2019-05-19 20:08:20 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* linux/fs/binfmt_aout.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992, 1996 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/a.out.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/stat.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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2010-03-06 05:44:06 +08:00
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#include <linux/coredump.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2017-02-09 01:51:37 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2016-12-25 03:46:01 +08:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
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2012-10-21 10:00:48 +08:00
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static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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static int load_aout_library(struct file*);
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2012-10-05 08:15:23 +08:00
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static struct linux_binfmt aout_format = {
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.module = THIS_MODULE,
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.load_binary = load_aout_binary,
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.load_shlib = load_aout_library,
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};
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#define BAD_ADDR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) >= TASK_SIZE)
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static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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{
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start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
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end = PAGE_ALIGN(end);
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2016-05-28 06:57:31 +08:00
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if (end > start)
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return vm_brk(start, end - start);
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2012-10-05 08:15:23 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* create_aout_tables() parses the env- and arg-strings in new user
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* memory and creates the pointer tables from them, and puts their
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* addresses on the "stack", returning the new stack pointer value.
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*/
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static unsigned long __user *create_aout_tables(char __user *p, struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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{
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char __user * __user *argv;
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char __user * __user *envp;
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unsigned long __user *sp;
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int argc = bprm->argc;
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int envc = bprm->envc;
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sp = (void __user *)((-(unsigned long)sizeof(char *)) & (unsigned long) p);
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#ifdef __alpha__
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/* whee.. test-programs are so much fun. */
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put_user(0, --sp);
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put_user(0, --sp);
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if (bprm->loader) {
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put_user(0, --sp);
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2009-01-03 15:16:23 +08:00
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put_user(1003, --sp);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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put_user(bprm->loader, --sp);
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2009-01-03 15:16:23 +08:00
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put_user(1002, --sp);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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put_user(bprm->exec, --sp);
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2009-01-03 15:16:23 +08:00
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put_user(1001, --sp);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#endif
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sp -= envc+1;
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envp = (char __user * __user *) sp;
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sp -= argc+1;
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argv = (char __user * __user *) sp;
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2009-01-03 15:16:23 +08:00
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#ifndef __alpha__
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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put_user((unsigned long) envp,--sp);
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put_user((unsigned long) argv,--sp);
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#endif
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put_user(argc,--sp);
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current->mm->arg_start = (unsigned long) p;
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while (argc-->0) {
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char c;
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put_user(p,argv++);
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do {
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get_user(c,p++);
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} while (c);
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}
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put_user(NULL,argv);
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current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->env_start = (unsigned long) p;
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while (envc-->0) {
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char c;
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put_user(p,envp++);
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do {
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get_user(c,p++);
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} while (c);
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}
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put_user(NULL,envp);
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current->mm->env_end = (unsigned long) p;
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return sp;
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}
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/*
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* These are the functions used to load a.out style executables and shared
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* libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
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*/
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2012-10-21 10:00:48 +08:00
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static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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2012-10-21 10:00:48 +08:00
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struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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struct exec ex;
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unsigned long error;
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unsigned long fd_offset;
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unsigned long rlim;
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int retval;
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ex = *((struct exec *) bprm->buf); /* exec-header */
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if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != OMAGIC &&
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N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||
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N_TRSIZE(ex) || N_DRSIZE(ex) ||
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2013-01-24 06:07:38 +08:00
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i_size_read(file_inode(bprm->file)) < ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return -ENOEXEC;
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}
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2006-09-29 16:59:33 +08:00
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/*
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* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
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* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
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*/
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2013-09-23 04:27:52 +08:00
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if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
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2006-09-29 16:59:33 +08:00
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return -ENOEXEC;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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fd_offset = N_TXTOFF(ex);
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/* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent
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* size limits imposed on them by creating programs with large
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* arrays in the data or bss.
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*/
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2010-03-06 05:42:42 +08:00
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rlim = rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
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rlim = ~0;
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if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
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2020-05-03 20:54:10 +08:00
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retval = begin_new_exec(bprm);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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if (retval)
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return retval;
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/* OK, This is the point of no return */
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2009-01-03 15:16:23 +08:00
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#ifdef __alpha__
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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SET_AOUT_PERSONALITY(bprm, ex);
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#else
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set_personality(PER_LINUX);
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#endif
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Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions
'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and
it is pretty badly misnamed. It doesn't just flush the old executable
environment, it also starts up the new one.
Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new
personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting
of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new
personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails.
As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this
insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit
(TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the
personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do
the actual personality magic.
This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the
'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail
(still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set
up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()). All callers are changed
to trivially comply with the new world order.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-01-29 14:14:42 +08:00
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setup_new_exec(bprm);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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current->mm->end_code = ex.a_text +
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(current->mm->start_code = N_TXTADDR(ex));
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current->mm->end_data = ex.a_data +
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(current->mm->start_data = N_DATADDR(ex));
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current->mm->brk = ex.a_bss +
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(current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex));
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2012-03-05 14:38:42 +08:00
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retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm, STACK_TOP, EXSTACK_DEFAULT);
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2014-05-05 08:11:36 +08:00
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if (retval < 0)
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2012-03-05 14:38:42 +08:00
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return retval;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
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unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
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loff_t pos;
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text_addr = N_TXTADDR(ex);
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2009-01-03 15:16:13 +08:00
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#ifdef __alpha__
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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pos = fd_offset;
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map_size = ex.a_text+ex.a_data + PAGE_SIZE - 1;
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#else
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pos = 32;
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map_size = ex.a_text+ex.a_data;
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#endif
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2012-04-21 06:35:40 +08:00
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error = vm_brk(text_addr & PAGE_MASK, map_size);
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2016-05-28 06:57:31 +08:00
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if (error)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return error;
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2013-04-14 08:31:37 +08:00
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error = read_code(bprm->file, text_addr, pos,
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ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
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2014-05-05 08:11:36 +08:00
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if ((signed long)error < 0)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return error;
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} else {
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if ((ex.a_text & 0xfff || ex.a_data & 0xfff) &&
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2008-04-29 15:59:26 +08:00
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(N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) && printk_ratelimit())
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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printk(KERN_NOTICE "executable not page aligned\n");
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}
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2008-04-29 15:59:26 +08:00
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if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0 && printk_ratelimit())
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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printk(KERN_WARNING
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2014-10-22 08:11:25 +08:00
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"fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert program: %pD\n",
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bprm->file);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap||((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0)) {
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2016-05-24 07:25:36 +08:00
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error = vm_brk(N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
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2016-05-28 06:57:31 +08:00
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if (error)
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2016-05-24 07:25:36 +08:00
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return error;
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2013-04-14 08:31:37 +08:00
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read_code(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), fd_offset,
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ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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goto beyond_if;
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}
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2012-04-21 08:13:58 +08:00
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error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text,
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binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
At exec time when we mmap the new executable via MAP_DENYWRITE we have it
opened via do_open_execat() and already deny_write_access()'ed the file
successfully. Once exec completes, we allow_write_acces(); however,
we set mm->exe_file in begin_new_exec() via set_mm_exe_file() and
also deny_write_access() as long as mm->exe_file remains set. We'll
effectively deny write access to our executable via mm->exe_file
until mm->exe_file is changed -- when the process is removed, on new
exec, or via sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE).
Let's remove all usage of MAP_DENYWRITE, it's no longer necessary for
mm->exe_file.
In case of an elf interpreter, we'll now only deny write access to the file
during exec. This is somewhat okay, because the interpreter behaves
(and sometime is) a shared library; all shared libraries, especially the
ones loaded directly in user space like via dlopen() won't ever be mapped
via MAP_DENYWRITE, because we ignore that from user space completely;
these shared libraries can always be modified while mapped and executed.
Let's only special-case the main executable, denying write access while
being executed by a process. This can be considered a minor user space
visible change.
While this is a cleanup, it also fixes part of a problem reported with
VM_DENYWRITE on overlayfs, as VM_DENYWRITE is effectively unused with
this patch and will be removed next:
"Overlayfs did not honor positive i_writecount on realfile for
VM_DENYWRITE mappings." [1]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/YNHXzBgzRrZu1MrD@miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com/
Reported-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
2021-04-23 15:42:41 +08:00
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PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE,
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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fd_offset);
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2014-05-05 08:11:36 +08:00
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if (error != N_TXTADDR(ex))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-21 08:13:58 +08:00
|
|
|
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
|
binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
At exec time when we mmap the new executable via MAP_DENYWRITE we have it
opened via do_open_execat() and already deny_write_access()'ed the file
successfully. Once exec completes, we allow_write_acces(); however,
we set mm->exe_file in begin_new_exec() via set_mm_exe_file() and
also deny_write_access() as long as mm->exe_file remains set. We'll
effectively deny write access to our executable via mm->exe_file
until mm->exe_file is changed -- when the process is removed, on new
exec, or via sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE).
Let's remove all usage of MAP_DENYWRITE, it's no longer necessary for
mm->exe_file.
In case of an elf interpreter, we'll now only deny write access to the file
during exec. This is somewhat okay, because the interpreter behaves
(and sometime is) a shared library; all shared libraries, especially the
ones loaded directly in user space like via dlopen() won't ever be mapped
via MAP_DENYWRITE, because we ignore that from user space completely;
these shared libraries can always be modified while mapped and executed.
Let's only special-case the main executable, denying write access while
being executed by a process. This can be considered a minor user space
visible change.
While this is a cleanup, it also fixes part of a problem reported with
VM_DENYWRITE on overlayfs, as VM_DENYWRITE is effectively unused with
this patch and will be removed next:
"Overlayfs did not honor positive i_writecount on realfile for
VM_DENYWRITE mappings." [1]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/YNHXzBgzRrZu1MrD@miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com/
Reported-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
2021-04-23 15:42:41 +08:00
|
|
|
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
fd_offset + ex.a_text);
|
2014-05-05 08:11:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error != N_DATADDR(ex))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
beyond_if:
|
|
|
|
set_binfmt(&aout_format);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = set_brk(current->mm->start_brk, current->mm->brk);
|
2014-05-05 08:11:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current->mm->start_stack =
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) create_aout_tables((char __user *) bprm->p, bprm);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __alpha__
|
|
|
|
regs->gp = ex.a_gpvalue;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2018-04-11 07:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
finalize_exec(bprm);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
start_thread(regs, ex.a_entry, current->mm->start_stack);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode * inode;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long bss, start_addr, len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long error;
|
|
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
struct exec ex;
|
2017-09-01 23:39:13 +08:00
|
|
|
loff_t pos = 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-24 06:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
inode = file_inode(file);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -ENOEXEC;
|
2017-09-01 23:39:13 +08:00
|
|
|
error = kernel_read(file, &ex, sizeof(ex), &pos);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error != sizeof(ex))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We come in here for the regular a.out style of shared libraries */
|
|
|
|
if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC) || N_TRSIZE(ex) ||
|
|
|
|
N_DRSIZE(ex) || ((ex.a_entry & 0xfff) && N_MAGIC(ex) == ZMAGIC) ||
|
|
|
|
i_size_read(inode) < ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-29 16:59:33 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
|
|
|
|
* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-09-23 04:27:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!file->f_op->mmap)
|
2006-09-29 16:59:33 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (N_FLAGS(ex))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For QMAGIC, the starting address is 0x20 into the page. We mask
|
|
|
|
this off to get the starting address for the page */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start_addr = ex.a_entry & 0xfffff000;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((N_TXTOFF(ex) & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
|
2008-04-29 15:59:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (printk_ratelimit())
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_WARNING
|
2014-10-22 08:11:25 +08:00
|
|
|
"N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert library: %pD\n",
|
|
|
|
file);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-24 07:25:36 +08:00
|
|
|
retval = vm_brk(start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
|
2016-05-28 06:57:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (retval)
|
2016-05-24 07:25:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-14 08:31:37 +08:00
|
|
|
read_code(file, start_addr, N_TXTOFF(ex),
|
|
|
|
ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
|
2012-04-21 08:13:58 +08:00
|
|
|
error = vm_mmap(file, start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
|
2021-09-05 17:30:34 +08:00
|
|
|
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
N_TXTOFF(ex));
|
|
|
|
retval = error;
|
|
|
|
if (error != start_addr)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = PAGE_ALIGN(ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
|
|
|
|
bss = ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss;
|
|
|
|
if (bss > len) {
|
2016-05-28 06:57:31 +08:00
|
|
|
retval = vm_brk(start_addr + len, bss - len);
|
|
|
|
if (retval)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init init_aout_binfmt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-03-17 15:05:16 +08:00
|
|
|
register_binfmt(&aout_format);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit exit_aout_binfmt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unregister_binfmt(&aout_format);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
core_initcall(init_aout_binfmt);
|
|
|
|
module_exit(exit_aout_binfmt);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|