platforms allow atomic writes of the breakpoint instruction. This also mirrors the behaviour of a ptrace() memory write to a PRIVATE file map. The core worker is derived from KSM's replace_page() logic. In essence, similar to KSM: a. allocate a new page and copy over contents of the page that has the uprobed vaddr b. modify the copy and insert the breakpoint at the required address c. switch the original page with the copy containing the breakpoint d. flush page tables. replace_page() is being replicated here because of some minor changes in the type of pages and also because Hugh Dickins had plans to improve replace_page() for KSM specific work. Instruction analysis on x86 is based on instruction decoder and determines if an instruction can be probed and determines the necessary fixups after singlestep. Instruction analysis is done at probe insertion time so that we avoid having to repeat the same analysis every time a probe is hit. A lot of code here is due to the improvement/suggestions/inputs from Peter Zijlstra. Changelog: (v10): - Add code to clear REX.B prefix as suggested by Denys Vlasenko and Masami Hiramatsu. (v9): - Use insn_offset_modrm as suggested by Masami Hiramatsu. (v7): Handle comments from Peter Zijlstra: - Dont take reference to inode. (expect inode to uprobe_register to be sane). - Use PTR_ERR to set the return value. - No need to take reference to inode. - use PTR_ERR to return error value. - register and uprobe_unregister share code. (v5): - Modified del_consumer as per comments from Peter. - Drop reference to inode before dropping reference to uprobe. - Use i_size_read(inode) instead of inode->i_size. - Ensure uprobe->consumers is NULL, before __uprobe_unregister() is called. - Includes errno.h as recommended by Stephen Rothwell to fix a build issue on sparc defconfig - Remove restrictions while unregistering. - Earlier code leaked inode references under some conditions while registering/unregistering. - Continue the vma-rmap walk even if the intermediate vma doesnt meet the requirements. - Validate the vma found by find_vma before inserting/removing the breakpoint - Call del_consumer under mutex_lock. - Use hash locks. - Handle mremap. - Introduce find_least_offset_node() instead of close match logic in find_uprobe - Uprobes no more depends on MM_OWNER; No reference to task_structs while inserting/removing a probe. - Uses read_mapping_page instead of grab_cache_page so that the pages have valid content. - pass NULL to get_user_pages for the task parameter. - call SetPageUptodate on the new page allocated in write_opcode. - fix leaking a reference to the new page under certain conditions. - Include Instruction Decoder if Uprobes gets defined. - Remove const attributes for instruction prefix arrays. - Uses mm_context to know if the application is 32 bit. Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Also-written-by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120209092642.GE16600@linux.vnet.ibm.com [ Made various small edits to the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-09 17:26:42 +08:00
Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS" It was believed that metag was the only architecture that required the ring buffer to keep 8 byte words aligned on 8 byte architectures, and with its removal, it was assumed that the ring buffer code did not need to handle this case. It appears that sparc64 also requires this. The following was reported on a sparc64 boot up: kernel: futex hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 4194304 bytes, linear) kernel: Running postponed tracer tests: kernel: Testing tracer function: kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a24] trace_function+0x44/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a24] trace_function+0x44/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140 kernel: PASSED Need to put back the 64BIT aligned code for the ring buffer. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CADxRZqzXQRYgKc=y-KV=S_yHL+Y8Ay2mh5ezeZUnpRvg+syWKw@mail.gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 86b3de60a0b6 ("ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS") Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2020-12-15 01:33:51 +08:00
config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS
def_bool 64BIT && !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
help
Some architectures require 64 bit accesses to be 64 bit
aligned, which also requires structs containing 64 bit values
to be 64 bit aligned too. This includes some 32 bit
architectures which can do 64 bit accesses, as well as 64 bit
architectures without unaligned access.
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if 64 bit
accesses are required to be 64 bit aligned in this way even
though it is not a 64 bit architecture.
arch/Kconfig: update a broken file reference Commit adab66b71abf ("Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"") added the config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS back into arch/Kconfig with this revert. In the meantime, commit c9b54d6f362c ("docs: move other kAPI documents to core-api") changed ./Documentation/unaligned-memory-access.txt to ./Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst. Fortunately, ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check detects this and warns about this broken reference. Update the file reference in arch/Kconfig. Fixes: adab66b71abf ("Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210119095326.13896-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2021-01-19 17:53:26 +08:00
See Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst for
more information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses.
Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS" It was believed that metag was the only architecture that required the ring buffer to keep 8 byte words aligned on 8 byte architectures, and with its removal, it was assumed that the ring buffer code did not need to handle this case. It appears that sparc64 also requires this. The following was reported on a sparc64 boot up: kernel: futex hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 4194304 bytes, linear) kernel: Running postponed tracer tests: kernel: Testing tracer function: kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a24] trace_function+0x44/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a24] trace_function+0x44/0x140 kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140 kernel: PASSED Need to put back the 64BIT aligned code for the ring buffer. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CADxRZqzXQRYgKc=y-KV=S_yHL+Y8Ay2mh5ezeZUnpRvg+syWKw@mail.gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 86b3de60a0b6 ("ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS") Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2020-12-15 01:33:51 +08:00
introduce HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS Kconfig symbol In many cases, especially in networking, it can be beneficial to know at compile time whether the architecture can do unaligned accesses efficiently. This patch introduces a new Kconfig symbol HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for that purpose and adds it to the powerpc and x86 architectures. Also add some documentation about alignment and networking, and especially one intended use of this symbol. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> [x86 architecture part] Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 16:45:33 +08:00
config HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
Kconfig: eliminate "def_bool n" constructs Using "def_bool n" is pointless, simply using bool here appears more appropriate. Further, retaining such options that don't have a prompt and aren't selected by anything seems also at least questionable. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-16 13:01:38 +08:00
bool
introduce HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS Kconfig symbol In many cases, especially in networking, it can be beneficial to know at compile time whether the architecture can do unaligned accesses efficiently. This patch introduces a new Kconfig symbol HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for that purpose and adds it to the powerpc and x86 architectures. Also add some documentation about alignment and networking, and especially one intended use of this symbol. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> [x86 architecture part] Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 16:45:33 +08:00
help
Some architectures are unable to perform unaligned accesses
without the use of get_unaligned/put_unaligned. Others are
unable to perform such accesses efficiently (e.g. trap on
unaligned access and require fixing it up in the exception
handler.)
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it can
perform unaligned accesses efficiently to allow different
code paths to be selected for these cases. Some network
drivers, for example, could opt to not fix up alignment
problems with received packets if doing so would not help
much.
docs: move other kAPI documents to core-api There are a number of random documents that seem to be describing some aspects of the core-api. Move them to such directory, adding them at the core-api/index.rst file. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86d979ed183adb76af93a92f20189bccf97f0055.1592918949.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-06-23 21:31:38 +08:00
See Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst for more
introduce HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS Kconfig symbol In many cases, especially in networking, it can be beneficial to know at compile time whether the architecture can do unaligned accesses efficiently. This patch introduces a new Kconfig symbol HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for that purpose and adds it to the powerpc and x86 architectures. Also add some documentation about alignment and networking, and especially one intended use of this symbol. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> [x86 architecture part] Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 16:45:33 +08:00
information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses.
byteorder: allow arch to opt to use GCC intrinsics for byteswapping Since GCC 4.4, there have been __builtin_bswap32() and __builtin_bswap16() intrinsics. A __builtin_bswap16() came a little later (4.6 for PowerPC, 48 for other platforms). By using these instead of the inline assembler that most architectures have in their __arch_swabXX() macros, we let the compiler see what's actually happening. The resulting code should be at least as good, and much *better* in the cases where it can be combined with a nearby load or store, using a load-and-byteswap or store-and-byteswap instruction (e.g. lwbrx/stwbrx on PowerPC, movbe on Atom). When GCC is sufficiently recent *and* the architecture opts in to using the intrinsics by setting CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP, they will be used in preference to the __arch_swabXX() macros. An architecture which does not set ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP will continue to use its own hand-crafted macros. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-12-04 00:25:40 +08:00
config ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in coding style with command like: $ sed -e 's/^ / /' -i */Kconfig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574306573-10886-1-git-send-email-krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 08:50:26 +08:00
bool
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
Modern versions of GCC (since 4.4) have builtin functions
for handling byte-swapping. Using these, instead of the old
inline assembler that the architecture code provides in the
__arch_bswapXX() macros, allows the compiler to see what's
happening and offers more opportunity for optimisation. In
particular, the compiler will be able to combine the byteswap
with a nearby load or store and use load-and-swap or
store-and-swap instructions if the architecture has them. It
should almost *never* result in code which is worse than the
hand-coded assembler in <asm/swab.h>. But just in case it
does, the use of the builtins is optional.
byteorder: allow arch to opt to use GCC intrinsics for byteswapping Since GCC 4.4, there have been __builtin_bswap32() and __builtin_bswap16() intrinsics. A __builtin_bswap16() came a little later (4.6 for PowerPC, 48 for other platforms). By using these instead of the inline assembler that most architectures have in their __arch_swabXX() macros, we let the compiler see what's actually happening. The resulting code should be at least as good, and much *better* in the cases where it can be combined with a nearby load or store, using a load-and-byteswap or store-and-byteswap instruction (e.g. lwbrx/stwbrx on PowerPC, movbe on Atom). When GCC is sufficiently recent *and* the architecture opts in to using the intrinsics by setting CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP, they will be used in preference to the __arch_swabXX() macros. An architecture which does not set ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP will continue to use its own hand-crafted macros. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-12-04 00:25:40 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
Any architecture with load-and-swap or store-and-swap
instructions should set this. And it shouldn't hurt to set it
on architectures that don't have such instructions.
byteorder: allow arch to opt to use GCC intrinsics for byteswapping Since GCC 4.4, there have been __builtin_bswap32() and __builtin_bswap16() intrinsics. A __builtin_bswap16() came a little later (4.6 for PowerPC, 48 for other platforms). By using these instead of the inline assembler that most architectures have in their __arch_swabXX() macros, we let the compiler see what's actually happening. The resulting code should be at least as good, and much *better* in the cases where it can be combined with a nearby load or store, using a load-and-byteswap or store-and-byteswap instruction (e.g. lwbrx/stwbrx on PowerPC, movbe on Atom). When GCC is sufficiently recent *and* the architecture opts in to using the intrinsics by setting CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP, they will be used in preference to the __arch_swabXX() macros. An architecture which does not set ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP will continue to use its own hand-crafted macros. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-12-04 00:25:40 +08:00
Kprobes: indicate kretprobe support in Kconfig Add CONFIG_HAVE_KRETPROBES to the arch/<arch>/Kconfig file for relevant architectures with kprobes support. This facilitates easy handling of in-kernel modules (like samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c) that depend on kretprobes being present in the kernel. Thanks to Sam Ravnborg for helping make the patch more lean. Per Mathieu's suggestion, added CONFIG_KRETPROBES and fixed up dependencies. Signed-off-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-05 06:28:37 +08:00
config KRETPROBES
def_bool y
kprobes: Use rethook for kretprobe if possible Use rethook for kretprobe function return hooking if the arch sets CONFIG_HAVE_RETHOOK=y. In this case, CONFIG_KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK is set to 'y' automatically, and the kretprobe internal data fields switches to use rethook. If not, it continues to use kretprobe specific function return hooks. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/164826162556.2455864.12255833167233452047.stgit@devnote2
2022-03-26 10:27:05 +08:00
depends on KPROBES && (HAVE_KRETPROBES || HAVE_RETHOOK)
config KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK
def_bool y
depends on HAVE_RETHOOK
depends on KRETPROBES
select RETHOOK
Kprobes: indicate kretprobe support in Kconfig Add CONFIG_HAVE_KRETPROBES to the arch/<arch>/Kconfig file for relevant architectures with kprobes support. This facilitates easy handling of in-kernel modules (like samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c) that depend on kretprobes being present in the kernel. Thanks to Sam Ravnborg for helping make the patch more lean. Per Mathieu's suggestion, added CONFIG_KRETPROBES and fixed up dependencies. Signed-off-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-05 06:28:37 +08:00
core, x86: Add user return notifiers Add a general per-cpu notifier that is called whenever the kernel is about to return to userspace. The notifier uses a thread_info flag and existing checks, so there is no impact on user return or context switch fast paths. This will be used initially to speed up KVM task switching by lazily updating MSRs. Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1253342422-13811-1-git-send-email-avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-09-19 14:40:22 +08:00
config USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
bool
depends on HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
help
Provide a kernel-internal notification when a cpu is about to
switch to user mode.
access_process_vm device memory infrastructure In order to be able to debug things like the X server and programs using the PPC Cell SPUs, the debugger needs to be able to access device memory through ptrace and /proc/pid/mem. This patch: Add the generic_access_phys access function and put the hooks in place to allow access_process_vm to access device or PPC Cell SPU memory. [riel@redhat.com: Add documentation for the vm_ops->access function] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrensmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:27:05 +08:00
config HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
Kconfig: eliminate "def_bool n" constructs Using "def_bool n" is pointless, simply using bool here appears more appropriate. Further, retaining such options that don't have a prompt and aren't selected by anything seems also at least questionable. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-16 13:01:38 +08:00
bool
access_process_vm device memory infrastructure In order to be able to debug things like the X server and programs using the PPC Cell SPUs, the debugger needs to be able to access device memory through ptrace and /proc/pid/mem. This patch: Add the generic_access_phys access function and put the hooks in place to allow access_process_vm to access device or PPC Cell SPU memory. [riel@redhat.com: Add documentation for the vm_ops->access function] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrensmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:27:05 +08:00
Move Kconfig.instrumentation to arch/Kconfig and init/Kconfig Move the instrumentation Kconfig to arch/Kconfig for architecture dependent options - oprofile - kprobes and init/Kconfig for architecture independent options - profiling - markers Remove the "Instrumentation Support" menu. Everything moves to "General setup". Delete the kernel/Kconfig.instrumentation file. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-02-03 04:10:36 +08:00
config HAVE_KPROBES
Kconfig: eliminate "def_bool n" constructs Using "def_bool n" is pointless, simply using bool here appears more appropriate. Further, retaining such options that don't have a prompt and aren't selected by anything seems also at least questionable. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-16 13:01:38 +08:00
bool
Kprobes: indicate kretprobe support in Kconfig Add CONFIG_HAVE_KRETPROBES to the arch/<arch>/Kconfig file for relevant architectures with kprobes support. This facilitates easy handling of in-kernel modules (like samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c) that depend on kretprobes being present in the kernel. Thanks to Sam Ravnborg for helping make the patch more lean. Per Mathieu's suggestion, added CONFIG_KRETPROBES and fixed up dependencies. Signed-off-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-05 06:28:37 +08:00
config HAVE_KRETPROBES
Kconfig: eliminate "def_bool n" constructs Using "def_bool n" is pointless, simply using bool here appears more appropriate. Further, retaining such options that don't have a prompt and aren't selected by anything seems also at least questionable. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-16 13:01:38 +08:00
bool
dma: add dma_*map*_attrs() interfaces Introduce new interfaces, dma_*map*_attrs(), for passing architecture-specific attributes when memory is mapped and unmapped for DMA. Give the interfaces default implementations which ignore attributes. Also introduce the dma_{set|get}_attr() interfaces for setting and retrieving individual attributes. Define one attribute, DMA_ATTR_WRITE_BARRIER, in anticipation of its use by ia64/sn. Select whether architectures implement arch-specific versions of the dma_*map*_attrs() interfaces via HAVE_DMA_ATTRS in Kconfig. [markn@au1.ibm.com: dma_{set,get}_attr() have to be static inline] Signed-off-by: Arthur Kepner <akepner@sgi.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org> Cc: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rdreier@cisco.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Mark Nelson <markn@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 16:00:30 +08:00
kprobes: Introduce kprobes jump optimization Introduce kprobes jump optimization arch-independent parts. Kprobes uses breakpoint instruction for interrupting execution flow, on some architectures, it can be replaced by a jump instruction and interruption emulation code. This gains kprobs' performance drastically. To enable this feature, set CONFIG_OPTPROBES=y (default y if the arch supports OPTPROBE). Changes in v9: - Fix a bug to optimize probe when enabling. - Check nearby probes can be optimize/unoptimize when disarming/arming kprobes, instead of registering/unregistering. This will help kprobe-tracer because most of probes on it are usually disabled. Changes in v6: - Cleanup coding style for readability. - Add comments around get/put_online_cpus(). Changes in v5: - Use get_online_cpus()/put_online_cpus() for avoiding text_mutex deadlock. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: systemtap <systemtap@sources.redhat.com> Cc: DLE <dle-develop@lists.sourceforge.net> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Anders Kaseorg <andersk@ksplice.com> Cc: Tim Abbott <tabbott@ksplice.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <compudj@krystal.dyndns.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20100225133407.6725.81992.stgit@localhost6.localdomain6> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-02-25 21:34:07 +08:00
config HAVE_OPTPROBES
bool
nmi watchdog: do not use cpp symbol in Kconfig ARCH_HAS_NMI_WATCHDOG is a macro defined by arch, but config HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR depends on it. This is wrong, ARCH_HAS_NMI_WATCHDOG has to be a Kconfig config, and arch's need it should select it explicitly. Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-24 06:01:51 +08:00
kprobes/x86: Move ftrace-based kprobe code into kprobes-ftrace.c Split ftrace-based kprobes code from kprobes, and introduce CONFIG_(HAVE_)KPROBES_ON_FTRACE Kconfig flags. For the cleanup reason, this also moves kprobe_ftrace check into skip_singlestep. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120928081520.3560.25624.stgit@ltc138.sdl.hitachi.co.jp Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-09-28 16:15:20 +08:00
config HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
bool
kprobes: Add a test case for stacktrace from kretprobe handler Add a test case for stacktrace from kretprobe handler and nested kretprobe handlers. This test checks both of stack trace inside kretprobe handler and stack trace from pt_regs. Those stack trace must include actual function return address instead of kretprobe trampoline. The nested kretprobe stacktrace test checks whether the unwinder can correctly unwind the call frame on the stack which has been modified by the kretprobe. Since the stacktrace on kretprobe is correctly fixed only on x86, this introduces a meta kconfig ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE which tells user that the stacktrace on kretprobe is correct or not. The test results will be shown like below; TAP version 14 1..1 # Subtest: kprobes_test 1..6 ok 1 - test_kprobe ok 2 - test_kprobes ok 3 - test_kretprobe ok 4 - test_kretprobes ok 5 - test_stacktrace_on_kretprobe ok 6 - test_stacktrace_on_nested_kretprobe # kprobes_test: pass:6 fail:0 skip:0 total:6 # Totals: pass:6 fail:0 skip:0 total:6 ok 1 - kprobes_test Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163516211244.604541.18350507860972214415.stgit@devnote2 Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-10-25 19:41:52 +08:00
config ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
bool
help
Since kretprobes modifies return address on the stack, the
stacktrace may see the kretprobe trampoline address instead
of correct one. If the architecture stacktrace code and
unwinder can adjust such entries, select this configuration.
error-injection: Separate error-injection from kprobe Since error-injection framework is not limited to be used by kprobes, nor bpf. Other kernel subsystems can use it freely for checking safeness of error-injection, e.g. livepatch, ftrace etc. So this separate error-injection framework from kprobes. Some differences has been made: - "kprobe" word is removed from any APIs/structures. - BPF_ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() is renamed to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() since it is not limited for BPF too. - CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION is the config item of this feature. It is automatically enabled if the arch supports error injection feature for kprobe or ftrace etc. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-01-13 01:55:03 +08:00
config HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
bpf: add a bpf_override_function helper Error injection is sloppy and very ad-hoc. BPF could fill this niche perfectly with it's kprobe functionality. We could make sure errors are only triggered in specific call chains that we care about with very specific situations. Accomplish this with the bpf_override_funciton helper. This will modify the probe'd callers return value to the specified value and set the PC to an override function that simply returns, bypassing the originally probed function. This gives us a nice clean way to implement systematic error injection for all of our code paths. Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2017-12-12 00:36:48 +08:00
bool
printk/nmi: generic solution for safe printk in NMI printk() takes some locks and could not be used a safe way in NMI context. The chance of a deadlock is real especially when printing stacks from all CPUs. This particular problem has been addressed on x86 by the commit a9edc8809328 ("x86/nmi: Perform a safe NMI stack trace on all CPUs"). The patchset brings two big advantages. First, it makes the NMI backtraces safe on all architectures for free. Second, it makes all NMI messages almost safe on all architectures (the temporary buffer is limited. We still should keep the number of messages in NMI context at minimum). Note that there already are several messages printed in NMI context: WARN_ON(in_nmi()), BUG_ON(in_nmi()), anything being printed out from MCE handlers. These are not easy to avoid. This patch reuses most of the code and makes it generic. It is useful for all messages and architectures that support NMI. The alternative printk_func is set when entering and is reseted when leaving NMI context. It queues IRQ work to copy the messages into the main ring buffer in a safe context. __printk_nmi_flush() copies all available messages and reset the buffer. Then we could use a simple cmpxchg operations to get synchronized with writers. There is also used a spinlock to get synchronized with other flushers. We do not longer use seq_buf because it depends on external lock. It would be hard to make all supported operations safe for a lockless use. It would be confusing and error prone to make only some operations safe. The code is put into separate printk/nmi.c as suggested by Steven Rostedt. It needs a per-CPU buffer and is compiled only on architectures that call nmi_enter(). This is achieved by the new HAVE_NMI Kconfig flag. The are MN10300 and Xtensa architectures. We need to clean up NMI handling there first. Let's do it separately. The patch is heavily based on the draft from Peter Zijlstra, see https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/10/327 [arnd@arndb.de: printk-nmi: use %zu format string for size_t] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: min_t->min - all types are size_t here] Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> [arm part] Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 08:00:33 +08:00
config HAVE_NMI
bool
asm-generic: Define CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_DESCRIPTORS Replace HAVE_DEREFERENCE_FUNCTION_DESCRIPTOR by a config option named CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_DESCRIPTORS and use it instead of 'dereference_function_descriptor' macro to know whether an arch has function descriptors. To limit churn in one of the following patches, use an #ifdef/#else construct with empty first part instead of an #ifndef in asm-generic/sections.h On powerpc, make sure the config option matches the ABI used by the compiler with a BUILD_BUG_ON() and add missing _CALL_ELF=2 when calling 'sparse' so that sparse sees the same piece of code as GCC. And include a helper to check whether an arch has function descriptors or not : have_function_descriptors() Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a0f11fb0ea74a3197bc44dd7ba25e53a24fd03d.1644928018.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2022-02-15 20:41:02 +08:00
config HAVE_FUNCTION_DESCRIPTORS
bool
tracing: Refactor TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT in Kconfig Make architectures select TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT instead of having many defines. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210731052233.4703-2-masahiroy@kernel.org Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>   #arch/arc Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-07-31 13:22:32 +08:00
config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
bool
arch: make TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT generic On most architectures, IRQ flag tracing is disabled in NMI context, and architectures need to define and select TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT in order to enable this. Commit: 859d069ee1ddd878 ("lockdep: Prepare for NMI IRQ state tracking") Permitted IRQ flag tracing in NMI context, allowing lockdep to work in NMI context where an architecture had suitable entry logic. At the time, most architectures did not have such suitable entry logic, and this broke lockdep on such architectures. Thus, this was partially disabled in commit: ed00495333ccc80f ("locking/lockdep: Fix TRACE_IRQFLAGS vs. NMIs") ... with architectures needing to select TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT to enable IRQ flag tracing in NMI context. Currently TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT is defined under arch/x86/Kconfig.debug. Move it to arch/Kconfig so architectures can select it without having to provide their own definition. Since the regular TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT is selected by arch/x86/Kconfig, the select of TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT is moved there too. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511131733.4074499-2-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2022-05-11 21:17:32 +08:00
config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT
bool
tracehook: CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK This adds the generic HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK kconfig item. Each arch should add to some Kconfig file: select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK if the arch code uses all the latest hooks to enable newfangled tracing and debugging code. The comment in arch/Kconfig lists all the prerequisite arch support. When all these are available, setting HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK will allow enabling any new features that depend on the modern arch interfaces. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 10:45:57 +08:00
#
# An arch should select this if it provides all these things:
#
# task_pt_regs() in asm/processor.h or asm/ptrace.h
# arch_has_single_step() if there is hardware single-step support
# arch_has_block_step() if there is hardware block-step support
# asm/syscall.h supplying asm-generic/syscall.h interface
# linux/regset.h user_regset interfaces
# CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET #define'd in linux/elf.h
ptrace: Create ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit} in ptrace.h Rename tracehook_report_syscall_{entry,exit} to ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit} and place them in ptrace.h There is no longer any generic tracehook infractructure so make these ptrace specific functions ptrace specific. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220309162454.123006-3-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-01-28 01:46:37 +08:00
# TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE calls ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit}
resume_user_mode: Move to resume_user_mode.h Move set_notify_resume and tracehook_notify_resume into resume_user_mode.h. While doing that rename tracehook_notify_resume to resume_user_mode_work. Update all of the places that included tracehook.h for these functions to include resume_user_mode.h instead. Update all of the callers of tracehook_notify_resume to call resume_user_mode_work. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220309162454.123006-12-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-02-10 02:20:45 +08:00
# TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME calls resume_user_mode_work()
tracehook: CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK This adds the generic HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK kconfig item. Each arch should add to some Kconfig file: select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK if the arch code uses all the latest hooks to enable newfangled tracing and debugging code. The comment in arch/Kconfig lists all the prerequisite arch support. When all these are available, setting HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK will allow enabling any new features that depend on the modern arch interfaces. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 10:45:57 +08:00
#
config HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
Kconfig: eliminate "def_bool n" constructs Using "def_bool n" is pointless, simply using bool here appears more appropriate. Further, retaining such options that don't have a prompt and aren't selected by anything seems also at least questionable. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-16 13:01:38 +08:00
bool
tracehook: CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK This adds the generic HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK kconfig item. Each arch should add to some Kconfig file: select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK if the arch code uses all the latest hooks to enable newfangled tracing and debugging code. The comment in arch/Kconfig lists all the prerequisite arch support. When all these are available, setting HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK will allow enabling any new features that depend on the modern arch interfaces. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 10:45:57 +08:00
drivers: add Contiguous Memory Allocator The Contiguous Memory Allocator is a set of helper functions for DMA mapping framework that improves allocations of contiguous memory chunks. CMA grabs memory on system boot, marks it with MIGRATE_CMA migrate type and gives back to the system. Kernel is allowed to allocate only movable pages within CMA's managed memory so that it can be used for example for page cache when DMA mapping do not use it. On dma_alloc_from_contiguous() request such pages are migrated out of CMA area to free required contiguous block and fulfill the request. This allows to allocate large contiguous chunks of memory at any time assuming that there is enough free memory available in the system. This code is heavily based on earlier works by Michal Nazarewicz. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Tested-by: Rob Clark <rob.clark@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ohad Ben-Cohen <ohad@wizery.com> Tested-by: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@linaro.org> Tested-by: Robert Nelson <robertcnelson@gmail.com> Tested-by: Barry Song <Baohua.Song@csr.com>
2011-12-29 20:09:51 +08:00
config HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
bool
smp: Provide generic idle thread allocation All SMP architectures have magic to fork the idle task and to store it for reusage when cpu hotplug is enabled. Provide a generic infrastructure for it. Create/reinit the idle thread for the cpu which is brought up in the generic code and hand the thread pointer to the architecture code via __cpu_up(). Note, that fork_idle() is called via a workqueue, because this guarantees that the idle thread does not get a reference to a user space VM. This can happen when the boot process did not bring up all possible cpus and a later cpu_up() is initiated via the sysfs interface. In that case fork_idle() would be called in the context of the user space task and take a reference on the user space VM. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120420124557.102478630@linutronix.de
2012-04-20 21:05:45 +08:00
config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in coding style with command like: $ sed -e 's/^ / /' -i */Kconfig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574306573-10886-1-git-send-email-krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 08:50:26 +08:00
bool
smp: Provide generic idle thread allocation All SMP architectures have magic to fork the idle task and to store it for reusage when cpu hotplug is enabled. Provide a generic infrastructure for it. Create/reinit the idle thread for the cpu which is brought up in the generic code and hand the thread pointer to the architecture code via __cpu_up(). Note, that fork_idle() is called via a workqueue, because this guarantees that the idle thread does not get a reference to a user space VM. This can happen when the boot process did not bring up all possible cpus and a later cpu_up() is initiated via the sysfs interface. In that case fork_idle() would be called in the context of the user space task and take a reference on the user space VM. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120420124557.102478630@linutronix.de
2012-04-20 21:05:45 +08:00
idle: Fix hlt/nohlt command-line handling in new generic idle commit d1669912 (idle: Implement generic idle function) added a new generic idle along with support for hlt/nohlt command line options to override default idle loop behavior. However, the command-line processing is never compiled. The command-line handling is wrapped by CONFIG_GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP and arches that use this feature select it in their Kconfigs. However, no Kconfig definition was created for this option, so it is never enabled, and therefore command-line override of the idle-loop behavior is broken after migrating to the generic idle loop. To fix, add a Kconfig definition for GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP. Tested on ARM (OMAP4/Panda) which enables the command-line overrides by default. Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Magnus Damm <magnus.damm@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1366849153-25564-1-git-send-email-khilman@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2013-04-25 08:19:13 +08:00
config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in coding style with command like: $ sed -e 's/^ / /' -i */Kconfig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574306573-10886-1-git-send-email-krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 08:50:26 +08:00
bool
idle: Fix hlt/nohlt command-line handling in new generic idle commit d1669912 (idle: Implement generic idle function) added a new generic idle along with support for hlt/nohlt command line options to override default idle loop behavior. However, the command-line processing is never compiled. The command-line handling is wrapped by CONFIG_GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP and arches that use this feature select it in their Kconfigs. However, no Kconfig definition was created for this option, so it is never enabled, and therefore command-line override of the idle-loop behavior is broken after migrating to the generic idle loop. To fix, add a Kconfig definition for GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP. Tested on ARM (OMAP4/Panda) which enables the command-line overrides by default. Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Magnus Damm <magnus.damm@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1366849153-25564-1-git-send-email-khilman@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2013-04-25 08:19:13 +08:00
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 05:36:10 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
bool
help
An architecture should select this when it can successfully
build and run with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
initramfs: move the legacy keepinitrd parameter to core code No need to handle the freeing disable in arch code when we already have a core hook (and a different name for the option) for it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190213174621.29297-7-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 08:18:30 +08:00
#
# Select if the arch provides a historic keepinit alias for the retain_initrd
# command line option
#
config ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD
bool
arch: add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY config Currently, there's no good way to test for the presence of set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() helpers implemented by archs such as x86, arm, arm64 and s390. There's DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX and DEBUG_RODATA, however both don't really reflect that: set_memory_*() are also available even when DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX is turned off, and DEBUG_RODATA is set by parisc, but doesn't implement above functions. Thus, add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY that is selected by mentioned archs, where generic code can test against this. This also allows later on to move DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX out of the arch specific Kconfig to define it only once depending on ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY. Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-21 23:09:33 +08:00
# Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h
config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
bool
x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_*() functions Add two new functions set_direct_map_default_noflush() and set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() for setting the direct map alias for the page to its default valid permissions and to an invalid state that cannot be cached in a TLB, respectively. These functions do not flush the TLB. Note, __kernel_map_pages() does something similar but flushes the TLB and doesn't reset the permission bits to default on all architectures. Also add an ARCH config ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP for specifying whether these have an actual implementation or a default empty one. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-15-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-26 08:11:34 +08:00
# Select if arch has all set_direct_map_invalid/default() functions
config ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
bool
dma-direct: provide generic support for uncached kernel segments A few architectures support uncached kernel segments. In that case we get an uncached mapping for a given physica address by using an offset in the uncached segement. Implement support for this scheme in the generic dma-direct code instead of duplicating it in arch hooks. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-06-03 14:43:51 +08:00
#
dma-direct: make uncached_kernel_address more general Rename the symbol to arch_dma_set_uncached, and pass a size to it as well as allow an error return. That will allow reusing this hook for in-place pagetable remapping. As the in-place remap doesn't always require an explicit cache flush, also detangle ARCH_HAS_DMA_PREP_COHERENT from ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
2020-02-22 07:55:43 +08:00
# Select if the architecture provides the arch_dma_set_uncached symbol to
arch/Kconfig: fix spelling mistakes There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text. Fix these. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:03:44 +08:00
# either provide an uncached segment alias for a DMA allocation, or
dma-direct: make uncached_kernel_address more general Rename the symbol to arch_dma_set_uncached, and pass a size to it as well as allow an error return. That will allow reusing this hook for in-place pagetable remapping. As the in-place remap doesn't always require an explicit cache flush, also detangle ARCH_HAS_DMA_PREP_COHERENT from ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
2020-02-22 07:55:43 +08:00
# to remap the page tables in place.
dma-direct: provide generic support for uncached kernel segments A few architectures support uncached kernel segments. In that case we get an uncached mapping for a given physica address by using an offset in the uncached segement. Implement support for this scheme in the generic dma-direct code instead of duplicating it in arch hooks. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-06-03 14:43:51 +08:00
#
dma-direct: make uncached_kernel_address more general Rename the symbol to arch_dma_set_uncached, and pass a size to it as well as allow an error return. That will allow reusing this hook for in-place pagetable remapping. As the in-place remap doesn't always require an explicit cache flush, also detangle ARCH_HAS_DMA_PREP_COHERENT from ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
2020-02-22 07:55:43 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED
dma-direct: provide generic support for uncached kernel segments A few architectures support uncached kernel segments. In that case we get an uncached mapping for a given physica address by using an offset in the uncached segement. Implement support for this scheme in the generic dma-direct code instead of duplicating it in arch hooks. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-06-03 14:43:51 +08:00
bool
dma-direct: provide a arch_dma_clear_uncached hook This allows the arch code to reset the page tables to cached access when freeing a dma coherent allocation that was set to uncached using arch_dma_set_uncached. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
2020-02-22 04:35:05 +08:00
#
# Select if the architectures provides the arch_dma_clear_uncached symbol
# to undo an in-place page table remap for uncached access.
#
config ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED
dma-direct: provide generic support for uncached kernel segments A few architectures support uncached kernel segments. In that case we get an uncached mapping for a given physica address by using an offset in the uncached segement. Implement support for this scheme in the generic dma-direct code instead of duplicating it in arch hooks. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-06-03 14:43:51 +08:00
bool
init: Provide arch_cpu_finalize_init() check_bugs() has become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities to finalize the CPU initialization before running the rest of the init code. Most are empty, a few do actual bug checks, some do alternative patching and some cobble a CPU advertisement string together.... Aside of that the current implementation requires duplicated function declaration and mostly empty header files for them. Provide a new function arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Provide a generic declaration if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT is selected and a stub inline otherwise. This requires a temporary #ifdef in start_kernel() which will be removed along with check_bugs() once the architectures are converted over. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224544.957805717@linutronix.de
2023-06-14 07:39:22 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
bool
Construct init thread stack in the linker script rather than by union Construct the init thread stack in the linker script rather than doing it by means of a union so that ia64's init_task.c can be got rid of. The following symbols are then made available from INIT_TASK_DATA() linker script macro: init_thread_union init_stack INIT_TASK_DATA() also expands the region to THREAD_SIZE to accommodate the size of the init stack. init_thread_union is given its own section so that it can be placed into the stack space in the right order. I'm assuming that the ia64 ordering is correct and that the task_struct is first and the thread_info second. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Tested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> (arm64) Tested-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-01-02 23:12:01 +08:00
# Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section
config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in coding style with command like: $ sed -e 's/^ / /' -i */Kconfig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574306573-10886-1-git-send-email-krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 08:50:26 +08:00
bool
init_task: Create generic init_task instance All archs define init_task in the same way (except ia64, but there is no particular reason why ia64 cannot use the common version). Create a generic instance so all archs can be converted over. The config switch is temporary and will be removed when all archs are converted over. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120503085034.092585287@linutronix.de
2012-05-03 17:02:48 +08:00
task_allocator: Use config switches instead of magic defines Replace __HAVE_ARCH_TASK_ALLOCATOR and __HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_ALLOCATOR with proper config switches. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120505150142.371309416@linutronix.de
2012-05-05 23:05:48 +08:00
# Select if arch has its private alloc_task_struct() function
config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
bool
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)). The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct at the end of task_struct. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_task_struct_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...); dup_task_struct(...): ... tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node); copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) example usage trace: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c: __fpu__restore_sig(...): ... struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu; ... __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size); fpu__restore_sig(...): ... return __fpu__restore_sig(...); arch/x86/kernel/signal.c: restore_sigcontext(...): ... fpu__restore_sig(...) This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct. If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2017-08-17 04:00:58 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
bool
depends on !ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
help
An architecture should select this to provide hardened usercopy
knowledge about what region of the thread_struct should be
whitelisted for copying to userspace. Normally this is only the
FPU registers. Specifically, arch_thread_struct_whitelist()
should be implemented. Without this, the entire thread_struct
field in task_struct will be left whitelisted.
Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off from the task struct), but that is about to change. But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and freeing functions are. Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical. That identity then meant that we would have things like ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node); ... tsk->stack = ti; which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code just gets to be entirely bogus. So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be about the stack. The fact that the thread_info then shares the allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the allocation itself. This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's just that we clarify what the pointer means. The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd, but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity doesn't matter. It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and type change. Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-25 06:09:37 +08:00
# Select if arch has its private alloc_thread_stack() function
config ARCH_THREAD_STACK_ALLOCATOR
task_allocator: Use config switches instead of magic defines Replace __HAVE_ARCH_TASK_ALLOCATOR and __HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_ALLOCATOR with proper config switches. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120505150142.371309416@linutronix.de
2012-05-05 23:05:48 +08:00
bool
x86/fpu, sched: Introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT and use it on x86 Don't burden architectures without dynamic task_struct sizing with the overhead of dynamic sizing. Also optimize the x86 code a bit by caching task_struct_size. Acked-and-Tested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-3-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-17 18:28:12 +08:00
# Select if arch wants to size task_struct dynamically via arch_task_struct_size:
config ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT
bool
Kconfig: Introduce ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR and CC_HAS_NO_PROFILE_FN_ATTR We don't want compiler instrumentation to touch noinstr functions, which are annotated with the no_profile_instrument_function function attribute. Add a Kconfig test for this and make GCOV depend on it, and in the future, PGO. If an architecture is using noinstr, it should denote that via this Kconfig value. That makes Kconfigs that depend on noinstr able to express dependencies in an architecturally agnostic way. Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YMTn9yjuemKFLbws@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YMcssV%2Fn5IBGv4f0@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/ Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210621231822.2848305-4-ndesaulniers@google.com
2021-06-22 07:18:22 +08:00
config ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR
bool
help
An architecture should select this if the noinstr macro is being used on
functions to denote that the toolchain should avoid instrumenting such
functions and is required for correctness.
32-bit userspace ABI: introduce ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T config option All new 32-bit architectures should have 64-bit userspace off_t type, but existing architectures has 32-bit ones. To enforce the rule, new config option is added to arch/Kconfig that defaults ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T to be disabled for new 32-bit architectures. All existing 32-bit architectures enable it explicitly. New option affects force_o_largefile() behaviour. Namely, if userspace off_t is 64-bits long, we have no reason to reject user to open big files. Note that even if architectures has only 64-bit off_t in the kernel (arc, c6x, h8300, hexagon, nios2, openrisc, and unicore32), a libc may use 32-bit off_t, and therefore want to limit the file size to 4GB unless specified differently in the open flags. Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <ynorov@caviumnetworks.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <ynorov@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-05-16 16:18:49 +08:00
config ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T
bool
depends on !64BIT
help
All new 32-bit architectures should have 64-bit off_t type on
userspace side which corresponds to the loff_t kernel type. This
is the requirement for modern ABIs. Some existing architectures
still support 32-bit off_t. This option is enabled for all such
architectures explicitly.
s390,alpha: switch to 64-bit ino_t s390 and alpha are the only 64 bit architectures with a 32-bit ino_t. Since this is quite unusual this causes bugs from time to time. See e.g. commit ebce3eb2f7ef ("ceph: fix inode number handling on arches with 32-bit ino_t") for an example. This (obviously) also prevents s390 and alpha to use 64-bit ino_t for tmpfs. See commit b85a7a8bb573 ("tmpfs: disallow CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 on s390"). Therefore switch both s390 and alpha to 64-bit ino_t. This should only have an effect on the ustat system call. To prevent ABI breakage define struct ustat compatible to the old layout and change sys_ustat() accordingly. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2021-02-11 04:51:02 +08:00
# Selected by 64 bit architectures which have a 32 bit f_tinode in struct ustat
config ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE
bool
kbuild: add CONFIG_ASM_MODVERSIONS Add CONFIG_ASM_MODVERSIONS. This allows to remove one if-conditional nesting in scripts/Makefile.build. scripts/Makefile.build is run every time Kbuild descends into a sub-directory. So, I want to avoid $(wildcard ...) evaluation where possible although computing $(wildcard ...) is so cheap that it may not make measurable performance difference. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
2019-08-19 13:54:20 +08:00
config HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
bool
help
arch/Kconfig: fix spelling mistakes There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text. Fix these. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:03:44 +08:00
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it provides
kbuild: add CONFIG_ASM_MODVERSIONS Add CONFIG_ASM_MODVERSIONS. This allows to remove one if-conditional nesting in scripts/Makefile.build. scripts/Makefile.build is run every time Kbuild descends into a sub-directory. So, I want to avoid $(wildcard ...) evaluation where possible although computing $(wildcard ...) is so cheap that it may not make measurable performance difference. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
2019-08-19 13:54:20 +08:00
<asm/asm-prototypes.h> to support the module versioning for symbols
exported from assembly code.
tracing/kprobes: Make Kconfig dependencies generic KPROBES_EVENT actually depends on the regs and stack access API (b1cf540f) and not on x86. So introduce a new config option which architectures can select if they have the API implemented and switch x86. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20100210162517.GB6933@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2010-02-11 00:25:17 +08:00
config HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
bool
tracing/kprobes: Add short documentation for HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API So that arch developers know how to implement it without the need to dig into changelogs. Reported-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier.adi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> LKML-Reference: <20100218132521.GB2406@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> [added reference to ptrace.h in the config help] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2010-02-18 21:25:21 +08:00
help
arch/Kconfig: fix spelling mistakes There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text. Fix these. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:03:44 +08:00
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it supports
tracing/kprobes: Add short documentation for HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API So that arch developers know how to implement it without the need to dig into changelogs. Reported-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier.adi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> LKML-Reference: <20100218132521.GB2406@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> [added reference to ptrace.h in the config help] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2010-02-18 21:25:21 +08:00
the API needed to access registers and stack entries from pt_regs,
declared in asm/ptrace.h
For example the kprobes-based event tracer needs this API.
tracing/kprobes: Make Kconfig dependencies generic KPROBES_EVENT actually depends on the regs and stack access API (b1cf540f) and not on x86. So introduce a new config option which architectures can select if they have the API implemented and switch x86. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20100210162517.GB6933@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2010-02-11 00:25:17 +08:00
rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the current CPU number value from user-space. * Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics) Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations. The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path. Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases. Test hardware: arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread. * Per-CPU statistic counter increment getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0 x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7 * LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer per-cpu buffer getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1 x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2 * liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8 x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9 * jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on rseq 2016 implementation): The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%. * Reading the current CPU number Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from memory. Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over alternative approaches: - 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc - 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso executing a "lsl" instruction, - 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction, - Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable sequences. - The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the case for the lsl-based x86 vdso. On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already using the gs segment selector for other purposes. Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) Machine model: Cubietruck - Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns - getcpu system call: 234.9 ns x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz: - Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns - Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns - "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns - getcpu system call: 53.9 ns - Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset) Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the scheduler: Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1 kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig, restartable sequences series applied. * CONFIG_RSEQ=n avg.: 41.37 s std.dev.: 0.36 s * CONFIG_RSEQ=y avg.: 40.46 s std.dev.: 0.33 s - Size On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is 567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/ [2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
2018-06-02 20:43:54 +08:00
config HAVE_RSEQ
bool
depends on HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
help
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it
supports an implementation of restartable sequences.
Kbuild: add Rust support Having most of the new files in place, we now enable Rust support in the build system, including `Kconfig` entries related to Rust, the Rust configuration printer and a few other bits. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Finn Behrens <me@kloenk.de> Signed-off-by: Finn Behrens <me@kloenk.de> Co-developed-by: Adam Bratschi-Kaye <ark.email@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Adam Bratschi-Kaye <ark.email@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@google.com> Co-developed-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Co-developed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net> Signed-off-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net> Co-developed-by: Boris-Chengbiao Zhou <bobo1239@web.de> Signed-off-by: Boris-Chengbiao Zhou <bobo1239@web.de> Co-developed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Douglas Su <d0u9.su@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: Douglas Su <d0u9.su@outlook.com> Co-developed-by: Dariusz Sosnowski <dsosnowski@dsosnowski.pl> Signed-off-by: Dariusz Sosnowski <dsosnowski@dsosnowski.pl> Co-developed-by: Antonio Terceiro <antonio.terceiro@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Antonio Terceiro <antonio.terceiro@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz> Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz> Co-developed-by: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com> Signed-off-by: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com> Co-developed-by: Martin Rodriguez Reboredo <yakoyoku@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Rodriguez Reboredo <yakoyoku@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
2021-07-03 22:42:57 +08:00
config HAVE_RUST
bool
help
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it
supports Rust.
x86: ptrace: Add function argument access API Add regs_get_argument() which returns N th argument of the function call. Note that this chooses most probably assignment, in some case it can be incorrect (e.g. passing data structure or floating point etc.) This is expected to be called from kprobes or ftrace with regs where the top of stack is the return address. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152465885737.26224.2822487520472783854.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2018-04-25 20:20:57 +08:00
config HAVE_FUNCTION_ARG_ACCESS_API
bool
help
arch/Kconfig: fix spelling mistakes There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text. Fix these. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:03:44 +08:00
This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it supports
x86: ptrace: Add function argument access API Add regs_get_argument() which returns N th argument of the function call. Note that this chooses most probably assignment, in some case it can be incorrect (e.g. passing data structure or floating point etc.) This is expected to be called from kprobes or ftrace with regs where the top of stack is the return address. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152465885737.26224.2822487520472783854.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2018-04-25 20:20:57 +08:00
the API needed to access function arguments from pt_regs,
declared in asm/ptrace.h
hw-breakpoints: introducing generic hardware breakpoint handler interfaces This patch introduces the generic Hardware Breakpoint interfaces for both user and kernel space requests. This core Api handles the hardware breakpoints through new helpers. It handles the user-space breakpoints and kernel breakpoints in front of arch implementation. One can choose kernel wide breakpoints using the following helpers and passing them a generic struct hw_breakpoint: - register_kernel_hw_breakpoint() - unregister_kernel_hw_breakpoint() - modify_kernel_hw_breakpoint() On the other side, you can choose per task breakpoints. - register_user_hw_breakpoint() - unregister_user_hw_breakpoint() - modify_user_hw_breakpoint() [ fweisbec@gmail.com: fix conflict against perfcounter ] Original-patch-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: K.Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2009-06-02 02:13:33 +08:00
config HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
bool
hw-breakpoints: Fix hardware breakpoints -> perf events dependency The kbuild's select command doesn't propagate through the config dependencies. Hence the current rules of hardware breakpoint's config can't ensure perf can never be disabled under us. We have: config X86 selects HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINTS config HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINTS select PERF_EVENTS config PERF_EVENTS [...] x86 will select the breakpoints but that won't propagate to perf events. The user can still disable the latter, but it is necessary for the breakpoints. What we need is: - x86 selects HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINTS and PERF_EVENTS - HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINTS depends on PERF_EVENTS so that we ensure PERF_EVENTS is enabled and frozen for x86. This fixes the following kind of build errors: In file included from arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c:31: include/linux/hw_breakpoint.h: In function 'hw_breakpoint_addr': include/linux/hw_breakpoint.h:39: error: 'struct perf_event' has no member named 'attr' v2: Select also ANON_INODES from x86, required for perf Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Reported-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Reported-by: Andrew Randrianasulu <randrik_a@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: K.Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <1261010034-7786-1-git-send-regression-fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-12-17 08:33:54 +08:00
depends on PERF_EVENTS
hw-breakpoints: introducing generic hardware breakpoint handler interfaces This patch introduces the generic Hardware Breakpoint interfaces for both user and kernel space requests. This core Api handles the hardware breakpoints through new helpers. It handles the user-space breakpoints and kernel breakpoints in front of arch implementation. One can choose kernel wide breakpoints using the following helpers and passing them a generic struct hw_breakpoint: - register_kernel_hw_breakpoint() - unregister_kernel_hw_breakpoint() - modify_kernel_hw_breakpoint() On the other side, you can choose per task breakpoints. - register_user_hw_breakpoint() - unregister_user_hw_breakpoint() - modify_user_hw_breakpoint() [ fweisbec@gmail.com: fix conflict against perfcounter ] Original-patch-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: K.Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2009-06-02 02:13:33 +08:00
hw-breakpoints: Separate constraint space for data and instruction breakpoints There are two outstanding fashions for archs to implement hardware breakpoints. The first is to separate breakpoint address pattern definition space between data and instruction breakpoints. We then have typically distinct instruction address breakpoint registers and data address breakpoint registers, delivered with separate control registers for data and instruction breakpoints as well. This is the case of PowerPc and ARM for example. The second consists in having merged breakpoint address space definition between data and instruction breakpoint. Address registers can host either instruction or data address and the access mode for the breakpoint is defined in a control register. This is the case of x86 and Super H. This patch adds a new CONFIG_HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS config that archs can select if they belong to the second case. Those will have their slot allocation merged for instructions and data breakpoints. The others will have a separate slot tracking between data and instruction breakpoints. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: K. Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-04-12 00:55:56 +08:00
config HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS
bool
depends on HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
help
Depending on the arch implementation of hardware breakpoints,
some of them have separate registers for data and instruction
breakpoints addresses, others have mixed registers to store
them but define the access type in a control register.
Select this option if your arch implements breakpoints under the
latter fashion.
core, x86: Add user return notifiers Add a general per-cpu notifier that is called whenever the kernel is about to return to userspace. The notifier uses a thread_info flag and existing checks, so there is no impact on user return or context switch fast paths. This will be used initially to speed up KVM task switching by lazily updating MSRs. Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1253342422-13811-1-git-send-email-avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-09-19 14:40:22 +08:00
config HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
bool
Merge branch 'tracing/core' into tracing/hw-breakpoints Conflicts: arch/Kconfig kernel/trace/trace.h Merge reason: resolve the conflicts, plus adopt to the new ring-buffer APIs. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-07 14:19:51 +08:00
lockup_detector: Adapt CONFIG_PERF_EVENT_NMI to other archs CONFIG_PERF_EVENT_NMI is something that need to be enabled from the arch. This is fine on x86 as PERF_EVENTS is builtin but if other archs select it, they will need to handle the PERF_EVENTS dependency. Instead, handle the dependency in the generic layer: - archs need to tell what they support through HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI - Enable magically PERF_EVENTS_NMI if we have PERF_EVENTS and HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
2010-05-16 04:57:48 +08:00
config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
bool
lockup_detector: Introduce CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR This new config is deemed to simplify even more the lockup detector dependencies and can make it easier to bring a smooth sorting between archs that support the new generic lockup detector and those that still have their own, especially for those that are in the middle of this migration. Instead of checking whether we have CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR + CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS_NMI each time an arch wants to know if it needs to build its own lockup detector, take a shortcut with this new config. It is enabled only if the hardlockup detection part of the whole lockup detector is on. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
2010-05-16 05:15:20 +08:00
help
System hardware can generate an NMI using the perf event
subsystem. Also has support for calculating CPU cycle events
to determine how many clock cycles in a given period.
lockup_detector: Adapt CONFIG_PERF_EVENT_NMI to other archs CONFIG_PERF_EVENT_NMI is something that need to be enabled from the arch. This is fine on x86 as PERF_EVENTS is builtin but if other archs select it, they will need to handle the PERF_EVENTS dependency. Instead, handle the dependency in the generic layer: - archs need to tell what they support through HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI - Enable magically PERF_EVENTS_NMI if we have PERF_EVENTS and HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
2010-05-16 04:57:48 +08:00
kernel/watchdog: split up config options Split SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR from LOCKUP_DETECTOR, and split HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF from HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR. LOCKUP_DETECTOR implies the general boot, sysctl, and programming interfaces for the lockup detectors. An architecture that wants to use a hard lockup detector must define HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF or HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. Alternatively an arch can define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, which provides the minimum arch_touch_nmi_watchdog, and it otherwise does its own thing and does not implement the LOCKUP_DETECTOR interfaces. sparc is unusual in that it has started to implement some of the interfaces, but not fully yet. It should probably be converted to a full HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. [npiggin@gmail.com: fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617223522.66c0ad88@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-4-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc] Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 05:35:46 +08:00
config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF
bool
depends on HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
help
The arch chooses to use the generic perf-NMI-based hardlockup
detector. Must define HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI.
config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
bool
help
watchdog/hardlockup: make the config checks more straightforward There are four possible variants of hardlockup detectors: + buddy: available when SMP is set. + perf: available when HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF is set. + arch-specific: available when HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH is set. + sparc64 special variant: available when HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG is set and HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH is not set. The check for the sparc64 variant is more complicated because HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG is used to #ifdef code used by both arch-specific and sparc64 specific variant. Therefore it is automatically selected with HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. This complexity is partly hidden in HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH. It reduces the size of some checks but it makes them harder to follow. Finally, the other temporary variable HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH is used to re-compute HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF/BUDDY when the global HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR switch is enabled/disabled. Make the logic more straightforward by the following changes: + Better explain the role of HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH and HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG in comments. + Add HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_BUDDY so that there is separate HAVE_* for all four hardlockup detector variants. Use it in the other conditions instead of SMP. It makes it clear that it is about the buddy detector. + Open code HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH in HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR and HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY. It helps to understand the conditions between the four hardlockup detector variants. + Define the exact conditions when HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF/BUDDY can be enabled. It explains the dependency on the other hardlockup detector variants. Also it allows to remove HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH by using "imply". It triggers re-evaluating HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF/BUDDY when the global HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR switch is changed. + Add dependency on HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR so that the affected variables disappear when the hardlockup detectors are disabled. Another nice side effect is that HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY value is not preserved when the global switch is disabled. The user has to make the decision again when it gets re-enabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230616150618.6073-3-pmladek@suse.com Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-06-16 23:06:14 +08:00
The arch provides its own hardlockup detector implementation instead
of the generic ones.
It uses the same command line parameters, and sysctl interface,
as the generic hardlockup detectors.
kernel/watchdog: split up config options Split SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR from LOCKUP_DETECTOR, and split HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF from HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR. LOCKUP_DETECTOR implies the general boot, sysctl, and programming interfaces for the lockup detectors. An architecture that wants to use a hard lockup detector must define HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF or HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. Alternatively an arch can define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, which provides the minimum arch_touch_nmi_watchdog, and it otherwise does its own thing and does not implement the LOCKUP_DETECTOR interfaces. sparc is unusual in that it has started to implement some of the interfaces, but not fully yet. It should probably be converted to a full HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. [npiggin@gmail.com: fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617223522.66c0ad88@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-4-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc] Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 05:35:46 +08:00
perf: Unified API to record selective sets of arch registers This brings a new API to help the selective dump of registers on event sampling, and its implementation for x86 arch. Added HAVE_PERF_REGS config option to determine if the architecture provides perf registers ABI. The information about desired registers will be passed in u64 mask. It's up to the architecture to map the registers into the mask bits. For the x86 arch implementation, both 32 and 64 bit registers bits are defined within single enum to ensure 64 bit system can provide register dump for compat task if needed in the future. Original-patch-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> [ Added missing linux/errno.h include ] Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com> Cc: Benjamin Redelings <benjamin.redelings@nescent.org> Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344345647-11536-2-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2012-08-07 21:20:36 +08:00
config HAVE_PERF_REGS
bool
help
Support selective register dumps for perf events. This includes
bit-mapping of each registers and a unique architecture id.
perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample Introducing PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER sample type bit to trigger the dump of the user level stack on sample. The size of the dump is specified by sample_stack_user value. Being able to dump parts of the user stack, starting from the stack pointer, will be useful to make a post mortem dwarf CFI based stack unwinding. Added HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP config option to determine if the architecture provides user stack dump on perf event samples. This needs access to the user stack pointer which is not unified across architectures. Enabling this for x86 architecture. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com> Cc: Benjamin Redelings <benjamin.redelings@nescent.org> Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344345647-11536-6-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2012-08-07 21:20:40 +08:00
config HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
bool
help
Support user stack dumps for perf event samples. This needs
access to the user stack pointer which is not unified across
architectures.
jump label: Base patch for jump label base patch to implement 'jump labeling'. Based on a new 'asm goto' inline assembly gcc mechanism, we can now branch to labels from an 'asm goto' statment. This allows us to create a 'no-op' fastpath, which can subsequently be patched with a jump to the slowpath code. This is useful for code which might be rarely used, but which we'd like to be able to call, if needed. Tracepoints are the current usecase that these are being implemented for. Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <ee8b3595967989fdaf84e698dc7447d315ce972a.1284733808.git.jbaron@redhat.com> [ cleaned up some formating ] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2010-09-17 23:09:00 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
bool
jump_label: Implement generic support for relative references To reduce the size taken up by absolute references in jump label entries themselves and the associated relocation records in the .init segment, add support for emitting them as relative references instead. Note that this requires some extra care in the sorting routine, given that the offsets change when entries are moved around in the jump_entry table. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919065144.25010-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
2018-09-19 14:51:37 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
bool
asm-generic/tlb: provide MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE As described in the comment, the correct order for freeing pages is: 1) unhook page 2) TLB invalidate page 3) free page This order equally applies to page directories. Currently there are two correct options: - use tlb_remove_page(), when all page directores are full pages and there are no futher contraints placed by things like software walkers (HAVE_FAST_GUP). - use MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE and tlb_remove_table() when the architecture does not do IPI based TLB invalidate and has HAVE_FAST_GUP (or software TLB fill). This however leaves architectures that don't have page based directories but don't need RCU in a bind. For those, provide MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE, which provides the independent batching for directories without the additional RCU freeing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-10-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:37:11 +08:00
config MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
bool
asm-generic/tlb: rename HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE Towards a more consistent naming scheme. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix sparc64 Kconfig] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-7-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:37:02 +08:00
config MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE
mm, powerpc: move the RCU page-table freeing into generic code In case other architectures require RCU freed page-tables to implement gup_fast() and software filled hashes and similar things, provide the means to do so by moving the logic into generic code. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Requested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 08:12:00 +08:00
bool
asm-generic/tlb: provide MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE As described in the comment, the correct order for freeing pages is: 1) unhook page 2) TLB invalidate page 3) free page This order equally applies to page directories. Currently there are two correct options: - use tlb_remove_page(), when all page directores are full pages and there are no futher contraints placed by things like software walkers (HAVE_FAST_GUP). - use MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE and tlb_remove_table() when the architecture does not do IPI based TLB invalidate and has HAVE_FAST_GUP (or software TLB fill). This however leaves architectures that don't have page based directories but don't need RCU in a bind. For those, provide MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE, which provides the independent batching for directories without the additional RCU freeing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-10-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:37:11 +08:00
select MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
mm, powerpc: move the RCU page-table freeing into generic code In case other architectures require RCU freed page-tables to implement gup_fast() and software filled hashes and similar things, provide the means to do so by moving the logic into generic code. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Requested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 08:12:00 +08:00
asm-generic/tlb: rename HAVE_MMU_GATHER_PAGE_SIZE Towards a more consistent naming scheme. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-8-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:37:05 +08:00
config MMU_GATHER_PAGE_SIZE
asm-generic/tlb, arch: Provide CONFIG_HAVE_MMU_GATHER_PAGE_SIZE Move the mmu_gather::page_size things into the generic code instead of PowerPC specific bits. No change in behavior intended. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-08-31 20:46:08 +08:00
bool
asm-generic/tlb: add missing CONFIG symbol Without this the symbol will not actually end up in .config files. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-6-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Fixes: a30e32bd79e9 ("asm-generic/tlb: Provide generic tlb_flush() based on flush_tlb_mm()") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:36:59 +08:00
config MMU_GATHER_NO_RANGE
bool
mmu_gather: Remove per arch tlb_{start,end}_vma() Scattered across the archs are 3 basic forms of tlb_{start,end}_vma(). Provide two new MMU_GATHER_knobs to enumerate them and remove the per arch tlb_{start,end}_vma() implementations. - MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE indicates the arch has flush_cache_range() but does *NOT* want to call it for each VMA. - MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS indicates the arch wants to merge the invalidate across multiple VMAs if possible. With these it is possible to capture the three forms: 1) empty stubs; select MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE and MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS 2) start: flush_cache_range(), end: empty; select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS 3) start: flush_cache_range(), end: flush_tlb_range(); default Obviously, if the architecture does not have flush_cache_range() then it also doesn't need to select MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-08 15:18:03 +08:00
select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
config MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE
bool
config MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
bool
asm-generic/tlb: add missing CONFIG symbol Without this the symbol will not actually end up in .config files. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-6-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Fixes: a30e32bd79e9 ("asm-generic/tlb: Provide generic tlb_flush() based on flush_tlb_mm()") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:36:59 +08:00
asm-generic/tlb: rename HAVE_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER Towards a more consistent naming scheme. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-9-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:37:08 +08:00
config MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER
asm-generic/tlb: Introduce CONFIG_HAVE_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER=y Add the Kconfig option HAVE_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER to the generic mmu_gather code. If the option is set the mmu_gather will not track individual pages for delayed page free anymore. A platform that enables the option needs to provide its own implementation of the __tlb_remove_page_size() function to free pages. No change in behavior intended. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk Cc: npiggin@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180918125151.31744-2-schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-09-18 20:51:50 +08:00
bool
asm-generic/tlb: provide MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE As described in the comment, the correct order for freeing pages is: 1) unhook page 2) TLB invalidate page 3) free page This order equally applies to page directories. Currently there are two correct options: - use tlb_remove_page(), when all page directores are full pages and there are no futher contraints placed by things like software walkers (HAVE_FAST_GUP). - use MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE and tlb_remove_table() when the architecture does not do IPI based TLB invalidate and has HAVE_FAST_GUP (or software TLB fill). This however leaves architectures that don't have page based directories but don't need RCU in a bind. For those, provide MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE, which provides the independent batching for directories without the additional RCU freeing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116064531.483522-10-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:37:11 +08:00
depends on MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
asm-generic/tlb: Introduce CONFIG_HAVE_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER=y Add the Kconfig option HAVE_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER to the generic mmu_gather code. If the option is set the mmu_gather will not track individual pages for delayed page free anymore. A platform that enables the option needs to provide its own implementation of the __tlb_remove_page_size() function to free pages. No change in behavior intended. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk Cc: npiggin@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180918125151.31744-2-schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-09-18 20:51:50 +08:00
mm: fix exec activate_mm vs TLB shootdown and lazy tlb switching race Reading and modifying current->mm and current->active_mm and switching mm should be done with irqs off, to prevent races seeing an intermediate state. This is similar to commit 38cf307c1f20 ("mm: fix kthread_use_mm() vs TLB invalidate"). At exec-time when the new mm is activated, the old one should usually be single-threaded and no longer used, unless something else is holding an mm_users reference (which may be possible). Absent other mm_users, there is also a race with preemption and lazy tlb switching. Consider the kernel_execve case where the current thread is using a lazy tlb active mm: call_usermodehelper() kernel_execve() old_mm = current->mm; active_mm = current->active_mm; *** preempt *** --------------------> schedule() prev->active_mm = NULL; mmdrop(prev active_mm); ... <-------------------- schedule() current->mm = mm; current->active_mm = mm; if (!old_mm) mmdrop(active_mm); If we switch back to the kernel thread from a different mm, there is a double free of the old active_mm, and a missing free of the new one. Closing this race only requires interrupts to be disabled while ->mm and ->active_mm are being switched, but the TLB problem requires also holding interrupts off over activate_mm. Unfortunately not all archs can do that yet, e.g., arm defers the switch if irqs are disabled and expects finish_arch_post_lock_switch() to be called to complete the flush; um takes a blocking lock in activate_mm(). So as a first step, disable interrupts across the mm/active_mm updates to close the lazy tlb preempt race, and provide an arch option to extend that to activate_mm which allows architectures doing IPI based TLB shootdowns to close the second race. This is a bit ugly, but in the interest of fixing the bug and backporting before all architectures are converted this is a compromise. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914045219.3736466-2-npiggin@gmail.com
2020-09-14 12:52:16 +08:00
config ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM
bool
help
Temporary select until all architectures can be converted to have
irqs disabled over activate_mm. Architectures that do IPI based TLB
shootdowns should enable this.
lazy tlb: allow lazy tlb mm refcounting to be configurable Add CONFIG_MMU_TLB_REFCOUNT which enables refcounting of the lazy tlb mm when it is context switched. This can be disabled by architectures that don't require this refcounting if they clean up lazy tlb mms when the last refcount is dropped. Currently this is always enabled, so the patch introduces no functional change. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230203071837.1136453-4-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-03 15:18:35 +08:00
# Use normal mm refcounting for MMU_LAZY_TLB kernel thread references.
# MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n can improve the scalability of context switching
# to/from kernel threads when the same mm is running on a lot of CPUs (a large
# multi-threaded application), by reducing contention on the mm refcount.
#
# This can be disabled if the architecture ensures no CPUs are using an mm as a
# "lazy tlb" beyond its final refcount (i.e., by the time __mmdrop frees the mm
# or its kernel page tables). This could be arranged by arch_exit_mmap(), or
# final exit(2) TLB flush, for example.
#
# To implement this, an arch *must*:
# Ensure the _lazy_tlb variants of mmgrab/mmdrop are used when manipulating
# the lazy tlb reference of a kthread's ->active_mm (non-arch code has been
# converted already).
config MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT
def_bool y
lazy tlb: shoot lazies, non-refcounting lazy tlb mm reference handling scheme On big systems, the mm refcount can become highly contented when doing a lot of context switching with threaded applications. user<->idle switch is one of the important cases. Abandoning lazy tlb entirely slows this switching down quite a bit in the common uncontended case, so that is not viable. Implement a scheme where lazy tlb mm references do not contribute to the refcount, instead they get explicitly removed when the refcount reaches zero. The final mmdrop() sends IPIs to all CPUs in the mm_cpumask and they switch away from this mm to init_mm if it was being used as the lazy tlb mm. Enabling the shoot lazies option therefore requires that the arch ensures that mm_cpumask contains all CPUs that could possibly be using mm. A DEBUG_VM option IPIs every CPU in the system after this to ensure there are no references remaining before the mm is freed. Shootdown IPIs cost could be an issue, but they have not been observed to be a serious problem with this scheme, because short-lived processes tend not to migrate CPUs much, therefore they don't get much chance to leave lazy tlb mm references on remote CPUs. There are a lot of options to reduce them if necessary, described in comments. The near-worst-case can be benchmarked with will-it-scale: context_switch1_threads -t $(($(nproc) / 2)) This will create nproc threads (nproc / 2 switching pairs) all sharing the same mm that spread over all CPUs so each CPU does thread->idle->thread switching. [ Rik came up with basically the same idea a few years ago, so credit to him for that. ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230118080011.2258375-1-npiggin@gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20180728215357.3249-11-riel@surriel.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230203071837.1136453-5-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-03 15:18:36 +08:00
depends on !MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
# This option allows MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n. It ensures no CPUs are using an
# mm as a lazy tlb beyond its last reference count, by shooting down these
# users before the mm is deallocated. __mmdrop() first IPIs all CPUs that may
# be using the mm as a lazy tlb, so that they may switch themselves to using
# init_mm for their active mm. mm_cpumask(mm) is used to determine which CPUs
# may be using mm as a lazy tlb mm.
#
# To implement this, an arch *must*:
# - At the time of the final mmdrop of the mm, ensure mm_cpumask(mm) contains
# at least all possible CPUs in which the mm is lazy.
# - It must meet the requirements for MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n (see above).
config MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
bool
lazy tlb: allow lazy tlb mm refcounting to be configurable Add CONFIG_MMU_TLB_REFCOUNT which enables refcounting of the lazy tlb mm when it is context switched. This can be disabled by architectures that don't require this refcounting if they clean up lazy tlb mms when the last refcount is dropped. Currently this is always enabled, so the patch introduces no functional change. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230203071837.1136453-4-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-03 15:18:35 +08:00
Add Kconfig option ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG cmpxchg() is widely used by lockless code, including NMI-safe lockless code. But on some architectures, the cmpxchg() implementation is not NMI-safe, on these architectures the lockless code may need a spin_trylock_irqsave() based implementation. This patch adds a Kconfig option: ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG, so that NMI-safe lockless code can depend on it or provide different implementation according to it. On many architectures, cmpxchg is only NMI-safe for several specific operand sizes. So, ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG define in this patch only guarantees cmpxchg is NMI-safe for sizeof(unsigned long). Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Acked-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Acked-by: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <hans-christian.egtvedt@atmel.com> Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Acked-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> CC: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> CC: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> CC: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org> CC: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> CC: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> CC: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> CC: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> CC: Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
2011-07-13 13:14:22 +08:00
config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
bool
srcu: Create an srcu_read_lock_nmisafe() and srcu_read_unlock_nmisafe() On strict load-store architectures, the use of this_cpu_inc() by srcu_read_lock() and srcu_read_unlock() is not NMI-safe in TREE SRCU. To see this suppose that an NMI arrives in the middle of srcu_read_lock(), just after it has read ->srcu_lock_count, but before it has written the incremented value back to memory. If that NMI handler also does srcu_read_lock() and srcu_read_lock() on that same srcu_struct structure, then upon return from that NMI handler, the interrupted srcu_read_lock() will overwrite the NMI handler's update to ->srcu_lock_count, but leave unchanged the NMI handler's update by srcu_read_unlock() to ->srcu_unlock_count. This can result in a too-short SRCU grace period, which can in turn result in arbitrary memory corruption. If the NMI handler instead interrupts the srcu_read_unlock(), this can result in eternal SRCU grace periods, which is not much better. This commit therefore creates a pair of new srcu_read_lock_nmisafe() and srcu_read_unlock_nmisafe() functions, which allow SRCU readers in both NMI handlers and in process and IRQ context. It is bad practice to mix the existing and the new _nmisafe() primitives on the same srcu_struct structure. Use one set or the other, not both. Just to underline that "bad practice" point, using srcu_read_lock() at process level and srcu_read_lock_nmisafe() in your NMI handler will not, repeat NOT, work. If you do not immediately understand why this is the case, please review the earlier paragraphs in this commit log. [ paulmck: Apply kernel test robot feedback. ] [ paulmck: Apply feedback from Randy Dunlap. ] [ paulmck: Apply feedback from John Ogness. ] [ paulmck: Apply feedback from Frederic Weisbecker. ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220910221947.171557773@linutronix.de/ Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2022-09-16 05:29:07 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_NMI_SAFE_THIS_CPU_OPS
bool
mm,slub,x86: decouple size of struct page from CONFIG_CMPXCHG_LOCAL While implementing cmpxchg_double() on s390 I realized that we don't set CONFIG_CMPXCHG_LOCAL despite the fact that we have support for it. However setting that option will increase the size of struct page by eight bytes on 64 bit, which we certainly do not want. Also, it doesn't make sense that a present cpu feature should increase the size of struct page. Besides that it looks like the dependency to CMPXCHG_LOCAL is wrong and that it should depend on CMPXCHG_DOUBLE instead. This patch: If an architecture supports CMPXCHG_LOCAL this shouldn't result automatically in larger struct pages if the SLUB allocator is used. Instead introduce a new config option "HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE" which can be selected if a double word aligned struct page is required. Also update x86 Kconfig so that it should work as before. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 09:17:27 +08:00
config HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE
bool
help
This makes sure that struct pages are double word aligned and that
e.g. the SLUB allocator can perform double word atomic operations
on a struct page for better performance. However selecting this
might increase the size of a struct page by a word.
mm,x86,um: move CMPXCHG_LOCAL config option Move CMPXCHG_LOCAL and rename it to HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL so architectures can simply select the option if it is supported. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 09:17:30 +08:00
config HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
bool
mm,x86,um: move CMPXCHG_DOUBLE config option Move CMPXCHG_DOUBLE and rename it to HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE so architectures can simply select the option if it is supported. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 09:17:33 +08:00
config HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
bool
rcu: Make arch select smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() strength The definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() is currently smp_mb() for CONFIG_PPC and a no-op otherwise. It would be better to instead provide an architecture-selectable Kconfig option, and select the strength of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() based on that option. This commit therefore creates ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE, has PPC select it, and bases the definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() on this new ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE Kconfig option. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
2017-01-15 05:32:50 +08:00
config ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE
bool
ipc: use Kconfig options for __ARCH_WANT_[COMPAT_]IPC_PARSE_VERSION Rather than #define the options manually in the architecture code, add Kconfig options for them and select them there instead. This also allows us to select the compat IPC version parsing automatically for platforms using the old compat IPC interface. Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 05:42:46 +08:00
config ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
bool
config ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
bool
[PATCH v3] ipc: provide generic compat versions of IPC syscalls When using the "compat" APIs, architectures will generally want to be able to make direct syscalls to msgsnd(), shmctl(), etc., and in the kernel we would want them to be handled directly by compat_sys_xxx() functions, as is true for other compat syscalls. However, for historical reasons, several of the existing compat IPC syscalls do not do this. semctl() expects a pointer to the fourth argument, instead of the fourth argument itself. msgsnd(), msgrcv() and shmat() expect arguments in different order. This change adds an ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC config option that can be set to preserve this behavior for ports that use it (x86, sparc, powerpc, s390, and mips). No actual semantics are changed for those architectures, and there is only a minimal amount of code refactoring in ipc/compat.c. Newer architectures like tile (and perhaps future architectures such as arm64 and unicore64) should not select this option, and thus can avoid having any IPC-specific code at all in their architecture-specific compat layer. In the same vein, if this option is not selected, IPC_64 mode is assumed, since that's what the <asm-generic> headers expect. The workaround code in "tile" for msgsnd() and msgrcv() is removed with this change; it also fixes the bug that shmat() and semctl() were not being properly handled. Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
2012-03-16 01:13:38 +08:00
config ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
ipc: use Kconfig options for __ARCH_WANT_[COMPAT_]IPC_PARSE_VERSION Rather than #define the options manually in the architecture code, add Kconfig options for them and select them there instead. This also allows us to select the compat IPC version parsing automatically for platforms using the old compat IPC interface. Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 05:42:46 +08:00
select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
[PATCH v3] ipc: provide generic compat versions of IPC syscalls When using the "compat" APIs, architectures will generally want to be able to make direct syscalls to msgsnd(), shmctl(), etc., and in the kernel we would want them to be handled directly by compat_sys_xxx() functions, as is true for other compat syscalls. However, for historical reasons, several of the existing compat IPC syscalls do not do this. semctl() expects a pointer to the fourth argument, instead of the fourth argument itself. msgsnd(), msgrcv() and shmat() expect arguments in different order. This change adds an ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC config option that can be set to preserve this behavior for ports that use it (x86, sparc, powerpc, s390, and mips). No actual semantics are changed for those architectures, and there is only a minimal amount of code refactoring in ipc/compat.c. Newer architectures like tile (and perhaps future architectures such as arm64 and unicore64) should not select this option, and thus can avoid having any IPC-specific code at all in their architecture-specific compat layer. In the same vein, if this option is not selected, IPC_64 mode is assumed, since that's what the <asm-generic> headers expect. The workaround code in "tile" for msgsnd() and msgrcv() is removed with this change; it also fixes the bug that shmat() and semctl() were not being properly handled. Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
2012-03-16 01:13:38 +08:00
bool
seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig In order to make adding configurable features into seccomp easier, it's better to have the options at one single location, considering especially that the bulk of seccomp code is arch-independent. An quick look also show that many SECCOMP descriptions are outdated; they talk about /proc rather than prctl. As a result of moving the config option and keeping it default on, architectures arm, arm64, csky, riscv, sh, and xtensa did not have SECCOMP on by default prior to this and SECCOMP will be default in this change. Architectures microblaze, mips, powerpc, s390, sh, and sparc have an outdated depend on PROC_FS and this dependency is removed in this change. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1YWz9cnp08UZgeieYRhHdqh-ch7aNwc4JRBnGyrmgfMg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [kees: added HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP help text, tweaked wording] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9ede6ef35c847e58d61e476c6a39540520066613.1600951211.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
2020-09-24 20:44:16 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol to support seccomp mode 1 (the fixed
syscall policy), and must provide an overrides for __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
and compat syscalls if the asm-generic/seccomp.h defaults need adjustment:
- __NR_seccomp_read_32
- __NR_seccomp_write_32
- __NR_seccomp_exit_32
- __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:57 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
bool
seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig In order to make adding configurable features into seccomp easier, it's better to have the options at one single location, considering especially that the bulk of seccomp code is arch-independent. An quick look also show that many SECCOMP descriptions are outdated; they talk about /proc rather than prctl. As a result of moving the config option and keeping it default on, architectures arm, arm64, csky, riscv, sh, and xtensa did not have SECCOMP on by default prior to this and SECCOMP will be default in this change. Architectures microblaze, mips, powerpc, s390, sh, and sparc have an outdated depend on PROC_FS and this dependency is removed in this change. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1YWz9cnp08UZgeieYRhHdqh-ch7aNwc4JRBnGyrmgfMg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [kees: added HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP help text, tweaked wording] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9ede6ef35c847e58d61e476c6a39540520066613.1600951211.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
2020-09-24 20:44:16 +08:00
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:57 +08:00
help
ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP, and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. The 16-bit SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG. If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified. If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno will be returned to userspace. This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path. Any future efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to address this restriction. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> v18: - rebase - comment fatal_signal check - acked-by - drop secure_computing_int comment v17: - ... v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu) [note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next] v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes - clean up style (indan@nul.nu) v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc (Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.) v12: - rebase to linux-next - use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency - drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com) v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator (indan@nul.nu) v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP v9: - n/a v8: - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef v7: - introduced Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:48:02 +08:00
An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig In order to make adding configurable features into seccomp easier, it's better to have the options at one single location, considering especially that the bulk of seccomp code is arch-independent. An quick look also show that many SECCOMP descriptions are outdated; they talk about /proc rather than prctl. As a result of moving the config option and keeping it default on, architectures arm, arm64, csky, riscv, sh, and xtensa did not have SECCOMP on by default prior to this and SECCOMP will be default in this change. Architectures microblaze, mips, powerpc, s390, sh, and sparc have an outdated depend on PROC_FS and this dependency is removed in this change. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1YWz9cnp08UZgeieYRhHdqh-ch7aNwc4JRBnGyrmgfMg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [kees: added HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP help text, tweaked wording] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9ede6ef35c847e58d61e476c6a39540520066613.1600951211.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
2020-09-24 20:44:16 +08:00
- all the requirements for HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Adds a new return value to seccomp filters that triggers a SIGSYS to be delivered with the new SYS_SECCOMP si_code. This allows in-process system call emulation, including just specifying an errno or cleanly dumping core, rather than just dying. Suggested-by: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> v18: - acked-by, rebase - don't mention secure_computing_int() anymore v15: - use audit_seccomp/skip - pad out error spacing; clean up switch (indan@nul.nu) v14: - n/a v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - rebase on to linux-next v11: - clarify the comment (indan@nul.nu) - s/sigtrap/sigsys v10: - use SIGSYS, syscall_get_arch, updates arch/Kconfig note suggested-by (though original suggestion had other behaviors) v9: - changes to SIGILL v8: - clean up based on changes to dependent patches v7: - introduction Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:48:01 +08:00
- syscall_get_arch()
- syscall_get_arguments()
- syscall_rollback()
- syscall_set_return_value()
ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP, and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. The 16-bit SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG. If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified. If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno will be returned to userspace. This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path. Any future efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to address this restriction. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> v18: - rebase - comment fatal_signal check - acked-by - drop secure_computing_int comment v17: - ... v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu) [note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next] v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes - clean up style (indan@nul.nu) v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc (Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.) v12: - rebase to linux-next - use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency - drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com) v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator (indan@nul.nu) v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP v9: - n/a v8: - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef v7: - introduced Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:48:02 +08:00
- SIGSYS siginfo_t support
- secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
- secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
results in the system call being skipped immediately.
seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags" parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value, used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...). In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter" for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags, and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially filter the seccomp syscall itself. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-06-26 07:08:24 +08:00
- seccomp syscall wired up
seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls. This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be in the format of: <arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER> where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: x86_64 0 ALLOW x86_64 1 ALLOW x86_64 2 ALLOW x86_64 3 ALLOW [...] x86_64 132 ALLOW x86_64 133 ALLOW x86_64 134 FILTER x86_64 135 FILTER x86_64 136 FILTER x86_64 137 ALLOW x86_64 138 ALLOW x86_64 139 FILTER x86_64 140 ALLOW x86_64 141 ALLOW [...] This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/94e663fa53136f5a11f432c661794d1ee7060779.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
2020-11-11 21:33:54 +08:00
- if !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR, have SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE,
SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME defined. If
COMPAT is supported, have the SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT* defines too.
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:57 +08:00
seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig In order to make adding configurable features into seccomp easier, it's better to have the options at one single location, considering especially that the bulk of seccomp code is arch-independent. An quick look also show that many SECCOMP descriptions are outdated; they talk about /proc rather than prctl. As a result of moving the config option and keeping it default on, architectures arm, arm64, csky, riscv, sh, and xtensa did not have SECCOMP on by default prior to this and SECCOMP will be default in this change. Architectures microblaze, mips, powerpc, s390, sh, and sparc have an outdated depend on PROC_FS and this dependency is removed in this change. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1YWz9cnp08UZgeieYRhHdqh-ch7aNwc4JRBnGyrmgfMg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [kees: added HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP help text, tweaked wording] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9ede6ef35c847e58d61e476c6a39540520066613.1600951211.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
2020-09-24 20:44:16 +08:00
config SECCOMP
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode"
def_bool y
depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
help
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
that may need to handle untrusted bytecode during their
execution. By using pipes or other transports made available
to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in their
own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is enabled via
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) or the seccomp() syscall, it cannot be
disabled and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe
syscalls defined by each seccomp mode.
If unsure, say Y.
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:57 +08:00
config SECCOMP_FILTER
def_bool y
depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
help
Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement
task-defined system call filtering polices.
docs: Fix some broken references As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of them via this script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few false-positives. Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2018-05-09 02:14:57 +08:00
See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details.
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2 - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org) - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu) - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@) - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@) - added acked-by v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com) - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000 v16: - no change v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:57 +08:00
seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls. This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be in the format of: <arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER> where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: x86_64 0 ALLOW x86_64 1 ALLOW x86_64 2 ALLOW x86_64 3 ALLOW [...] x86_64 132 ALLOW x86_64 133 ALLOW x86_64 134 FILTER x86_64 135 FILTER x86_64 136 FILTER x86_64 137 ALLOW x86_64 138 ALLOW x86_64 139 FILTER x86_64 140 ALLOW x86_64 141 ALLOW [...] This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/94e663fa53136f5a11f432c661794d1ee7060779.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
2020-11-11 21:33:54 +08:00
config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG
bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache"
depends on SECCOMP_FILTER && !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
depends on PROC_FS
help
This enables the /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor
seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading
the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This option is for debugging only. Enabling presents the risk that
an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic.
If unsure, say N.
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 06:16:58 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
bool
help
An architecture should select this if it has the code which
fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON
value before returning from system calls.
Kbuild: rename HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR config variable HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR should be selected by architectures with stack canary implementation. It is not about the compiler support. For the consistency with commit 050e9baa9dc9 ("Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables"), remove 'CC_' from the config symbol. I moved the 'select' lines to keep the alphabetical sorting. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 18:36:45 +08:00
config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:58 +08:00
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol if:
- it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
config STACKPROTECTOR
stack-protector: test compiler capability in Kconfig and drop AUTO mode Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig. If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu is automatically hidden. If STRONG is not supported, it will fall back to REGULAR. If REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled. This means, AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of Kconfig, hence removed. I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols. The use of 'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to disable as many features as possible. X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports those options, but generates broken code. I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR to test this. I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh to make it work correctly. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-05-28 17:22:00 +08:00
bool "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
Kbuild: rename HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR config variable HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR should be selected by architectures with stack canary implementation. It is not about the compiler support. For the consistency with commit 050e9baa9dc9 ("Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables"), remove 'CC_' from the config symbol. I moved the 'select' lines to keep the alphabetical sorting. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 18:36:45 +08:00
depends on HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
stack-protector: test compiler capability in Kconfig and drop AUTO mode Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig. If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu is automatically hidden. If STRONG is not supported, it will fall back to REGULAR. If REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled. This means, AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of Kconfig, hence removed. I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols. The use of 'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to disable as many features as possible. X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports those options, but generates broken code. I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR to test this. I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh to make it work correctly. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-05-28 17:22:00 +08:00
depends on $(cc-option,-fstack-protector)
default y
stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:58 +08:00
help
stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of "None", "Regular", and "Strong": CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option. "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all. For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are: -fstack-protector-all: Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago. -fstack-protector: Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8 (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or size overhead. -fstack-protector-strong Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with only a small change in performance. Based on the original design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of: - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an assignment or function argument - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), regardless of array type or length - uses register local variables https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with gcc-4.9 in three configurations: - defconfig 11430641 kernel text size 36110 function bodies - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR 11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%) 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%) - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch 11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%) 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%) With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used during decompression and was never used before, the exposure here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the stack guard is back to normal. Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel builds for the last 8 months with no problems. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:59 +08:00
This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This
stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:58 +08:00
feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
the stack just before the return address, and validates
the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
neutralized via a kernel panic.
stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of "None", "Regular", and "Strong": CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option. "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all. For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are: -fstack-protector-all: Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago. -fstack-protector: Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8 (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or size overhead. -fstack-protector-strong Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with only a small change in performance. Based on the original design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of: - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an assignment or function argument - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), regardless of array type or length - uses register local variables https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with gcc-4.9 in three configurations: - defconfig 11430641 kernel text size 36110 function bodies - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR 11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%) 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%) - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch 11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%) 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%) With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used during decompression and was never used before, the exposure here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the stack guard is back to normal. Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel builds for the last 8 months with no problems. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:59 +08:00
Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added if they
have an 8-byte or larger character array on the stack.
stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:58 +08:00
This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of "None", "Regular", and "Strong": CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option. "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all. For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are: -fstack-protector-all: Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago. -fstack-protector: Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8 (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or size overhead. -fstack-protector-strong Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with only a small change in performance. Based on the original design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of: - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an assignment or function argument - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), regardless of array type or length - uses register local variables https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with gcc-4.9 in three configurations: - defconfig 11430641 kernel text size 36110 function bodies - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR 11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%) 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%) - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch 11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%) 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%) With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used during decompression and was never used before, the exposure here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the stack guard is back to normal. Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel builds for the last 8 months with no problems. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:59 +08:00
gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector").
On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
about 3% of all kernel functions, which increases kernel code size
by about 0.3%.
Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
stack-protector: test compiler capability in Kconfig and drop AUTO mode Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig. If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu is automatically hidden. If STRONG is not supported, it will fall back to REGULAR. If REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled. This means, AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of Kconfig, hence removed. I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols. The use of 'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to disable as many features as possible. X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports those options, but generates broken code. I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR to test this. I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh to make it work correctly. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-05-28 17:22:00 +08:00
bool "Strong Stack Protector"
Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
depends on STACKPROTECTOR
stack-protector: test compiler capability in Kconfig and drop AUTO mode Move the test for -fstack-protector(-strong) option to Kconfig. If the compiler does not support the option, the corresponding menu is automatically hidden. If STRONG is not supported, it will fall back to REGULAR. If REGULAR is not supported, it will be disabled. This means, AUTO is implicitly handled by the dependency solver of Kconfig, hence removed. I also turned the 'choice' into only two boolean symbols. The use of 'choice' is not a good idea here, because all of all{yes,mod,no}config would choose the first visible value, while we want allnoconfig to disable as many features as possible. X86 has additional shell scripts in case the compiler supports those options, but generates broken code. I added CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR to test this. I had to add -m32 to gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh to make it work correctly. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-05-28 17:22:00 +08:00
depends on $(cc-option,-fstack-protector-strong)
default y
stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of "None", "Regular", and "Strong": CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option. "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all. For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are: -fstack-protector-all: Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago. -fstack-protector: Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8 (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or size overhead. -fstack-protector-strong Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with only a small change in performance. Based on the original design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of: - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an assignment or function argument - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), regardless of array type or length - uses register local variables https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with gcc-4.9 in three configurations: - defconfig 11430641 kernel text size 36110 function bodies - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR 11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%) 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%) - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch 11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%) 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%) With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used during decompression and was never used before, the exposure here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the stack guard is back to normal. Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel builds for the last 8 months with no problems. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:59 +08:00
help
Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any
of the following conditions:
- local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an
assignment or function argument
- local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
regardless of array type or length
- uses register local variables
This feature requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution
gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong").
On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
size by about 2%.
scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [will: Numerous cosmetic changes] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-04-28 00:00:07 +08:00
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
bool
help
arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support Shadow call stacks will be available in GCC >= 12, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with the gcc. Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like: str x30, [x18], #8 stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ...... - ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=ce09ab17ddd21f73ff2caf6eec3b0ee9b0e1a11e Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303074323.86282-1-ashimida@linux.alibaba.com
2022-03-03 15:43:23 +08:00
An architecture should select this if it supports the compiler's
Shadow Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack
scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core code asm/scs.h is no longer needed by the core code, so remove a redundant header inclusion and update the stale Kconfig text. Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-15 23:15:46 +08:00
switching.
scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [will: Numerous cosmetic changes] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-04-28 00:00:07 +08:00
config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support Shadow call stacks will be available in GCC >= 12, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with the gcc. Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like: str x30, [x18], #8 stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ...... - ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=ce09ab17ddd21f73ff2caf6eec3b0ee9b0e1a11e Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303074323.86282-1-ashimida@linux.alibaba.com
2022-03-03 15:43:23 +08:00
bool "Shadow Call Stack"
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
ftrace: Allow WITH_ARGS flavour of graph tracer with shadow call stack The recent switch on arm64 from DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS to DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_ARGS failed to take into account that we currently require the former in order to allow the function graph tracer to be enabled in combination with shadow call stacks. This means that this is no longer permitted at all, in spite of the fact that either flavour of ftrace works perfectly fine in this combination. So permit WITH_ARGS as well as WITH_REGS. Fixes: ddc9863e9e90 ("scs: Disable when function graph tracing is enabled") Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221213132407.1485025-1-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2022-12-13 21:24:07 +08:00
depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_ARGS || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [will: Numerous cosmetic changes] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-04-28 00:00:07 +08:00
help
arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support Shadow call stacks will be available in GCC >= 12, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with the gcc. Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like: str x30, [x18], #8 stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ...... - ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=ce09ab17ddd21f73ff2caf6eec3b0ee9b0e1a11e Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303074323.86282-1-ashimida@linux.alibaba.com
2022-03-03 15:43:23 +08:00
This option enables the compiler's Shadow Call Stack, which
uses a shadow stack to protect function return addresses from
being overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found
in the compiler's documentation:
scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [will: Numerous cosmetic changes] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-04-28 00:00:07 +08:00
arm64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support Shadow call stacks will be available in GCC >= 12, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with the gcc. Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like: str x30, [x18], #8 stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ...... - ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=ce09ab17ddd21f73ff2caf6eec3b0ee9b0e1a11e Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303074323.86282-1-ashimida@linux.alibaba.com
2022-03-03 15:43:23 +08:00
- Clang: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
- GCC: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options
scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [will: Numerous cosmetic changes] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-04-28 00:00:07 +08:00
Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the
ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses
of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable of
reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them
and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks.
scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks In order to allow arches to use code patching to conditionally emit the shadow stack pushes and pops, rather than always taking the performance hit even on CPUs that implement alternatives such as stack pointer authentication on arm64, add a Kconfig symbol that can be set by the arch to omit the SCS codegen itself, without otherwise affecting how support code for SCS and compiler options (for register reservation, for instance) are emitted. Also, add a static key and some plumbing to omit the allocation of shadow call stack for dynamic SCS configurations if SCS is disabled at runtime. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027155908.1940624-3-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2022-10-27 23:59:07 +08:00
config DYNAMIC_SCS
bool
help
Set by the arch code if it relies on code patching to insert the
shadow call stack push and pop instructions rather than on the
compiler.
kbuild: add support for Clang LTO This change adds build system support for Clang's Link Time Optimization (LTO). With -flto, instead of ELF object files, Clang produces LLVM bitcode, which is compiled into native code at link time, allowing the final binary to be optimized globally. For more details, see: https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html The Kconfig option CONFIG_LTO_CLANG is implemented as a choice, which defaults to LTO being disabled. To use LTO, the architecture must select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG and support: - compiling with Clang, - compiling all assembly code with Clang's integrated assembler, - and linking with LLD. While using CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL results in the best runtime performance, the compilation is not scalable in time or memory. CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN enables ThinLTO, which allows parallel optimization and faster incremental builds. ThinLTO is used by default if the architecture also selects ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html To enable LTO, LLVM tools must be used to handle bitcode files, by passing LLVM=1 and LLVM_IAS=1 options to make: $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig $ scripts/config -e LTO_CLANG_THIN $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 To prepare for LTO support with other compilers, common parts are gated behind the CONFIG_LTO option, and LTO can be disabled for specific files by filtering out CC_FLAGS_LTO. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211184633.3213045-3-samitolvanen@google.com
2020-12-12 02:46:19 +08:00
config LTO
bool
help
Selected if the kernel will be built using the compiler's LTO feature.
config LTO_CLANG
bool
select LTO
help
Selected if the kernel will be built using Clang's LTO feature.
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG
bool
help
An architecture should select this option if it supports:
- compiling with Clang,
- compiling inline assembly with Clang's integrated assembler,
- and linking with LLD.
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN
bool
help
An architecture should select this option if it can support Clang's
ThinLTO mode.
config HAS_LTO_CLANG
def_bool y
arch/Kconfig: Remove CLANG_VERSION check in HAS_LTO_CLANG The minimum supported version of LLVM has been raised to 11.0.0, meaning this check is always true, so it can be dropped. Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2021-11-30 00:58:00 +08:00
depends on CC_IS_CLANG && LD_IS_LLD && AS_IS_LLVM
kbuild: add support for Clang LTO This change adds build system support for Clang's Link Time Optimization (LTO). With -flto, instead of ELF object files, Clang produces LLVM bitcode, which is compiled into native code at link time, allowing the final binary to be optimized globally. For more details, see: https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html The Kconfig option CONFIG_LTO_CLANG is implemented as a choice, which defaults to LTO being disabled. To use LTO, the architecture must select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG and support: - compiling with Clang, - compiling all assembly code with Clang's integrated assembler, - and linking with LLD. While using CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL results in the best runtime performance, the compilation is not scalable in time or memory. CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN enables ThinLTO, which allows parallel optimization and faster incremental builds. ThinLTO is used by default if the architecture also selects ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html To enable LTO, LLVM tools must be used to handle bitcode files, by passing LLVM=1 and LLVM_IAS=1 options to make: $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig $ scripts/config -e LTO_CLANG_THIN $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 To prepare for LTO support with other compilers, common parts are gated behind the CONFIG_LTO option, and LTO can be disabled for specific files by filtering out CC_FLAGS_LTO. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211184633.3213045-3-samitolvanen@google.com
2020-12-12 02:46:19 +08:00
depends on $(success,$(NM) --help | head -n 1 | grep -qi llvm)
depends on $(success,$(AR) --help | head -n 1 | grep -qi llvm)
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG
depends on !FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_RECORDMCOUNT
arch: enable HAS_LTO_CLANG with KASAN and KCOV Both KASAN and KCOV had issues with LTO_CLANG if DEBUG_INFO is enabled. With LTO inlinable function calls are required to have debug info if they are inlined into a function that has debug info. Starting with LLVM 17 this will be fixed ([1],[2]) and enabling LTO with KASAN/KCOV and DEBUG_INFO doesn't cause linker errors anymore. Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/913f7e93dac67ecff47bade862ba42f27cb68ca9 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/4a8b1249306ff11f229320abdeadf0c215a00400 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230717-enable-kasan-lto1-v3-1-650e1efc19d1@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel <jkl820.git@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-07-19 06:29:12 +08:00
# https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1721
depends on (!KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || CLANG_VERSION >= 170000) || !DEBUG_INFO
depends on (!KCOV || CLANG_VERSION >= 170000) || !DEBUG_INFO
kbuild: add support for Clang LTO This change adds build system support for Clang's Link Time Optimization (LTO). With -flto, instead of ELF object files, Clang produces LLVM bitcode, which is compiled into native code at link time, allowing the final binary to be optimized globally. For more details, see: https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html The Kconfig option CONFIG_LTO_CLANG is implemented as a choice, which defaults to LTO being disabled. To use LTO, the architecture must select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG and support: - compiling with Clang, - compiling all assembly code with Clang's integrated assembler, - and linking with LLD. While using CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL results in the best runtime performance, the compilation is not scalable in time or memory. CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN enables ThinLTO, which allows parallel optimization and faster incremental builds. ThinLTO is used by default if the architecture also selects ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html To enable LTO, LLVM tools must be used to handle bitcode files, by passing LLVM=1 and LLVM_IAS=1 options to make: $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig $ scripts/config -e LTO_CLANG_THIN $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 To prepare for LTO support with other compilers, common parts are gated behind the CONFIG_LTO option, and LTO can be disabled for specific files by filtering out CC_FLAGS_LTO. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211184633.3213045-3-samitolvanen@google.com
2020-12-12 02:46:19 +08:00
depends on !GCOV_KERNEL
help
The compiler and Kconfig options support building with Clang's
LTO.
choice
prompt "Link Time Optimization (LTO)"
default LTO_NONE
help
This option enables Link Time Optimization (LTO), which allows the
compiler to optimize binaries globally.
If unsure, select LTO_NONE. Note that LTO is very resource-intensive
so it's disabled by default.
config LTO_NONE
bool "None"
help
Build the kernel normally, without Link Time Optimization (LTO).
config LTO_CLANG_FULL
bool "Clang Full LTO (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on HAS_LTO_CLANG
depends on !COMPILE_TEST
select LTO_CLANG
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
This option enables Clang's full Link Time Optimization (LTO), which
allows the compiler to optimize the kernel globally. If you enable
this option, the compiler generates LLVM bitcode instead of ELF
object files, and the actual compilation from bitcode happens at
the LTO link step, which may take several minutes depending on the
kernel configuration. More information can be found from LLVM's
documentation:
kbuild: add support for Clang LTO This change adds build system support for Clang's Link Time Optimization (LTO). With -flto, instead of ELF object files, Clang produces LLVM bitcode, which is compiled into native code at link time, allowing the final binary to be optimized globally. For more details, see: https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html The Kconfig option CONFIG_LTO_CLANG is implemented as a choice, which defaults to LTO being disabled. To use LTO, the architecture must select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG and support: - compiling with Clang, - compiling all assembly code with Clang's integrated assembler, - and linking with LLD. While using CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL results in the best runtime performance, the compilation is not scalable in time or memory. CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN enables ThinLTO, which allows parallel optimization and faster incremental builds. ThinLTO is used by default if the architecture also selects ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html To enable LTO, LLVM tools must be used to handle bitcode files, by passing LLVM=1 and LLVM_IAS=1 options to make: $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig $ scripts/config -e LTO_CLANG_THIN $ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 To prepare for LTO support with other compilers, common parts are gated behind the CONFIG_LTO option, and LTO can be disabled for specific files by filtering out CC_FLAGS_LTO. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211184633.3213045-3-samitolvanen@google.com
2020-12-12 02:46:19 +08:00
https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html
During link time, this option can use a large amount of RAM, and
may take much longer than the ThinLTO option.
config LTO_CLANG_THIN
bool "Clang ThinLTO (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on HAS_LTO_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN
select LTO_CLANG
help
This option enables Clang's ThinLTO, which allows for parallel
optimization and faster incremental compiles compared to the
CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL option. More information can be found
from Clang's documentation:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html
If unsure, say Y.
endchoice
add support for Clang CFI This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored function pointers. For more details, see: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between independently compiled components. With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address() to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x. Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables, the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes __cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function with the address of the jump table entry. Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local to each component, they break cross-module function address equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module, it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other components. CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute. Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI. By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but should only be enabled during development. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com
2021-04-09 02:28:26 +08:00
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG
bool
help
An architecture should select this option if it can support Clang's
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.
cfi: Switch to -fsanitize=kcfi Switch from Clang's original forward-edge control-flow integrity implementation to -fsanitize=kcfi, which is better suited for the kernel, as it doesn't require LTO, doesn't use a jump table that requires altering function references, and won't break cross-module function address equality. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-6-samitolvanen@google.com
2022-09-09 05:54:47 +08:00
config ARCH_USES_CFI_TRAPS
bool
add support for Clang CFI This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored function pointers. For more details, see: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between independently compiled components. With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address() to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x. Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables, the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes __cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function with the address of the jump table entry. Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local to each component, they break cross-module function address equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module, it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other components. CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute. Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI. By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but should only be enabled during development. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com
2021-04-09 02:28:26 +08:00
config CFI_CLANG
bool "Use Clang's Control Flow Integrity (CFI)"
cfi: Switch to -fsanitize=kcfi Switch from Clang's original forward-edge control-flow integrity implementation to -fsanitize=kcfi, which is better suited for the kernel, as it doesn't require LTO, doesn't use a jump table that requires altering function references, and won't break cross-module function address equality. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-6-samitolvanen@google.com
2022-09-09 05:54:47 +08:00
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG
depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=kcfi)
add support for Clang CFI This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored function pointers. For more details, see: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between independently compiled components. With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address() to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x. Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables, the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes __cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function with the address of the jump table entry. Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local to each component, they break cross-module function address equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module, it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other components. CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute. Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI. By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but should only be enabled during development. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com
2021-04-09 02:28:26 +08:00
help
This option enables Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
(CFI) checking, where the compiler injects a runtime check to each
indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with
the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and
makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow
the modification of stored function pointers. More information can be
found from Clang's documentation:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html
config CFI_PERMISSIVE
bool "Use CFI in permissive mode"
depends on CFI_CLANG
help
When selected, Control Flow Integrity (CFI) violations result in a
warning instead of a kernel panic. This option should only be used
for finding indirect call type mismatches during development.
If unsure, say N.
mm: Implement stack frame object validation This creates per-architecture function arch_within_stack_frames() that should validate if a given object is contained by a kernel stack frame. Initial implementation is on x86. This is based on code from PaX. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-07-13 07:19:48 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
bool
help
An architecture should select this if it can walk the kernel stack
frames to determine if an object is part of either the arguments
or local variables (i.e. that it excludes saved return addresses,
and similar) by implementing an inline arch_within_stack_frames(),
which is used by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
context_tracking: Split user tracking Kconfig Context tracking is going to be used not only to track user transitions but also idle/IRQs/NMIs. The user tracking part will then become a separate feature. Prepare Kconfig for that. [ frederic: Apply Max Filippov feedback. ] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <uladzislau.rezki@sony.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@kernel.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> Cc: Yu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Alex Belits <abelits@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com> Tested-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com>
2022-06-08 22:40:24 +08:00
config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER
rcu: Settle config for userspace extended quiescent state Create a new config option under the RCU menu that put CPUs under RCU extended quiescent state (as in dynticks idle mode) when they run in userspace. This require some contribution from architectures to hook into kernel and userspace boundaries. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Alessio Igor Bogani <abogani@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org> Cc: Gilad Ben Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Cc: Hakan Akkan <hakanakkan@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@ti.com> Cc: Max Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sven-Thorsten Dietrich <thebigcorporation@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
2012-07-12 02:26:30 +08:00
bool
help
context_tracking: New context tracking susbsystem Create a new subsystem that probes on kernel boundaries to keep track of the transitions between level contexts with two basic initial contexts: user or kernel. This is an abstraction of some RCU code that use such tracking to implement its userspace extended quiescent state. We need to pull this up from RCU into this new level of indirection because this tracking is also going to be used to implement an "on demand" generic virtual cputime accounting. A necessary step to shutdown the tick while still accounting the cputime. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> [ paulmck: fix whitespace error and email address. ] Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2012-11-28 02:33:25 +08:00
Provide kernel/user boundaries probes necessary for subsystems
that need it, such as userspace RCU extended quiescent state.
context-tracking: Introduce CONFIG_HAVE_TIF_NOHZ A few archs (x86, arm, arm64) don't rely anymore on TIF_NOHZ to call into context tracking on user entry/exit but instead use static keys (or not) to optimize those calls. Ideally every arch should migrate to that behaviour in the long run. Settle a config option to let those archs remove their TIF_NOHZ definitions. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-27 23:41:52 +08:00
Syscalls need to be wrapped inside user_exit()-user_enter(), either
optimized behind static key or through the slow path using TIF_NOHZ
flag. Exceptions handlers must be wrapped as well. Irqs are already
context_tracking: Take IRQ eqs entrypoints over RCU The RCU dynticks counter is going to be merged into the context tracking subsystem. Prepare with moving the IRQ extended quiescent states entrypoints to context tracking. For now those are dumb redirection to existing RCU calls. [ paulmck: Apply Stephen Rothwell feedback from -next. ] [ paulmck: Apply Nathan Chancellor feedback. ] Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <uladzislau.rezki@sony.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@kernel.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> Cc: Yu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Alex Belits <abelits@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com> Tested-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com>
2022-06-08 22:40:26 +08:00
protected inside ct_irq_enter/ct_irq_exit() but preemption or signal
context-tracking: Introduce CONFIG_HAVE_TIF_NOHZ A few archs (x86, arm, arm64) don't rely anymore on TIF_NOHZ to call into context tracking on user entry/exit but instead use static keys (or not) to optimize those calls. Ideally every arch should migrate to that behaviour in the long run. Settle a config option to let those archs remove their TIF_NOHZ definitions. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-27 23:41:52 +08:00
handling on irq exit still need to be protected.
context_tracking: Split user tracking Kconfig Context tracking is going to be used not only to track user transitions but also idle/IRQs/NMIs. The user tracking part will then become a separate feature. Prepare Kconfig for that. [ frederic: Apply Max Filippov feedback. ] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <uladzislau.rezki@sony.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@kernel.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> Cc: Yu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Alex Belits <abelits@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com> Tested-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com>
2022-06-08 22:40:24 +08:00
config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER_OFFSTACK
context_tracking: Introduce HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK Historically, context tracking had to deal with fragile entry code path, ie: before user_exit() is called and after user_enter() is called, in case some of those spots would call schedule() or use RCU. On such cases, the site had to be protected between exception_enter() and exception_exit() that save the context tracking state in the task stack. Such sleepable fragile code path had many different origins: tracing, exceptions, early or late calls to context tracking on syscalls... Aside of that not being pretty, saving the context tracking state on the task stack forces us to run context tracking on all CPUs, including housekeepers, and prevents us to completely shutdown nohz_full at runtime on a CPU in the future as context tracking and its overhead would still need to run system wide. Now thanks to the extensive efforts to sanitize x86 entry code, those conditions have been removed and we can now get rid of these workarounds in this architecture. Create a Kconfig feature to express this achievement. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117151637.259084-2-frederic@kernel.org
2020-11-17 23:16:33 +08:00
bool
help
Architecture neither relies on exception_enter()/exception_exit()
nor on schedule_user(). Also preempt_schedule_notrace() and
preempt_schedule_irq() can't be called in a preemptible section
while context tracking is CONTEXT_USER. This feature reflects a sane
entry implementation where the following requirements are met on
critical entry code, ie: before user_exit() or after user_enter():
- Critical entry code isn't preemptible (or better yet:
not interruptible).
context_tracking: Take NMI eqs entrypoints over RCU The RCU dynticks counter is going to be merged into the context tracking subsystem. Prepare with moving the NMI extended quiescent states entrypoints to context tracking. For now those are dumb redirection to existing RCU calls. Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <uladzislau.rezki@sony.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@kernel.org> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> Cc: Yu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Alex Belits <abelits@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com> Tested-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzju@redhat.com>
2022-06-08 22:40:27 +08:00
- No use of RCU read side critical sections, unless ct_nmi_enter()
context_tracking: Introduce HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK Historically, context tracking had to deal with fragile entry code path, ie: before user_exit() is called and after user_enter() is called, in case some of those spots would call schedule() or use RCU. On such cases, the site had to be protected between exception_enter() and exception_exit() that save the context tracking state in the task stack. Such sleepable fragile code path had many different origins: tracing, exceptions, early or late calls to context tracking on syscalls... Aside of that not being pretty, saving the context tracking state on the task stack forces us to run context tracking on all CPUs, including housekeepers, and prevents us to completely shutdown nohz_full at runtime on a CPU in the future as context tracking and its overhead would still need to run system wide. Now thanks to the extensive efforts to sanitize x86 entry code, those conditions have been removed and we can now get rid of these workarounds in this architecture. Create a Kconfig feature to express this achievement. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117151637.259084-2-frederic@kernel.org
2020-11-17 23:16:33 +08:00
got called.
- No use of instrumentation, unless instrumentation_begin() got
called.
context-tracking: Introduce CONFIG_HAVE_TIF_NOHZ A few archs (x86, arm, arm64) don't rely anymore on TIF_NOHZ to call into context tracking on user entry/exit but instead use static keys (or not) to optimize those calls. Ideally every arch should migrate to that behaviour in the long run. Settle a config option to let those archs remove their TIF_NOHZ definitions. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-27 23:41:52 +08:00
config HAVE_TIF_NOHZ
bool
help
Arch relies on TIF_NOHZ and syscall slow path to implement context
tracking calls to user_enter()/user_exit().
rcu: Settle config for userspace extended quiescent state Create a new config option under the RCU menu that put CPUs under RCU extended quiescent state (as in dynticks idle mode) when they run in userspace. This require some contribution from architectures to hook into kernel and userspace boundaries. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Alessio Igor Bogani <abogani@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org> Cc: Gilad Ben Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Cc: Hakan Akkan <hakanakkan@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@ti.com> Cc: Max Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sven-Thorsten Dietrich <thebigcorporation@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
2012-07-12 02:26:30 +08:00
cputime: Generalize CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING S390, ia64 and powerpc all define their own version of CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING. Generalize the config and its description to a single place to avoid duplication. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
2012-06-16 21:39:34 +08:00
config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
bool
s390/vtime: Use the generic IRQ entry accounting s390 has its own version of IRQ entry accounting because it doesn't account the idle time the same way the other architectures do. Only the actual idle sleep time is accounted as idle time, the rest of the idle task execution is accounted as system time. Make the generic IRQ entry accounting aware of architectures that have their own way of accounting idle time and convert s390 to use it. This prepares s390 to get involved in further consolidations of IRQ time accounting. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202115732.27827-3-frederic@kernel.org
2020-12-02 19:57:29 +08:00
config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_IDLE
bool
help
Architecture has its own way to account idle CPU time and therefore
doesn't implement vtime_account_idle().
sched/cputime, powerpc, s390: Make scaled cputime arch specific Only s390 and powerpc have hardware facilities allowing to measure cputimes scaled by frequency. On all other architectures utimescaled/stimescaled are equal to utime/stime (however they are accounted separately). Remove {u,s}timescaled accounting on all architectures except powerpc and s390, where those values are explicitly accounted in the proper places. Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161031162143.GB12646@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-11-15 10:06:51 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME
bool
vtime: Add HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN Kconfig With VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN, cputime_t becomes 64-bit. In order to use that feature, arch code should be audited to ensure there are no races in concurrent read/write of cputime_t. For example, reading/writing 64-bit cputime_t on some 32-bit arches may require multiple accesses for low and high value parts, so proper locking is needed to protect against concurrent accesses. Therefore, add CONFIG_HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN which arches can enable after they've been audited for potential races. This option is automatically enabled on 64-bit platforms. Feature requested by Frederic Weisbecker. Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arm Linux <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
2013-09-17 06:28:21 +08:00
config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
bool
default y if 64BIT
help
With VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN, cputime_t becomes 64-bit.
Before enabling this option, arch code must be audited
to ensure there are no races in concurrent read/write of
cputime_t. For example, reading/writing 64-bit cputime_t on
some 32-bit arches may require multiple accesses, so proper
locking is needed to protect against concurrent accesses.
cputime: Make finegrained irqtime accounting generally available There is no known reason for this option to be unavailable on other archs than x86. They just need to call enable_sched_clock_irqtime() if they have a sufficiently finegrained clock to make it working. Move it to the general option and let the user choose between it and pure tick based or virtual cputime accounting. Note that virtual cputime accounting already performs a finegrained irqtime accounting. CONFIG_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING is a kind of middle ground between tick and virtual based accounting. So CONFIG_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING are mutually exclusive choices. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
2012-09-09 20:56:31 +08:00
config HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING
bool
help
Archs need to ensure they use a high enough resolution clock to
support irq time accounting and then call enable_sched_clock_irqtime().
mm: speedup mremap on 1GB or larger regions Android needs to move large memory regions for garbage collection. The GC requires moving physical pages of multi-gigabyte heap using mremap. During this move, the application threads have to be paused for correctness. It is critical to keep this pause as short as possible to avoid jitters during user interaction. Optimize mremap for >= 1GB-sized regions by moving at the PUD/PGD level if the source and destination addresses are PUD-aligned. For CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 3, moving at the PUD level in effect moves PGD entries, since the PUD entry is “folded back” onto the PGD entry. Add HAVE_MOVE_PUD so that architectures where moving at the PUD level isn't supported/tested can turn this off by not selecting the config. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201014005320.2233162-4-kaleshsingh@google.com Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> Cc: Hassan Naveed <hnaveed@wavecomp.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:07:30 +08:00
config HAVE_MOVE_PUD
bool
help
Architectures that select this are able to move page tables at the
PUD level. If there are only 3 page table levels, the move effectively
happens at the PGD level.
mm: speed up mremap by 20x on large regions Android needs to mremap large regions of memory during memory management related operations. The mremap system call can be really slow if THP is not enabled. The bottleneck is move_page_tables, which is copying each pte at a time, and can be really slow across a large map. Turning on THP may not be a viable option, and is not for us. This patch speeds up the performance for non-THP system by copying at the PMD level when possible. The speedup is an order of magnitude on x86 (~20x). On a 1GB mremap, the mremap completion times drops from 3.4-3.6 milliseconds to 144-160 microseconds. Before: Total mremap time for 1GB data: 3521942 nanoseconds. Total mremap time for 1GB data: 3449229 nanoseconds. Total mremap time for 1GB data: 3488230 nanoseconds. After: Total mremap time for 1GB data: 150279 nanoseconds. Total mremap time for 1GB data: 144665 nanoseconds. Total mremap time for 1GB data: 158708 nanoseconds. If THP is enabled the optimization is mostly skipped except in certain situations. [joel@joelfernandes.org: fix 'move_normal_pmd' unused function warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108224457.GB209347@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108181201.88826-3-joelaf@google.com Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 07:28:38 +08:00
config HAVE_MOVE_PMD
bool
help
Archs that select this are able to move page tables at the PMD level.
thp, x86: introduce HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE Cleanup patch in preparation for transparent hugepage support on s390. Adding new architectures to the TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE config option can make the "depends" line rather ugly, like "depends on (X86 || (S390 && 64BIT)) && MMU". This patch adds a HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE instead. x86 already has MMU "def_bool y", so the MMU check is superfluous there and HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE can be selected in arch/x86/Kconfig. Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-09 07:30:04 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
bool
mm, x86: add support for PUD-sized transparent hugepages The current transparent hugepage code only supports PMDs. This patch adds support for transparent use of PUDs with DAX. It does not include support for anonymous pages. x86 support code also added. Most of this patch simply parallels the work that was done for huge PMDs. The only major difference is how the new ->pud_entry method in mm_walk works. The ->pmd_entry method replaces the ->pte_entry method, whereas the ->pud_entry method works along with either ->pmd_entry or ->pte_entry. The pagewalk code takes care of locking the PUD before calling ->pud_walk, so handlers do not need to worry whether the PUD is stable. [dave.jiang@intel.com: fix SMP x86 32bit build for native_pud_clear()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148719066814.31111.3239231168815337012.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com [dave.jiang@intel.com: native_pud_clear missing on i386 build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148640375195.69754.3315433724330910314.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148545059381.17912.8602162635537598445.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Tested-by: Alexander Kapshuk <alexander.kapshuk@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Nilesh Choudhury <nilesh.choudhury@oracle.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-02-25 06:57:02 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD
bool
lib/ioremap.c: add huge I/O map capability interfaces Add ioremap_pud_enabled() and ioremap_pmd_enabled(), which return 1 when I/O mappings with pud/pmd are enabled on the kernel. ioremap_huge_init() calls arch_ioremap_pud_supported() and arch_ioremap_pmd_supported() to initialize the capabilities at boot-time. A new kernel option "nohugeiomap" is also added, so that user can disable the huge I/O map capabilities when necessary. Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Robert Elliott <Elliott@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:20 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
bool
mm/vmalloc: hugepage vmalloc mappings Support huge page vmalloc mappings. Config option HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC enables support on architectures that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP and supports PMD sized vmap mappings. vmalloc will attempt to allocate PMD-sized pages if allocating PMD size or larger, and fall back to small pages if that was unsuccessful. Architectures must ensure that any arch specific vmalloc allocations that require PAGE_SIZE mappings (e.g., module allocations vs strict module rwx) use the VM_NOHUGE flag to inhibit larger mappings. This can result in more internal fragmentation and memory overhead for a given allocation, an option nohugevmalloc is added to disable at boot. [colin.king@canonical.com: fix read of uninitialized pointer area] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210318155955.18220-1-colin.king@canonical.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317062402.533919-14-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30 13:58:49 +08:00
#
# Archs that select this would be capable of PMD-sized vmaps (i.e.,
vmalloc: replace VM_NO_HUGE_VMAP with VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP Huge page backed vmalloc memory could benefit performance in many cases. However, some users of vmalloc may not be ready to handle huge pages for various reasons: hardware constraints, potential pages split, etc. VM_NO_HUGE_VMAP was introduced to allow vmalloc users to opt-out huge pages. However, it is not easy to track down all the users that require the opt-out, as the allocation are passed different stacks and may cause issues in different layers. To address this issue, replace VM_NO_HUGE_VMAP with an opt-in flag, VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP, so that users that benefit from huge pages could ask specificially. Also, remove vmalloc_no_huge() and add opt-in helper vmalloc_huge(). Fixes: fac54e2bfb5b ("x86/Kconfig: Select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC with HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/14444103-d51b-0fb3-ee63-c3f182f0b546@molgen.mpg.de/" Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-16 00:44:10 +08:00
# arch_vmap_pmd_supported() returns true). The VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP flag
# must be used to enable allocations to use hugepages.
mm/vmalloc: hugepage vmalloc mappings Support huge page vmalloc mappings. Config option HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC enables support on architectures that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP and supports PMD sized vmap mappings. vmalloc will attempt to allocate PMD-sized pages if allocating PMD size or larger, and fall back to small pages if that was unsuccessful. Architectures must ensure that any arch specific vmalloc allocations that require PAGE_SIZE mappings (e.g., module allocations vs strict module rwx) use the VM_NOHUGE flag to inhibit larger mappings. This can result in more internal fragmentation and memory overhead for a given allocation, an option nohugevmalloc is added to disable at boot. [colin.king@canonical.com: fix read of uninitialized pointer area] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210318155955.18220-1-colin.king@canonical.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317062402.533919-14-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30 13:58:49 +08:00
#
config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC
depends on HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
bool
x86, arm64: Move ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE config in arch/Kconfig ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE config was declared in both architectures: move this declaration in arch/Kconfig and make those architectures select it. Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> # for arm64 Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
2019-06-28 06:00:11 +08:00
config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE
bool
mm: Rename arch pte_mkwrite()'s to pte_mkwrite_novma() The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly. One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable, but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that call pte_mkwrite(). The goal is to make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular writable or shadow stack mappings. But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA. So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite() added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers can be changed to take/pass a VMA. Start the process by renaming pte_mkwrite() to pte_mkwrite_novma() and adding the pte_mkwrite() wrapper in linux/pgtable.h. Apply the same pattern for pmd_mkwrite(). Since not all archs have a pmd_mkwrite_novma(), create a new arch config HAS_HUGE_PAGE that can be used to tell if pmd_mkwrite() should be defined. Otherwise in the !HAS_HUGE_PAGE cases the compiler would not be able to find pmd_mkwrite_novma(). No functional change. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiZjSu7c9sFYZb3q04108stgHff2wfbokGCCgW7riz+8Q@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-2-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-13 08:10:27 +08:00
# Archs that want to use pmd_mkwrite on kernel memory need it defined even
# if there are no userspace memory management features that use it
config ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_PMD_MKWRITE
bool
config ARCH_WANT_PMD_MKWRITE
def_bool TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE || ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_PMD_MKWRITE
mm: soft-dirty bits for user memory changes tracking The soft-dirty is a bit on a PTE which helps to track which pages a task writes to. In order to do this tracking one should 1. Clear soft-dirty bits from PTEs ("echo 4 > /proc/PID/clear_refs) 2. Wait some time. 3. Read soft-dirty bits (55'th in /proc/PID/pagemap2 entries) To do this tracking, the writable bit is cleared from PTEs when the soft-dirty bit is. Thus, after this, when the task tries to modify a page at some virtual address the #PF occurs and the kernel sets the soft-dirty bit on the respective PTE. Note, that although all the task's address space is marked as r/o after the soft-dirty bits clear, the #PF-s that occur after that are processed fast. This is so, since the pages are still mapped to physical memory, and thus all the kernel does is finds this fact out and puts back writable, dirty and soft-dirty bits on the PTE. Another thing to note, is that when mremap moves PTEs they are marked with soft-dirty as well, since from the user perspective mremap modifies the virtual memory at mremap's new address. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-04 06:01:20 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
bool
Make most arch asm/module.h files use asm-generic/module.h Use the mapping of Elf_[SPE]hdr, Elf_Addr, Elf_Sym, Elf_Dyn, Elf_Rel/Rela, ELF_R_TYPE() and ELF_R_SYM() to either the 32-bit version or the 64-bit version into asm-generic/module.h for all arches bar MIPS. Also, use the generic definition mod_arch_specific where possible. To this end, I've defined three new config bools: (*) HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC Arches define this if they don't want to use the empty generic mod_arch_specific struct. (*) MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA Arches define this if their modules can contain RELA records. This causes the Elf_Rela mapping to be emitted and allows apply_relocate_add() to be defined by the arch rather than have the core emit an error message. (*) MODULES_USE_ELF_REL Arches define this if their modules can contain REL records. This causes the Elf_Rel mapping to be emitted and allows apply_relocate() to be defined by the arch rather than have the core emit an error message. Note that it is possible to allow both REL and RELA records: m68k and mips are two arches that do this. With this, some arch asm/module.h files can be deleted entirely and replaced with a generic-y marker in the arch Kbuild file. Additionally, I have removed the bits from m32r and score that handle the unsupported type of relocation record as that's now handled centrally. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-28 13:01:03 +08:00
config HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
bool
help
The arch uses struct mod_arch_specific to store data. Many arches
just need a simple module loader without arch specific data - those
should not enable this.
config MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
bool
help
Modules only use ELF RELA relocations. Modules with ELF REL
relocations will give an error.
config MODULES_USE_ELF_REL
bool
help
Modules only use ELF REL relocations. Modules with ELF RELA
relocations will give an error.
module: Add CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC Add CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC to allow architectures to request having modules data in vmalloc area instead of module area. This is required on powerpc book3s/32 in order to set data non executable, because it is not possible to set executability on page basis, this is done per 256 Mbytes segments. The module area has exec right, vmalloc area has noexec. This can also be useful on other powerpc/32 in order to maximize the chance of code being close enough to kernel core to avoid branch trampolines. Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Acked-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> [mcgrof: rebased in light of kernel/module/kdb.c move] Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2022-02-23 20:02:14 +08:00
config ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC
bool
help
For architectures like powerpc/32 which have constraints on module
allocation and need to allocate module data outside of module area.
irq: Optimize softirq stack selection in irq exit If irq_exit() is called on the arch's specified irq stack, it should be safe to run softirqs inline under that same irq stack as it is near empty by the time we call irq_exit(). For example if we use the same stack for both hard and soft irqs here, the worst case scenario is: hardirq -> softirq -> hardirq. But then the softirq supersedes the first hardirq as the stack user since irq_exit() is called in a mostly empty stack. So the stack merge in this case looks acceptable. Stack overrun still have a chance to happen if hardirqs have more opportunities to nest, but then it's another problem to solve. So lets adapt the irq exit's softirq stack on top of a new Kconfig symbol that can be defined when irq_exit() runs on the irq stack. That way we can spare some stack switch on irq processing and all the cache issues that come along. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2013-09-24 23:17:47 +08:00
config HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK
bool
help
Architecture doesn't only execute the irq handler on the irq stack
but also irq_exit(). This way we can process softirqs on this irq
stack instead of switching to a new one when we call __do_softirq()
in the end of an hardirq.
This spares a stack switch and improves cache usage on softirq
processing.
softirq: Move __ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ to Kconfig To prepare for inlining do_softirq_own_stack() replace __ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ with a Kconfig switch and select it in the affected architectures. This allows in the next step to move the function prototype and the inline stub into a seperate asm-generic header file which is required to avoid include recursion. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002513.181713427@linutronix.de
2021-02-10 07:40:52 +08:00
config HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK
bool
help
Architecture provides a function to run __do_softirq() on a
arch: Kconfig: fix spelling mistake "seperate" -> "separate" Threre is a spelling mistake in the Kconfig text. Fix it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210704095207.37342-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-08 10:57:38 +08:00
separate stack.
softirq: Move __ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ to Kconfig To prepare for inlining do_softirq_own_stack() replace __ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ with a Kconfig switch and select it in the affected architectures. This allows in the next step to move the function prototype and the inline stub into a seperate asm-generic header file which is required to avoid include recursion. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002513.181713427@linutronix.de
2021-02-10 07:40:52 +08:00
asm-generic: Conditionally enable do_softirq_own_stack() via Kconfig. Remove the CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT symbol from the ifdef around do_softirq_own_stack() and move it to Kconfig instead. Enable softirq stacks based on SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK which depends on HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK and its default value is set to !PREEMPT_RT. This ensures that softirq stacks are not used on PREEMPT_RT and avoids a 'select' statement on an option which has a 'depends' statement. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/YvN5E%2FPrHfUhggr7@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2022-08-25 16:25:05 +08:00
config SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK
def_bool HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK && !PREEMPT_RT
uaccess: generalize access_ok() There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the user_addr_max() value or they accept anything. Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside of uaccess_kernel() sections. For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong. Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of callers need an extra __user annotation for this. Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic] Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2022-02-16 00:55:04 +08:00
config ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE
bool
help
Architectures set this when the CPU uses separate address
spaces for kernel and user space pointers. In this case, the
access_ok() check on a __user pointer is skipped.
mm: define default PGTABLE_LEVELS to two By this time all architectures which support more than two page table levels should be covered. This patch add default definiton of PGTABLE_LEVELS equal 2. We also add assert to detect inconsistence between CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS and __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED/__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:46:17 +08:00
config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
default 2
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:00 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
bool
help
An architecture supports choosing randomized locations for
stack, mmap, brk, and ET_DYN. Defined functions:
- arch_mmap_rnd()
mm: fold arch_randomize_brk into ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE The arch_randomize_brk() function is used on several architectures, even those that don't support ET_DYN ASLR. To avoid bulky extern/#define tricks, consolidate the support under CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for the architectures that support it, while still handling CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:12 +08:00
- arch_randomize_brk()
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:00 +08:00
mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for fragmentation. The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values, which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts of entropy. This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for offset generation on a system. The direct motivation for this change was in response to the libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to information provided by Google's project zero at: http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack. Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded 8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more likely to be noticed. The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the user-space accessible virtual address space. When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location, which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced, preventing very large allocations. This patch (of 4): ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place the trade-off. Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-15 07:19:53 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol if it supports setting a variable
number of bits for use in establishing the base address for mmap
allocations, has MMU enabled and provides values for both:
- ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
- ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
exit_thread: remove empty bodies Define HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for archs which want to do something in exit_thread. For others, let's define exit_thread as an empty inline. This is a cleanup before we change the prototype of exit_thread to accept a task parameter. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips] Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 08:00:16 +08:00
config HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
bool
help
An architecture implements exit_thread.
mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for fragmentation. The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values, which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts of entropy. This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for offset generation on a system. The direct motivation for this change was in response to the libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to information provided by Google's project zero at: http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack. Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded 8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more likely to be noticed. The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the user-space accessible virtual address space. When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location, which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced, preventing very large allocations. This patch (of 4): ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place the trade-off. Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-15 07:19:53 +08:00
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
int
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
int
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
int
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
help
This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions
resulting from mmap allocations. This value will be bounded
by the architecture's minimum and maximum supported values.
This value can be changed after boot using the
/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits tunable
config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol if it supports running applications
in compatibility mode, supports setting a variable number of bits for
use in establishing the base address for mmap allocations, has MMU
enabled and provides values for both:
- ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
- ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
int
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
int
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
int
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
help
This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions
resulting from mmap allocations for compatible applications This
value will be bounded by the architecture's minimum and maximum
supported values.
This value can be changed after boot using the
/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits tunable
x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap() mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space for allocation. The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications. Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat (32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space (4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an invalid address. To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit applications. As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping. [ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-06 22:17:19 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES
bool
help
This allows 64bit applications to invoke 32-bit mmap() syscall
and vice-versa 32-bit applications to call 64-bit mmap().
Required for applications doing different bitness syscalls.
arch: Add generic Kconfig option indicating page size smaller than 64k NTFS_RW and VMXNET3 require a page size smaller than 64kB. Add generic Kconfig option for use outside architecture code to avoid architecture specific Kconfig options in that code. Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-27 23:44:40 +08:00
config PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB
def_bool y
depends on !ARM64_64K_PAGES
depends on !PAGE_SIZE_64KB
depends on !PARISC_PAGE_SIZE_64KB
arch/Kconfig: split PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB from PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB Patch series "Fix CONFIG_TEST_KMOD with 256kB page size". The kernel test robot reported a build error [1] from a failed assertion in fs/btrfs/inode.c with a hexagon randconfig that includes CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_256KB. This error is the same one that was addressed by commit b05fbcc36be1 ("btrfs: disable build on platforms having page size 256K") but CONFIG_TEST_KMOD selects CONFIG_BTRFS without having the "page size less than 256kB dependency", which results in the error reappearing. The first patch introduces CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB by splitting it off from CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB, which was introduced in commit 1f0e290cc5fd ("arch: Add generic Kconfig option indicating page size smaller than 64k") for a similar reason in 5.16-rc3. The second patch uses that configuration option for CONFIG_BTRFS to reduce duplication. The third patch resolves the build error by adding CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB as a dependency to CONFIG_TEST_KMOD so that CONFIG_BTRFS does not get enabled under that invalid configuration. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202111270255.UYOoN5VN-lkp@intel.com/ This patch (of 3): btrfs requires a page size smaller than 256kB. To use that dependency in other places, introduce CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB and reuse that dependency in CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211129230141.228085-1-nathan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211129230141.228085-2-nathan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-20 10:10:22 +08:00
depends on PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
config PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
def_bool y
arch: Add generic Kconfig option indicating page size smaller than 64k NTFS_RW and VMXNET3 require a page size smaller than 64kB. Add generic Kconfig option for use outside architecture code to avoid architecture specific Kconfig options in that code. Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-27 23:44:40 +08:00
depends on !PAGE_SIZE_256KB
arm64, mm: move generic mmap layout functions to mm arm64 handles top-down mmap layout in a way that can be easily reused by other architectures, so make it available in mm. It then introduces a new config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT that can be set by other architectures to benefit from those functions. Note that this new config depends on MMU being enabled, if selected without MMU support, a warning will be thrown. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-5-alex@ghiti.fr Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 06:38:47 +08:00
# This allows to use a set of generic functions to determine mmap base
# address by giving priority to top-down scheme only if the process
# is not in legacy mode (compat task, unlimited stack size or
# sysctl_legacy_va_layout).
# Architecture that selects this option can provide its own version of:
# - STACK_RND_MASK
config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
bool
depends on MMU
arm64, mm: make randomization selected by generic topdown mmap layout This commits selects ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE when an arch uses the generic topdown mmap layout functions so that this security feature is on by default. Note that this commit also removes the possibility for arm64 to have elf randomization and no MMU: without MMU, the security added by randomization is worth nothing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-6-alex@ghiti.fr Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 06:38:50 +08:00
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
arm64, mm: move generic mmap layout functions to mm arm64 handles top-down mmap layout in a way that can be easily reused by other architectures, so make it available in mm. It then introduces a new config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT that can be set by other architectures to benefit from those functions. Note that this new config depends on MMU being enabled, if selected without MMU support, a warning will be thrown. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-5-alex@ghiti.fr Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 06:38:47 +08:00
objtool: Add CONFIG_OBJTOOL Now that stack validation is an optional feature of objtool, add CONFIG_OBJTOOL and replace most usages of CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION with it. CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION can now be considered to be frame-pointer specific. CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC is already inherently valid for live patching, so no need to "validate" it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939bf3d85604b2a126412bf11af6e3bd3b872bcb.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:36 +08:00
config HAVE_OBJTOOL
bool
objtool: Make jump label hack optional Objtool secretly does a jump label hack to overcome the limitations of the toolchain. Make the hack explicit (and optional for other arches) by turning it into a cmdline option and kernel config option. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3bdcbfdd27ecb01ddec13c04bdf756a583b13d24.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:39 +08:00
config HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK
bool
objtool: Make noinstr hacks optional Objtool has some hacks in place to workaround toolchain limitations which otherwise would break no-instrumentation rules. Make the hacks explicit (and optional for other arches) by turning it into a cmdline option and kernel config option. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b326eeb9c33231b9dfbb925f194ed7ee40edcd7c.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:40 +08:00
config HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK
bool
objtool: Add HAVE_NOINSTR_VALIDATION Remove CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION's dependency on HAVE_OBJTOOL, since other arches might want to implement objtool without it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/488e94f69db4df154499bc098573d90e5db1c826.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:42 +08:00
config HAVE_NOINSTR_VALIDATION
bool
objtool: Add CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION Allow an arch specify that it has objtool uaccess validation with CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION. For now, doing so unconditionally selects CONFIG_OBJTOOL. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d393d5e2fe73aec6e8e41d5c24f4b6fe8583f2d8.1650384225.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-20 00:05:09 +08:00
config HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION
bool
select OBJTOOL
objtool: Add CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option Add a CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option which will run "objtool check" for each .o file to ensure the validity of its stack metadata. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/92baab69a6bf9bc7043af0bfca9fb964a1d45546.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:42 +08:00
config HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION
bool
help
objtool: Add CONFIG_OBJTOOL Now that stack validation is an optional feature of objtool, add CONFIG_OBJTOOL and replace most usages of CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION with it. CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION can now be considered to be frame-pointer specific. CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC is already inherently valid for live patching, so no need to "validate" it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939bf3d85604b2a126412bf11af6e3bd3b872bcb.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:36 +08:00
Architecture supports objtool compile-time frame pointer rule
validation.
objtool: Add CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option Add a CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option which will run "objtool check" for each .o file to ensure the validity of its stack metadata. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/92baab69a6bf9bc7043af0bfca9fb964a1d45546.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:42 +08:00
stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that. Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either 'current' or inactive. save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception (e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers. It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as: - corrupted stack data - stack grows the wrong way - stack walk doesn't reach the bottom - user didn't provide a large enough entries array Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done(). Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can determine at build time whether the function is implemented. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the x86 changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 09:42:28 +08:00
config HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
bool
help
arch/Kconfig: update HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE description save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() is not the only function providing the reliable stack traces anymore. Architecture might define ARCH_STACKWALK which provides a newer stack walking interface and has arch_stack_walk_reliable() function. Update the description accordingly. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200120154042.9934-1-mbenes@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-03-06 14:28:45 +08:00
Architecture has either save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() or
arch_stack_walk_reliable() function which only returns a stack trace
if it can guarantee the trace is reliable.
stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that. Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either 'current' or inactive. save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception (e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers. It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as: - corrupted stack data - stack grows the wrong way - stack walk doesn't reach the bottom - user didn't provide a large enough entries array Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done(). Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can determine at build time whether the function is implemented. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the x86 changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 09:42:28 +08:00
<linux/hash.h>: Add support for architecture-specific functions This is just the infrastructure; there are no users yet. This is modelled on CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM; a CONFIG_ symbol declares the existence of <asm/hash.h>. That file may define its own versions of various functions, and define HAVE_* symbols (no CONFIG_ prefix!) to suppress the generic ones. Included is a self-test (in lib/test_hash.c) that verifies the basics. It is NOT in general required that the arch-specific functions compute the same thing as the generic, but if a HAVE_* symbol is defined with the value 1, then equality is tested. Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macq.eu> Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org Cc: Alistair Francis <alistai@xilinx.com> Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp
2016-05-27 10:11:51 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_HASH
bool
default n
help
If this is set, the architecture provides an <asm/hash.h>
file which provides platform-specific implementations of some
functions in <linux/hash.h> or fs/namei.c.
m68k/atari: Implement arch_nvram_ops methods and enable CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_NVRAM_OPS Atari RTC NVRAM uses a checksum so implement the remaining arch_nvram_ops methods for the set_checksum and initialize ioctls. Enable CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_NVRAM_OPS. Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-15 12:18:56 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_NVRAM_OPS
bool
isa: Allow ISA-style drivers on modern systems Several modern devices, such as PC/104 cards, are expected to run on modern systems via an ISA bus interface. Since ISA is a legacy interface for most modern architectures, ISA support should remain disabled in general. Support for ISA-style drivers should be enabled on a per driver basis. To allow ISA-style drivers on modern systems, this patch introduces the ISA_BUS_API and ISA_BUS Kconfig options. The ISA bus driver will now build conditionally on the ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option, which defaults to the legacy ISA Kconfig option. The ISA_BUS Kconfig option allows the ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option to be selected on architectures which do not enable ISA (e.g. X86_64). The ISA_BUS Kconfig option is currently only implemented for X86 architectures. Other architectures may have their own ISA_BUS Kconfig options added as required. Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-05-28 06:08:27 +08:00
config ISA_BUS_API
def_bool ISA
generic sys_fork / sys_vfork / sys_clone ... and get rid of idiotic struct pt_regs * in asm-generic/syscalls.h prototypes of the same, while we are at it. Eventually we want those in linux/syscalls.h, of course, but that'll have to wait a bit. Note that there are *three* variants of sys_clone() order of arguments. Braindamage galore... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-24 01:17:59 +08:00
#
# ABI hall of shame
#
config CLONE_BACKWARDS
bool
help
Architecture has tls passed as the 4th argument of clone(2),
not the 5th one.
config CLONE_BACKWARDS2
bool
help
Architecture has the first two arguments of clone(2) swapped.
microblaze: fix clone syscall Fix inadvertent breakage in the clone syscall ABI for Microblaze that was introduced in commit f3268edbe6fe ("microblaze: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone"). The Microblaze syscall ABI for clone takes the parent tid address in the 4th argument; the third argument slot is used for the stack size. The incorrectly-used CLONE_BACKWARDS type assigned parent tid to the 3rd slot. This commit restores the original ABI so that existing userspace libc code will work correctly. All kernel versions from v3.8-rc1 were affected. Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-08-14 07:00:53 +08:00
config CLONE_BACKWARDS3
bool
help
Architecture has tls passed as the 3rd argument of clone(2),
not the 5th one.
sanitize rt_sigaction() situation a bit Switch from __ARCH_WANT_SYS_RT_SIGACTION to opposite (!CONFIG_ODD_RT_SIGACTION); the only two architectures that need it are alpha and sparc. The reason for use of CONFIG_... instead of __ARCH_... is that it's needed only kernel-side and doing it that way avoids a mess with include order on many architectures. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-11-26 12:12:10 +08:00
config ODD_RT_SIGACTION
bool
help
Architecture has unusual rt_sigaction(2) arguments
old sigsuspend variants in kernel/signal.c conditional on OLD_SIGSUSPEND/OLD_SIGSUSPEND3, depending on which variety of that fossil is needed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-26 05:04:12 +08:00
config OLD_SIGSUSPEND
bool
help
Architecture has old sigsuspend(2) syscall, of one-argument variety
config OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
bool
help
Even weirder antique ABI - three-argument sigsuspend(2)
generic sys_sigaction() and compat_sys_sigaction() conditional on OLD_SIGACTION/COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-26 08:09:45 +08:00
config OLD_SIGACTION
bool
help
Architecture has old sigaction(2) syscall. Nope, not the same
as OLD_SIGSUSPEND | OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 - alpha has sigsuspend(2),
but fairly different variant of sigaction(2), thanks to OSF/1
compatibility...
config COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION
bool
time: Introduce CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME Compat functions are now used to support 32 bit time_t in compat mode on 64 bit architectures and in native mode on 32 bit architectures. Introduce COMPAT_32BIT_TIME to conditionally compile these functions. Note that turning off 32 bit time_t support requires more changes on architecture side. For instance, architecure syscall tables need to be updated to drop support for 32 bit time_t syscalls. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-03-14 12:03:28 +08:00
config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls At the moment, the compilation of the old time32 system calls depends purely on the architecture. As systems with new libc based on 64-bit time_t are getting deployed, even architectures that previously supported these (notably x86-32 and arm32 but also many others) no longer depend on them, and removing them from a kernel image results in a smaller kernel binary, the same way we can leave out many other optional system calls. More importantly, on an embedded system that needs to keep working beyond year 2038, any user space program calling these system calls is likely a bug, so removing them from the kernel image does provide an extra debugging help for finding broken applications. I've gone back and forth on hiding this option unless CONFIG_EXPERT is set. This version leaves it visible based on the logic that eventually it will be turned off indefinitely. Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-07-15 17:46:10 +08:00
bool "Provide system calls for 32-bit time_t"
default !64BIT || COMPAT
time: Introduce CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME Compat functions are now used to support 32 bit time_t in compat mode on 64 bit architectures and in native mode on 32 bit architectures. Introduce COMPAT_32BIT_TIME to conditionally compile these functions. Note that turning off 32 bit time_t support requires more changes on architecture side. For instance, architecure syscall tables need to be updated to drop support for 32 bit time_t syscalls. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-03-14 12:03:28 +08:00
help
This enables 32 bit time_t support in addition to 64 bit time_t support.
This is relevant on all 32-bit architectures, and 64-bit architectures
as part of compat syscall handling.
kconfig: include kernel/Kconfig.preempt from init/Kconfig Almost all architectures include it. Add a ARCH_NO_PREEMPT symbol to disable preempt support for alpha, hexagon, non-coldfire m68k and user mode Linux. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2018-07-31 19:39:32 +08:00
config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
bool
sched/rt, Kconfig: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT Add a new entry to the preemption menu which enables the real-time support for the kernel. The choice is only enabled when an architecture supports it. It selects PREEMPT as the RT features depend on it. To achieve that the existing PREEMPT choice is renamed to PREEMPT_LL which select PREEMPT as well. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Acked-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi@monom.org> Acked-by: Luis Claudio R. Goncalves <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Acked-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com> Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com> Acked-by: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1907172200190.1778@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-07-18 04:01:49 +08:00
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT
bool
lib/GCD.c: use binary GCD algorithm instead of Euclidean The binary GCD algorithm is based on the following facts: 1. If a and b are all evens, then gcd(a,b) = 2 * gcd(a/2, b/2) 2. If a is even and b is odd, then gcd(a,b) = gcd(a/2, b) 3. If a and b are all odds, then gcd(a,b) = gcd((a-b)/2, b) = gcd((a+b)/2, b) Even on x86 machines with reasonable division hardware, the binary algorithm runs about 25% faster (80% the execution time) than the division-based Euclidian algorithm. On platforms like Alpha and ARMv6 where division is a function call to emulation code, it's even more significant. There are two variants of the code here, depending on whether a fast __ffs (find least significant set bit) instruction is available. This allows the unpredictable branches in the bit-at-a-time shifting loop to be eliminated. If fast __ffs is not available, the "even/odd" GCD variant is used. I use the following code to benchmark: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <string.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #define swap(a, b) \ do { \ a ^= b; \ b ^= a; \ a ^= b; \ } while (0) unsigned long gcd0(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) { unsigned long r; if (a < b) { swap(a, b); } if (b == 0) return a; while ((r = a % b) != 0) { a = b; b = r; } return b; } unsigned long gcd1(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) { unsigned long r = a | b; if (!a || !b) return r; b >>= __builtin_ctzl(b); for (;;) { a >>= __builtin_ctzl(a); if (a == b) return a << __builtin_ctzl(r); if (a < b) swap(a, b); a -= b; } } unsigned long gcd2(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) { unsigned long r = a | b; if (!a || !b) return r; r &= -r; while (!(b & r)) b >>= 1; for (;;) { while (!(a & r)) a >>= 1; if (a == b) return a; if (a < b) swap(a, b); a -= b; a >>= 1; if (a & r) a += b; a >>= 1; } } unsigned long gcd3(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) { unsigned long r = a | b; if (!a || !b) return r; b >>= __builtin_ctzl(b); if (b == 1) return r & -r; for (;;) { a >>= __builtin_ctzl(a); if (a == 1) return r & -r; if (a == b) return a << __builtin_ctzl(r); if (a < b) swap(a, b); a -= b; } } unsigned long gcd4(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) { unsigned long r = a | b; if (!a || !b) return r; r &= -r; while (!(b & r)) b >>= 1; if (b == r) return r; for (;;) { while (!(a & r)) a >>= 1; if (a == r) return r; if (a == b) return a; if (a < b) swap(a, b); a -= b; a >>= 1; if (a & r) a += b; a >>= 1; } } static unsigned long (*gcd_func[])(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) = { gcd0, gcd1, gcd2, gcd3, gcd4, }; #define TEST_ENTRIES (sizeof(gcd_func) / sizeof(gcd_func[0])) #if defined(__x86_64__) #define rdtscll(val) do { \ unsigned long __a,__d; \ __asm__ __volatile__("rdtsc" : "=a" (__a), "=d" (__d)); \ (val) = ((unsigned long long)__a) | (((unsigned long long)__d)<<32); \ } while(0) static unsigned long long benchmark_gcd_func(unsigned long (*gcd)(unsigned long, unsigned long), unsigned long a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *res) { unsigned long long start, end; unsigned long long ret; unsigned long gcd_res; rdtscll(start); gcd_res = gcd(a, b); rdtscll(end); if (end >= start) ret = end - start; else ret = ~0ULL - start + 1 + end; *res = gcd_res; return ret; } #else static inline struct timespec read_time(void) { struct timespec time; clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, &time); return time; } static inline unsigned long long diff_time(struct timespec start, struct timespec end) { struct timespec temp; if ((end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec) < 0) { temp.tv_sec = end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec - 1; temp.tv_nsec = 1000000000ULL + end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec; } else { temp.tv_sec = end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec; temp.tv_nsec = end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec; } return temp.tv_sec * 1000000000ULL + temp.tv_nsec; } static unsigned long long benchmark_gcd_func(unsigned long (*gcd)(unsigned long, unsigned long), unsigned long a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *res) { struct timespec start, end; unsigned long gcd_res; start = read_time(); gcd_res = gcd(a, b); end = read_time(); *res = gcd_res; return diff_time(start, end); } #endif static inline unsigned long get_rand() { if (sizeof(long) == 8) return (unsigned long)rand() << 32 | rand(); else return rand(); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned int seed = time(0); int loops = 100; int repeats = 1000; unsigned long (*res)[TEST_ENTRIES]; unsigned long long elapsed[TEST_ENTRIES]; int i, j, k; for (;;) { int opt = getopt(argc, argv, "n:r:s:"); /* End condition always first */ if (opt == -1) break; switch (opt) { case 'n': loops = atoi(optarg); break; case 'r': repeats = atoi(optarg); break; case 's': seed = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); break; default: /* You won't actually get here. */ break; } } res = malloc(sizeof(unsigned long) * TEST_ENTRIES * loops); memset(elapsed, 0, sizeof(elapsed)); srand(seed); for (j = 0; j < loops; j++) { unsigned long a = get_rand(); /* Do we have args? */ unsigned long b = argc > optind ? strtoul(argv[optind], NULL, 10) : get_rand(); unsigned long long min_elapsed[TEST_ENTRIES]; for (k = 0; k < repeats; k++) { for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) { unsigned long long tmp = benchmark_gcd_func(gcd_func[i], a, b, &res[j][i]); if (k == 0 || min_elapsed[i] > tmp) min_elapsed[i] = tmp; } } for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) elapsed[i] += min_elapsed[i]; } for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) printf("gcd%d: elapsed %llu\n", i, elapsed[i]); k = 0; srand(seed); for (j = 0; j < loops; j++) { unsigned long a = get_rand(); unsigned long b = argc > optind ? strtoul(argv[optind], NULL, 10) : get_rand(); for (i = 1; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) { if (res[j][i] != res[j][0]) break; } if (i < TEST_ENTRIES) { if (k == 0) { k = 1; fprintf(stderr, "Error:\n"); } fprintf(stderr, "gcd(%lu, %lu): ", a, b); for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%ld%s", res[j][i], i < TEST_ENTRIES - 1 ? ", " : "\n"); } } if (k == 0) fprintf(stderr, "PASS\n"); free(res); return 0; } Compiled with "-O2", on "VirtualBox 4.4.0-22-generic #38-Ubuntu x86_64" got: zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10 gcd0: elapsed 10174 gcd1: elapsed 2120 gcd2: elapsed 2902 gcd3: elapsed 2039 gcd4: elapsed 2812 PASS zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10 gcd0: elapsed 9309 gcd1: elapsed 2280 gcd2: elapsed 2822 gcd3: elapsed 2217 gcd4: elapsed 2710 PASS zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10 gcd0: elapsed 9589 gcd1: elapsed 2098 gcd2: elapsed 2815 gcd3: elapsed 2030 gcd4: elapsed 2718 PASS zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10 gcd0: elapsed 9914 gcd1: elapsed 2309 gcd2: elapsed 2779 gcd3: elapsed 2228 gcd4: elapsed 2709 PASS [akpm@linux-foundation.org: avoid #defining a CONFIG_ variable] Signed-off-by: Zhaoxiu Zeng <zhaoxiu.zeng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 08:03:57 +08:00
config CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS
def_bool n
fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y is selected, kernel stacks are allocated with __vmalloc_node_range(). Grsecurity has had a similar feature (called GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW=y) for a long time. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/14c07d4fd173a5b117f51e8b939f9f4323e39899.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org [ Minor edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-11 17:35:21 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
def_bool n
help
An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stacks
in vmalloc space. This means:
- vmalloc space must be large enough to hold many kernel stacks.
This may rule out many 32-bit architectures.
- Stacks in vmalloc space need to work reliably. For example, if
vmap page tables are created on demand, either this mechanism
needs to work while the stack points to a virtual address with
unpopulated page tables or arch code (switch_to() and switch_mm(),
most likely) needs to ensure that the stack's page table entries
are populated before running on a possibly unpopulated stack.
- If the stack overflows into a guard page, something reasonable
should happen. The definition of "reasonable" is flexible, but
instantly rebooting without logging anything would be unfriendly.
config VMAP_STACK
default y
bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
fork: support VMAP_STACK with KASAN_VMALLOC Supporting VMAP_STACK with KASAN_VMALLOC is straightforward: - clear the shadow region of vmapped stacks when swapping them in - tweak Kconfig to allow VMAP_STACK to be turned on with KASAN Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-4-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 09:54:57 +08:00
depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with VMAP_STACK as is. Change VMAP_STACK definition accordingly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ecdb2a1658ebd88eb276dee2493518ac0e82de41.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I3552cbc12321dec82cd7372676e9372a2eb452ac Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-23 04:02:45 +08:00
depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOC
treewide: replace '---help---' in Kconfig files with 'help' Since commit 84af7a6194e4 ("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'"), the number of '---help---' has been gradually decreasing, but there are still more than 2400 instances. This commit finishes the conversion. While I touched the lines, I also fixed the indentation. There are a variety of indentation styles found. a) 4 spaces + '---help---' b) 7 spaces + '---help---' c) 8 spaces + '---help---' d) 1 space + 1 tab + '---help---' e) 1 tab + '---help---' (correct indentation) f) 1 tab + 1 space + '---help---' g) 1 tab + 2 spaces + '---help---' In order to convert all of them to 1 tab + 'help', I ran the following commend: $ find . -name 'Kconfig*' | xargs sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*---help---/\thelp/' Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2020-06-14 00:50:22 +08:00
help
fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y is selected, kernel stacks are allocated with __vmalloc_node_range(). Grsecurity has had a similar feature (called GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW=y) for a long time. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/14c07d4fd173a5b117f51e8b939f9f4323e39899.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org [ Minor edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-11 17:35:21 +08:00
Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
with guard pages. This causes kernel stack overflows to be
caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose
corruption.
kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with VMAP_STACK as is. Change VMAP_STACK definition accordingly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ecdb2a1658ebd88eb276dee2493518ac0e82de41.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I3552cbc12321dec82cd7372676e9372a2eb452ac Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-23 04:02:45 +08:00
To use this with software KASAN modes, the architecture must support
backing virtual mappings with real shadow memory, and KASAN_VMALLOC
must be enabled.
fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y is selected, kernel stacks are allocated with __vmalloc_node_range(). Grsecurity has had a similar feature (called GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW=y) for a long time. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/14c07d4fd173a5b117f51e8b939f9f4323e39899.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org [ Minor edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-11 17:35:21 +08:00
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT. This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below). Reasoning for the feature: This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in past (just to name few): https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving (vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info, STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls: https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf (page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow) https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html (leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall) The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible. Design description: During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack", which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size, and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called, with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request. The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay explicitly tied to a single task. As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca() and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler. In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be left turned off with no performance impact. The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this: ... ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax # 12380 <kstack_offset> ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax ... As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about 5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how much of the stack space we wish to trade for security. My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64): lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default. There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First, compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection) enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain (unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe from Stack Clash style attacks. The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with -fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation, which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of -fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be used to disable stack protector for specific functions. Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature: The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start (cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable, rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though obviously the intent is similar. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ [3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
2021-04-02 07:23:44 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
def_bool n
help
An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stack
offset randomization with calls to add_random_kstack_offset()
during syscall entry and choose_random_kstack_offset() during
syscall exit. Careful removal of -fstack-protector-strong and
-fstack-protector should also be applied to the entry code and
closely examined, as the artificial stack bump looks like an array
to the compiler, so it will attempt to add canary checks regardless
of the static branch state.
stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET The randomize_kstack_offset feature is unconditionally compiled in when the architecture supports it. To add constraints on compiler versions, we require a dedicated Kconfig variable. Therefore, introduce RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET. Furthermore, this option is now also configurable by EXPERT kernels: while the feature is supposed to have zero performance overhead when disabled, due to its use of static branches, there are few cases where giving a distribution the option to disable the feature entirely makes sense. For example, in very resource constrained environments, which would never enable the feature to begin with, in which case the additional kernel code size increase would be redundant. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131090521.1947110-1-elver@google.com
2022-01-31 17:05:20 +08:00
config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EXPERT
default y
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT. This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below). Reasoning for the feature: This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in past (just to name few): https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving (vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info, STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls: https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf (page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow) https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html (leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall) The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible. Design description: During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack", which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size, and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called, with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request. The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay explicitly tied to a single task. As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca() and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler. In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be left turned off with no performance impact. The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this: ... ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax # 12380 <kstack_offset> ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax ... As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about 5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how much of the stack space we wish to trade for security. My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64): lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default. There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First, compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection) enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain (unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe from Stack Clash style attacks. The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with -fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation, which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of -fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be used to disable stack protector for specific functions. Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature: The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start (cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable, rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though obviously the intent is similar. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ [3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
2021-04-02 07:23:44 +08:00
depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
stack: Constrain and fix stack offset randomization with Clang builds All supported versions of Clang perform auto-init of __builtin_alloca() when stack auto-init is on (CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_{ZERO,PATTERN}). add_random_kstack_offset() uses __builtin_alloca() to add a stack offset. This means, when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_{ZERO,PATTERN} is enabled, add_random_kstack_offset() will auto-init that unused portion of the stack used to add an offset. There are several problems with this: 1. These offsets can be as large as 1023 bytes. Performing memset() on them isn't exactly cheap, and this is done on every syscall entry. 2. Architectures adding add_random_kstack_offset() to syscall entry implemented in C require them to be 'noinstr' (e.g. see x86 and s390). The potential problem here is that a call to memset may occur, which is not noinstr. A x86_64 defconfig kernel with Clang 11 and CONFIG_VMLINUX_VALIDATION shows: | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_syscall_64()+0x9d: call to memset() leaves .noinstr.text section | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_int80_syscall_32()+0xab: call to memset() leaves .noinstr.text section | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __do_fast_syscall_32()+0xe2: call to memset() leaves .noinstr.text section | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: fixup_bad_iret()+0x2f: call to memset() leaves .noinstr.text section Clang 14 (unreleased) will introduce a way to skip alloca initialization via __builtin_alloca_uninitialized() (https://reviews.llvm.org/D115440). Constrain RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET to only be enabled if no stack auto-init is enabled, the compiler is GCC, or Clang is version 14+. Use __builtin_alloca_uninitialized() if the compiler provides it, as is done by Clang 14. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YbHTKUjEejZCLyhX@elver.google.com Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall") Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131090521.1947110-2-elver@google.com
2022-01-31 17:05:21 +08:00
depends on INIT_STACK_NONE || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT. This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below). Reasoning for the feature: This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in past (just to name few): https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving (vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info, STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls: https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf (page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow) https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html (leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall) The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible. Design description: During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack", which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size, and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called, with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request. The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay explicitly tied to a single task. As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca() and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler. In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be left turned off with no performance impact. The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this: ... ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax # 12380 <kstack_offset> ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax ... As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about 5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how much of the stack space we wish to trade for security. My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64): lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default. There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First, compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection) enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain (unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe from Stack Clash style attacks. The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with -fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation, which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of -fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be used to disable stack protector for specific functions. Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature: The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start (cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable, rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though obviously the intent is similar. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ [3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
2021-04-02 07:23:44 +08:00
help
The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by
roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption
attacks that depend on stack address determinism or
stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET The randomize_kstack_offset feature is unconditionally compiled in when the architecture supports it. To add constraints on compiler versions, we require a dedicated Kconfig variable. Therefore, introduce RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET. Furthermore, this option is now also configurable by EXPERT kernels: while the feature is supposed to have zero performance overhead when disabled, due to its use of static branches, there are few cases where giving a distribution the option to disable the feature entirely makes sense. For example, in very resource constrained environments, which would never enable the feature to begin with, in which case the additional kernel code size increase would be redundant. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131090521.1947110-1-elver@google.com
2022-01-31 17:05:20 +08:00
cross-syscall address exposures.
The feature is controlled via the "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off"
kernel boot param, and if turned off has zero overhead due to its use
of static branches (see JUMP_LABEL).
If unsure, say Y.
config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
bool "Default state of kernel stack offset randomization"
depends on RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
help
Kernel stack offset randomization is controlled by kernel boot param
"randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this config chooses the default
boot state.
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT. This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below). Reasoning for the feature: This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in past (just to name few): https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving (vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info, STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls: https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf (page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow) https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html (leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall) The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible. Design description: During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack", which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size, and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called, with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request. The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay explicitly tied to a single task. As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca() and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler. In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be left turned off with no performance impact. The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this: ... ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax # 12380 <kstack_offset> ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax ... As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about 5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how much of the stack space we wish to trade for security. My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64): lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default. There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First, compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection) enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain (unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe from Stack Clash style attacks. The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with -fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation, which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of -fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be used to disable stack protector for specific functions. Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature: The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start (cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable, rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though obviously the intent is similar. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ [3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
2021-04-02 07:23:44 +08:00
arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those arches. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 08:31:57 +08:00
config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
def_bool n
config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
def_bool n
config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
def_bool n
arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only. Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 08:31:58 +08:00
config STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those arches. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 08:31:57 +08:00
bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
help
If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap
or modifying text)
These features are considered standard security practice these days.
You should say Y here in almost all cases.
config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
def_bool n
arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only. Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 08:31:58 +08:00
config STRICT_MODULE_RWX
arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those arches. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 08:31:57 +08:00
bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && MODULES
default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
help
If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text)
dma-mapping: move swiotlb arch helpers to a new header phys_to_dma, dma_to_phys and dma_capable are helpers published by architecture code for use of swiotlb and xen-swiotlb only. Drivers are not supposed to use these directly, but use the DMA API instead. Move these to a new asm/dma-direct.h helper, included by a linux/dma-direct.h wrapper that provides the default linear mapping unless the architecture wants to override it. In the MIPS case the existing dma-coherent.h is reused for now as untangling it will take a bit of work. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
2018-01-10 23:21:13 +08:00
# select if the architecture provides an asm/dma-direct.h header
config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA
bool
compiler.h: Allow arch-specific asm/compiler.h We have a need to override the definition of barrier_before_unreachable() for MIPS, which means we either need to add architecture-specific code into linux/compiler-gcc.h or we need to allow the architecture to provide a header that can define the macro before the generic definition. The latter seems like the better approach. A straightforward approach to the per-arch header is to make use of asm-generic to provide a default empty header & adjust architectures which don't need anything specific to make use of that by adding the header to generic-y. Unfortunately this doesn't work so well due to commit 28128c61e08e ("kconfig.h: Include compiler types to avoid missed struct attributes") which caused linux/compiler_types.h to be included in the compilation of every C file via the -include linux/kconfig.h flag in c_flags. Because the -include flag is present for all C files we compile, we need the architecture-provided header to be present before any C files are compiled. If any C files can be compiled prior to the asm-generic header wrappers being generated then we hit a build failure due to missing header. Such cases do exist - one pointed out by the kbuild test robot is the compilation of arch/ia64/kernel/nr-irqs.c, which occurs as part of the archprepare target [1]. This leaves us with a few options: 1) Use generic-y & fix any build failures we find by enforcing ordering such that the asm-generic target occurs before any C compilation, such that linux/compiler_types.h can always include the generated asm-generic wrapper which in turn includes the empty asm-generic header. This would rely on us finding all the problematic cases - I don't know for sure that the ia64 issue is the only one. 2) Add an actual empty header to each architecture, so that we don't need the generated asm-generic wrapper. This seems messy. 3) Give up & add #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS or similar to linux/compiler_types.h. This seems messy too. 4) Include the arch header only when it's actually needed, removing the need for the asm-generic wrapper for all other architectures. This patch allows us to use approach 4, by including an asm/compiler.h header from linux/compiler_types.h after the inclusion of the compiler-specific linux/compiler-*.h header(s). We do this conditionally, only when CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H is selected, in order to avoid the need for asm-generic wrappers & the associated build ordering issue described above. The asm/compiler.h header is included after the generic linux/compiler-*.h header(s) for consistency with the way linux/compiler-intel.h & linux/compiler-clang.h are included after the linux/compiler-gcc.h header that they override. [1] https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all/2018-August/051175.html Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/20269/ Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
2018-08-21 06:36:17 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H
bool
help
An architecture can select this if it provides an
asm/compiler.h header that should be included after
linux/compiler-*.h in order to override macro definitions that those
headers generally provide.
arch: enable relative relocations for arm64, power and x86 Patch series "add support for relative references in special sections", v10. This adds support for emitting special sections such as initcall arrays, PCI fixups and tracepoints as relative references rather than absolute references. This reduces the size by 50% on 64-bit architectures, but more importantly, it removes the need for carrying relocation metadata for these sections in relocatable kernels (e.g., for KASLR) that needs to be fixed up at boot time. On arm64, this reduces the vmlinux footprint of such a reference by 8x (8 byte absolute reference + 24 byte RELA entry vs 4 byte relative reference) Patch #3 was sent out before as a single patch. This series supersedes the previous submission. This version makes relative ksymtab entries dependent on the new Kconfig symbol HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS rather than trying to infer from kbuild test robot replies for which architectures it should be blacklisted. Patch #1 introduces the new Kconfig symbol HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS, and sets it for the main architectures that are expected to benefit the most from this feature, i.e., 64-bit architectures or ones that use runtime relocations. Patch #2 add support for #define'ing __DISABLE_EXPORTS to get rid of ksymtab/kcrctab sections in decompressor and EFI stub objects when rebuilding existing C files to run in a different context. Patches #4 - #6 implement relative references for initcalls, PCI fixups and tracepoints, respectively, all of which produce sections with order ~1000 entries on an arm64 defconfig kernel with tracing enabled. This means we save about 28 KB of vmlinux space for each of these patches. [From the v7 series blurb, which included the jump_label patches as well]: For the arm64 kernel, all patches combined reduce the memory footprint of vmlinux by about 1.3 MB (using a config copied from Ubuntu that has KASLR enabled), of which ~1 MB is the size reduction of the RELA section in .init, and the remaining 300 KB is reduction of .text/.data. This patch (of 6): Before updating certain subsystems to use place relative 32-bit relocations in special sections, to save space and reduce the number of absolute relocations that need to be processed at runtime by relocatable kernels, introduce the Kconfig symbol and define it for some architectures that should be able to support and benefit from it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180704083651.24360-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>, Cc: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-22 12:56:00 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
bool
help
May be selected by an architecture if it supports place-relative
32-bit relocations, both in the toolchain and in the module loader,
in which case relative references can be used in special sections
for PCI fixup, initcalls etc which are only half the size on 64 bit
architectures, and don't require runtime relocation on relocatable
kernels.
x86: Make ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT a generic Kconfig symbol Turn ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT into a generic Kconfig symbol, and fix the dependency expression to reflect that AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT depends on it, instead of the other way around. This will permit ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT to be selected by other architectures. Note that the encryption related early memremap routines in arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c cannot be built for 32-bit x86 without triggering the following warning: arch/x86//mm/ioremap.c: In function 'early_memremap_encrypted': >> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h:193:27: warning: conversion from 'long long unsigned int' to 'long unsigned int' changes value from '9223372036854776163' to '355' [-Woverflow] #define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86//mm/ioremap.c:713:46: note: in expansion of macro '__PAGE_KERNEL_ENC' return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC); which essentially means they are 64-bit only anyway. However, we cannot make them dependent on CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT, since that is always defined, even for i386 (and changing that results in a slew of build errors) So instead, build those routines only if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is defined. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190202094119.13230-9-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-02-02 17:41:17 +08:00
config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
bool
locking/lock_events: Make lock_events available for all archs & other locks The QUEUED_LOCK_STAT option to report queued spinlocks event counts was previously allowed only on x86 architecture. To make the locking event counting code more useful, it is now renamed to a more generic LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS config option. This new option will be available to all the architectures that use qspinlock at the moment. Other locking code can now start to use the generic locking event counting code by including lock_events.h and put the new locking event names into the lock_events_list.h header file. My experience with lock event counting is that it gives valuable insight on how the locking code works and what can be done to make it better. I would like to extend this benefit to other locking code like mutex and rwsem in the near future. The PV qspinlock specific code will stay in qspinlock_stat.h. The locking event counters will now reside in the <debugfs>/lock_event_counts directory. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404174320.22416-9-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-05 01:43:17 +08:00
config LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS
bool "Locking event counts collection"
depends on DEBUG_FS
treewide: replace '---help---' in Kconfig files with 'help' Since commit 84af7a6194e4 ("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'"), the number of '---help---' has been gradually decreasing, but there are still more than 2400 instances. This commit finishes the conversion. While I touched the lines, I also fixed the indentation. There are a variety of indentation styles found. a) 4 spaces + '---help---' b) 7 spaces + '---help---' c) 8 spaces + '---help---' d) 1 space + 1 tab + '---help---' e) 1 tab + '---help---' (correct indentation) f) 1 tab + 1 space + '---help---' g) 1 tab + 2 spaces + '---help---' In order to convert all of them to 1 tab + 'help', I ran the following commend: $ find . -name 'Kconfig*' | xargs sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*---help---/\thelp/' Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2020-06-14 00:50:22 +08:00
help
locking/lock_events: Make lock_events available for all archs & other locks The QUEUED_LOCK_STAT option to report queued spinlocks event counts was previously allowed only on x86 architecture. To make the locking event counting code more useful, it is now renamed to a more generic LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS config option. This new option will be available to all the architectures that use qspinlock at the moment. Other locking code can now start to use the generic locking event counting code by including lock_events.h and put the new locking event names into the lock_events_list.h header file. My experience with lock event counting is that it gives valuable insight on how the locking code works and what can be done to make it better. I would like to extend this benefit to other locking code like mutex and rwsem in the near future. The PV qspinlock specific code will stay in qspinlock_stat.h. The locking event counters will now reside in the <debugfs>/lock_event_counts directory. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404174320.22416-9-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-05 01:43:17 +08:00
Enable light-weight counting of various locking related events
in the system with minimal performance impact. This reduces
the chance of application behavior change because of timing
differences. The counts are reported via debugfs.
arm64: Add support for relocating the kernel with RELR relocations RELR is a relocation packing format for relative relocations. The format is described in a generic-abi proposal: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/generic-abi/bX460iggiKg/discussion The LLD linker can be instructed to pack relocations in the RELR format by passing the flag --pack-dyn-relocs=relr. This patch adds a new config option, CONFIG_RELR. Enabling this option instructs the linker to pack vmlinux's relative relocations in the RELR format, and causes the kernel to apply the relocations at startup along with the RELA relocations. RELA relocations still need to be applied because the linker will emit RELA relative relocations if they are unrepresentable in the RELR format (i.e. address not a multiple of 2). Enabling CONFIG_RELR reduces the size of a defconfig kernel image with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE by 3.5MB/16% uncompressed, or 550KB/5% compressed (lz4). Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2019-08-01 09:18:42 +08:00
# Select if the architecture has support for applying RELR relocations.
config ARCH_HAS_RELR
bool
config RELR
bool "Use RELR relocation packing"
depends on ARCH_HAS_RELR && TOOLS_SUPPORT_RELR
default y
help
Store the kernel's dynamic relocations in the RELR relocation packing
format. Requires a compatible linker (LLD supports this feature), as
well as compatible NM and OBJCOPY utilities (llvm-nm and llvm-objcopy
are compatible).
x86, s390: Move ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT definition to arch/Kconfig powerpc is also going to use this feature, so put it in a generic location. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806044919.10622-2-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
2019-08-06 12:49:14 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
bool
arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features In preparation for other confidential computing technologies, introduce a generic helper function, cc_platform_has(), that can be used to check for specific active confidential computing attributes, like memory encryption. This is intended to eliminate having to add multiple technology-specific checks to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() || tdx_active() || ... ). [ bp: s/_CC_PLATFORM_H/_LINUX_CC_PLATFORM_H/g ] Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-3-bp@alien8.de
2021-09-09 06:58:33 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
bool
tracing: Use xarray for syscall trace events Currently, a lot of memory is wasted for architectures like MIPS when init_ftrace_syscalls() allocates the array for syscalls using kcalloc. This is because syscalls numbers start from 4000, 5000 or 6000 and array elements up to that point are unused. Fix this by using a data structure more suited to storing sparsely populated arrays. The XARRAY data structure, implemented using radix trees, is much more memory efficient for storing the syscalls in question. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115234314.21599-1-hnaveed@wavecomp.com Signed-off-by: Hassan Naveed <hnaveed@wavecomp.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-11-16 07:44:42 +08:00
config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
bool
help
An architecture should select this if its syscall numbering is sparse
tracing: Use xarray for syscall trace events Currently, a lot of memory is wasted for architectures like MIPS when init_ftrace_syscalls() allocates the array for syscalls using kcalloc. This is because syscalls numbers start from 4000, 5000 or 6000 and array elements up to that point are unused. Fix this by using a data structure more suited to storing sparsely populated arrays. The XARRAY data structure, implemented using radix trees, is much more memory efficient for storing the syscalls in question. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115234314.21599-1-hnaveed@wavecomp.com Signed-off-by: Hassan Naveed <hnaveed@wavecomp.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-11-16 07:44:42 +08:00
to save space. For example, MIPS architecture has a syscall array with
entries at 4000, 5000 and 6000 locations. This option turns on syscall
related optimizations for a given architecture.
lib/vdso: Allow to add architecture-specific vdso data The initial assumption that all VDSO related data can be completely generic does not hold. S390 needs architecture specific storage to access the clock steering information. Add struct arch_vdso_data to the vdso data struct. For architectures which do not need extra data this defaults to an empty struct. Architectures which require it, enable CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA and provide their specific struct in asm/vdso/data.h. Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200804150124.41692-2-svens@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-04 23:01:22 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA
bool
static_call: Add basic static call infrastructure Static calls are a replacement for global function pointers. They use code patching to allow direct calls to be used instead of indirect calls. They give the flexibility of function pointers, but with improved performance. This is especially important for cases where retpolines would otherwise be used, as retpolines can significantly impact performance. The concept and code are an extension of previous work done by Ard Biesheuvel and Steven Rostedt: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005081333.15018-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181006015110.653946300@goodmis.org There are two implementations, depending on arch support: 1) out-of-line: patched trampolines (CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL) 2) basic function pointers For more details, see the comments in include/linux/static_call.h. [peterz: simplified interface] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200818135804.623259796@infradead.org
2020-08-18 21:57:41 +08:00
config HAVE_STATIC_CALL
bool
static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure Add infrastructure for an arch-specific CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE option, which is a faster version of CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL. At runtime, the static call sites are patched directly, rather than using the out-of-line trampolines. Compared to out-of-line static calls, the performance benefits are more modest, but still measurable. Steven Rostedt did some tracepoint measurements: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126155405.72b4f718@gandalf.local.home This code is heavily inspired by the jump label code (aka "static jumps"), as some of the concepts are very similar. For more details, see the comments in include/linux/static_call.h. [peterz: simplified interface; merged trampolines] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200818135804.684334440@infradead.org
2020-08-18 21:57:42 +08:00
config HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE
bool
depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
objtool: Add CONFIG_OBJTOOL Now that stack validation is an optional feature of objtool, add CONFIG_OBJTOOL and replace most usages of CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION with it. CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION can now be considered to be frame-pointer specific. CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC is already inherently valid for live patching, so no need to "validate" it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939bf3d85604b2a126412bf11af6e3bd3b872bcb.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2022-04-19 00:50:36 +08:00
select OBJTOOL
static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure Add infrastructure for an arch-specific CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE option, which is a faster version of CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL. At runtime, the static call sites are patched directly, rather than using the out-of-line trampolines. Compared to out-of-line static calls, the performance benefits are more modest, but still measurable. Steven Rostedt did some tracepoint measurements: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126155405.72b4f718@gandalf.local.home This code is heavily inspired by the jump label code (aka "static jumps"), as some of the concepts are very similar. For more details, see the comments in include/linux/static_call.h. [peterz: simplified interface; merged trampolines] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200818135804.684334440@infradead.org
2020-08-18 21:57:42 +08:00
preempt: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Preemption mode selection is currently hardcoded on Kconfig choices. Introduce a dedicated option to tune preemption flavour at boot time, This will be only available on architectures efficiently supporting static calls in order not to tempt with the feature against additional overhead that might be prohibitive or undesirable. CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is automatically selected by CONFIG_PREEMPT if the architecture provides the necessary support (CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY, and provide with __preempt_schedule_function() / __preempt_schedule_notrace_function()). Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> [peterz: relax requirement to HAVE_STATIC_CALL] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118141223.123667-5-frederic@kernel.org
2021-01-18 22:12:19 +08:00
config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
bool
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL
bool
preempt: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Preemption mode selection is currently hardcoded on Kconfig choices. Introduce a dedicated option to tune preemption flavour at boot time, This will be only available on architectures efficiently supporting static calls in order not to tempt with the feature against additional overhead that might be prohibitive or undesirable. CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is automatically selected by CONFIG_PREEMPT if the architecture provides the necessary support (CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY, and provide with __preempt_schedule_function() / __preempt_schedule_notrace_function()). Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> [peterz: relax requirement to HAVE_STATIC_CALL] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118141223.123667-5-frederic@kernel.org
2021-01-18 22:12:19 +08:00
depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
select HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
An architecture should select this if it can handle the preemption
model being selected at boot time using static calls.
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, any call to a
preemption function will be patched directly.
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
Where an architecture does not select HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, any
call to a preemption function will go through a trampoline, and the
trampoline will be patched.
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
It is strongly advised to support inline static call to avoid any
overhead.
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_KEY
bool
asm goto: eradicate CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO GCC has supported asm goto since 4.5, and Clang has since version 9.0.0. The minimum supported versions of these tools for the build according to Documentation/process/changes.rst are 5.1 and 11.0.0 respectively. Remove the feature detection script, Kconfig option, and clean up some fallback code that is no longer supported. The removed script was also testing for a GCC specific bug that was fixed in the 4.7 release. Also remove workarounds for bpftrace using clang older than 9.0.0, since other BPF backend fixes are required at this point. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK7LNATSr=BXKfkdW8f-H5VT_w=xBpT2ZQcZ7rm6JfkdE+QnmA@mail.gmail.com/ Link: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48637 Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-08-20 03:06:40 +08:00
depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
select HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
preempt: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Preemption mode selection is currently hardcoded on Kconfig choices. Introduce a dedicated option to tune preemption flavour at boot time, This will be only available on architectures efficiently supporting static calls in order not to tempt with the feature against additional overhead that might be prohibitive or undesirable. CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is automatically selected by CONFIG_PREEMPT if the architecture provides the necessary support (CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY, and provide with __preempt_schedule_function() / __preempt_schedule_notrace_function()). Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> [peterz: relax requirement to HAVE_STATIC_CALL] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118141223.123667-5-frederic@kernel.org
2021-01-18 22:12:19 +08:00
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
An architecture should select this if it can handle the preemption
model being selected at boot time using static keys.
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
Each preemption function will be given an early return based on a
static key. This should have slightly lower overhead than non-inline
static calls, as this effectively inlines each trampoline into the
start of its callee. This may avoid redundant work, and may
integrate better with CFI schemes.
sched/preempt: Add PREEMPT_DYNAMIC using static keys Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL but not HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, each static call has an out-of-line trampoline which will either branch to a callee or return to the caller. On such architectures, a number of constraints can conspire to make those trampolines more complicated and potentially less useful than we'd like. For example: * Hardware and software control flow integrity schemes can require the addition of "landing pad" instructions (e.g. `BTI` for arm64), which will also be present at the "real" callee. * Limited branch ranges can require that trampolines generate or load an address into a register and perform an indirect branch (or at least have a slow path that does so). This loses some of the benefits of having a direct branch. * Interaction with SW CFI schemes can be complicated and fragile, e.g. requiring that we can recognise idiomatic codegen and remove indirections understand, at least until clang proves more helpful mechanisms for dealing with this. For PREEMPT_DYNAMIC, we don't need the full power of static calls, as we really only need to enable/disable specific preemption functions. We can achieve the same effect without a number of the pain points above by using static keys to fold early returns into the preemption functions themselves rather than in an out-of-line trampoline, effectively inlining the trampoline into the start of the function. For arm64, this results in good code generation. For example, the dynamic_cond_resched() wrapper looks as follows when enabled. When disabled, the first `B` is replaced with a `NOP`, resulting in an early return. | <dynamic_cond_resched>: | bti c | b <dynamic_cond_resched+0x10> // or `nop` | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x0, [x0, #8] | cbnz x0, <dynamic_cond_resched+0x8> | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret ... compared to the regular form of the function: | <__cond_resched>: | bti c | mrs x0, sp_el0 | ldr x1, [x0, #8] | cbz x1, <__cond_resched+0x18> | mov w0, #0x0 | ret | paciasp | stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | mov x29, sp | bl <preempt_schedule_common> | mov w0, #0x1 | ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | autiasp | ret Any architecture which implements static keys should be able to use this to implement PREEMPT_DYNAMIC with similar cost to non-inlined static calls. Since this is likely to have greater overhead than (inlined) static calls, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is only defaulted to enabled when HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL is selected. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214165216.2231574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
2022-02-15 00:52:14 +08:00
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
This will have greater overhead than using inline static calls as
the call to the preemption function cannot be entirely elided.
preempt: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Preemption mode selection is currently hardcoded on Kconfig choices. Introduce a dedicated option to tune preemption flavour at boot time, This will be only available on architectures efficiently supporting static calls in order not to tempt with the feature against additional overhead that might be prohibitive or undesirable. CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is automatically selected by CONFIG_PREEMPT if the architecture provides the necessary support (CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY, and provide with __preempt_schedule_function() / __preempt_schedule_notrace_function()). Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> [peterz: relax requirement to HAVE_STATIC_CALL] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118141223.123667-5-frederic@kernel.org
2021-01-18 22:12:19 +08:00
kbuild: Hoist '--orphan-handling' into Kconfig Currently, '--orphan-handling=warn' is spread out across four different architectures in their respective Makefiles, which makes it a little unruly to deal with in case it needs to be disabled for a specific linker version (in this case, ld.lld 10.0.1). To make it easier to control this, hoist this warning into Kconfig and the main Makefile so that disabling it is simpler, as the warning will only be enabled in a couple places (main Makefile and a couple of compressed boot folders that blow away LDFLAGS_vmlinx) and making it conditional is easier due to Kconfig syntax. One small additional benefit of this is saving a call to ld-option on incremental builds because we will have already evaluated it for CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN. To keep the list of supported architectures the same, introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN, which an architecture can select to gain this automatically after all of the sections are specified and size asserted. A special thanks to Kees Cook for the help text on this config. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1187 Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2020-11-20 04:46:56 +08:00
config ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol once all linker sections are explicitly
included, size-asserted, or discarded in the linker scripts. This is
important because we never want expected sections to be placed heuristically
by the linker, since the locations of such sections can change between linker
versions.
arm, arm64: move free_unused_memmap() to generic mm ARM and ARM64 free unused parts of the memory map just before the initialization of the page allocator. To allow holes in the memory map both architectures overload pfn_valid() and define HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID. Allowing holes in the memory map for FLATMEM may be useful for small machines, such as ARC and m68k and will enable those architectures to cease using DISCONTIGMEM and still support more than one memory bank. Move the functions that free unused memory map to generic mm and enable them in case HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID=y. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201101170454.9567-10-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Cc: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:09:59 +08:00
config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
bool
arch, mm: restore dependency of __kernel_map_pages() on DEBUG_PAGEALLOC The design of DEBUG_PAGEALLOC presumes that __kernel_map_pages() must never fail. With this assumption is wouldn't be safe to allow general usage of this function. Moreover, some architectures that implement __kernel_map_pages() have this function guarded by #ifdef DEBUG_PAGEALLOC and some refuse to map/unmap pages when page allocation debugging is disabled at runtime. As all the users of __kernel_map_pages() were converted to use debug_pagealloc_map_pages() it is safe to make it available only when DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is set. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109192128.960-4-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 11:10:30 +08:00
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
bool
mm: page table check Check user page table entries at the time they are added and removed. Allows to synchronously catch memory corruption issues related to double mapping. When a pte for an anonymous page is added into page table, we verify that this pte does not already point to a file backed page, and vice versa if this is a file backed page that is being added we verify that this page does not have an anonymous mapping We also enforce that read-only sharing for anonymous pages is allowed (i.e. cow after fork). All other sharing must be for file pages. Page table check allows to protect and debug cases where "struct page" metadata became corrupted for some reason. For example, when refcnt or mapcount become invalid. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211221154650.1047963-4-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 06:06:37 +08:00
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK
bool
fanotify: Fix sys_fanotify_mark() on native x86-32 Commit 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments") converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs. sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that takes the split args for native 32-bit. [ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ] Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments") Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak <pawel@jasiak.xyz> Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com
2020-12-01 06:30:59 +08:00
config ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64
bool
help
arch/Kconfig: fix indentation The convention for indentation seems to be a single tab. Help text is further indented by an additional two whitespaces. Fix the lines that violate these rules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230201162435.218368-1-juerg.haefliger@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dan Li <ashimida@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 00:24:35 +08:00
If a 32-bit architecture requires 64-bit arguments to be split into
pairs of 32-bit arguments, select this option.
fanotify: Fix sys_fanotify_mark() on native x86-32 Commit 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments") converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs. sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that takes the split args for native 32-bit. [ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ] Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments") Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak <pawel@jasiak.xyz> Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com
2020-12-01 06:30:59 +08:00
[amd64] clean PRSTATUS_SIZE/SET_PR_FPVALID up properly To get rid of hardcoded size/offset in those macros we need to have a definition of i386 variant of struct elf_prstatus. However, we can't do that in asm/compat.h - the types needed for that are not there and adding an include of asm/user32.h into asm/compat.h would cause a lot of mess. That could be conveniently done in elfcore-compat.h, but currently there is nowhere to put arch-dependent parts of it - no asm/elfcore-compat.h. So we introduce a new file (asm/elfcore-compat.h, present on architectures that have CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELFCORE_COMPAT set, currently only on x86), have it pulled by linux/elfcore-compat.h and move the definitions there. As a side benefit, we don't need to worry about accidental inclusion of that file into binfmt_elf.c itself, so we don't need the dance with COMPAT_PRSTATUS_SIZE, etc. - only fs/compat_binfmt_elf.c will see that header. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-06-14 11:03:25 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_ELFCORE_COMPAT
bool
sched: Add task_work callback for paranoid L1D flush The upcoming paranoid L1D flush infrastructure allows to conditionally (opt-in) flush L1D in switch_mm() as a defense against potential new side channels or for paranoia reasons. As the flush makes only sense when a task runs on a non-SMT enabled core, because SMT siblings share L1, the switch_mm() logic will kill a task which is flagged for L1D flush when it is running on a SMT thread. Add a taskwork callback so switch_mm() can queue a SIG_KILL command which is invoked when the task tries to return to user space. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-1-sblbir@amazon.com
2021-04-27 03:59:11 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
bool
lib: Add register read/write tracing support Generic MMIO read/write i.e., __raw_{read,write}{b,l,w,q} accessors are typically used to read/write from/to memory mapped registers and can cause hangs or some undefined behaviour in following few cases, * If the access to the register space is unclocked, for example: if there is an access to multimedia(MM) block registers without MM clocks. * If the register space is protected and not set to be accessible from non-secure world, for example: only EL3 (EL: Exception level) access is allowed and any EL2/EL1 access is forbidden. * If xPU(memory/register protection units) is controlling access to certain memory/register space for specific clients. and more... Such cases usually results in instant reboot/SErrors/NOC or interconnect hangs and tracing these register accesses can be very helpful to debug such issues during initial development stages and also in later stages. So use ftrace trace events to log such MMIO register accesses which provides rich feature set such as early enablement of trace events, filtering capability, dumping ftrace logs on console and many more. Sample output: rwmmio_write: __qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x160/0x1e0 width=32 val=0xa0d5d addr=0xfffffbfffdbff700 rwmmio_post_write: __qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x160/0x1e0 width=32 val=0xa0d5d addr=0xfffffbfffdbff700 rwmmio_read: qcom_geni_serial_poll_bit+0x94/0x138 width=32 addr=0xfffffbfffdbff610 rwmmio_post_read: qcom_geni_serial_poll_bit+0x94/0x138 width=32 val=0x0 addr=0xfffffbfffdbff610 Co-developed-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <quic_saipraka@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <quic_saipraka@quicinc.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2022-05-19 00:44:14 +08:00
config ARCH_HAVE_TRACE_MMIO_ACCESS
bool
signal: Add an optional check for altstack size New x86 FPU features will be very large, requiring ~10k of stack in signal handlers. These new features require a new approach called "dynamic features". The kernel currently tries to ensure that altstacks are reasonably sized. Right now, on x86, sys_sigaltstack() requires a size of >=2k. However, that 2k is a constant. Simply raising that 2k requirement to >10k for the new features would break existing apps which have a compiled-in size of 2k. Instead of universally enforcing a larger stack, prohibit a process from using dynamic features without properly-sized altstacks. This must be enforced in two places: * A dynamic feature can not be enabled without an large-enough altstack for each process thread. * Once a dynamic feature is enabled, any request to install a too-small altstack will be rejected The dynamic feature enabling code must examine each thread in a process to ensure that the altstacks are large enough. Add a new lock (sigaltstack_lock()) to ensure that threads can not race and change their altstack after being examined. Add the infrastructure in form of a config option and provide empty stubs for architectures which do not need dynamic altstack size checks. This implementation will be fleshed out for x86 in a future patch called x86/arch_prctl: Add controls for dynamic XSTATE components [dhansen: commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021225527.10184-2-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
2021-10-22 06:55:05 +08:00
config DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME
bool
x86/sgx: Add an attribute for the amount of SGX memory in a NUMA node == Problem == The amount of SGX memory on a system is determined by the BIOS and it varies wildly between systems. It can be as small as dozens of MB's and as large as many GB's on servers. Just like how applications need to know how much regular RAM is available, enclave builders need to know how much SGX memory an enclave can consume. == Solution == Introduce a new sysfs file: /sys/devices/system/node/nodeX/x86/sgx_total_bytes to enumerate the amount of SGX memory available in each NUMA node. This serves the same function for SGX as /proc/meminfo or /sys/devices/system/node/nodeX/meminfo does for normal RAM. 'sgx_total_bytes' is needed today to help drive the SGX selftests. SGX-specific swap code is exercised by creating overcommitted enclaves which are larger than the physical SGX memory on the system. They currently use a CPUID-based approach which can diverge from the actual amount of SGX memory available. 'sgx_total_bytes' ensures that the selftests can work efficiently and do not attempt stupid things like creating a 100,000 MB enclave on a system with 128 MB of SGX memory. == Implementation Details == Introduce CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP opt-in flag to expose an arch specific attribute group, and add an attribute for the amount of SGX memory in bytes to each NUMA node: == ABI Design Discussion == As opposed to the per-node ABI, a single, global ABI was considered. However, this would prevent enclaves from being able to size themselves so that they fit on a single NUMA node. Essentially, a single value would rule out NUMA optimizations for enclaves. Create a new "x86/" directory inside each "nodeX/" sysfs directory. 'sgx_total_bytes' is expected to be the first of at least a few sgx-specific files to be placed in the new directory. Just scanning /proc/meminfo, these are the no-brainers that we have for RAM, but we need for SGX: MemTotal: xxxx kB // sgx_total_bytes (implemented here) MemFree: yyyy kB // sgx_free_bytes SwapTotal: zzzz kB // sgx_swapped_bytes So, at *least* three. I think we will eventually end up needing something more along the lines of a dozen. A new directory (as opposed to being in the nodeX/ "root") directory avoids cluttering the root with several "sgx_*" files. Place the new file in a new "nodeX/x86/" directory because SGX is highly x86-specific. It is very unlikely that any other architecture (or even non-Intel x86 vendor) will ever implement SGX. Using "sgx/" as opposed to "x86/" was also considered. But, there is a real chance this can get used for other arch-specific purposes. [ dhansen: rewrite changelog ] Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116162116.93081-2-jarkko@kernel.org
2021-11-17 00:21:16 +08:00
# Select, if arch has a named attribute group bound to NUMA device nodes.
config HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP
bool
mm: x86: add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG Some architectures support the accessed bit in non-leaf PMD entries, e.g., x86 sets the accessed bit in a non-leaf PMD entry when using it as part of linear address translation [1]. Page table walkers that clear the accessed bit may use this capability to reduce their search space. Note that: 1. Although an inline function is preferable, this capability is added as a configuration option for consistency with the existing macros. 2. Due to the little interest in other varieties, this capability was only tested on Intel and AMD CPUs. Thanks to the following developers for their efforts [2][3]. Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [1]: Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual Volume 3 (June 2021), section 4.8 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/bfdcc7c8-922f-61a9-aa15-7e7250f04af7@infradead.org/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220413151513.5a0d7a7e@canb.auug.org.au/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220918080010.2920238-3-yuzhao@google.com Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Acked-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <heftig@archlinux.org> Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Acked-by: Steven Barrett <steven@liquorix.net> Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <djbyrne@mtu.edu> Tested-by: Donald Carr <d@chaos-reins.com> Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com> Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <Hi-Angel@yandex.ru> Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <szhai2@cs.rochester.edu> Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <sofia.trinh@edi.works> Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michael Larabel <Michael@MichaelLarabel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-18 15:59:59 +08:00
config ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG
bool
help
Architectures that select this option are capable of setting the
accessed bit in non-leaf PMD entries when using them as part of linear
address translations. Page table walkers that clear the accessed bit
may use this capability to reduce their search space.
gcov: add gcov profiling infrastructure Enable the use of GCC's coverage testing tool gcov [1] with the Linux kernel. gcov may be useful for: * debugging (has this code been reached at all?) * test improvement (how do I change my test to cover these lines?) * minimizing kernel configurations (do I need this option if the associated code is never run?) The profiling patch incorporates the following changes: * change kbuild to include profiling flags * provide functions needed by profiling code * present profiling data as files in debugfs Note that on some architectures, enabling gcc's profiling option "-fprofile-arcs" for the entire kernel may trigger compile/link/ run-time problems, some of which are caused by toolchain bugs and others which require adjustment of architecture code. For this reason profiling the entire kernel is initially restricted to those architectures for which it is known to work without changes. This restriction can be lifted once an architecture has been tested and found compatible with gcc's profiling. Profiling of single files or directories is still available on all platforms (see config help text). [1] http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Gcov.html Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Li Wei <W.Li@Sun.COM> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michaele@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <mschwid2@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-06-18 07:28:08 +08:00
source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
gcc-plugins: split out Kconfig entries to scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig Collect relevant code into the scripts/gcc-plugins directory. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-07-05 14:24:12 +08:00
source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
Consolidation of Kconfig files by Christoph Hellwig. Move the source statements of arch-independent Kconfig files instead of duplicating the includes in every arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAABAgAGBQJbdFsfAAoJED2LAQed4NsGxHsP/1tmA57OOOj8oGxO2OXhXVbr Q0MZqCoV4bqMvK/hgCQdl9f+tp0m+j12x4xDLdVf4OqnTXMbqvPDu3uQVKvaj/k1 gHhsFA1tFgSbuJ8InltUsrPEQqbceeJsj50xHVAKijqI6LYeRPPSU7aE9obn+OzH n2nd5sLKvMI/dqdJvW6i5KPydqTH3r3iA7D+ne/XQj0s0EMXvXUPmDT1+ijTnM4a yfm6W5p7L/c3Ugf1Pz5PfnPl4BxBwZMfW5ie/UO8j5C6Rl0iPaOGuuHurocaaJb3 MefR/7NEAR3G8MhJyL2+70jbbwhjpqR2b5ooz1vpuulPHxjeU45BY60XIBWq1afR ewsc12MMCYB695ieYWoHdaWgxD/jhffyRuajfpkXKIZEMgDxS03sMhdULXENVMx1 M0ZQ01g/NLWt9ti9DY3eTKB3ymOhnBa1sa77nGGUHkITq4DQKwPX1J9FP/HT6RNt uOvzeH5kGzc7tqOlZAO0kHbwhQG1uqGcd78IYd4lgf/XfkSgDERTWjnJmnQbwr9m 3PFuST2u8eyO+8Lh1MK76TXOEkXsHMdFugPmb6SlgtMEPKGVLDPlsj52o/LFtgzl eygfMiBFr2+ttkZ6IpNcpmQ4IztmDpz6XoMk3PqDAfUTUSYpCnq1gAEuff/eisCM Odva1ZZaeQ7WpxhsP8rr =gsQJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'kconfig-v4.19-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull Kconfig consolidation from Masahiro Yamada: "Consolidation of Kconfig files by Christoph Hellwig. Move the source statements of arch-independent Kconfig files instead of duplicating the includes in every arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig" * tag 'kconfig-v4.19-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: kconfig: add a Memory Management options" menu kconfig: move the "Executable file formats" menu to fs/Kconfig.binfmt kconfig: use a menu in arch/Kconfig to reduce clutter kconfig: include kernel/Kconfig.preempt from init/Kconfig Kconfig: consolidate the "Kernel hacking" menu kconfig: include common Kconfig files from top-level Kconfig kconfig: remove duplicate SWAP symbol defintions um: create a proper drivers Kconfig um: cleanup Kconfig files um: stop abusing KBUILD_KCONFIG
2018-08-16 04:05:12 +08:00
arch: Introduce CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT Generic function-alignment infrastructure. Architectures can select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_xxB symbols; the FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT symbol is then set to the largest such selected size, 0 otherwise. From this the -falign-functions compiler argument and __ALIGN macro are set. This incorporates the DEBUG_FORCE_FUNCTION_ALIGN_64B knob and future alignment requirements for x86_64 (later in this series) into a single place. NOTE: also removes the 0x90 filler byte from the generic __ALIGN primitive, that value makes no sense outside of x86. NOTE: .balign 0 reverts to a no-op. Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111143.719248727@infradead.org
2022-09-15 19:10:47 +08:00
config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B
bool
config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B
bool
config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B
bool
config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
bool
config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_64B
bool
config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT
int
default 64 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_64B
default 32 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
default 16 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B
default 8 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B
default 4 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B
default 0
kconfig: use a menu in arch/Kconfig to reduce clutter Put everything in arch/Kconfig into a General options menu so that they don't clutter up the main/major/primary list of menu options. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2018-07-31 19:39:33 +08:00
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