2019-05-27 14:55:01 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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/*
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* Stateless NAT actions
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2007 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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*/
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/netfilter.h>
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#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
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#include <linux/skbuff.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/spinlock.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/tc_act/tc_nat.h>
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#include <net/act_api.h>
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2019-03-20 22:00:06 +08:00
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#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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#include <net/icmp.h>
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#include <net/ip.h>
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#include <net/netlink.h>
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#include <net/tc_act/tc_nat.h>
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#include <net/tcp.h>
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#include <net/udp.h>
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netns: make struct pernet_operations::id unsigned int
Make struct pernet_operations::id unsigned.
There are 2 reasons to do so:
1)
This field is really an index into an zero based array and
thus is unsigned entity. Using negative value is out-of-bound
access by definition.
2)
On x86_64 unsigned 32-bit data which are mixed with pointers
via array indexing or offsets added or subtracted to pointers
are preffered to signed 32-bit data.
"int" being used as an array index needs to be sign-extended
to 64-bit before being used.
void f(long *p, int i)
{
g(p[i]);
}
roughly translates to
movsx rsi, esi
mov rdi, [rsi+...]
call g
MOVSX is 3 byte instruction which isn't necessary if the variable is
unsigned because x86_64 is zero extending by default.
Now, there is net_generic() function which, you guessed it right, uses
"int" as an array index:
static inline void *net_generic(const struct net *net, int id)
{
...
ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1];
...
}
And this function is used a lot, so those sign extensions add up.
Patch snipes ~1730 bytes on allyesconfig kernel (without all junk
messing with code generation):
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 70/598 up/down: 396/-2126 (-1730)
Unfortunately some functions actually grow bigger.
This is a semmingly random artefact of code generation with register
allocator being used differently. gcc decides that some variable
needs to live in new r8+ registers and every access now requires REX
prefix. Or it is shifted into r12, so [r12+0] addressing mode has to be
used which is longer than [r8]
However, overall balance is in negative direction:
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 70/598 up/down: 396/-2126 (-1730)
function old new delta
nfsd4_lock 3886 3959 +73
tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1096 1140 +44
mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2776 2808 +32
tipc_mon_rcv 1032 1058 +26
svcauth_gss_legacy_init 1413 1429 +16
tipc_bcbase_select_primary 379 392 +13
nfsd4_exchange_id 1247 1260 +13
nfsd4_setclientid_confirm 782 793 +11
...
put_client_renew_locked 494 480 -14
ip_set_sockfn_get 730 716 -14
geneve_sock_add 829 813 -16
nfsd4_sequence_done 721 703 -18
nlmclnt_lookup_host 708 686 -22
nfsd4_lockt 1085 1063 -22
nfs_get_client 1077 1050 -27
tcf_bpf_init 1106 1076 -30
nfsd4_encode_fattr 5997 5930 -67
Total: Before=154856051, After=154854321, chg -0.00%
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-17 09:58:21 +08:00
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static unsigned int nat_net_id;
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2016-07-26 07:09:41 +08:00
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static struct tc_action_ops act_nat_ops;
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2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
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2008-01-24 12:36:30 +08:00
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static const struct nla_policy nat_policy[TCA_NAT_MAX + 1] = {
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[TCA_NAT_PARMS] = { .len = sizeof(struct tc_nat) },
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};
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2013-01-14 13:15:39 +08:00
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static int tcf_nat_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, struct nlattr *est,
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2018-02-15 23:54:56 +08:00
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struct tc_action **a, int ovr, int bind,
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net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action
- pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler,
to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain
exists and (eventually) refcounting it.
- remove code that validates the control action after a successful call
to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids
addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at
the same time.
- add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action
and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init()
handler.
- add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and
swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one.
This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly
in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after
successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact()
to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently.
By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid
'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats
like the following one:
# tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \
> ip_proto tcp action drop
# tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \
> ip_proto udp action drop
# tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \
> action gact goto chain 42 index 66
# tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \
> action gact goto chain 43 index 66
# echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
<...>
unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024):
comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0
[<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
[<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110
[<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250
[<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0
[<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
[<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0
[<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
[<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain")
Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 21:59:59 +08:00
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bool rtnl_held, struct tcf_proto *tp,
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2019-10-30 22:09:05 +08:00
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u32 flags, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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{
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2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
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struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, nat_net_id);
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2008-01-23 14:11:50 +08:00
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struct nlattr *tb[TCA_NAT_MAX + 1];
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2019-03-20 22:00:06 +08:00
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struct tcf_chain *goto_ch = NULL;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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struct tc_nat *parm;
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2008-01-24 12:33:32 +08:00
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int ret = 0, err;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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struct tcf_nat *p;
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2019-08-01 21:02:51 +08:00
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u32 index;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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2008-01-24 12:33:32 +08:00
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if (nla == NULL)
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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return -EINVAL;
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netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness
We currently have two levels of strict validation:
1) liberal (default)
- undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
- garbage at end of message accepted
2) strict (opt-in)
- NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
* TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
attributes (in message or nested)
* MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type
* UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
* STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size
The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().
Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.
We end up with the following renames:
* nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated
* nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
* nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
* nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
* nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
* nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated
Using spatch, of course:
@@
expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
@@
expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.
Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.
Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.
In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
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err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, TCA_NAT_MAX, nla, nat_policy,
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NULL);
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2008-01-24 12:33:32 +08:00
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if (err < 0)
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return err;
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2008-01-24 12:36:30 +08:00
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if (tb[TCA_NAT_PARMS] == NULL)
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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return -EINVAL;
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2008-01-23 14:11:50 +08:00
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parm = nla_data(tb[TCA_NAT_PARMS]);
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2019-08-01 21:02:51 +08:00
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index = parm->index;
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err = tcf_idr_check_alloc(tn, &index, a, bind);
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2018-07-05 22:24:32 +08:00
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if (!err) {
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2019-08-01 21:02:51 +08:00
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ret = tcf_idr_create(tn, index, est, a,
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2019-10-30 22:09:06 +08:00
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&act_nat_ops, bind, false, 0);
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2018-07-05 22:24:32 +08:00
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if (ret) {
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2019-08-01 21:02:51 +08:00
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tcf_idr_cleanup(tn, index);
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2014-02-12 09:07:31 +08:00
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return ret;
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2018-07-05 22:24:32 +08:00
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}
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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ret = ACT_P_CREATED;
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2018-07-05 22:24:32 +08:00
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} else if (err > 0) {
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2013-12-23 21:02:11 +08:00
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if (bind)
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return 0;
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2018-07-05 22:24:30 +08:00
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if (!ovr) {
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tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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return -EEXIST;
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2018-07-05 22:24:30 +08:00
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}
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2018-07-05 22:24:32 +08:00
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} else {
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return err;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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}
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2019-03-20 22:00:06 +08:00
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err = tcf_action_check_ctrlact(parm->action, tp, &goto_ch, extack);
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if (err < 0)
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goto release_idr;
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2016-07-26 07:09:41 +08:00
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p = to_tcf_nat(*a);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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spin_lock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
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p->old_addr = parm->old_addr;
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p->new_addr = parm->new_addr;
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p->mask = parm->mask;
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p->flags = parm->flags;
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2019-03-20 22:00:06 +08:00
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goto_ch = tcf_action_set_ctrlact(*a, parm->action, goto_ch);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
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2019-03-20 22:00:06 +08:00
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if (goto_ch)
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tcf_chain_put_by_act(goto_ch);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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if (ret == ACT_P_CREATED)
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2017-08-30 14:31:59 +08:00
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tcf_idr_insert(tn, *a);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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return ret;
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2019-03-20 22:00:06 +08:00
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release_idr:
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tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
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return err;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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}
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2018-08-12 21:34:54 +08:00
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static int tcf_nat_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
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struct tcf_result *res)
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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{
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2016-07-26 07:09:41 +08:00
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struct tcf_nat *p = to_tcf_nat(a);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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struct iphdr *iph;
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__be32 old_addr;
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__be32 new_addr;
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__be32 mask;
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__be32 addr;
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int egress;
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int action;
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int ihl;
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2010-08-04 01:39:18 +08:00
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int noff;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);
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2016-06-06 18:32:53 +08:00
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tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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old_addr = p->old_addr;
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new_addr = p->new_addr;
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mask = p->mask;
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egress = p->flags & TCA_NAT_FLAG_EGRESS;
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action = p->tcf_action;
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2011-01-09 16:30:54 +08:00
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bstats_update(&p->tcf_bstats, skb);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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spin_unlock(&p->tcf_lock);
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if (unlikely(action == TC_ACT_SHOT))
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goto drop;
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2010-08-04 01:39:18 +08:00
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noff = skb_network_offset(skb);
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if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph) + noff))
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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goto drop;
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iph = ip_hdr(skb);
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if (egress)
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addr = iph->saddr;
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else
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addr = iph->daddr;
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if (!((old_addr ^ addr) & mask)) {
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2016-02-20 06:05:25 +08:00
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if (skb_try_make_writable(skb, sizeof(*iph) + noff))
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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goto drop;
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new_addr &= mask;
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new_addr |= addr & ~mask;
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/* Rewrite IP header */
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iph = ip_hdr(skb);
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if (egress)
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iph->saddr = new_addr;
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else
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iph->daddr = new_addr;
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2007-11-29 22:17:11 +08:00
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csum_replace4(&iph->check, addr, new_addr);
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2010-05-29 22:26:59 +08:00
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} else if ((iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET)) ||
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iph->protocol != IPPROTO_ICMP) {
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goto out;
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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}
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ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
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/* It would be nice to share code with stateful NAT. */
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switch (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET) ? 0 : iph->protocol) {
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case IPPROTO_TCP:
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{
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struct tcphdr *tcph;
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2010-08-04 01:39:18 +08:00
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if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl + sizeof(*tcph) + noff) ||
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2016-02-20 06:05:25 +08:00
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skb_try_make_writable(skb, ihl + sizeof(*tcph) + noff))
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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goto drop;
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tcph = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
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2015-08-18 04:42:25 +08:00
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inet_proto_csum_replace4(&tcph->check, skb, addr, new_addr,
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true);
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2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
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break;
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}
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case IPPROTO_UDP:
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{
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struct udphdr *udph;
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2010-08-04 01:39:18 +08:00
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|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl + sizeof(*udph) + noff) ||
|
2016-02-20 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_try_make_writable(skb, ihl + sizeof(*udph) + noff))
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
udph = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
|
|
|
|
if (udph->check || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
|
2007-11-29 22:17:11 +08:00
|
|
|
inet_proto_csum_replace4(&udph->check, skb, addr,
|
2015-08-18 04:42:25 +08:00
|
|
|
new_addr, true);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!udph->check)
|
|
|
|
udph->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ICMP:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct icmphdr *icmph;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-04 01:39:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl + sizeof(*icmph) + noff))
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
icmph = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-02 08:12:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!icmp_is_err(icmph->type))
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-04 01:39:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl + sizeof(*icmph) + sizeof(*iph) +
|
|
|
|
noff))
|
2010-07-09 23:33:25 +08:00
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-29 21:41:46 +08:00
|
|
|
icmph = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
iph = (void *)(icmph + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (egress)
|
|
|
|
addr = iph->daddr;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
addr = iph->saddr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((old_addr ^ addr) & mask)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-20 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb_try_make_writable(skb, ihl + sizeof(*icmph) +
|
|
|
|
sizeof(*iph) + noff))
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
icmph = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);
|
|
|
|
iph = (void *)(icmph + 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new_addr &= mask;
|
|
|
|
new_addr |= addr & ~mask;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX Fix up the inner checksums. */
|
|
|
|
if (egress)
|
|
|
|
iph->daddr = new_addr;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
iph->saddr = new_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-29 22:17:11 +08:00
|
|
|
inet_proto_csum_replace4(&icmph->checksum, skb, addr, new_addr,
|
2015-08-18 04:42:25 +08:00
|
|
|
false);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-29 22:26:59 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return action;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
drop:
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);
|
|
|
|
p->tcf_qstats.drops++;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&p->tcf_lock);
|
|
|
|
return TC_ACT_SHOT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int tcf_nat_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a,
|
|
|
|
int bind, int ref)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *b = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
|
2016-07-26 07:09:41 +08:00
|
|
|
struct tcf_nat *p = to_tcf_nat(a);
|
2010-08-17 04:04:22 +08:00
|
|
|
struct tc_nat opt = {
|
|
|
|
.index = p->tcf_index,
|
2018-07-05 22:24:24 +08:00
|
|
|
.refcnt = refcount_read(&p->tcf_refcnt) - ref,
|
|
|
|
.bindcnt = atomic_read(&p->tcf_bindcnt) - bind,
|
2010-08-17 04:04:22 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
struct tcf_t t;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-03 15:09:20 +08:00
|
|
|
spin_lock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
|
|
|
|
opt.old_addr = p->old_addr;
|
|
|
|
opt.new_addr = p->new_addr;
|
|
|
|
opt.mask = p->mask;
|
|
|
|
opt.flags = p->flags;
|
|
|
|
opt.action = p->tcf_action;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-29 17:11:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (nla_put(skb, TCA_NAT_PARMS, sizeof(opt), &opt))
|
|
|
|
goto nla_put_failure;
|
2016-06-06 18:32:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tcf_tm_dump(&t, &p->tcf_tm);
|
2016-04-26 16:06:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (nla_put_64bit(skb, TCA_NAT_TM, sizeof(t), &t, TCA_NAT_PAD))
|
2012-03-29 17:11:39 +08:00
|
|
|
goto nla_put_failure;
|
2018-09-03 15:09:20 +08:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return skb->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-23 14:11:50 +08:00
|
|
|
nla_put_failure:
|
2018-09-03 15:09:20 +08:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
nlmsg_trim(skb, b);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static int tcf_nat_walker(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
|
|
struct netlink_callback *cb, int type,
|
2018-02-15 23:54:58 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct tc_action_ops *ops,
|
|
|
|
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, nat_net_id);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 23:54:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return tcf_generic_walker(tn, skb, cb, type, ops, extack);
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-30 01:15:35 +08:00
|
|
|
static int tcf_nat_search(struct net *net, struct tc_action **a, u32 index)
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, nat_net_id);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-30 14:31:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return tcf_idr_search(tn, a, index);
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct tc_action_ops act_nat_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.kind = "nat",
|
2019-02-10 20:25:00 +08:00
|
|
|
.id = TCA_ID_NAT,
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
2018-08-12 21:34:54 +08:00
|
|
|
.act = tcf_nat_act,
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
.dump = tcf_nat_dump,
|
|
|
|
.init = tcf_nat_init,
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
.walk = tcf_nat_walker,
|
|
|
|
.lookup = tcf_nat_search,
|
2016-07-26 07:09:41 +08:00
|
|
|
.size = sizeof(struct tcf_nat),
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __net_init int nat_init_net(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, nat_net_id);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-26 01:01:32 +08:00
|
|
|
return tc_action_net_init(net, tn, &act_nat_ops);
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-12 07:35:03 +08:00
|
|
|
static void __net_exit nat_exit_net(struct list_head *net_list)
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-12-12 07:35:03 +08:00
|
|
|
tc_action_net_exit(net_list, nat_net_id);
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct pernet_operations nat_net_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.init = nat_init_net,
|
2017-12-12 07:35:03 +08:00
|
|
|
.exit_batch = nat_exit_net,
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
.id = &nat_net_id,
|
|
|
|
.size = sizeof(struct tc_action_net),
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Stateless NAT actions");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init nat_init_module(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
return tcf_register_action(&act_nat_ops, &nat_net_ops);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit nat_cleanup_module(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-02-23 07:57:53 +08:00
|
|
|
tcf_unregister_action(&act_nat_ops, &nat_net_ops);
|
2007-09-28 03:48:05 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_init(nat_init_module);
|
|
|
|
module_exit(nat_cleanup_module);
|