2019-05-19 20:08:55 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* sysctl.c: General linux system control interface
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*
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* Begun 24 March 1995, Stephen Tweedie
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* Added /proc support, Dec 1995
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* Added bdflush entry and intvec min/max checking, 2/23/96, Tom Dyas.
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* Added hooks for /proc/sys/net (minor, minor patch), 96/4/1, Mike Shaver.
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* Added kernel/java-{interpreter,appletviewer}, 96/5/10, Mike Shaver.
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* Dynamic registration fixes, Stephen Tweedie.
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* Added kswapd-interval, ctrl-alt-del, printk stuff, 1/8/97, Chris Horn.
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* Made sysctl support optional via CONFIG_SYSCTL, 1/10/97, Chris
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* Horn.
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* Added proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax, 09/08/99, Carlos H. Bauer.
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* Added proc_doulongvec_minmax, 09/08/99, Carlos H. Bauer.
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* Changed linked lists to use list.h instead of lists.h, 02/24/00, Bill
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* Wendling.
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* The list_for_each() macro wasn't appropriate for the sysctl loop.
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* Removed it and replaced it with older style, 03/23/00, Bill Wendling
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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2012-03-29 05:42:50 +08:00
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#include <linux/bitmap.h>
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2010-03-11 07:23:59 +08:00
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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2021-07-01 09:54:59 +08:00
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#include <linux/panic.h>
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kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-13 08:59:41 +08:00
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#include <linux/printk.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
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V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap
The non-filesystem capability meaning of CAP_SETPCAP is that a process, p1,
can change the capabilities of another process, p2. This is not the
meaning that was intended for this capability at all, and this
implementation came about purely because, without filesystem capabilities,
there was no way to use capabilities without one process bestowing them on
another.
Since we now have a filesystem support for capabilities we can fix the
implementation of CAP_SETPCAP.
The most significant thing about this change is that, with it in effect, no
process can set the capabilities of another process.
The capabilities of a program are set via the capability convolution
rules:
pI(post-exec) = pI(pre-exec)
pP(post-exec) = (X(aka cap_bset) & fP) | (pI(post-exec) & fI)
pE(post-exec) = fE ? pP(post-exec) : 0
at exec() time. As such, the only influence the pre-exec() program can
have on the post-exec() program's capabilities are through the pI
capability set.
The correct implementation for CAP_SETPCAP (and that enabled by this patch)
is that it can be used to add extra pI capabilities to the current process
- to be picked up by subsequent exec()s when the above convolution rules
are applied.
Here is how it works:
Let's say we have a process, p. It has capability sets, pE, pP and pI.
Generally, p, can change the value of its own pI to pI' where
(pI' & ~pI) & ~pP = 0.
That is, the only new things in pI' that were not present in pI need to
be present in pP.
The role of CAP_SETPCAP is basically to permit changes to pI beyond
the above:
if (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) {
pI' = anything; /* ie., even (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP != 0 */
}
This capability is useful for things like login, which (say, via
pam_cap) might want to raise certain inheritable capabilities for use
by the children of the logged-in user's shell, but those capabilities
are not useful to or needed by the login program itself.
One such use might be to limit who can run ping. You set the
capabilities of the 'ping' program to be "= cap_net_raw+i", and then
only shells that have (pI & CAP_NET_RAW) will be able to run
it. Without CAP_SETPCAP implemented as described above, login(pam_cap)
would have to also have (pP & CAP_NET_RAW) in order to raise this
capability and pass it on through the inheritable set.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 18:05:59 +08:00
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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2012-07-31 05:42:48 +08:00
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#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
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2021-12-29 08:49:13 +08:00
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#include <linux/filter.h>
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2007-07-17 19:03:45 +08:00
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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2005-11-11 12:33:52 +08:00
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#include <linux/kobject.h>
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2005-08-16 13:18:02 +08:00
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#include <linux/net.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/sysrq.h>
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#include <linux/highuid.h>
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#include <linux/writeback.h>
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2009-09-22 22:18:09 +08:00
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
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#include <linux/initrd.h>
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2008-04-29 16:01:32 +08:00
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#include <linux/key.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/times.h>
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#include <linux/limits.h>
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#include <linux/dcache.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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2008-07-24 12:27:03 +08:00
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#include <linux/vmstat.h>
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2006-02-21 10:27:58 +08:00
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#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
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#include <linux/acpi.h>
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2007-07-18 09:37:02 +08:00
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#include <linux/reboot.h>
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2008-05-13 03:20:43 +08:00
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#include <linux/ftrace.h>
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perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events
Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events!
In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its
initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is
becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging,
monitoring, analysis facility.
Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem
'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending
code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and
less appropriate.
All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance
events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables
and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion)
The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes
it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well.
Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and
suggested a rename.
User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch
should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to
keep the size down.)
This patch has been generated via the following script:
FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config')
sed -i \
-e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \
-e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \
-e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \
-e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \
-e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \
-e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \
$FILES
for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do
M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g')
mv $N $M
done
FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*)
sed -i \
-e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \
-e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \
-e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \
-e 's/counter/event/g' \
-e 's/Counter/Event/g' \
$FILES
... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be
used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts
a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this
change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches
is the smallest: the end of the merge window.
Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some
stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch.
( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal
with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit
over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but
in case there's something left where 'counter' would be
better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis
instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. )
Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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2010-08-10 08:18:56 +08:00
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#include <linux/oom.h>
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2011-04-02 05:07:50 +08:00
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#include <linux/kmod.h>
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2011-11-01 08:11:20 +08:00
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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2012-02-13 11:58:52 +08:00
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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2013-02-07 23:46:59 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
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2016-09-28 13:27:17 +08:00
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd
Userfaultfd can be misued to make it easier to exploit existing
use-after-free (and similar) bugs that might otherwise only make a
short window or race condition available. By using userfaultfd to
stall a kernel thread, a malicious program can keep some state that it
wrote, stable for an extended period, which it can then access using an
existing exploit. While it doesn't cause the exploit itself, and while
it's not the only thing that can stall a kernel thread when accessing a
memory location, it's one of the few that never needs privilege.
We can add a flag, allowing userfaultfd to be restricted, so that in
general it won't be useable by arbitrary user programs, but in
environments that require userfaultfd it can be turned back on.
Add a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control
whether userfaultfd is allowed by unprivileged users. When this is
set to zero, only privileged users (root user, or users with the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) will be able to use the userfaultfd
syscalls.
Andrea said:
: The only difference between the bpf sysctl and the userfaultfd sysctl
: this way is that the bpf sysctl adds the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
: requirement, while userfaultfd adds the CAP_SYS_PTRACE requirement,
: because the userfaultfd monitor is more likely to need CAP_SYS_PTRACE
: already if it's doing other kind of tracking on processes runtime, in
: addition of userfaultfd. In other words both syscalls works only for
: root, when the two sysctl are opt-in set to 1.
[dgilbert@redhat.com: changelog additions]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: documentation tweak, per Mike]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190319030722.12441-2-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Cc: Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>
Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 08:16:41 +08:00
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#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
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2020-04-24 14:43:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2019-03-08 08:29:40 +08:00
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#include "../lib/kstrtox.h"
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2016-12-25 03:46:01 +08:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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2006-09-30 07:47:55 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86
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#include <asm/nmi.h>
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2006-12-07 09:14:11 +08:00
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#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
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2008-01-30 20:30:05 +08:00
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#include <asm/io.h>
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2006-09-30 07:47:55 +08:00
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#endif
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2012-03-29 01:30:03 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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#endif
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2010-03-11 07:24:09 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
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#include <linux/rtmutex.h>
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#endif
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2010-02-13 06:19:19 +08:00
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2022-09-08 16:29:46 +08:00
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/* shared constants to be used in various sysctls */
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const int sysctl_vals[] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 100, 200, 1000, 3000, INT_MAX, 65535, -1 };
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_vals);
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const unsigned long sysctl_long_vals[] = { 0, 1, LONG_MAX };
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sysctl_long_vals);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
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2022-09-08 16:29:46 +08:00
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/* Constants used for minimum and maximum */
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2007-10-17 14:26:09 +08:00
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2016-04-21 23:28:50 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
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2022-01-22 14:11:14 +08:00
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static const int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024;
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2016-04-21 23:28:50 +08:00
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#endif
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2007-10-17 14:26:09 +08:00
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2009-05-01 06:08:57 +08:00
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2022-01-22 14:11:09 +08:00
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static const int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX;
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2011-11-01 08:11:20 +08:00
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static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2006-10-20 14:28:34 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
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sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
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2017-07-13 05:33:30 +08:00
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/**
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* enum sysctl_writes_mode - supported sysctl write modes
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*
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* @SYSCTL_WRITES_LEGACY: each write syscall must fully contain the sysctl value
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2019-07-17 07:26:54 +08:00
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* to be written, and multiple writes on the same sysctl file descriptor
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* will rewrite the sysctl value, regardless of file position. No warning
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* is issued when the initial position is not 0.
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2017-07-13 05:33:30 +08:00
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* @SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN: same as above but warn when the initial file position is
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2019-07-17 07:26:54 +08:00
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* not 0.
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2017-07-13 05:33:30 +08:00
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* @SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT: writes to numeric sysctl entries must always be at
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2019-07-17 07:26:54 +08:00
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* file position 0 and the value must be fully contained in the buffer
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* sent to the write syscall. If dealing with strings respect the file
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* position, but restrict this to the max length of the buffer, anything
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* passed the max length will be ignored. Multiple writes will append
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* to the buffer.
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2017-07-13 05:33:30 +08:00
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*
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* These write modes control how current file position affects the behavior of
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* updating sysctl values through the proc interface on each write.
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*/
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enum sysctl_writes_mode {
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_WRITES_LEGACY = -1,
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN = 0,
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT = 1,
|
|
|
|
};
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-13 05:33:30 +08:00
|
|
|
static enum sysctl_writes_mode sysctl_writes_strict = SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL */
|
2018-03-10 22:14:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-24 06:38:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT) || \
|
|
|
|
defined(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* /proc/sys support
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-27 16:51:04 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-07 05:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
static int _proc_do_string(char *data, int maxlen, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char c, *p;
|
2007-02-10 17:46:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!data || !maxlen || !*lenp) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-10 17:46:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sysctl_writes_strict == SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT) {
|
|
|
|
/* Only continue writes not past the end of buffer. */
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(data);
|
|
|
|
if (len > maxlen - 1)
|
|
|
|
len = maxlen - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*ppos > len)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
len = *ppos;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Start writing from beginning of buffer. */
|
|
|
|
len = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-07 05:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
*ppos += *lenp;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
p = buffer;
|
2014-06-07 05:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
while ((p - buffer) < *lenp && len < maxlen - 1) {
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
c = *(p++);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (c == 0 || c == '\n')
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2014-06-07 05:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
data[len++] = c;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-07 05:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
data[len] = 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2006-10-02 17:18:04 +08:00
|
|
|
len = strlen(data);
|
|
|
|
if (len > maxlen)
|
|
|
|
len = maxlen;
|
2007-02-10 17:46:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*ppos > len) {
|
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data += *ppos;
|
|
|
|
len -= *ppos;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len > *lenp)
|
|
|
|
len = *lenp;
|
|
|
|
if (len)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(buffer, data, len);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len < *lenp) {
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
buffer[len] = '\n';
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
len++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*lenp = len;
|
|
|
|
*ppos += len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
static void warn_sysctl_write(struct ctl_table *table)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pr_warn_once("%s wrote to %s when file position was not 0!\n"
|
|
|
|
"This will not be supported in the future. To silence this\n"
|
|
|
|
"warning, set kernel.sysctl_writes_strict = -1\n",
|
|
|
|
current->comm, table->procname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-13 05:33:33 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2018-08-22 13:01:06 +08:00
|
|
|
* proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore - check if first position is allowed
|
2017-07-13 05:33:33 +08:00
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns true if the first position is non-zero and the sysctl_writes_strict
|
|
|
|
* mode indicates this is not allowed for numeric input types. String proc
|
2018-08-22 13:01:06 +08:00
|
|
|
* handlers can ignore the return value.
|
2017-07-13 05:33:33 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore(loff_t *ppos,
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!*ppos)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (sysctl_writes_strict) {
|
|
|
|
case SYSCTL_WRITES_STRICT:
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
case SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN:
|
|
|
|
warn_sysctl_write(table);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-10-02 17:18:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dostring - read a string sysctl
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes a string from/to the user buffer. If the kernel
|
|
|
|
* buffer provided is not large enough to hold the string, the
|
|
|
|
* string is truncated. The copied string is %NULL-terminated.
|
|
|
|
* If the string is being read by the user process, it is copied
|
|
|
|
* and a newline '\n' is added. It is truncated if the buffer is
|
|
|
|
* not large enough.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dostring(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2006-10-02 17:18:04 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-07-13 05:33:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write)
|
|
|
|
proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore(ppos, table);
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
return _proc_do_string(table->data, table->maxlen, write, buffer, lenp,
|
|
|
|
ppos);
|
2006-10-02 17:18:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
static void proc_skip_spaces(char **buf, size_t *size)
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
while (*size) {
|
|
|
|
if (!isspace(**buf))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
(*size)--;
|
|
|
|
(*buf)++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static void proc_skip_char(char **buf, size_t *size, const char v)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
while (*size) {
|
|
|
|
if (**buf != v)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
(*size)--;
|
|
|
|
(*buf)++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 08:29:40 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* strtoul_lenient - parse an ASCII formatted integer from a buffer and only
|
|
|
|
* fail on overflow
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @cp: kernel buffer containing the string to parse
|
|
|
|
* @endp: pointer to store the trailing characters
|
|
|
|
* @base: the base to use
|
|
|
|
* @res: where the parsed integer will be stored
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In case of success 0 is returned and @res will contain the parsed integer,
|
|
|
|
* @endp will hold any trailing characters.
|
|
|
|
* This function will fail the parse on overflow. If there wasn't an overflow
|
|
|
|
* the function will defer the decision what characters count as invalid to the
|
|
|
|
* caller.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int strtoul_lenient(const char *cp, char **endp, unsigned int base,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *res)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long long result;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cp = _parse_integer_fixup_radix(cp, &base);
|
|
|
|
rv = _parse_integer(cp, base, &result);
|
|
|
|
if ((rv & KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW) || (result != (unsigned long)result))
|
|
|
|
return -ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cp += rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (endp)
|
|
|
|
*endp = (char *)cp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*res = (unsigned long)result;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
#define TMPBUFLEN 22
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2010-05-22 02:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* proc_get_long - reads an ASCII formatted integer from a user buffer
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-05-22 02:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* @buf: a kernel buffer
|
|
|
|
* @size: size of the kernel buffer
|
|
|
|
* @val: this is where the number will be stored
|
|
|
|
* @neg: set to %TRUE if number is negative
|
|
|
|
* @perm_tr: a vector which contains the allowed trailers
|
|
|
|
* @perm_tr_len: size of the perm_tr vector
|
|
|
|
* @tr: pointer to store the trailer character
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-05-22 02:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* In case of success %0 is returned and @buf and @size are updated with
|
|
|
|
* the amount of bytes read. If @tr is non-NULL and a trailing
|
|
|
|
* character exists (size is non-zero after returning from this
|
|
|
|
* function), @tr is updated with the trailing character.
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int proc_get_long(char **buf, size_t *size,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *val, bool *neg,
|
|
|
|
const char *perm_tr, unsigned perm_tr_len, char *tr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *p, tmp[TMPBUFLEN];
|
2022-12-06 03:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
ssize_t len = *size;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-12-06 03:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len > TMPBUFLEN - 1)
|
|
|
|
len = TMPBUFLEN - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(tmp, *buf, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp[len] = 0;
|
|
|
|
p = tmp;
|
|
|
|
if (*p == '-' && *size > 1) {
|
|
|
|
*neg = true;
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*neg = false;
|
|
|
|
if (!isdigit(*p))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 08:29:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (strtoul_lenient(p, &p, 0, val))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = p - tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We don't know if the next char is whitespace thus we may accept
|
|
|
|
* invalid integers (e.g. 1234...a) or two integers instead of one
|
|
|
|
* (e.g. 123...1). So lets not allow such large numbers. */
|
|
|
|
if (len == TMPBUFLEN - 1)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len < *size && perm_tr_len && !memchr(perm_tr, *p, perm_tr_len))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (tr && (len < *size))
|
|
|
|
*tr = *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*buf += len;
|
|
|
|
*size -= len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2010-05-22 02:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* proc_put_long - converts an integer to a decimal ASCII formatted string
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2010-05-22 02:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* @buf: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @size: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @val: the integer to be converted
|
|
|
|
* @neg: sign of the number, %TRUE for negative
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
* In case of success @buf and @size are updated with the amount of bytes
|
|
|
|
* written.
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static void proc_put_long(void **buf, size_t *size, unsigned long val, bool neg)
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
char tmp[TMPBUFLEN], *p = tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sprintf(p, "%s%lu", neg ? "-" : "", val);
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(tmp);
|
|
|
|
if (len > *size)
|
|
|
|
len = *size;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(*buf, tmp, len);
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*size -= len;
|
|
|
|
*buf += len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#undef TMPBUFLEN
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static void proc_put_char(void **buf, size_t *size, char c)
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (*size) {
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char **buffer = (char **)buf;
|
|
|
|
**buffer = c;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(*size)--;
|
|
|
|
(*buffer)++;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*buf = *buffer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2015-04-17 03:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*negp) {
|
|
|
|
if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX + 1)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2022-07-07 07:39:52 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, -*lvalp);
|
2015-04-17 03:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2022-07-07 07:39:52 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp);
|
2015-04-17 03:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-07-07 07:39:52 +08:00
|
|
|
int val = READ_ONCE(*valp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (val < 0) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = true;
|
2015-09-10 06:39:06 +08:00
|
|
|
*lvalp = -(unsigned long)val;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = false;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*lvalp = (unsigned long)val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_douintvec_conv(unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2017-04-07 23:51:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*lvalp > UINT_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2022-07-07 07:39:53 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp);
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-07-07 07:39:53 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int val = READ_ONCE(*valp);
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
*lvalp = (unsigned long)val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
static const char proc_wspace_sep[] = { ' ', '\t', '\n' };
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-18 18:05:22 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __do_proc_dointvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
int write, void *buffer,
|
2006-10-02 17:18:23 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
int (*conv)(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, int *valp,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int write, void *data),
|
|
|
|
void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
int *i, vleft, first = 1, err = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t left;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char *p;
|
2022-05-16 17:07:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!tbl_data || !table->maxlen || !*lenp || (*ppos && !write)) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-16 17:07:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2006-10-02 17:18:23 +08:00
|
|
|
i = (int *) tbl_data;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(*i);
|
|
|
|
left = *lenp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!conv)
|
|
|
|
conv = do_proc_dointvec_conv;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2017-07-13 05:33:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore(ppos, table))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (left > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
|
|
|
|
left = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
p = buffer;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
for (; left && vleft--; i++, first=0) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long lval;
|
|
|
|
bool neg;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_spaces(&p, &left);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-26 07:10:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!left)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
err = proc_get_long(&p, &left, &lval, &neg,
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_wspace_sep,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(proc_wspace_sep), NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conv(&neg, &lval, i, 1, data)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conv(&neg, &lval, i, 0, data)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!first)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\t');
|
|
|
|
proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, lval, neg);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!write && !first && left && !err)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\n');
|
2010-05-26 07:10:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write && !err && left)
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_spaces(&p, &left);
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write && first)
|
|
|
|
return err ? : -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*lenp -= left;
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*ppos += *lenp;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
int (*conv)(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, int *valp,
|
2006-10-02 17:18:23 +08:00
|
|
|
int write, void *data),
|
|
|
|
void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return __do_proc_dointvec(table->data, table, write,
|
2006-10-02 17:18:23 +08:00
|
|
|
buffer, lenp, ppos, conv, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_douintvec_w(unsigned int *tbl_data,
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer,
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
|
|
|
int (*conv)(unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data),
|
|
|
|
void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long lval;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t left;
|
|
|
|
bool neg;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char *p = buffer;
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
left = *lenp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore(ppos, table))
|
|
|
|
goto bail_early;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
|
|
|
|
left = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_spaces(&p, &left);
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!left) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = proc_get_long(&p, &left, &lval, &neg,
|
|
|
|
proc_wspace_sep,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(proc_wspace_sep), NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (err || neg) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (conv(&lval, tbl_data, 1, data)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!err && left)
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_spaces(&p, &left);
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_free:
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is in keeping with old __do_proc_dointvec() */
|
|
|
|
bail_early:
|
|
|
|
*ppos += *lenp;
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_douintvec_r(unsigned int *tbl_data, void *buffer,
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
|
|
|
int (*conv)(unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data),
|
|
|
|
void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long lval;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t left;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
left = *lenp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (conv(&lval, tbl_data, 0, data)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, lval, false);
|
|
|
|
if (!left)
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\n');
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
*lenp -= left;
|
|
|
|
*ppos += *lenp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __do_proc_douintvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
int write, void *buffer,
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
|
|
|
int (*conv)(unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data),
|
|
|
|
void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *i, vleft;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tbl_data || !table->maxlen || !*lenp || (*ppos && !write)) {
|
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = (unsigned int *) tbl_data;
|
|
|
|
vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(*i);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Arrays are not supported, keep this simple. *Do not* add
|
|
|
|
* support for them.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (vleft != 1) {
|
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!conv)
|
|
|
|
conv = do_proc_douintvec_conv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write)
|
|
|
|
return do_proc_douintvec_w(i, table, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
|
|
|
conv, data);
|
|
|
|
return do_proc_douintvec_r(i, buffer, lenp, ppos, conv, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-22 14:13:20 +08:00
|
|
|
int do_proc_douintvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
|
|
|
int (*conv)(unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data),
|
|
|
|
void *data)
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return __do_proc_douintvec(table->data, table, write,
|
|
|
|
buffer, lenp, ppos, conv, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-03 18:59:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dobool - read/write a bool
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
2023-02-10 22:58:23 +08:00
|
|
|
* Reads/writes one integer value from/to the user buffer,
|
|
|
|
* treated as an ASCII string.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* table->data must point to a bool variable and table->maxlen must
|
|
|
|
* be sizeof(bool).
|
2021-08-03 18:59:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int proc_dobool(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-02-10 22:58:23 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tmp;
|
|
|
|
bool *data = table->data;
|
|
|
|
int res, val;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do not support arrays yet. */
|
|
|
|
if (table->maxlen != sizeof(bool))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = *table;
|
|
|
|
tmp.maxlen = sizeof(val);
|
|
|
|
tmp.data = &val;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
val = READ_ONCE(*data);
|
|
|
|
res = proc_dointvec(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
if (write)
|
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*data, val);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2021-08-03 18:59:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dointvec - read a vector of integers
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
|
2022-05-16 17:07:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_douintvec - read a vector of unsigned integers
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) unsigned integer
|
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_douintvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-07-13 05:33:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_douintvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
|
|
|
do_proc_douintvec_conv, NULL);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-10 17:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-10-16 13:01:41 +08:00
|
|
|
* Taint values can only be increased
|
|
|
|
* This means we can safely use a temporary.
|
2007-02-10 17:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2007-02-10 17:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-10-16 13:01:41 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ctl_table t;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2007-02-10 17:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2007-04-24 05:41:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
2007-02-10 17:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-16 13:01:41 +08:00
|
|
|
t = *table;
|
|
|
|
t.data = &tmptaint;
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
2008-10-16 13:01:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2020-06-08 12:40:17 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
|
|
|
|
* false positives due to userspace input, bail out
|
|
|
|
* before setting the requested taint flags.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-16 13:01:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
|
|
|
|
* to everyone's atomic.h for this
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-06-08 12:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
|
|
|
|
if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
|
2013-01-21 14:47:39 +08:00
|
|
|
add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
|
2008-10-16 13:01:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
2007-02-10 17:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-11 07:35:38 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
|
|
|
|
* @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
|
|
|
|
* @max: pointer to maximum allowable value
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param structure provides the
|
|
|
|
* minimum and maximum values for doing range checking for those sysctl
|
|
|
|
* parameters that use the proc_dointvec_minmax() handler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param {
|
|
|
|
int *min;
|
|
|
|
int *max;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
int *valp,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
int tmp, ret;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param *param = data;
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If writing, first do so via a temporary local int so we can
|
|
|
|
* bounds-check it before touching *valp.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int *ip = write ? &tmp : valp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = do_proc_dointvec_conv(negp, lvalp, ip, write, data);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((param->min && *param->min > tmp) ||
|
|
|
|
(param->max && *param->max < tmp))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2022-07-07 07:39:54 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, tmp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dointvec_minmax - read a vector of integers with min/max values
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
|
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
|
|
|
|
* table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
|
|
|
|
*
|
2018-04-11 07:35:38 +08:00
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on write when the range check fails.
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param param = {
|
|
|
|
.min = (int *) table->extra1,
|
|
|
|
.max = (int *) table->extra2,
|
|
|
|
};
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv, ¶m);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-11 07:35:38 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_douintvec_minmax() range checking structure
|
|
|
|
* @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
|
|
|
|
* @max: pointer to maximum allowable value
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param structure provides the
|
|
|
|
* minimum and maximum values for doing range checking for those sysctl
|
|
|
|
* parameters that use the proc_douintvec_minmax() handler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *min;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *max;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv(unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int tmp;
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param *param = data;
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
/* write via temporary local uint for bounds-checking */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *up = write ? &tmp : valp;
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = do_proc_douintvec_conv(lvalp, up, write, data);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-11-18 07:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 14:28:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
|
|
|
if ((param->min && *param->min > tmp) ||
|
|
|
|
(param->max && *param->max < tmp))
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-07-07 07:39:55 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, tmp);
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_douintvec_minmax - read a vector of unsigned ints with min/max values
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) unsigned integer
|
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string. Negative
|
|
|
|
* strings are not allowed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
|
|
|
|
* table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max). There is a final sanity
|
|
|
|
* check for UINT_MAX to avoid having to support wrap around uses from
|
|
|
|
* userspace.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2018-04-11 07:35:38 +08:00
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success or -ERANGE on write when the range check fails.
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int proc_douintvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param param = {
|
|
|
|
.min = (unsigned int *) table->extra1,
|
|
|
|
.max = (unsigned int *) table->extra2,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
return do_proc_douintvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
|
|
|
do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv, ¶m);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 02:08:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dou8vec_minmax - read a vector of unsigned chars with min/max values
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(u8) unsigned chars
|
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string. Negative
|
|
|
|
* strings are not allowed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
|
|
|
|
* table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success or an error on write when the range check fails.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int proc_dou8vec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tmp;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int min = 0, max = 255U, val;
|
|
|
|
u8 *data = table->data;
|
|
|
|
struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param param = {
|
|
|
|
.min = &min,
|
|
|
|
.max = &max,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do not support arrays yet. */
|
|
|
|
if (table->maxlen != sizeof(u8))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (table->extra1) {
|
|
|
|
min = *(unsigned int *) table->extra1;
|
|
|
|
if (min > 255U)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (table->extra2) {
|
|
|
|
max = *(unsigned int *) table->extra2;
|
|
|
|
if (max > 255U)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = *table;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp.maxlen = sizeof(val);
|
|
|
|
tmp.data = &val;
|
2022-07-12 08:15:19 +08:00
|
|
|
val = READ_ONCE(*data);
|
2021-03-26 02:08:13 +08:00
|
|
|
res = do_proc_douintvec(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
|
|
|
do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv, ¶m);
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
if (write)
|
2022-07-12 08:15:19 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*data, val);
|
2021-03-26 02:08:13 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_dou8vec_minmax);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-03 01:51:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
|
|
|
|
static int sysrq_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2020-03-03 01:51:34 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int tmp, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = sysrq_mask();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = __do_proc_dointvec(&tmp, table, write, buffer,
|
|
|
|
lenp, ppos, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ret || !write)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write)
|
|
|
|
sysrq_toggle_support(tmp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table *table,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long convmul, unsigned long convdiv)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *i, *min, *max;
|
|
|
|
int vleft, first = 1, err = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t left;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char *p;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!data || !table->maxlen || !*lenp || (*ppos && !write)) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-22 14:30:49 +08:00
|
|
|
i = data;
|
|
|
|
min = table->extra1;
|
|
|
|
max = table->extra2;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(unsigned long);
|
|
|
|
left = *lenp;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2017-07-13 05:33:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore(ppos, table))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (left > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
|
|
|
|
left = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
p = buffer;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-08 03:59:29 +08:00
|
|
|
for (; left && vleft--; i++, first = 0) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long val;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
bool neg;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_spaces(&p, &left);
|
proc/sysctl: fix return error for proc_doulongvec_minmax()
If the number of input parameters is less than the total parameters, an
EINVAL error will be returned.
For example, we use proc_doulongvec_minmax to pass up to two parameters
with kern_table:
{
.procname = "monitor_signals",
.data = &monitor_sigs,
.maxlen = 2*sizeof(unsigned long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
Reproduce:
When passing two parameters, it's work normal. But passing only one
parameter, an error "Invalid argument"(EINVAL) is returned.
[root@cl150 ~]# echo 1 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
[root@cl150 ~]# cat /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
1 2
[root@cl150 ~]# echo 3 > /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
[root@cl150 ~]# echo $?
1
[root@cl150 ~]# cat /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
3 2
[root@cl150 ~]#
The following is the result after apply this patch. No error is
returned when the number of input parameters is less than the total
parameters.
[root@cl150 ~]# echo 1 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
[root@cl150 ~]# cat /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
1 2
[root@cl150 ~]# echo 3 > /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
[root@cl150 ~]# echo $?
0
[root@cl150 ~]# cat /proc/sys/kernel/monitor_signals
3 2
[root@cl150 ~]#
There are three processing functions dealing with digital parameters,
__do_proc_dointvec/__do_proc_douintvec/__do_proc_doulongvec_minmax.
This patch deals with __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax, just as
__do_proc_dointvec does, adding a check for parameters 'left'. In
__do_proc_douintvec, its code implementation explicitly does not support
multiple inputs.
static int __do_proc_douintvec(...){
...
/*
* Arrays are not supported, keep this simple. *Do not* add
* support for them.
*/
if (vleft != 1) {
*lenp = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
...
}
So, just __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax has the problem. And most use of
proc_doulongvec_minmax/proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax just have one
parameter.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1544081775-15720-1-git-send-email-cheng.lin130@zte.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Cheng Lin <cheng.lin130@zte.com.cn>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 07:26:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!left)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
err = proc_get_long(&p, &left, &val, &neg,
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_wspace_sep,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(proc_wspace_sep), NULL);
|
2022-01-22 14:13:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err || neg) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2022-01-22 14:13:48 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-26 10:20:55 +08:00
|
|
|
val = convmul * val / convdiv;
|
2019-05-15 06:44:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((min && val < *min) || (max && val > *max)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-07 07:39:56 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*i, val);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-07-07 07:39:56 +08:00
|
|
|
val = convdiv * READ_ONCE(*i) / convmul;
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!first)
|
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\t');
|
|
|
|
proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, val, false);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!write && !first && left && !err)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\n');
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write && !err)
|
2022-12-06 04:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_spaces(&p, &left);
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (write && first)
|
|
|
|
return err ? : -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*lenp -= left;
|
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling
When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:
open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1
write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9
close(1) = 0
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
/bin/true
Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.
The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.
This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-07 05:37:19 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*ppos += *lenp;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-18 18:05:22 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, unsigned long convmul,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long convdiv)
|
2006-10-02 17:18:23 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(table->data, table, write,
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
buffer, lenp, ppos, convmul, convdiv);
|
2006-10-02 17:18:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_doulongvec_minmax - read a vector of long integers with min/max values
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned long) unsigned long
|
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
|
|
|
|
* table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_doulongvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos, 1l, 1l);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax - read a vector of millisecond values with min/max values
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned long) unsigned long
|
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string. The values
|
|
|
|
* are treated as milliseconds, and converted to jiffies when they are stored.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
|
|
|
|
* table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-10-18 18:05:22 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
lenp, ppos, HZ, 1000l);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2017-05-09 06:54:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*lvalp > INT_MAX / HZ)
|
2006-03-24 19:15:50 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2022-07-07 07:39:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*negp)
|
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, -*lvalp * HZ);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp * HZ);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-07-07 07:39:57 +08:00
|
|
|
int val = READ_ONCE(*valp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long lval;
|
|
|
|
if (val < 0) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = true;
|
2015-09-10 06:39:06 +08:00
|
|
|
lval = -(unsigned long)val;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = false;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
lval = (unsigned long)val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*lvalp = lval / HZ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2006-03-24 19:15:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (USER_HZ < HZ && *lvalp > (LONG_MAX / HZ) * USER_HZ)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*valp = clock_t_to_jiffies(*negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
int val = *valp;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long lval;
|
|
|
|
if (val < 0) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = true;
|
2015-09-10 06:39:06 +08:00
|
|
|
lval = -(unsigned long)val;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = false;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
lval = (unsigned long)val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*lvalp = jiffies_to_clock_t(lval);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int *valp,
|
|
|
|
int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2013-07-24 16:39:07 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long jif = msecs_to_jiffies(*negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (jif > INT_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2022-07-12 08:15:20 +08:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(*valp, (int)jif);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-07-12 08:15:20 +08:00
|
|
|
int val = READ_ONCE(*valp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long lval;
|
|
|
|
if (val < 0) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = true;
|
2015-09-10 06:39:06 +08:00
|
|
|
lval = -(unsigned long)val;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:45 +08:00
|
|
|
*negp = false;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
lval = (unsigned long)val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*lvalp = jiffies_to_msecs(lval);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-06-29 16:48:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static int do_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_minmax_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
|
|
|
|
int *valp, int write, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int tmp, ret;
|
|
|
|
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param *param = data;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If writing, first do so via a temporary local int so we can
|
|
|
|
* bounds-check it before touching *valp.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int *ip = write ? &tmp : valp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = do_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_conv(negp, lvalp, ip, write, data);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
|
|
|
if ((param->min && *param->min > tmp) ||
|
|
|
|
(param->max && *param->max < tmp))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
*valp = tmp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dointvec_jiffies - read a vector of integers as seconds
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
|
2022-05-16 17:07:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
* The values read are assumed to be in seconds, and are converted into
|
|
|
|
* jiffies.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,buffer,lenp,ppos,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
do_proc_dointvec_jiffies_conv,NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-06-29 16:48:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param param = {
|
|
|
|
.min = (int *) table->extra1,
|
|
|
|
.max = (int *) table->extra2,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
|
|
|
do_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_minmax_conv, ¶m);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies - read a vector of integers as 1/USER_HZ seconds
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
2005-11-07 17:01:06 +08:00
|
|
|
* @ppos: pointer to the file position
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
|
2022-05-16 17:07:53 +08:00
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
|
|
|
* The values read are assumed to be in 1/USER_HZ seconds, and
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
* are converted into jiffies.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-05-22 13:29:33 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
|
|
|
do_proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies_conv, NULL);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies - read a vector of integers as 1 milliseconds
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
2005-05-01 23:59:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: the current position in the file
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
|
2022-07-12 08:15:20 +08:00
|
|
|
* values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
|
|
|
|
* The values read are assumed to be in 1/1000 seconds, and
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
* are converted into jiffies.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
do_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_conv, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2006-10-02 17:19:00 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct pid *new_pid;
|
|
|
|
pid_t tmp;
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 20:19:20 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp = pid_vnr(cad_pid);
|
2006-10-02 17:19:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
r = __do_proc_dointvec(&tmp, table, write, buffer,
|
2006-10-02 17:19:00 +08:00
|
|
|
lenp, ppos, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (r || !write)
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new_pid = find_get_pid(tmp);
|
|
|
|
if (!new_pid)
|
|
|
|
return -ESRCH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_pid(xchg(&cad_pid, new_pid));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* proc_do_large_bitmap - read/write from/to a large bitmap
|
|
|
|
* @table: the sysctl table
|
|
|
|
* @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
|
|
|
|
* @buffer: the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @lenp: the size of the user buffer
|
|
|
|
* @ppos: file position
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The bitmap is stored at table->data and the bitmap length (in bits)
|
|
|
|
* in table->maxlen.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We use a range comma separated format (e.g. 1,3-4,10-10) so that
|
|
|
|
* large bitmaps may be represented in a compact manner. Writing into
|
|
|
|
* the file will clear the bitmap then update it with the given input.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int proc_do_large_bitmap(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t left = *lenp;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long bitmap_len = table->maxlen;
|
2014-05-13 07:04:53 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *bitmap = *(unsigned long **) table->data;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *tmp_bitmap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char tr_a[] = { '-', ',', '\n' }, tr_b[] = { ',', '\n', 0 }, c;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-13 07:04:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!bitmap || !bitmap_len || !left || (*ppos && !write)) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
char *p = buffer;
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t skipped = 0;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (left > PAGE_SIZE - 1) {
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
left = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/* How much of the buffer we'll skip this pass */
|
|
|
|
skipped = *lenp - left;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-15 06:44:52 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(bitmap_len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!tmp_bitmap)
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_char(&p, &left, '\n');
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
while (!err && left) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long val_a, val_b;
|
|
|
|
bool neg;
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t saved_left;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/* In case we stop parsing mid-number, we can reset */
|
|
|
|
saved_left = left;
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
err = proc_get_long(&p, &left, &val_a, &neg, tr_a,
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
sizeof(tr_a), &c);
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we consumed the entirety of a truncated buffer or
|
|
|
|
* only one char is left (may be a "-"), then stop here,
|
|
|
|
* reset, & come back for more.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((left <= 1) && skipped) {
|
|
|
|
left = saved_left;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (val_a >= bitmap_len || neg) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
val_b = val_a;
|
|
|
|
if (left) {
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
p++;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
left--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c == '-') {
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
err = proc_get_long(&p, &left, &val_b,
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
&neg, tr_b, sizeof(tr_b),
|
|
|
|
&c);
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we consumed all of a truncated buffer or
|
|
|
|
* then stop here, reset, & come back for more.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!left && skipped) {
|
|
|
|
left = saved_left;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (val_b >= bitmap_len || neg ||
|
|
|
|
val_a > val_b) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (left) {
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
p++;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
left--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-29 05:42:50 +08:00
|
|
|
bitmap_set(tmp_bitmap, val_a, val_b - val_a + 1);
|
2015-12-24 13:13:10 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_skip_char(&p, &left, '\n');
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-15 06:45:13 +08:00
|
|
|
left += skipped;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long bit_a, bit_b = 0;
|
2021-07-01 09:54:53 +08:00
|
|
|
bool first = 1;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (left) {
|
|
|
|
bit_a = find_next_bit(bitmap, bitmap_len, bit_b);
|
|
|
|
if (bit_a >= bitmap_len)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
bit_b = find_next_zero_bit(bitmap, bitmap_len,
|
|
|
|
bit_a + 1) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!first)
|
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, ',');
|
|
|
|
proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, bit_a, false);
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (bit_a != bit_b) {
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '-');
|
|
|
|
proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, bit_b, false);
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
first = 0; bit_b++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\n');
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
|
|
if (write) {
|
|
|
|
if (*ppos)
|
|
|
|
bitmap_or(bitmap, bitmap, tmp_bitmap, bitmap_len);
|
|
|
|
else
|
2012-03-29 05:42:50 +08:00
|
|
|
bitmap_copy(bitmap, tmp_bitmap, bitmap_len);
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*lenp -= left;
|
|
|
|
*ppos += *lenp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-11-18 07:30:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-15 06:44:52 +08:00
|
|
|
bitmap_free(tmp_bitmap);
|
2017-11-18 07:30:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-13 09:00:45 +08:00
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-24 06:57:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dostring(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-03 18:59:36 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dobool(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int proc_douintvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int proc_douintvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
2010-05-05 08:26:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 02:08:13 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dou8vec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-06-29 16:48:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_doulongvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int proc_do_large_bitmap(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
|
|
|
|
int proc_do_static_key(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
struct static_key *key = (struct static_key *)table->data;
|
|
|
|
static DEFINE_MUTEX(static_key_mutex);
|
|
|
|
int val, ret;
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table tmp = {
|
|
|
|
.data = &val,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(val),
|
|
|
|
.mode = table->mode,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&static_key_mutex);
|
|
|
|
val = static_key_enabled(key);
|
|
|
|
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
|
|
if (write && !ret) {
|
|
|
|
if (val)
|
|
|
|
static_key_enable(key);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
static_key_disable(key);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&static_key_mutex);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "panic",
|
|
|
|
.data = &panic_timeout,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tainted",
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_taint,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "sysctl_writes_strict",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_writes_strict,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2022-01-22 14:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_NEG_ONE,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "print-fatal-signals",
|
|
|
|
.data = &print_fatal_signals,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "reboot-cmd",
|
|
|
|
.data = reboot_command,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = 256,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dostring,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "stop-a",
|
|
|
|
.data = &stop_a_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "scons-poweroff",
|
|
|
|
.data = &scons_pwroff,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tsb-ratio",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_tsb_ratio,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PARISC
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "soft-power",
|
|
|
|
.data = &pwrsw_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL_ARCH_UNALIGN_ALLOW
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "unaligned-trap",
|
|
|
|
.data = &unaligned_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_TRACER
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "stack_tracer_enabled",
|
|
|
|
.data = &stack_tracer_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = stack_trace_sysctl,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ftrace_dump_on_oops",
|
|
|
|
.data = &ftrace_dump_on_oops,
|
2024-02-23 16:31:26 +08:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = MAX_TRACER_SIZE,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2024-02-23 16:31:26 +08:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dostring,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "traceoff_on_warning",
|
|
|
|
.data = &__disable_trace_on_warning,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(__disable_trace_on_warning),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "tracepoint_printk",
|
|
|
|
.data = &tracepoint_printk,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(tracepoint_printk),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = tracepoint_printk_sysctl,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "modprobe",
|
|
|
|
.data = &modprobe_path,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = KMOD_PATH_LEN,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dostring,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "modules_disabled",
|
|
|
|
.data = &modules_disabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
/* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "hotplug",
|
|
|
|
.data = &uevent_helper,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = UEVENT_HELPER_PATH_LEN,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dostring,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "sysrq",
|
|
|
|
.data = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = sysrq_sysctl_handler,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "cad_pid",
|
|
|
|
.data = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_do_cad_pid,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "threads-max",
|
|
|
|
.data = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = sysctl_max_threads,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "overflowuid",
|
|
|
|
.data = &overflowuid,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2022-01-22 14:11:19 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:13:03 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_MAXOLDUID,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "overflowgid",
|
|
|
|
.data = &overflowgid,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2022-01-22 14:11:19 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:13:03 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_MAXOLDUID,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_S390
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "userprocess_debug",
|
|
|
|
.data = &show_unhandled_signals,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "pid_max",
|
|
|
|
.data = &pid_max,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = &pid_max_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = &pid_max_max,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_on_oops",
|
|
|
|
.data = &panic_on_oops,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_print",
|
|
|
|
.data = &panic_print,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ngroups_max",
|
2022-01-22 14:11:09 +08:00
|
|
|
.data = (void *)&ngroups_max,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0444,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "cap_last_cap",
|
|
|
|
.data = (void *)&cap_last_cap,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0444,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "unknown_nmi_panic",
|
|
|
|
.data = &unknown_nmi_panic,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
2020-06-04 07:27:18 +08:00
|
|
|
#if (defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || defined(CONFIG_PARISC)) && \
|
|
|
|
defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
2020-06-04 07:27:18 +08:00
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_on_stackoverflow",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
2020-06-04 07:27:18 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
2020-06-04 07:27:18 +08:00
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_on_unrecovered_nmi",
|
|
|
|
.data = &panic_on_unrecovered_nmi,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
2020-06-04 07:27:18 +08:00
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_on_io_nmi",
|
|
|
|
.data = &panic_on_io_nmi,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "bootloader_type",
|
|
|
|
.data = &bootloader_type,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0444,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "bootloader_version",
|
|
|
|
.data = &bootloader_version,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0444,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "io_delay_type",
|
|
|
|
.data = &io_delay_type,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "randomize_va_space",
|
|
|
|
.data = &randomize_va_space,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_S390) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "spin_retry",
|
|
|
|
.data = &spin_retry,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "acpi_video_flags",
|
|
|
|
.data = &acpi_realmode_flags,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL_ARCH_UNALIGN_NO_WARN
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "ignore-unaligned-usertrap",
|
|
|
|
.data = &no_unaligned_warning,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "max_lock_depth",
|
|
|
|
.data = &max_lock_depth,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* User-space scripts rely on the existence of this file
|
|
|
|
* as a feature check for perf_events being enabled.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* So it's an ABI, do not remove!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "perf_event_paranoid",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_perf_event_paranoid,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_event_paranoid),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "perf_event_mlock_kb",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_perf_event_mlock,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_event_mlock),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "perf_event_max_sample_rate",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2023-07-21 17:06:07 +08:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = perf_event_max_sample_rate_handler,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "perf_cpu_time_max_percent",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE_HUNDRED,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "perf_event_max_stack",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_perf_event_max_stack,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = perf_event_max_stack_handler,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:11:14 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = (void *)&six_hundred_forty_kb,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = perf_event_max_stack_handler,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE_THOUSAND,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_on_warn",
|
|
|
|
.data = &panic_on_warn,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2022-05-17 23:07:31 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TREE_RCU
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "panic_on_rcu_stall",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2020-08-31 14:41:17 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "max_rcu_stall_to_panic",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_max_rcu_stall_to_panic,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_max_rcu_stall_to_panic),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
};
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "overcommit_memory",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_overcommit_memory,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_overcommit_memory),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2020-08-07 14:23:15 +08:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = overcommit_policy_handler,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "overcommit_ratio",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_overcommit_ratio,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_overcommit_ratio),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = overcommit_ratio_handler,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "overcommit_kbytes",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_overcommit_kbytes,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_overcommit_kbytes),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = overcommit_kbytes_handler,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "page-cluster",
|
|
|
|
.data = &page_cluster,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-10-24 00:25:33 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = (void *)&page_cluster_max,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "dirtytime_expire_seconds",
|
|
|
|
.data = &dirtytime_expire_interval,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(dirtytime_expire_interval),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = dirtytime_interval_handler,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "swappiness",
|
|
|
|
.data = &vm_swappiness,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(vm_swappiness),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
2022-01-22 14:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO_HUNDRED,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
2022-06-09 18:40:32 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "numa_stat",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_vm_numa_stat,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = sysctl_vm_numa_stat_handler,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "drop_caches",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_drop_caches,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0200,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = drop_caches_sysctl_handler,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
|
2022-01-22 14:10:55 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = SYSCTL_FOUR,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
},
|
mm: allow a controlled amount of unfairness in the page lock
Commit 2a9127fcf229 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic") made
the page locking entirely fair, in that if a waiter came in while the
lock was held, the lock would be transferred to the lockers strictly in
order.
That was intended to finally get rid of the long-reported watchdog
failures that involved the page lock under extreme load, where a process
could end up waiting essentially forever, as other page lockers stole
the lock from under it.
It also improved some benchmarks, but it ended up causing huge
performance regressions on others, simply because fair lock behavior
doesn't end up giving out the lock as aggressively, causing better
worst-case latency, but potentially much worse average latencies and
throughput.
Instead of reverting that change entirely, this introduces a controlled
amount of unfairness, with a sysctl knob to tune it if somebody needs
to. But the default value should hopefully be good for any normal load,
allowing a few rounds of lock stealing, but enforcing the strict
ordering before the lock has been stolen too many times.
There is also a hint from Matthieu Baerts that the fair page coloring
may end up exposing an ABBA deadlock that is hidden by the usual
optimistic lock stealing, and while the unfairness doesn't fix the
fundamental issue (and I'm still looking at that), it avoids it in
practice.
The amount of unfairness can be modified by writing a new value to the
'sysctl_page_lock_unfairness' variable (default value of 5, exposed
through /proc/sys/vm/page_lock_unfairness), but that is hopefully
something we'd use mainly for debugging rather than being necessary for
any deep system tuning.
This whole issue has exposed just how critical the page lock can be, and
how contended it gets under certain locks. And the main contention
doesn't really seem to be anything related to IO (which was the origin
of this lock), but for things like just verifying that the page file
mapping is stable while faulting in the page into a page table.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/ed8442fd-6f54-dd84-cd4a-941e8b7ee603@MichaelLarabel.com/
Link: https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=linux-50-59&num=1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/c560a38d-8313-51fb-b1ec-e904bd8836bc@tessares.net/
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Larabel <Michael@michaellarabel.com>
Tested-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-09-14 05:05:35 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "page_lock_unfairness",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_page_lock_unfairness,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_page_lock_unfairness),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "max_map_count",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_max_map_count,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_max_map_count),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "nr_trim_pages",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_nr_trim_pages,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_nr_trim_pages),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "vfs_cache_pressure",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2021-02-26 09:20:53 +08:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT) || \
|
|
|
|
defined(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "legacy_va_layout",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_legacy_va_layout,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_legacy_va_layout),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2021-02-26 09:20:53 +08:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "zone_reclaim_mode",
|
|
|
|
.data = &node_reclaim_mode,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(node_reclaim_mode),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2021-02-26 09:20:53 +08:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "stat_interval",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_stat_interval,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_stat_interval),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "stat_refresh",
|
|
|
|
.data = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = 0,
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = vmstat_refresh,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "mmap_min_addr",
|
|
|
|
.data = &dac_mmap_min_addr,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = mmap_min_addr_handler,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && !defined(CONFIG_UML))|| \
|
|
|
|
(defined(CONFIG_SUPERH) && defined(CONFIG_VSYSCALL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "vdso_enabled",
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
|
|
|
|
.data = &vdso32_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(vdso32_enabled),
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
.data = &vdso_enabled,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(vdso_enabled),
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "user_reserve_kbytes",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_user_reserve_kbytes,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_user_reserve_kbytes),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "admin_reserve_kbytes",
|
|
|
|
.data = &sysctl_admin_reserve_kbytes,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_admin_reserve_kbytes),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "mmap_rnd_bits",
|
|
|
|
.data = &mmap_rnd_bits,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_bits),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_bits_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_bits_max,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "mmap_rnd_compat_bits",
|
|
|
|
.data = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits,
|
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_compat_bits),
|
|
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
|
|
|
.extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
|
|
|
|
.extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
};
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-01-22 14:13:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int __init sysctl_init_bases(void)
|
2019-02-26 06:28:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-05-23 20:22:19 +08:00
|
|
|
register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_table);
|
|
|
|
register_sysctl_init("vm", vm_table);
|
2019-02-26 06:28:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2019-02-26 06:28:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-24 14:43:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No sense putting this after each symbol definition, twice,
|
|
|
|
* exception granted :-)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-08-03 18:59:36 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dobool);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec);
|
2016-08-26 06:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_douintvec);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_jiffies);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_minmax);
|
2017-07-13 05:33:40 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_douintvec_minmax);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dostring);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_doulongvec_minmax);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax);
|
2019-04-18 04:35:49 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_do_large_bitmap);
|