linux/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Topspin Communications. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Voltaire, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Cisco. All rights reserved.
*
* This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
* licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
* General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
* COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
* OpenIB.org BSD license below:
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
* without modification, are permitted provided that the following
* conditions are met:
*
* - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer.
*
* - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
* provided with the distribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "user_mad: " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/cdev.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/semaphore.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <rdma/ib_mad.h>
#include <rdma/ib_user_mad.h>
#include <rdma/rdma_netlink.h>
#include "core_priv.h"
MODULE_AUTHOR("Roland Dreier");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("InfiniBand userspace MAD packet access");
MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
#define MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE 200000
enum {
IB_UMAD_MAX_PORTS = RDMA_MAX_PORTS,
IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS = 32,
IB_UMAD_MAJOR = 231,
IB_UMAD_MINOR_BASE = 0,
IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR = 64,
IB_UMAD_NUM_DYNAMIC_MINOR = IB_UMAD_MAX_PORTS - IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR,
IB_ISSM_MINOR_BASE = IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR,
};
/*
* Our lifetime rules for these structs are the following:
* device special file is opened, we take a reference on the
* ib_umad_port's struct ib_umad_device. We drop these
* references in the corresponding close().
*
* In addition to references coming from open character devices, there
* is one more reference to each ib_umad_device representing the
* module's reference taken when allocating the ib_umad_device in
* ib_umad_add_one().
*
* When destroying an ib_umad_device, we drop the module's reference.
*/
struct ib_umad_port {
struct cdev cdev;
struct device dev;
struct cdev sm_cdev;
struct device sm_dev;
struct semaphore sm_sem;
struct mutex file_mutex;
struct list_head file_list;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
struct ib_umad_device *umad_dev;
int dev_num;
RDMA: Support more than 255 rdma ports Current code uses many different types when dealing with a port of a RDMA device: u8, unsigned int and u32. Switch to u32 to clean up the logic. This allows us to make (at least) the core view consistent and use the same type. Unfortunately not all places can be converted. Many uverbs functions expect port to be u8 so keep those places in order not to break UAPIs. HW/Spec defined values must also not be changed. With the switch to u32 we now can support devices with more than 255 ports. U32_MAX is reserved to make control logic a bit easier to deal with. As a device with U32_MAX ports probably isn't going to happen any time soon this seems like a non issue. When a device with more than 255 ports is created uverbs will report the RDMA device as having 255 ports as this is the max currently supported. The verbs interface is not changed yet because the IBTA spec limits the port size in too many places to be u8 and all applications that relies in verbs won't be able to cope with this change. At this stage, we are extending the interfaces that are using vendor channel solely Once the limitation is lifted mlx5 in switchdev mode will be able to have thousands of SFs created by the device. As the only instance of an RDMA device that reports more than 255 ports will be a representor device and it exposes itself as a RAW Ethernet only device CM/MAD/IPoIB and other ULPs aren't effected by this change and their sysfs/interfaces that are exposes to userspace can remain unchanged. While here cleanup some alignment issues and remove unneeded sanity checks (mainly in rdmavt), Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301070420.439400-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
2021-03-01 15:04:20 +08:00
u32 port_num;
};
struct ib_umad_device {
struct kref kref;
struct ib_umad_port ports[];
};
struct ib_umad_file {
struct mutex mutex;
struct ib_umad_port *port;
struct list_head recv_list;
atomic_t recv_list_size;
struct list_head send_list;
struct list_head port_list;
spinlock_t send_lock;
wait_queue_head_t recv_wait;
struct ib_mad_agent *agent[IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS];
int agents_dead;
u8 use_pkey_index;
u8 already_used;
};
struct ib_umad_packet {
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg;
struct ib_mad_recv_wc *recv_wc;
struct list_head list;
int length;
struct ib_user_mad mad;
};
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr {
struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr;
struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr;
} __packed;
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/ib_umad.h>
static const dev_t base_umad_dev = MKDEV(IB_UMAD_MAJOR, IB_UMAD_MINOR_BASE);
static const dev_t base_issm_dev = MKDEV(IB_UMAD_MAJOR, IB_UMAD_MINOR_BASE) +
IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR;
static dev_t dynamic_umad_dev;
static dev_t dynamic_issm_dev;
static DEFINE_IDA(umad_ida);
static int ib_umad_add_one(struct ib_device *device);
static void ib_umad_remove_one(struct ib_device *device, void *client_data);
static void ib_umad_dev_free(struct kref *kref)
{
struct ib_umad_device *dev =
container_of(kref, struct ib_umad_device, kref);
kfree(dev);
}
static void ib_umad_dev_get(struct ib_umad_device *dev)
{
kref_get(&dev->kref);
}
static void ib_umad_dev_put(struct ib_umad_device *dev)
{
kref_put(&dev->kref, ib_umad_dev_free);
}
static int hdr_size(struct ib_umad_file *file)
{
return file->use_pkey_index ? sizeof(struct ib_user_mad_hdr) :
sizeof(struct ib_user_mad_hdr_old);
}
/* caller must hold file->mutex */
static struct ib_mad_agent *__get_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, int id)
{
return file->agents_dead ? NULL : file->agent[id];
}
static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
struct ib_umad_packet *packet, bool is_recv_mad)
{
int ret = 1;
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
if (is_recv_mad &&
atomic_read(&file->recv_list_size) > MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE)
goto unlock;
for (packet->mad.hdr.id = 0;
packet->mad.hdr.id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS;
packet->mad.hdr.id++)
if (agent == __get_agent(file, packet->mad.hdr.id)) {
list_add_tail(&packet->list, &file->recv_list);
atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size);
wake_up_interruptible(&file->recv_wait);
ret = 0;
break;
}
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
return ret;
}
static void dequeue_send(struct ib_umad_file *file,
struct ib_umad_packet *packet)
{
spin_lock_irq(&file->send_lock);
list_del(&packet->list);
spin_unlock_irq(&file->send_lock);
}
static void send_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
struct ib_mad_send_wc *send_wc)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file = agent->context;
struct ib_umad_packet *packet = send_wc->send_buf->context[0];
dequeue_send(file, packet);
rdma_destroy_ah(packet->msg->ah, RDMA_DESTROY_AH_SLEEPABLE);
ib_free_send_mad(packet->msg);
if (send_wc->status == IB_WC_RESP_TIMEOUT_ERR) {
packet->length = IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR;
packet->mad.hdr.status = ETIMEDOUT;
if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet, false))
return;
}
kfree(packet);
}
static void recv_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
struct ib_mad_send_buf *send_buf,
struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_recv_wc)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file = agent->context;
struct ib_umad_packet *packet;
if (mad_recv_wc->wc->status != IB_WC_SUCCESS)
goto err1;
packet = kzalloc(sizeof *packet, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!packet)
goto err1;
packet->length = mad_recv_wc->mad_len;
packet->recv_wc = mad_recv_wc;
packet->mad.hdr.status = 0;
packet->mad.hdr.length = hdr_size(file) + mad_recv_wc->mad_len;
packet->mad.hdr.qpn = cpu_to_be32(mad_recv_wc->wc->src_qp);
IB/core: Do not warn on lid conversions for OPA On OPA devices the user_mad recv_handler can receive 32Bit LIDs (e.g. OPA_PERMISSIVE_LID) and it is okay to lose the upper 16 bits of the LID as this information is obtained elsewhere. Do not issue a warning when calling ib_lid_be16() in this case by masking out the upper 16Bits. [75667.310846] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [75667.316447] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1718 at ./include/rdma/ib_verbs.h:3799 recv_handler+0x15a/0x170 [ib_umad] [75667.327640] Modules linked in: ib_ipoib hfi1(E) rdmavt(E) rdma_ucm(E) ib_ucm(E) rdma_cm(E) ib_cm(E) iw_cm(E) ib_umad(E) ib_uverbs(E) ib_core(E) libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel mei_me ipmi_si iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support crypto_simd ipmi_devintf pcspkr mei sg i2c_i801 glue_helper lpc_ich shpchp ioatdma mfd_core wmi ipmi_msghandler cryptd acpi_power_meter acpi_pad nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm igb ptp ahci libahci pps_core crc32c_intel libata dca i2c_algo_bit i2c_core [last unloaded: ib_core] [75667.407704] CPU: 0 PID: 1718 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G W I E 4.13.0-rc7+ #1 [75667.417310] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WT2/S2600WT2, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0008.021120151325 02/11/2015 [75667.429555] Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] [75667.436360] task: ffff88084a718000 task.stack: ffffc9000a424000 [75667.443549] RIP: 0010:recv_handler+0x15a/0x170 [ib_umad] [75667.450090] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a427ce8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [75667.456508] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffff88085159ce80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [75667.465094] RDX: ffff88085a47b068 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88085159cf00 [75667.473668] RBP: ffffc9000a427d38 R08: 000000000001efc0 R09: ffff88085159ce80 [75667.482228] R10: ffff88085f007480 R11: ffff88084acf20e8 R12: ffff88085a47b020 [75667.490824] R13: ffff881056842e10 R14: ffff881056840200 R15: ffff88104c8d0800 [75667.499390] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [75667.509028] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [75667.516080] CR2: 00007f9e4b3d9000 CR3: 0000000001c09000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [75667.524664] Call Trace: [75667.528044] ? find_mad_agent+0x7c/0x1b0 [ib_core] [75667.534031] ? ib_mark_mad_done+0x73/0xa0 [ib_core] [75667.540142] ib_mad_recv_done+0x423/0x9b0 [ib_core] [75667.546215] __ib_process_cq+0x5d/0xb0 [ib_core] [75667.552007] ib_cq_poll_work+0x20/0x60 [ib_core] [75667.557766] process_one_work+0x149/0x360 [75667.562844] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0 [75667.567529] kthread+0x109/0x140 [75667.571713] ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 [75667.576775] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [75667.581447] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [75667.586014] Code: 43 4a 0f b6 45 c6 88 43 4b 48 8b 45 b0 48 89 43 4c 48 8b 45 b8 48 89 43 54 8b 45 c0 0f c8 89 43 5c e9 79 ff ff ff e8 16 4e fa e0 <0f> ff e9 42 ff ff ff 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 [75667.608323] ---[ end trace cf26df27c9597264 ]--- Fixes: 62ede7779904 ("Add OPA extended LID support") Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Don Hiatt <don.hiatt@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
2017-10-03 02:04:48 +08:00
/*
* On OPA devices it is okay to lose the upper 16 bits of LID as this
* information is obtained elsewhere. Mask off the upper 16 bits.
*/
if (rdma_cap_opa_mad(agent->device, agent->port_num))
IB/core: Do not warn on lid conversions for OPA On OPA devices the user_mad recv_handler can receive 32Bit LIDs (e.g. OPA_PERMISSIVE_LID) and it is okay to lose the upper 16 bits of the LID as this information is obtained elsewhere. Do not issue a warning when calling ib_lid_be16() in this case by masking out the upper 16Bits. [75667.310846] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [75667.316447] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1718 at ./include/rdma/ib_verbs.h:3799 recv_handler+0x15a/0x170 [ib_umad] [75667.327640] Modules linked in: ib_ipoib hfi1(E) rdmavt(E) rdma_ucm(E) ib_ucm(E) rdma_cm(E) ib_cm(E) iw_cm(E) ib_umad(E) ib_uverbs(E) ib_core(E) libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel mei_me ipmi_si iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support crypto_simd ipmi_devintf pcspkr mei sg i2c_i801 glue_helper lpc_ich shpchp ioatdma mfd_core wmi ipmi_msghandler cryptd acpi_power_meter acpi_pad nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm igb ptp ahci libahci pps_core crc32c_intel libata dca i2c_algo_bit i2c_core [last unloaded: ib_core] [75667.407704] CPU: 0 PID: 1718 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G W I E 4.13.0-rc7+ #1 [75667.417310] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WT2/S2600WT2, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0008.021120151325 02/11/2015 [75667.429555] Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] [75667.436360] task: ffff88084a718000 task.stack: ffffc9000a424000 [75667.443549] RIP: 0010:recv_handler+0x15a/0x170 [ib_umad] [75667.450090] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a427ce8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [75667.456508] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffff88085159ce80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [75667.465094] RDX: ffff88085a47b068 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88085159cf00 [75667.473668] RBP: ffffc9000a427d38 R08: 000000000001efc0 R09: ffff88085159ce80 [75667.482228] R10: ffff88085f007480 R11: ffff88084acf20e8 R12: ffff88085a47b020 [75667.490824] R13: ffff881056842e10 R14: ffff881056840200 R15: ffff88104c8d0800 [75667.499390] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [75667.509028] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [75667.516080] CR2: 00007f9e4b3d9000 CR3: 0000000001c09000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [75667.524664] Call Trace: [75667.528044] ? find_mad_agent+0x7c/0x1b0 [ib_core] [75667.534031] ? ib_mark_mad_done+0x73/0xa0 [ib_core] [75667.540142] ib_mad_recv_done+0x423/0x9b0 [ib_core] [75667.546215] __ib_process_cq+0x5d/0xb0 [ib_core] [75667.552007] ib_cq_poll_work+0x20/0x60 [ib_core] [75667.557766] process_one_work+0x149/0x360 [75667.562844] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0 [75667.567529] kthread+0x109/0x140 [75667.571713] ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 [75667.576775] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [75667.581447] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [75667.586014] Code: 43 4a 0f b6 45 c6 88 43 4b 48 8b 45 b0 48 89 43 4c 48 8b 45 b8 48 89 43 54 8b 45 c0 0f c8 89 43 5c e9 79 ff ff ff e8 16 4e fa e0 <0f> ff e9 42 ff ff ff 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 [75667.608323] ---[ end trace cf26df27c9597264 ]--- Fixes: 62ede7779904 ("Add OPA extended LID support") Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Don Hiatt <don.hiatt@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
2017-10-03 02:04:48 +08:00
packet->mad.hdr.lid = ib_lid_be16(0xFFFF &
mad_recv_wc->wc->slid);
else
packet->mad.hdr.lid = ib_lid_be16(mad_recv_wc->wc->slid);
packet->mad.hdr.sl = mad_recv_wc->wc->sl;
packet->mad.hdr.path_bits = mad_recv_wc->wc->dlid_path_bits;
packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index = mad_recv_wc->wc->pkey_index;
packet->mad.hdr.grh_present = !!(mad_recv_wc->wc->wc_flags & IB_WC_GRH);
if (packet->mad.hdr.grh_present) {
struct rdma_ah_attr ah_attr;
const struct ib_global_route *grh;
int ret;
ret = ib_init_ah_attr_from_wc(agent->device, agent->port_num,
mad_recv_wc->wc,
mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.grh,
&ah_attr);
if (ret)
goto err2;
grh = rdma_ah_read_grh(&ah_attr);
packet->mad.hdr.gid_index = grh->sgid_index;
packet->mad.hdr.hop_limit = grh->hop_limit;
packet->mad.hdr.traffic_class = grh->traffic_class;
memcpy(packet->mad.hdr.gid, &grh->dgid, 16);
packet->mad.hdr.flow_label = cpu_to_be32(grh->flow_label);
rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&ah_attr);
}
if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet, true))
goto err2;
return;
err2:
kfree(packet);
err1:
ib_free_recv_mad(mad_recv_wc);
}
static ssize_t copy_recv_mad(struct ib_umad_file *file, char __user *buf,
struct ib_umad_packet *packet, size_t count)
{
struct ib_mad_recv_buf *recv_buf;
int left, seg_payload, offset, max_seg_payload;
size_t seg_size;
recv_buf = &packet->recv_wc->recv_buf;
seg_size = packet->recv_wc->mad_seg_size;
/* We need enough room to copy the first (or only) MAD segment. */
if ((packet->length <= seg_size &&
count < hdr_size(file) + packet->length) ||
(packet->length > seg_size &&
count < hdr_size(file) + seg_size))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &packet->mad, hdr_size(file)))
return -EFAULT;
buf += hdr_size(file);
seg_payload = min_t(int, packet->length, seg_size);
if (copy_to_user(buf, recv_buf->mad, seg_payload))
return -EFAULT;
if (seg_payload < packet->length) {
/*
* Multipacket RMPP MAD message. Copy remainder of message.
* Note that last segment may have a shorter payload.
*/
if (count < hdr_size(file) + packet->length) {
/*
* The buffer is too small, return the first RMPP segment,
* which includes the RMPP message length.
*/
return -ENOSPC;
}
offset = ib_get_mad_data_offset(recv_buf->mad->mad_hdr.mgmt_class);
max_seg_payload = seg_size - offset;
for (left = packet->length - seg_payload, buf += seg_payload;
left; left -= seg_payload, buf += seg_payload) {
recv_buf = container_of(recv_buf->list.next,
struct ib_mad_recv_buf, list);
seg_payload = min(left, max_seg_payload);
if (copy_to_user(buf, ((void *) recv_buf->mad) + offset,
seg_payload))
return -EFAULT;
}
}
trace_ib_umad_read_recv(file, &packet->mad.hdr, &recv_buf->mad->mad_hdr);
return hdr_size(file) + packet->length;
}
static ssize_t copy_send_mad(struct ib_umad_file *file, char __user *buf,
struct ib_umad_packet *packet, size_t count)
{
ssize_t size = hdr_size(file) + packet->length;
if (count < size)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &packet->mad, hdr_size(file)))
return -EFAULT;
buf += hdr_size(file);
if (copy_to_user(buf, packet->mad.data, packet->length))
return -EFAULT;
trace_ib_umad_read_send(file, &packet->mad.hdr,
(struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data);
return size;
}
static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_umad_packet *packet;
ssize_t ret;
if (count < hdr_size(file))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
if (file->agents_dead) {
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
return -EIO;
}
while (list_empty(&file->recv_list)) {
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (wait_event_interruptible(file->recv_wait,
!list_empty(&file->recv_list)))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
}
if (file->agents_dead) {
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
return -EIO;
}
packet = list_entry(file->recv_list.next, struct ib_umad_packet, list);
list_del(&packet->list);
atomic_dec(&file->recv_list_size);
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
if (packet->recv_wc)
ret = copy_recv_mad(file, buf, packet, count);
else
ret = copy_send_mad(file, buf, packet, count);
if (ret < 0) {
/* Requeue packet */
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
list_add(&packet->list, &file->recv_list);
atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size);
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
} else {
if (packet->recv_wc)
ib_free_recv_mad(packet->recv_wc);
kfree(packet);
}
return ret;
}
static int copy_rmpp_mad(struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg, const char __user *buf)
{
int left, seg;
/* Copy class specific header */
if ((msg->hdr_len > IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) &&
copy_from_user(msg->mad + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, buf + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR,
msg->hdr_len - IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR))
return -EFAULT;
/* All headers are in place. Copy data segments. */
for (seg = 1, left = msg->data_len, buf += msg->hdr_len; left > 0;
seg++, left -= msg->seg_size, buf += msg->seg_size) {
if (copy_from_user(ib_get_rmpp_segment(msg, seg), buf,
min(left, msg->seg_size)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
static int same_destination(struct ib_user_mad_hdr *hdr1,
struct ib_user_mad_hdr *hdr2)
{
if (!hdr1->grh_present && !hdr2->grh_present)
return (hdr1->lid == hdr2->lid);
if (hdr1->grh_present && hdr2->grh_present)
return !memcmp(hdr1->gid, hdr2->gid, 16);
return 0;
}
static int is_duplicate(struct ib_umad_file *file,
struct ib_umad_packet *packet)
{
struct ib_umad_packet *sent_packet;
struct ib_mad_hdr *sent_hdr, *hdr;
hdr = (struct ib_mad_hdr *) packet->mad.data;
list_for_each_entry(sent_packet, &file->send_list, list) {
sent_hdr = (struct ib_mad_hdr *) sent_packet->mad.data;
if ((hdr->tid != sent_hdr->tid) ||
(hdr->mgmt_class != sent_hdr->mgmt_class))
continue;
/*
* No need to be overly clever here. If two new operations have
* the same TID, reject the second as a duplicate. This is more
* restrictive than required by the spec.
*/
if (!ib_response_mad(hdr)) {
if (!ib_response_mad(sent_hdr))
return 1;
continue;
} else if (!ib_response_mad(sent_hdr))
continue;
if (same_destination(&packet->mad.hdr, &sent_packet->mad.hdr))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file = filp->private_data;
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *rmpp_mad_hdr;
struct ib_umad_packet *packet;
struct ib_mad_agent *agent;
struct rdma_ah_attr ah_attr;
struct ib_ah *ah;
__be64 *tid;
int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active;
u8 base_version;
if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR)
return -EINVAL;
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!packet)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(&packet->mad, buf, hdr_size(file))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
if (packet->mad.hdr.id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
buf += hdr_size(file);
if (copy_from_user(packet->mad.data, buf, IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
trace_ib_umad_write(file, &packet->mad.hdr,
(struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data);
agent = __get_agent(file, packet->mad.hdr.id);
if (!agent) {
ret = -EIO;
goto err_up;
}
memset(&ah_attr, 0, sizeof ah_attr);
IB/umad: Fix use of unprotected device pointer The ib_write_umad() is protected by taking the umad file mutex. However, it accesses file->port->ib_dev -- which is protected only by the port's mutex (field file_mutex). The ib_umad_remove_one() calls ib_umad_kill_port() which sets port->ib_dev to NULL under the port mutex (NOT the file mutex). It then sets the mad agent to "dead" under the umad file mutex. This is a race condition -- because there is a window where port->ib_dev is NULL, while the agent is not "dead". As a result, we saw stack traces like: [16490.678059] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b0 [16490.678246] IP: ib_umad_write+0x29c/0xa3a [ib_umad] [16490.678333] PGD 0 P4D 0 [16490.678404] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [16490.678466] Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) ib_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx4_en(OE) ptp pps_core mlx4_ib(OE-) ib_core(OE) mlx4_core(OE) mlx_compat (OE) memtrack(OE) devlink mst_pciconf(OE) mst_pci(OE) netconsole nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache cfg80211 rfkill esp6_offload esp6 esp4_offload esp4 sunrpc kvm_intel kvm ppdev parport_pc irqbypass parport joydev i2c_piix4 virtio_balloon cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm e1000 serio_raw virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio ata_generic pata_acpi qemu_fw_cfg [last unloaded: mlxfw] [16490.679202] CPU: 4 PID: 3115 Comm: sminfo Tainted: G OE 4.14.13-300.fc27.x86_64 #1 [16490.679339] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu2 04/01/2014 [16490.679477] task: ffff9cf753890000 task.stack: ffffaf70c26b0000 [16490.679571] RIP: 0010:ib_umad_write+0x29c/0xa3a [ib_umad] [16490.679664] RSP: 0018:ffffaf70c26b3d90 EFLAGS: 00010202 [16490.679747] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: ffff9cf75610fd80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [16490.679856] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffdf2bfd714 RDI: ffff9cf6bb2a9c00 In the above trace, ib_umad_write is trying to dereference the NULL file->port->ib_dev pointer. Fix this by using the agent's device pointer (the device field in struct ib_mad_agent) -- which IS protected by the umad file mutex. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11 Fixes: 44c58487d51a ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types") Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-28 17:25:29 +08:00
ah_attr.type = rdma_ah_find_type(agent->device,
file->port->port_num);
rdma_ah_set_dlid(&ah_attr, be16_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.lid));
rdma_ah_set_sl(&ah_attr, packet->mad.hdr.sl);
rdma_ah_set_path_bits(&ah_attr, packet->mad.hdr.path_bits);
rdma_ah_set_port_num(&ah_attr, file->port->port_num);
if (packet->mad.hdr.grh_present) {
rdma_ah_set_grh(&ah_attr, NULL,
be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.flow_label),
packet->mad.hdr.gid_index,
packet->mad.hdr.hop_limit,
packet->mad.hdr.traffic_class);
rdma_ah_set_dgid_raw(&ah_attr, packet->mad.hdr.gid);
}
ah = rdma_create_user_ah(agent->qp->pd, &ah_attr, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ah)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ah);
goto err_up;
}
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
rmpp_mad_hdr = (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *)packet->mad.data;
hdr_len = ib_get_mad_data_offset(rmpp_mad_hdr->mad_hdr.mgmt_class);
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
if (ib_is_mad_class_rmpp(rmpp_mad_hdr->mad_hdr.mgmt_class)
&& ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(agent)) {
copy_offset = IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR;
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
rmpp_active = ib_get_rmpp_flags(&rmpp_mad_hdr->rmpp_hdr) &
IB_MGMT_RMPP_FLAG_ACTIVE;
} else {
copy_offset = IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR;
rmpp_active = 0;
}
base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version;
data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len;
packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent,
be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn),
packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active,
hdr_len, data_len, GFP_KERNEL,
base_version);
if (IS_ERR(packet->msg)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(packet->msg);
goto err_ah;
}
packet->msg->ah = ah;
packet->msg->timeout_ms = packet->mad.hdr.timeout_ms;
packet->msg->retries = packet->mad.hdr.retries;
packet->msg->context[0] = packet;
/* Copy MAD header. Any RMPP header is already in place. */
memcpy(packet->msg->mad, packet->mad.data, IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR);
if (!rmpp_active) {
if (copy_from_user(packet->msg->mad + copy_offset,
buf + copy_offset,
hdr_len + data_len - copy_offset)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_msg;
}
} else {
ret = copy_rmpp_mad(packet->msg, buf);
if (ret)
goto err_msg;
}
/*
* Set the high-order part of the transaction ID to make MADs from
* different agents unique, and allow routing responses back to the
* original requestor.
*/
if (!ib_response_mad(packet->msg->mad)) {
tid = &((struct ib_mad_hdr *) packet->msg->mad)->tid;
*tid = cpu_to_be64(((u64) agent->hi_tid) << 32 |
(be64_to_cpup(tid) & 0xffffffff));
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
rmpp_mad_hdr->mad_hdr.tid = *tid;
}
if (!ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(agent)
RDMA/core: Fix multiple -Warray-bounds warnings GCC-13 (and Clang)[1] does not like to access a partially allocated object, since it cannot reason about it for bounds checking. In this case 140 bytes are allocated for an object of type struct ib_umad_packet: packet = kzalloc(sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR, GFP_KERNEL); However, notice that sizeof(*packet) is only 104 bytes: struct ib_umad_packet { struct ib_mad_send_buf * msg; /* 0 8 */ struct ib_mad_recv_wc * recv_wc; /* 8 8 */ struct list_head list; /* 16 16 */ int length; /* 32 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct ib_user_mad mad __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 40 64 */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */ /* sum members: 100, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* forced alignments: 1, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); and 36 bytes extra bytes are allocated for a flexible-array member in struct ib_user_mad: include/rdma/ib_mad.h: 120 enum { ... 123 IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR = 36, ... } struct ib_user_mad { struct ib_user_mad_hdr hdr; /* 0 64 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ __u64 data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 64 0 */ /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); So we have sizeof(*packet) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == 140 bytes Then the address of the flex-array member (for which only 36 bytes were allocated) is casted and copied into a pointer to struct ib_rmpp_mad, which, in turn, is of size 256 bytes: rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) packet->mad.data; struct ib_rmpp_mad { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; /* 0 24 */ struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; /* 24 12 */ u8 data[220]; /* 36 220 */ /* size: 256, cachelines: 4, members: 3 */ }; The thing is that those 36 bytes allocated for flex-array member data in struct ib_user_mad onlly account for the size of both struct ib_mad_hdr and struct ib_rmpp_hdr, but nothing is left for array u8 data[220]. So, the compiler is legitimately complaining about accessing an object for which not enough memory was allocated. Apparently, the only members of struct ib_rmpp_mad that are relevant (that are actually being used) in function ib_umad_write() are mad_hdr and rmpp_hdr. So, instead of casting packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad *) create a new structure struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr { struct ib_mad_hdr mad_hdr; struct ib_rmpp_hdr rmpp_hdr; } __packed; and cast packet->mad.data to (struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr *). Notice that IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR == sizeof(struct ib_rmpp_mad_hdr) == 36 bytes Refactor the rest of the code, accordingly. Fix the following warnings seen under GCC-13 and -Warray-bounds: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:564:50: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:566:42: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:618:25: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:622:44: warning: array subscript ‘struct ib_rmpp_mad[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[140]’ [-Warray-bounds=] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/273 Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oYWaGM4Yb [1] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZBpB91qQcB10m3Fw@work Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-03-22 07:47:03 +08:00
&& ib_is_mad_class_rmpp(rmpp_mad_hdr->mad_hdr.mgmt_class)
&& (ib_get_rmpp_flags(&rmpp_mad_hdr->rmpp_hdr) & IB_MGMT_RMPP_FLAG_ACTIVE)) {
spin_lock_irq(&file->send_lock);
list_add_tail(&packet->list, &file->send_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&file->send_lock);
} else {
spin_lock_irq(&file->send_lock);
ret = is_duplicate(file, packet);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&packet->list, &file->send_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&file->send_lock);
if (ret) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_msg;
}
}
ret = ib_post_send_mad(packet->msg, NULL);
if (ret)
goto err_send;
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
return count;
err_send:
dequeue_send(file, packet);
err_msg:
ib_free_send_mad(packet->msg);
err_ah:
rdma_destroy_ah(ah, RDMA_DESTROY_AH_SLEEPABLE);
err_up:
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
err:
kfree(packet);
return ret;
}
static __poll_t ib_umad_poll(struct file *filp, struct poll_table_struct *wait)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file = filp->private_data;
/* we will always be able to post a MAD send */
__poll_t mask = EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
poll_wait(filp, &file->recv_wait, wait);
if (!list_empty(&file->recv_list))
mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
if (file->agents_dead)
mask = EPOLLERR;
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
return mask;
}
static int ib_umad_reg_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, void __user *arg,
int compat_method_mask)
{
struct ib_user_mad_reg_req ureq;
struct ib_mad_reg_req req;
struct ib_mad_agent *agent = NULL;
int agent_id;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
if (!file->port->ib_dev) {
dev_notice(&file->port->dev, "%s: invalid device\n", __func__);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ureq, arg, sizeof ureq)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (ureq.qpn != 0 && ureq.qpn != 1) {
dev_notice(&file->port->dev,
"%s: invalid QPN %u specified\n", __func__,
ureq.qpn);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
for (agent_id = 0; agent_id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; ++agent_id)
if (!__get_agent(file, agent_id))
goto found;
dev_notice(&file->port->dev, "%s: Max Agents (%u) reached\n", __func__,
IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
found:
if (ureq.mgmt_class) {
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
req.mgmt_class = ureq.mgmt_class;
req.mgmt_class_version = ureq.mgmt_class_version;
memcpy(req.oui, ureq.oui, sizeof req.oui);
if (compat_method_mask) {
u32 *umm = (u32 *) ureq.method_mask;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_TO_LONGS(IB_MGMT_MAX_METHODS); ++i)
req.method_mask[i] =
umm[i * 2] | ((u64) umm[i * 2 + 1] << 32);
} else
memcpy(req.method_mask, ureq.method_mask,
sizeof req.method_mask);
}
agent = ib_register_mad_agent(file->port->ib_dev, file->port->port_num,
ureq.qpn ? IB_QPT_GSI : IB_QPT_SMI,
ureq.mgmt_class ? &req : NULL,
ureq.rmpp_version,
send_handler, recv_handler, file, 0);
if (IS_ERR(agent)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(agent);
agent = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (put_user(agent_id,
(u32 __user *) (arg + offsetof(struct ib_user_mad_reg_req, id)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (!file->already_used) {
file->already_used = 1;
if (!file->use_pkey_index) {
dev_warn(&file->port->dev,
"process %s did not enable P_Key index support.\n",
current->comm);
dev_warn(&file->port->dev,
" Documentation/infiniband/user_mad.rst has info on the new ABI.\n");
}
}
file->agent[agent_id] = agent;
ret = 0;
out:
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
if (ret && agent)
ib_unregister_mad_agent(agent);
mutex_unlock(&file->port->file_mutex);
return ret;
}
static int ib_umad_reg_agent2(struct ib_umad_file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct ib_user_mad_reg_req2 ureq;
struct ib_mad_reg_req req;
struct ib_mad_agent *agent = NULL;
int agent_id;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
if (!file->port->ib_dev) {
dev_notice(&file->port->dev, "%s: invalid device\n", __func__);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ureq, arg, sizeof(ureq))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (ureq.qpn != 0 && ureq.qpn != 1) {
dev_notice(&file->port->dev, "%s: invalid QPN %u specified\n",
__func__, ureq.qpn);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (ureq.flags & ~IB_USER_MAD_REG_FLAGS_CAP) {
dev_notice(&file->port->dev,
"%s failed: invalid registration flags specified 0x%x; supported 0x%x\n",
__func__, ureq.flags, IB_USER_MAD_REG_FLAGS_CAP);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (put_user((u32)IB_USER_MAD_REG_FLAGS_CAP,
(u32 __user *) (arg + offsetof(struct
ib_user_mad_reg_req2, flags))))
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
for (agent_id = 0; agent_id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; ++agent_id)
if (!__get_agent(file, agent_id))
goto found;
dev_notice(&file->port->dev, "%s: Max Agents (%u) reached\n", __func__,
IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
found:
if (ureq.mgmt_class) {
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
req.mgmt_class = ureq.mgmt_class;
req.mgmt_class_version = ureq.mgmt_class_version;
if (ureq.oui & 0xff000000) {
dev_notice(&file->port->dev,
"%s failed: oui invalid 0x%08x\n", __func__,
ureq.oui);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
req.oui[2] = ureq.oui & 0x0000ff;
req.oui[1] = (ureq.oui & 0x00ff00) >> 8;
req.oui[0] = (ureq.oui & 0xff0000) >> 16;
memcpy(req.method_mask, ureq.method_mask,
sizeof(req.method_mask));
}
agent = ib_register_mad_agent(file->port->ib_dev, file->port->port_num,
ureq.qpn ? IB_QPT_GSI : IB_QPT_SMI,
ureq.mgmt_class ? &req : NULL,
ureq.rmpp_version,
send_handler, recv_handler, file,
ureq.flags);
if (IS_ERR(agent)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(agent);
agent = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (put_user(agent_id,
(u32 __user *)(arg +
offsetof(struct ib_user_mad_reg_req2, id)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (!file->already_used) {
file->already_used = 1;
file->use_pkey_index = 1;
}
file->agent[agent_id] = agent;
ret = 0;
out:
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
if (ret && agent)
ib_unregister_mad_agent(agent);
mutex_unlock(&file->port->file_mutex);
return ret;
}
static int ib_umad_unreg_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, u32 __user *arg)
{
struct ib_mad_agent *agent = NULL;
u32 id;
int ret = 0;
if (get_user(id, arg))
return -EFAULT;
if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
id = array_index_nospec(id, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS);
if (!__get_agent(file, id)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
agent = file->agent[id];
file->agent[id] = NULL;
out:
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
if (agent)
ib_unregister_mad_agent(agent);
mutex_unlock(&file->port->file_mutex);
return ret;
}
static long ib_umad_enable_pkey(struct ib_umad_file *file)
{
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
if (file->already_used)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
file->use_pkey_index = 1;
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
return ret;
}
static long ib_umad_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case IB_USER_MAD_REGISTER_AGENT:
return ib_umad_reg_agent(filp->private_data, (void __user *) arg, 0);
case IB_USER_MAD_UNREGISTER_AGENT:
return ib_umad_unreg_agent(filp->private_data, (__u32 __user *) arg);
case IB_USER_MAD_ENABLE_PKEY:
return ib_umad_enable_pkey(filp->private_data);
case IB_USER_MAD_REGISTER_AGENT2:
return ib_umad_reg_agent2(filp->private_data, (void __user *) arg);
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static long ib_umad_compat_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case IB_USER_MAD_REGISTER_AGENT:
return ib_umad_reg_agent(filp->private_data, compat_ptr(arg), 1);
case IB_USER_MAD_UNREGISTER_AGENT:
return ib_umad_unreg_agent(filp->private_data, compat_ptr(arg));
case IB_USER_MAD_ENABLE_PKEY:
return ib_umad_enable_pkey(filp->private_data);
case IB_USER_MAD_REGISTER_AGENT2:
return ib_umad_reg_agent2(filp->private_data, compat_ptr(arg));
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
}
#endif
/*
* ib_umad_open() does not need the BKL:
*
* - the ib_umad_port structures are properly reference counted, and
* everything else is purely local to the file being created, so
* races against other open calls are not a problem;
* - the ioctl method does not affect any global state outside of the
* file structure being operated on;
*/
static int ib_umad_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct ib_umad_port *port;
struct ib_umad_file *file;
int ret = 0;
port = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct ib_umad_port, cdev);
mutex_lock(&port->file_mutex);
if (!port->ib_dev) {
ret = -ENXIO;
goto out;
}
if (!rdma_dev_access_netns(port->ib_dev, current->nsproxy->net_ns)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
file = kzalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!file) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
mutex_init(&file->mutex);
spin_lock_init(&file->send_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file->recv_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file->send_list);
init_waitqueue_head(&file->recv_wait);
file->port = port;
filp->private_data = file;
list_add_tail(&file->port_list, &port->file_list);
*: convert stream-like files from nonseekable_open -> stream_open Using scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci added in 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock"), search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations which assume @offset access. I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert, but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g. drivers/input/mousedev.c) Among cases converted 14 were potentially vulnerable to read vs write deadlock (see details in 10dce8af3422): drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:988:1-17: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:401:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. and the rest were just safe to convert to stream_open because their read and write do not use ppos at all and corresponding file_operations do not have methods that assume @offset file access(*): arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c:631:8-24: WARNING: mpc52xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/um/drivers/harddog_kern.c:88:8-24: WARNING: harddog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c:430:33-49: WARNING: microcode_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ds1620.c:215:8-24: WARNING: ds1620_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/dtlk.c:301:1-17: WARNING: dtlk_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c:840:9-25: WARNING: ipmi_wdog_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c:95:8-24: WARNING: scr24x_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/tb0219.c:246:9-25: WARNING: tb0219_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/firewire/nosy.c:306:8-24: WARNING: nosy_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/fschmd.c:840:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/w83793.c:1344:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1747:8-24: WARNING: ucma_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1178:8-24: WARNING: ucm_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:1086:8-24: WARNING: uverbs_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/input/joydev.c:282:1-17: WARNING: joydev_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c:393:1-17: WARNING: switchtec_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_debugfs.c:135:8-24: WARNING: cros_ec_console_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c:470:9-25: WARNING: ds1374_wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-m41t80.c:805:9-25: WARNING: wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/tape_char.c:293:2-18: WARNING: tape_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/zcore.c:194:8-24: WARNING: zcore_reipl_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c:528:8-24: WARNING: zcrypt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/spi/spidev.c:594:1-17: WARNING: spidev_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/staging/pi433/pi433_if.c:974:1-17: WARNING: pi433_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/acquirewdt.c:203:8-24: WARNING: acq_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/advantechwdt.c:202:8-24: WARNING: advwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim1535_wdt.c:252:8-24: WARNING: ali_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim7101_wdt.c:217:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ar7_wdt.c:166:8-24: WARNING: ar7_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/at91rm9200_wdt.c:113:8-24: WARNING: at91wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ath79_wdt.c:135:8-24: WARNING: ath79_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/bcm63xx_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: bcm63xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c:143:8-24: WARNING: cpu5wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpwd.c:397:8-24: WARNING: cpwd_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/eurotechwdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: eurwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c:528:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/gef_wdt.c:232:8-24: WARNING: gef_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/geodewdt.c:95:8-24: WARNING: geodewdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ib700wdt.c:241:8-24: WARNING: ibwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ibmasr.c:326:8-24: WARNING: asr_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/indydog.c:80:8-24: WARNING: indydog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/intel_scu_watchdog.c:307:8-24: WARNING: intel_scu_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/iop_wdt.c:104:8-24: WARNING: iop_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/it8712f_wdt.c:330:8-24: WARNING: it8712f_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ixp4xx_wdt.c:68:8-24: WARNING: ixp4xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ks8695_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: ks8695wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/m54xx_wdt.c:88:8-24: WARNING: m54xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/machzwd.c:336:8-24: WARNING: zf_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mixcomwd.c:153:8-24: WARNING: mixcomwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mtx-1_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: mtx1_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mv64x60_wdt.c:136:8-24: WARNING: mv64x60_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nuc900_wdt.c:134:8-24: WARNING: nuc900wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nv_tco.c:164:8-24: WARNING: nv_tco_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pc87413_wdt.c:289:8-24: WARNING: pc87413_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:698:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:737:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:581:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:623:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:488:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:527:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_temperature_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pika_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: pikawdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pnx833x_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: pnx833x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rc32434_wdt.c:153:8-24: WARNING: rc32434_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rdc321x_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: rdc321x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/riowd.c:79:1-17: WARNING: riowd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sa1100_wdt.c:62:8-24: WARNING: sa1100dog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc60xxwdt.c:211:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc7240_wdt.c:139:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc8360.c:274:8-24: WARNING: sbc8360_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_epx_c3.c:81:8-24: WARNING: epx_c3_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_fitpc2_wdt.c:78:8-24: WARNING: fitpc2_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sb_wdog.c:108:1-17: WARNING: sbwdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc1200wdt.c:181:8-24: WARNING: sc1200wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc520_wdt.c:261:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sch311x_wdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: sch311x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/scx200_wdt.c:105:8-24: WARNING: scx200_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/smsc37b787_wdt.c:369:8-24: WARNING: wb_smsc_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83877f_wdt.c:227:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83977f_wdt.c:301:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wafer5823wdt.c:200:8-24: WARNING: wafwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/watchdog_dev.c:828:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:379:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:445:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt285.c:104:1-17: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt977.c:276:8-24: WARNING: wdt977_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:424:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:484:8-24: WARNING: wdt_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:464:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:527:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. net/batman-adv/log.c:105:1-17: WARNING: batadv_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/control.c:57:7-23: WARNING: snd_ctl_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/rawmidi.c:385:7-23: WARNING: snd_rawmidi_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:310:7-23: WARNING: snd_seq_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/timer.c:1428:7-23: WARNING: snd_timer_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. One can also recheck/review the patch via generating it with explanation comments included via $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci SPFLAGS="-D explain" (*) This second group also contains cases with read/write deadlocks that stream_open.cocci don't yet detect, but which are still valid to convert to stream_open since ppos is not used. For example drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c calls wait_for_completion_interruptible() in its .read, but stream_open.cocci currently detects only "wait_event*" as blocking. Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James R. Van Zandt" <jrv@vanzandt.mv.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Acked-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> [scr24x_cs] Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@googlemail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> [watchdog/* hwmon/*] Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Cc: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Kurt Schwemmer <kurt.schwemmer@microsemi.com> Acked-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Cc: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org> Acked-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> [platform/chrome] Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> [rtc/*] Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Cc: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com Cc: Wan ZongShun <mcuos.com@gmail.com> Cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
2019-03-27 04:51:19 +08:00
stream_open(inode, filp);
out:
mutex_unlock(&port->file_mutex);
return ret;
}
static int ib_umad_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_umad_packet *packet, *tmp;
int already_dead;
int i;
mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
already_dead = file->agents_dead;
file->agents_dead = 1;
list_for_each_entry_safe(packet, tmp, &file->recv_list, list) {
if (packet->recv_wc)
ib_free_recv_mad(packet->recv_wc);
kfree(packet);
}
list_del(&file->port_list);
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
if (!already_dead)
for (i = 0; i < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; ++i)
if (file->agent[i])
ib_unregister_mad_agent(file->agent[i]);
mutex_unlock(&file->port->file_mutex);
mutex_destroy(&file->mutex);
kfree(file);
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations umad_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.read = ib_umad_read,
.write = ib_umad_write,
.poll = ib_umad_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = ib_umad_ioctl,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = ib_umad_compat_ioctl,
#endif
.open = ib_umad_open,
.release = ib_umad_close,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static int ib_umad_sm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct ib_umad_port *port;
struct ib_port_modify props = {
.set_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_SM
};
int ret;
port = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct ib_umad_port, sm_cdev);
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (down_trylock(&port->sm_sem)) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto fail;
}
} else {
if (down_interruptible(&port->sm_sem)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto fail;
}
}
if (!rdma_dev_access_netns(port->ib_dev, current->nsproxy->net_ns)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto err_up_sem;
}
ret = ib_modify_port(port->ib_dev, port->port_num, 0, &props);
if (ret)
goto err_up_sem;
filp->private_data = port;
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
return 0;
err_up_sem:
up(&port->sm_sem);
fail:
return ret;
}
static int ib_umad_sm_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct ib_umad_port *port = filp->private_data;
struct ib_port_modify props = {
.clr_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_SM
};
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&port->file_mutex);
if (port->ib_dev)
ret = ib_modify_port(port->ib_dev, port->port_num, 0, &props);
mutex_unlock(&port->file_mutex);
up(&port->sm_sem);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations umad_sm_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.open = ib_umad_sm_open,
.release = ib_umad_sm_close,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
static struct ib_umad_port *get_port(struct ib_device *ibdev,
struct ib_umad_device *umad_dev,
RDMA: Support more than 255 rdma ports Current code uses many different types when dealing with a port of a RDMA device: u8, unsigned int and u32. Switch to u32 to clean up the logic. This allows us to make (at least) the core view consistent and use the same type. Unfortunately not all places can be converted. Many uverbs functions expect port to be u8 so keep those places in order not to break UAPIs. HW/Spec defined values must also not be changed. With the switch to u32 we now can support devices with more than 255 ports. U32_MAX is reserved to make control logic a bit easier to deal with. As a device with U32_MAX ports probably isn't going to happen any time soon this seems like a non issue. When a device with more than 255 ports is created uverbs will report the RDMA device as having 255 ports as this is the max currently supported. The verbs interface is not changed yet because the IBTA spec limits the port size in too many places to be u8 and all applications that relies in verbs won't be able to cope with this change. At this stage, we are extending the interfaces that are using vendor channel solely Once the limitation is lifted mlx5 in switchdev mode will be able to have thousands of SFs created by the device. As the only instance of an RDMA device that reports more than 255 ports will be a representor device and it exposes itself as a RAW Ethernet only device CM/MAD/IPoIB and other ULPs aren't effected by this change and their sysfs/interfaces that are exposes to userspace can remain unchanged. While here cleanup some alignment issues and remove unneeded sanity checks (mainly in rdmavt), Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301070420.439400-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
2021-03-01 15:04:20 +08:00
u32 port)
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
{
if (!umad_dev)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
if (!rdma_is_port_valid(ibdev, port))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!rdma_cap_ib_mad(ibdev, port))
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
return &umad_dev->ports[port - rdma_start_port(ibdev)];
}
static int ib_umad_get_nl_info(struct ib_device *ibdev, void *client_data,
struct ib_client_nl_info *res)
{
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
struct ib_umad_port *port = get_port(ibdev, client_data, res->port);
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
if (IS_ERR(port))
return PTR_ERR(port);
res->abi = IB_USER_MAD_ABI_VERSION;
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
res->cdev = &port->dev;
return 0;
}
static struct ib_client umad_client = {
.name = "umad",
.add = ib_umad_add_one,
.remove = ib_umad_remove_one,
.get_nl_info = ib_umad_get_nl_info,
};
MODULE_ALIAS_RDMA_CLIENT("umad");
static int ib_issm_get_nl_info(struct ib_device *ibdev, void *client_data,
struct ib_client_nl_info *res)
{
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
struct ib_umad_port *port = get_port(ibdev, client_data, res->port);
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
if (IS_ERR(port))
return PTR_ERR(port);
res->abi = IB_USER_MAD_ABI_VERSION;
RDMA/mad: Do not crash if the rdma device does not have a umad interface Non-IB devices do not have a umad interface and the client_data will be left set to NULL. In this case calling get_nl_info() will try to kref a NULL cdev causing a crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ba: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005d0-0x00000000000005d7] CPU: 0 PID: 20851 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0x35/0x150 lib/kobject.c:640 Code: 53 e8 3f b0 8b f9 4d 85 e4 0f 84 a2 00 00 00 e8 31 b0 8b f9 49 8d 7c 24 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa +83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 eb 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000946f1a0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff85bdbbb0 RCX: ffffc9000bf22000 RDX: 00000000000000ba RSI: ffffffff87e9d78f RDI: 00000000000005d4 RBP: ffffc9000946f1b8 R08: ffff8880581a6440 R09: ffff8880581a6cd0 R10: fffffbfff154b838 R11: ffffffff8aa5c1c7 R12: 0000000000000598 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc9000946f278 R15: ffff88805cb0c4d0 FS: 00007faa9e8af700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b30121000 CR3: 000000004515d000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_device+0x25/0x40 drivers/base/core.c:2574 __ib_get_client_nl_info+0x205/0x2e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1861 ib_get_client_nl_info+0x35/0x180 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1881 nldev_get_chardev+0x575/0xac0 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1621 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0x5d9/0x980 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 8f71bb0030b8 ("RDMA: Report available cdevs through RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_GET_CHARDEV") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310075339.238090-1-leon@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+46fe08363dbba223dec5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-03-10 15:53:39 +08:00
res->cdev = &port->sm_dev;
return 0;
}
static struct ib_client issm_client = {
.name = "issm",
.get_nl_info = ib_issm_get_nl_info,
};
MODULE_ALIAS_RDMA_CLIENT("issm");
static ssize_t ibdev_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct ib_umad_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
if (!port)
return -ENODEV;
RDMA: Convert sysfs device * show functions to use sysfs_emit() Done with cocci script: @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - sprintf(buf, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; expression chr; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - strcpy(buf, chr); + sysfs_emit(buf, chr); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... len = - sprintf(buf, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... len = - snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... len = - scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... - len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; expression chr; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { ... - strcpy(buf, chr); - return strlen(buf); + return sysfs_emit(buf, chr); } Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7f406fa8e3aa2552c022bec680f621e38d1fe414.1602122879.git.joe@perches.com Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
2020-10-08 10:36:24 +08:00
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", dev_name(&port->ib_dev->dev));
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(ibdev);
static ssize_t port_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct ib_umad_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
if (!port)
return -ENODEV;
RDMA: Convert sysfs device * show functions to use sysfs_emit() Done with cocci script: @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - sprintf(buf, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; expression chr; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... return - strcpy(buf, chr); + sysfs_emit(buf, chr); ...> } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... len = - sprintf(buf, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... len = - snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... len = - scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, + sysfs_emit(buf, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; identifier len; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { <... - len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, + len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, ...); ...> return len; } @@ identifier d_show; identifier dev, attr, buf; expression chr; @@ ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { ... - strcpy(buf, chr); - return strlen(buf); + return sysfs_emit(buf, chr); } Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7f406fa8e3aa2552c022bec680f621e38d1fe414.1602122879.git.joe@perches.com Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
2020-10-08 10:36:24 +08:00
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", port->port_num);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(port);
static struct attribute *umad_class_dev_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_ibdev.attr,
&dev_attr_port.attr,
NULL,
};
ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(umad_class_dev);
driver core: make struct class.devnode() take a const * The devnode() in struct class should not be modifying the device that is passed into it, so mark it as a const * and propagate the function signature changes out into all relevant subsystems that use this callback. Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Justin Sanders <justin@coraid.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com> Cc: Liam Mark <lmark@codeaurora.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Brian Starkey <Brian.Starkey@arm.com> Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com> Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org> Cc: Frank Haverkamp <haver@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> Cc: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Cc: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Cc: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> Cc: Gautam Dawar <gautam.dawar@xilinx.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com> Cc: Parav Pandit <parav@nvidia.com> Cc: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com> Cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123122523.1332370-2-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23 20:25:20 +08:00
static char *umad_devnode(const struct device *dev, umode_t *mode)
{
return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "infiniband/%s", dev_name(dev));
}
driver core: class: mark the struct class for sysfs callbacks as constant struct class should never be modified in a sysfs callback as there is nothing in the structure to modify, and frankly, the structure is almost never used in a sysfs callback, so mark it as constant to allow struct class to be moved to read-only memory. While we are touching all class sysfs callbacks also mark the attribute as constant as it can not be modified. The bonding code still uses this structure so it can not be removed from the function callbacks. Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com> Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325084537.3622280-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-25 16:45:37 +08:00
static ssize_t abi_version_show(const struct class *class,
const struct class_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", IB_USER_MAD_ABI_VERSION);
}
static CLASS_ATTR_RO(abi_version);
static struct attribute *umad_class_attrs[] = {
&class_attr_abi_version.attr,
NULL,
};
ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(umad_class);
static struct class umad_class = {
.name = "infiniband_mad",
.devnode = umad_devnode,
.class_groups = umad_class_groups,
.dev_groups = umad_class_dev_groups,
};
static void ib_umad_release_port(struct device *device)
{
struct ib_umad_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(device);
struct ib_umad_device *umad_dev = port->umad_dev;
ib_umad_dev_put(umad_dev);
}
static void ib_umad_init_port_dev(struct device *dev,
struct ib_umad_port *port,
const struct ib_device *device)
{
device_initialize(dev);
ib_umad_dev_get(port->umad_dev);
dev->class = &umad_class;
dev->parent = device->dev.parent;
dev_set_drvdata(dev, port);
dev->release = ib_umad_release_port;
}
static int ib_umad_init_port(struct ib_device *device, int port_num,
struct ib_umad_device *umad_dev,
struct ib_umad_port *port)
{
int devnum;
dev_t base_umad;
dev_t base_issm;
int ret;
devnum = ida_alloc_max(&umad_ida, IB_UMAD_MAX_PORTS - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (devnum < 0)
return -1;
port->dev_num = devnum;
if (devnum >= IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR) {
base_umad = dynamic_umad_dev + devnum - IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR;
base_issm = dynamic_issm_dev + devnum - IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR;
} else {
base_umad = devnum + base_umad_dev;
base_issm = devnum + base_issm_dev;
}
port->ib_dev = device;
port->umad_dev = umad_dev;
port->port_num = port_num;
sema_init(&port->sm_sem, 1);
mutex_init(&port->file_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->file_list);
ib_umad_init_port_dev(&port->dev, port, device);
port->dev.devt = base_umad;
dev_set_name(&port->dev, "umad%d", port->dev_num);
cdev_init(&port->cdev, &umad_fops);
port->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
ret = cdev_device_add(&port->cdev, &port->dev);
if (ret)
goto err_cdev;
if (rdma_cap_ib_smi(device, port_num)) {
ib_umad_init_port_dev(&port->sm_dev, port, device);
port->sm_dev.devt = base_issm;
dev_set_name(&port->sm_dev, "issm%d", port->dev_num);
cdev_init(&port->sm_cdev, &umad_sm_fops);
port->sm_cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
ret = cdev_device_add(&port->sm_cdev, &port->sm_dev);
if (ret)
goto err_dev;
}
return 0;
err_dev:
put_device(&port->sm_dev);
cdev_device_del(&port->cdev, &port->dev);
err_cdev:
put_device(&port->dev);
ida_free(&umad_ida, devnum);
return ret;
}
static void ib_umad_kill_port(struct ib_umad_port *port)
{
struct ib_umad_file *file;
bool has_smi = false;
int id;
if (rdma_cap_ib_smi(port->ib_dev, port->port_num)) {
cdev_device_del(&port->sm_cdev, &port->sm_dev);
has_smi = true;
}
IB/umad: Fix kernel crash while unloading ib_umad When disassociating a device from umad we must ensure that the sysfs access is prevented before blocking the fops, otherwise assumptions in syfs don't hold: CPU0 CPU1 ib_umad_kill_port() ibdev_show() port->ib_dev = NULL dev_name(port->ib_dev) The prior patch made an error in moving the device_destroy(), it should have been split into device_del() (above) and put_device() (below). At this point we already have the split, so move the device_del() back to its original place. kernel stack PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI RIP: 0010:ibdev_show+0x18/0x50 [ib_umad] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000097fe40 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0441120 RCX: ffff8881df514000 RDX: ffff8881df514000 RSI: ffffffffa0441120 RDI: ffff8881df1e8870 RBP: ffffffff81caf000 R08: ffff8881df1e8870 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff88822f550b40 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc9000097ff08 R15: ffff8882238bad58 FS: 00007f1437ff3740(0000) GS:ffff888236940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000004e8 CR3: 00000001e0dfc001 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: dev_attr_show+0x15/0x50 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xb8/0x1a0 seq_read+0x12d/0x350 vfs_read+0x89/0x140 ksys_read+0x55/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9: Fixes: cf7ad3030271 ("IB/umad: Avoid destroying device while it is accessed") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200212072635.682689-9-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yonatan Cohen <yonatanc@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-02-12 15:26:34 +08:00
cdev_device_del(&port->cdev, &port->dev);
mutex_lock(&port->file_mutex);
/* Mark ib_dev NULL and block ioctl or other file ops to progress
* further.
*/
port->ib_dev = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(file, &port->file_list, port_list) {
mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
file->agents_dead = 1;
wake_up_interruptible(&file->recv_wait);
mutex_unlock(&file->mutex);
for (id = 0; id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; ++id)
if (file->agent[id])
ib_unregister_mad_agent(file->agent[id]);
}
mutex_unlock(&port->file_mutex);
ida_free(&umad_ida, port->dev_num);
/* balances device_initialize() */
if (has_smi)
put_device(&port->sm_dev);
put_device(&port->dev);
}
static int ib_umad_add_one(struct ib_device *device)
{
struct ib_umad_device *umad_dev;
int s, e, i;
int count = 0;
int ret;
s = rdma_start_port(device);
e = rdma_end_port(device);
umad_dev = kzalloc(struct_size(umad_dev, ports,
size_add(size_sub(e, s), 1)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!umad_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
kref_init(&umad_dev->kref);
for (i = s; i <= e; ++i) {
if (!rdma_cap_ib_mad(device, i))
continue;
ret = ib_umad_init_port(device, i, umad_dev,
&umad_dev->ports[i - s]);
if (ret)
goto err;
count++;
}
if (!count) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto free;
}
ib_set_client_data(device, &umad_client, umad_dev);
return 0;
err:
while (--i >= s) {
if (!rdma_cap_ib_mad(device, i))
continue;
ib_umad_kill_port(&umad_dev->ports[i - s]);
}
free:
/* balances kref_init */
ib_umad_dev_put(umad_dev);
return ret;
}
static void ib_umad_remove_one(struct ib_device *device, void *client_data)
{
struct ib_umad_device *umad_dev = client_data;
unsigned int i;
rdma_for_each_port (device, i) {
if (rdma_cap_ib_mad(device, i))
ib_umad_kill_port(
&umad_dev->ports[i - rdma_start_port(device)]);
}
/* balances kref_init() */
ib_umad_dev_put(umad_dev);
}
static int __init ib_umad_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = register_chrdev_region(base_umad_dev,
IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR * 2,
umad_class.name);
if (ret) {
pr_err("couldn't register device number\n");
goto out;
}
ret = alloc_chrdev_region(&dynamic_umad_dev, 0,
IB_UMAD_NUM_DYNAMIC_MINOR * 2,
umad_class.name);
if (ret) {
pr_err("couldn't register dynamic device number\n");
goto out_alloc;
}
dynamic_issm_dev = dynamic_umad_dev + IB_UMAD_NUM_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
ret = class_register(&umad_class);
if (ret) {
pr_err("couldn't create class infiniband_mad\n");
goto out_chrdev;
}
ret = ib_register_client(&umad_client);
if (ret)
goto out_class;
ret = ib_register_client(&issm_client);
if (ret)
goto out_client;
return 0;
out_client:
ib_unregister_client(&umad_client);
out_class:
class_unregister(&umad_class);
out_chrdev:
unregister_chrdev_region(dynamic_umad_dev,
IB_UMAD_NUM_DYNAMIC_MINOR * 2);
out_alloc:
unregister_chrdev_region(base_umad_dev,
IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR * 2);
out:
return ret;
}
static void __exit ib_umad_cleanup(void)
{
ib_unregister_client(&issm_client);
ib_unregister_client(&umad_client);
class_unregister(&umad_class);
unregister_chrdev_region(base_umad_dev,
IB_UMAD_NUM_FIXED_MINOR * 2);
unregister_chrdev_region(dynamic_umad_dev,
IB_UMAD_NUM_DYNAMIC_MINOR * 2);
}
module_init(ib_umad_init);
module_exit(ib_umad_cleanup);