2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
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/* Copyright(c) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation. */
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#ifndef __CXL_MEM_H__
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#define __CXL_MEM_H__
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2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
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#include <uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h>
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2021-06-16 07:36:31 +08:00
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#include <linux/cdev.h>
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2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/uuid.h>
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2023-05-24 01:09:27 +08:00
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#include <linux/rcuwait.h>
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2021-06-16 07:36:31 +08:00
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#include "cxl.h"
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2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
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/* CXL 2.0 8.2.8.5.1.1 Memory Device Status Register */
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#define CXLMDEV_STATUS_OFFSET 0x0
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#define CXLMDEV_DEV_FATAL BIT(0)
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#define CXLMDEV_FW_HALT BIT(1)
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#define CXLMDEV_STATUS_MEDIA_STATUS_MASK GENMASK(3, 2)
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#define CXLMDEV_MS_NOT_READY 0
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#define CXLMDEV_MS_READY 1
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#define CXLMDEV_MS_ERROR 2
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#define CXLMDEV_MS_DISABLED 3
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#define CXLMDEV_READY(status) \
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(FIELD_GET(CXLMDEV_STATUS_MEDIA_STATUS_MASK, status) == \
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CXLMDEV_MS_READY)
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#define CXLMDEV_MBOX_IF_READY BIT(4)
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_MASK GENMASK(7, 5)
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_NOT 0
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_COLD 1
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_WARM 2
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_HOT 3
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_CXL 4
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#define CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED(status) \
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(FIELD_GET(CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_MASK, status) != \
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CXLMDEV_RESET_NEEDED_NOT)
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/**
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* struct cxl_memdev - CXL bus object representing a Type-3 Memory Device
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* @dev: driver core device object
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* @cdev: char dev core object for ioctl operations
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2021-11-03 04:29:01 +08:00
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* @cxlds: The device state backing this device
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2022-02-04 23:18:31 +08:00
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* @detach_work: active memdev lost a port in its ancestry
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cxl/pmem: Refactor nvdimm device registration, delete the workqueue
The three objects 'struct cxl_nvdimm_bridge', 'struct cxl_nvdimm', and
'struct cxl_pmem_region' manage CXL persistent memory resources. The
bridge represents base platform resources, the nvdimm represents one or
more endpoints, and the region is a collection of nvdimms that
contribute to an assembled address range.
Their relationship is such that a region is torn down if any component
endpoints are removed. All regions and endpoints are torn down if the
foundational bridge device goes down.
A workqueue was deployed to manage these interdependencies, but it is
difficult to reason about, and fragile. A recent attempt to take the CXL
root device lock in the cxl_mem driver was reported by lockdep as
colliding with the flush_work() in the cxl_pmem flows.
Instead of the workqueue, arrange for all pmem/nvdimm devices to be torn
down immediately and hierarchically. A similar change is made to both
the 'cxl_nvdimm' and 'cxl_pmem_region' objects. For bisect-ability both
changes are made in the same patch which unfortunately makes the patch
bigger than desired.
Arrange for cxl_memdev and cxl_region to register a cxl_nvdimm and
cxl_pmem_region as a devres release action of the bridge device.
Additionally, include a devres release action of the cxl_memdev or
cxl_region device that triggers the bridge's release action if an endpoint
exits before the bridge. I.e. this allows either unplugging the bridge,
or unplugging and endpoint to result in the same cleanup actions.
To keep the patch smaller the cleanup of the now defunct workqueue
infrastructure is saved for a follow-on patch.
Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166993041773.1882361.16444301376147207609.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2022-12-02 05:33:37 +08:00
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* @cxl_nvb: coordinate removal of @cxl_nvd if present
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* @cxl_nvd: optional bridge to an nvdimm if the device supports pmem
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2023-06-15 09:30:43 +08:00
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* @endpoint: connection to the CXL port topology for this memory device
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2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
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* @id: id number of this memdev instance.
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2023-02-11 09:29:09 +08:00
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* @depth: endpoint port depth
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2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
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*/
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struct cxl_memdev {
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struct device dev;
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struct cdev cdev;
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2021-11-03 04:29:01 +08:00
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struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds;
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2022-02-04 23:18:31 +08:00
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struct work_struct detach_work;
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cxl/pmem: Refactor nvdimm device registration, delete the workqueue
The three objects 'struct cxl_nvdimm_bridge', 'struct cxl_nvdimm', and
'struct cxl_pmem_region' manage CXL persistent memory resources. The
bridge represents base platform resources, the nvdimm represents one or
more endpoints, and the region is a collection of nvdimms that
contribute to an assembled address range.
Their relationship is such that a region is torn down if any component
endpoints are removed. All regions and endpoints are torn down if the
foundational bridge device goes down.
A workqueue was deployed to manage these interdependencies, but it is
difficult to reason about, and fragile. A recent attempt to take the CXL
root device lock in the cxl_mem driver was reported by lockdep as
colliding with the flush_work() in the cxl_pmem flows.
Instead of the workqueue, arrange for all pmem/nvdimm devices to be torn
down immediately and hierarchically. A similar change is made to both
the 'cxl_nvdimm' and 'cxl_pmem_region' objects. For bisect-ability both
changes are made in the same patch which unfortunately makes the patch
bigger than desired.
Arrange for cxl_memdev and cxl_region to register a cxl_nvdimm and
cxl_pmem_region as a devres release action of the bridge device.
Additionally, include a devres release action of the cxl_memdev or
cxl_region device that triggers the bridge's release action if an endpoint
exits before the bridge. I.e. this allows either unplugging the bridge,
or unplugging and endpoint to result in the same cleanup actions.
To keep the patch smaller the cleanup of the now defunct workqueue
infrastructure is saved for a follow-on patch.
Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166993041773.1882361.16444301376147207609.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2022-12-02 05:33:37 +08:00
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struct cxl_nvdimm_bridge *cxl_nvb;
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struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd;
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2023-06-15 09:30:43 +08:00
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struct cxl_port *endpoint;
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2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
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int id;
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2023-02-11 09:29:09 +08:00
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int depth;
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2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
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};
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2021-08-03 01:30:05 +08:00
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static inline struct cxl_memdev *to_cxl_memdev(struct device *dev)
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{
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return container_of(dev, struct cxl_memdev, dev);
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}
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2022-07-22 08:19:12 +08:00
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static inline struct cxl_port *cxled_to_port(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled)
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{
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return to_cxl_port(cxled->cxld.dev.parent);
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}
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2022-06-08 01:56:10 +08:00
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static inline struct cxl_port *cxlrd_to_port(struct cxl_root_decoder *cxlrd)
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{
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return to_cxl_port(cxlrd->cxlsd.cxld.dev.parent);
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}
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2022-07-22 08:19:12 +08:00
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static inline struct cxl_memdev *
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cxled_to_memdev(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled)
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{
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struct cxl_port *port = to_cxl_port(cxled->cxld.dev.parent);
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2023-06-23 04:55:01 +08:00
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return to_cxl_memdev(port->uport_dev);
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2022-07-22 08:19:12 +08:00
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}
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2023-01-11 19:30:17 +08:00
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bool is_cxl_memdev(const struct device *dev);
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2022-02-04 23:18:31 +08:00
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static inline bool is_cxl_endpoint(struct cxl_port *port)
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{
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2023-06-23 04:55:01 +08:00
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return is_cxl_memdev(port->uport_dev);
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2022-02-04 23:18:31 +08:00
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}
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2021-11-03 04:29:01 +08:00
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struct cxl_memdev *devm_cxl_add_memdev(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
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2023-06-26 08:16:51 +08:00
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struct cxl_memdev_state;
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int cxl_memdev_setup_fw_upload(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds);
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2023-02-10 17:06:45 +08:00
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int devm_cxl_dpa_reserve(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled,
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resource_size_t base, resource_size_t len,
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resource_size_t skipped);
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2021-08-03 01:30:05 +08:00
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2022-12-02 05:34:10 +08:00
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static inline struct cxl_ep *cxl_ep_load(struct cxl_port *port,
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struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
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{
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if (!port)
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return NULL;
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return xa_load(&port->endpoints, (unsigned long)&cxlmd->dev);
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}
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2021-09-09 13:12:21 +08:00
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/**
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* struct cxl_mbox_cmd - A command to be submitted to hardware.
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* @opcode: (input) The command set and command submitted to hardware.
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* @payload_in: (input) Pointer to the input payload.
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* @payload_out: (output) Pointer to the output payload. Must be allocated by
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* the caller.
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* @size_in: (input) Number of bytes to load from @payload_in.
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* @size_out: (input) Max number of bytes loaded into @payload_out.
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* (output) Number of bytes generated by the device. For fixed size
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* outputs commands this is always expected to be deterministic. For
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* variable sized output commands, it tells the exact number of bytes
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* written.
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2022-12-06 12:22:39 +08:00
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* @min_out: (input) internal command output payload size validation
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2023-05-24 01:09:27 +08:00
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* @poll_count: (input) Number of timeouts to attempt.
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* @poll_interval_ms: (input) Time between mailbox background command polling
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* interval timeouts.
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2021-09-09 13:12:21 +08:00
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* @return_code: (output) Error code returned from hardware.
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*
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* This is the primary mechanism used to send commands to the hardware.
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* All the fields except @payload_* correspond exactly to the fields described in
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* Command Register section of the CXL 2.0 8.2.8.4.5. @payload_in and
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* @payload_out are written to, and read from the Command Payload Registers
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* defined in CXL 2.0 8.2.8.4.8.
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*/
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struct cxl_mbox_cmd {
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u16 opcode;
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void *payload_in;
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void *payload_out;
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size_t size_in;
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size_t size_out;
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2022-12-06 12:22:39 +08:00
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size_t min_out;
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2023-05-24 01:09:27 +08:00
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int poll_count;
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int poll_interval_ms;
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2021-09-09 13:12:21 +08:00
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u16 return_code;
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};
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2022-04-04 10:12:15 +08:00
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/*
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2023-03-07 12:26:55 +08:00
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* Per CXL 3.0 Section 8.2.8.4.5.1
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*/
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#define CMD_CMD_RC_TABLE \
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C(SUCCESS, 0, NULL), \
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C(BACKGROUND, -ENXIO, "background cmd started successfully"), \
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C(INPUT, -ENXIO, "cmd input was invalid"), \
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C(UNSUPPORTED, -ENXIO, "cmd is not supported"), \
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C(INTERNAL, -ENXIO, "internal device error"), \
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C(RETRY, -ENXIO, "temporary error, retry once"), \
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C(BUSY, -ENXIO, "ongoing background operation"), \
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C(MEDIADISABLED, -ENXIO, "media access is disabled"), \
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C(FWINPROGRESS, -ENXIO, "one FW package can be transferred at a time"), \
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C(FWOOO, -ENXIO, "FW package content was transferred out of order"), \
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C(FWAUTH, -ENXIO, "FW package authentication failed"), \
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C(FWSLOT, -ENXIO, "FW slot is not supported for requested operation"), \
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C(FWROLLBACK, -ENXIO, "rolled back to the previous active FW"), \
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C(FWRESET, -ENXIO, "FW failed to activate, needs cold reset"), \
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C(HANDLE, -ENXIO, "one or more Event Record Handles were invalid"), \
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2023-04-19 01:39:06 +08:00
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C(PADDR, -EFAULT, "physical address specified is invalid"), \
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C(POISONLMT, -ENXIO, "poison injection limit has been reached"), \
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C(MEDIAFAILURE, -ENXIO, "permanent issue with the media"), \
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C(ABORT, -ENXIO, "background cmd was aborted by device"), \
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C(SECURITY, -ENXIO, "not valid in the current security state"), \
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C(PASSPHRASE, -ENXIO, "phrase doesn't match current set passphrase"), \
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C(MBUNSUPPORTED, -ENXIO, "unsupported on the mailbox it was issued on"),\
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2023-03-07 12:26:55 +08:00
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C(PAYLOADLEN, -ENXIO, "invalid payload length"), \
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C(LOG, -ENXIO, "invalid or unsupported log page"), \
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C(INTERRUPTED, -ENXIO, "asynchronous event occured"), \
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C(FEATUREVERSION, -ENXIO, "unsupported feature version"), \
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C(FEATURESELVALUE, -ENXIO, "unsupported feature selection value"), \
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C(FEATURETRANSFERIP, -ENXIO, "feature transfer in progress"), \
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C(FEATURETRANSFEROOO, -ENXIO, "feature transfer out of order"), \
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C(RESOURCEEXHAUSTED, -ENXIO, "resources are exhausted"), \
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C(EXTLIST, -ENXIO, "invalid Extent List"), \
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2022-04-04 10:12:15 +08:00
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#undef C
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#define C(a, b, c) CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_##a
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enum { CMD_CMD_RC_TABLE };
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#undef C
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#define C(a, b, c) { b, c }
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struct cxl_mbox_cmd_rc {
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int err;
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const char *desc;
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};
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static const
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struct cxl_mbox_cmd_rc cxl_mbox_cmd_rctable[] ={ CMD_CMD_RC_TABLE };
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#undef C
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static inline const char *cxl_mbox_cmd_rc2str(struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd)
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{
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return cxl_mbox_cmd_rctable[mbox_cmd->return_code].desc;
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}
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static inline int cxl_mbox_cmd_rc2errno(struct cxl_mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd)
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{
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return cxl_mbox_cmd_rctable[mbox_cmd->return_code].err;
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}
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2021-09-09 13:12:21 +08:00
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/*
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* CXL 2.0 - Memory capacity multiplier
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* See Section 8.2.9.5
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*
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* Volatile, Persistent, and Partition capacities are specified to be in
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* multiples of 256MB - define a multiplier to convert to/from bytes.
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*/
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#define CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER SZ_256M
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2023-06-15 09:29:51 +08:00
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/*
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2023-01-18 13:53:37 +08:00
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* Event Interrupt Policy
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*
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* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.4; Table 8-52
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*/
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enum cxl_event_int_mode {
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CXL_INT_NONE = 0x00,
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CXL_INT_MSI_MSIX = 0x01,
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CXL_INT_FW = 0x02
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};
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struct cxl_event_interrupt_policy {
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u8 info_settings;
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u8 warn_settings;
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u8 failure_settings;
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u8 fatal_settings;
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} __packed;
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2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
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/**
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* struct cxl_event_state - Event log driver state
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*
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2023-06-15 09:29:51 +08:00
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* @buf: Buffer to receive event data
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* @log_lock: Serialize event_buf and log use
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2022-02-02 07:48:56 +08:00
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*/
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2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
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struct cxl_event_state {
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struct cxl_get_event_payload *buf;
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struct mutex log_lock;
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2022-02-02 07:48:56 +08:00
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};
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2023-04-19 01:39:03 +08:00
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/* Device enabled poison commands */
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enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits {
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST,
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT,
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR,
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS,
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA,
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS,
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CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @max_errors: Maximum media error records held in device cache
|
|
|
|
* @enabled_cmds: All poison commands enabled in the CEL
|
|
|
|
* @list_out: The poison list payload returned by device
|
|
|
|
* @lock: Protect reads of the poison list
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reads of the poison list are synchronized to ensure that a reader
|
|
|
|
* does not get an incomplete list because their request overlapped
|
|
|
|
* (was interrupted or preceded by) another read request of the same
|
|
|
|
* DPA range. CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.9.8.4.1
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_poison_state {
|
|
|
|
u32 max_errors;
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX);
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_poison_out *list_out;
|
|
|
|
struct mutex lock; /* Protect reads of poison list */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
cxl: add a firmware update mechanism using the sysfs firmware loader
The sysfs based firmware loader mechanism was created to easily allow
userspace to upload firmware images to FPGA cards. This also happens to
be pretty suitable to create a user-initiated but kernel-controlled
firmware update mechanism for CXL devices, using the CXL specified
mailbox commands.
Since firmware update commands can be long-running, and can be processed
in the background by the endpoint device, it is desirable to have the
ability to chunk the firmware transfer down to smaller pieces, so that
one operation does not monopolize the mailbox, locking out any other
long running background commands entirely - e.g. security commands like
'sanitize' or poison scanning operations.
The firmware loader mechanism allows a natural way to perform this
chunking, as after each mailbox command, that is restricted to the
maximum mailbox payload size, the cxl memdev driver relinquishes control
back to the fw_loader system and awaits the next chunk of data to
transfer. This opens opportunities for other background commands to
access the mailbox and send their own slices of background commands.
Add the necessary helpers and state tracking to be able to perform the
'Get FW Info', 'Transfer FW', and 'Activate FW' mailbox commands as
described in the CXL spec. Wire these up to the firmware loader
callbacks, and register with that system to create the memX/firmware/
sysfs ABI.
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602-vv-fw_update-v4-1-c6265bd7343b@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-06-15 01:17:40 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get FW Info
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.3.1; Table 8-56
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_get_fw_info {
|
|
|
|
u8 num_slots;
|
|
|
|
u8 slot_info;
|
|
|
|
u8 activation_cap;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[13];
|
|
|
|
char slot_1_revision[16];
|
|
|
|
char slot_2_revision[16];
|
|
|
|
char slot_3_revision[16];
|
|
|
|
char slot_4_revision[16];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_INFO_SLOT_INFO_CUR_MASK GENMASK(2, 0)
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_INFO_SLOT_INFO_NEXT_MASK GENMASK(5, 3)
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_INFO_SLOT_INFO_NEXT_SHIFT 3
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_INFO_ACTIVATION_CAP_HAS_LIVE_ACTIVATE BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Transfer FW Input Payload
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.3.2; Table 8-57
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_transfer_fw {
|
|
|
|
u8 action;
|
|
|
|
u8 slot;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[2];
|
|
|
|
__le32 offset;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved2[0x78];
|
|
|
|
u8 data[];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_TRANSFER_ACTION_FULL 0x0
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_TRANSFER_ACTION_INITIATE 0x1
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_TRANSFER_ACTION_CONTINUE 0x2
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_TRANSFER_ACTION_END 0x3
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_TRANSFER_ACTION_ABORT 0x4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.3.2 mandates 128-byte alignment for FW packages
|
|
|
|
* and for each part transferred in a Transfer FW command.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_TRANSFER_ALIGNMENT 128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Activate FW Input Payload
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.3.3; Table 8-58
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_activate_fw {
|
|
|
|
u8 action;
|
|
|
|
u8 slot;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_ACTIVATE_ONLINE 0x0
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_ACTIVATE_OFFLINE 0x1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* FW state bits */
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_STATE_BITS 32
|
2023-07-03 22:17:45 +08:00
|
|
|
#define CXL_FW_CANCEL 0
|
cxl: add a firmware update mechanism using the sysfs firmware loader
The sysfs based firmware loader mechanism was created to easily allow
userspace to upload firmware images to FPGA cards. This also happens to
be pretty suitable to create a user-initiated but kernel-controlled
firmware update mechanism for CXL devices, using the CXL specified
mailbox commands.
Since firmware update commands can be long-running, and can be processed
in the background by the endpoint device, it is desirable to have the
ability to chunk the firmware transfer down to smaller pieces, so that
one operation does not monopolize the mailbox, locking out any other
long running background commands entirely - e.g. security commands like
'sanitize' or poison scanning operations.
The firmware loader mechanism allows a natural way to perform this
chunking, as after each mailbox command, that is restricted to the
maximum mailbox payload size, the cxl memdev driver relinquishes control
back to the fw_loader system and awaits the next chunk of data to
transfer. This opens opportunities for other background commands to
access the mailbox and send their own slices of background commands.
Add the necessary helpers and state tracking to be able to perform the
'Get FW Info', 'Transfer FW', and 'Activate FW' mailbox commands as
described in the CXL spec. Wire these up to the firmware loader
callbacks, and register with that system to create the memX/firmware/
sysfs ABI.
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602-vv-fw_update-v4-1-c6265bd7343b@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-06-15 01:17:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct cxl_fw_state - Firmware upload / activation state
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @state: fw_uploader state bitmask
|
|
|
|
* @oneshot: whether the fw upload fits in a single transfer
|
|
|
|
* @num_slots: Number of FW slots available
|
|
|
|
* @cur_slot: Slot number currently active
|
|
|
|
* @next_slot: Slot number for the new firmware
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_fw_state {
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_BITMAP(state, CXL_FW_STATE_BITS);
|
|
|
|
bool oneshot;
|
|
|
|
int num_slots;
|
|
|
|
int cur_slot;
|
|
|
|
int next_slot;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2023-06-13 02:10:33 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct cxl_security_state - Device security state
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @state: state of last security operation
|
2023-06-13 02:10:34 +08:00
|
|
|
* @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support
|
|
|
|
* @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout
|
|
|
|
* @poll_dwork: polling work item
|
2023-06-13 02:10:35 +08:00
|
|
|
* @sanitize_node: sanitation sysfs file to notify
|
2023-06-13 02:10:33 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_security_state {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long state;
|
2023-06-13 02:10:34 +08:00
|
|
|
bool poll;
|
|
|
|
int poll_tmo_secs;
|
|
|
|
struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
|
2023-06-13 02:10:35 +08:00
|
|
|
struct kernfs_node *sanitize_node;
|
2023-06-13 02:10:33 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2023-06-15 09:30:07 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* enum cxl_devtype - delineate type-2 from a generic type-3 device
|
|
|
|
* @CXL_DEVTYPE_DEVMEM - Vendor specific CXL Type-2 device implementing HDM-D or
|
|
|
|
* HDM-DB, no requirement that this device implements a
|
|
|
|
* mailbox, or other memory-device-standard manageability
|
|
|
|
* flows.
|
|
|
|
* @CXL_DEVTYPE_CLASSMEM - Common class definition of a CXL Type-3 device with
|
|
|
|
* HDM-H and class-mandatory memory device registers
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
enum cxl_devtype {
|
|
|
|
CXL_DEVTYPE_DEVMEM,
|
|
|
|
CXL_DEVTYPE_CLASSMEM,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2021-11-03 04:29:01 +08:00
|
|
|
* struct cxl_dev_state - The driver device state
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* cxl_dev_state represents the CXL driver/device state. It provides an
|
|
|
|
* interface to mailbox commands as well as some cached data about the device.
|
|
|
|
* Currently only memory devices are represented.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @dev: The device associated with this CXL state
|
2022-11-30 01:48:59 +08:00
|
|
|
* @cxlmd: The device representing the CXL.mem capabilities of @dev
|
cxl/mem: Introduce 'struct cxl_regs' for "composable" CXL devices
CXL MMIO register blocks are organized by device type and capabilities.
There are Component registers, Device registers (yes, an ambiguous
name), and Memory Device registers (a specific extension of Device
registers).
It is possible for a given device instance (endpoint or port) to
implement register sets from multiple of the above categories.
The driver code that enumerates and maps the registers is type specific
so it is useful to have a dedicated type and helpers for each block
type.
At the same time, once the registers are mapped the origin type does not
matter. It is overly pedantic to reference the register block type in
code that is using the registers.
In preparation for the endpoint driver to incorporate Component registers
into its MMIO operations reorganize the registers to allow typed
enumeration + mapping, but anonymous usage. With the end state of
'struct cxl_regs' to be:
struct cxl_regs {
union {
struct {
CXL_DEVICE_REGS();
};
struct cxl_device_regs device_regs;
};
union {
struct {
CXL_COMPONENT_REGS();
};
struct cxl_component_regs component_regs;
};
};
With this arrangement the driver can share component init code with
ports, but when using the registers it can directly reference the
component register block type by name without the 'component_regs'
prefix.
So, map + enumerate can be shared across drivers of different CXL
classes e.g.:
void cxl_setup_device_regs(struct device *dev, void __iomem *base,
struct cxl_device_regs *regs);
void cxl_setup_component_regs(struct device *dev, void __iomem *base,
struct cxl_component_regs *regs);
...while inline usage in the driver need not indicate where the
registers came from:
readl(cxlm->regs.mbox + MBOX_OFFSET);
readl(cxlm->regs.hdm + HDM_OFFSET);
...instead of:
readl(cxlm->regs.device_regs.mbox + MBOX_OFFSET);
readl(cxlm->regs.component_regs.hdm + HDM_OFFSET);
This complexity of the definition in .h yields improvement in code
readability in .c while maintaining type-safety for organization of
setup code. It prepares the implementation to maintain organization in
the face of CXL devices that compose register interfaces consisting of
multiple types.
Given that this new container is named 'regs' rename the common register
base pointer @base, and fixup the kernel-doc for the missing @cxlmd
description.
Reviewed-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162096971451.1865304.13540251513463515153.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2021-05-14 13:21:54 +08:00
|
|
|
* @regs: Parsed register blocks
|
2022-02-02 06:06:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* @cxl_dvsec: Offset to the PCIe device DVSEC
|
2022-12-02 05:34:16 +08:00
|
|
|
* @rcd: operating in RCD mode (CXL 3.0 9.11.8 CXL Devices Attached to an RCH)
|
2023-05-19 07:38:20 +08:00
|
|
|
* @media_ready: Indicate whether the device media is usable
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
* @dpa_res: Overall DPA resource tree for the device
|
|
|
|
* @pmem_res: Active Persistent memory capacity configuration
|
|
|
|
* @ram_res: Active Volatile memory capacity configuration
|
|
|
|
* @component_reg_phys: register base of component registers
|
|
|
|
* @serial: PCIe Device Serial Number
|
2023-06-15 09:30:07 +08:00
|
|
|
* @type: Generic Memory Class device or Vendor Specific Memory device
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_dev_state {
|
|
|
|
struct device *dev;
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd;
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_regs regs;
|
|
|
|
int cxl_dvsec;
|
|
|
|
bool rcd;
|
|
|
|
bool media_ready;
|
|
|
|
struct resource dpa_res;
|
|
|
|
struct resource pmem_res;
|
|
|
|
struct resource ram_res;
|
|
|
|
resource_size_t component_reg_phys;
|
|
|
|
u64 serial;
|
2023-06-15 09:30:07 +08:00
|
|
|
enum cxl_devtype type;
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct cxl_memdev_state - Generic Type-3 Memory Device Class driver data
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* CXL 8.1.12.1 PCI Header - Class Code Register Memory Device defines
|
|
|
|
* common memory device functionality like the presence of a mailbox and
|
|
|
|
* the functionality related to that like Identify Memory Device and Get
|
|
|
|
* Partition Info
|
|
|
|
* @cxlds: Core driver state common across Type-2 and Type-3 devices
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
* @payload_size: Size of space for payload
|
|
|
|
* (CXL 2.0 8.2.8.4.3 Mailbox Capabilities Register)
|
2021-05-21 03:47:45 +08:00
|
|
|
* @lsa_size: Size of Label Storage Area
|
|
|
|
* (CXL 2.0 8.2.9.5.1.1 Identify Memory Device)
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
* @mbox_mutex: Mutex to synchronize mailbox access.
|
|
|
|
* @firmware_version: Firmware version for the memory device.
|
|
|
|
* @enabled_cmds: Hardware commands found enabled in CEL.
|
2021-09-15 03:03:04 +08:00
|
|
|
* @exclusive_cmds: Commands that are kernel-internal only
|
2021-09-14 06:24:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* @total_bytes: sum of all possible capacities
|
|
|
|
* @volatile_only_bytes: hard volatile capacity
|
|
|
|
* @persistent_only_bytes: hard persistent capacity
|
|
|
|
* @partition_align_bytes: alignment size for partition-able capacity
|
|
|
|
* @active_volatile_bytes: sum of hard + soft volatile
|
|
|
|
* @active_persistent_bytes: sum of hard + soft persistent
|
|
|
|
* @next_volatile_bytes: volatile capacity change pending device reset
|
|
|
|
* @next_persistent_bytes: persistent capacity change pending device reset
|
2023-02-17 03:24:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* @event: event log driver state
|
2023-04-19 01:39:03 +08:00
|
|
|
* @poison: poison driver state info
|
2023-07-26 13:19:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* @security: security driver state info
|
cxl: add a firmware update mechanism using the sysfs firmware loader
The sysfs based firmware loader mechanism was created to easily allow
userspace to upload firmware images to FPGA cards. This also happens to
be pretty suitable to create a user-initiated but kernel-controlled
firmware update mechanism for CXL devices, using the CXL specified
mailbox commands.
Since firmware update commands can be long-running, and can be processed
in the background by the endpoint device, it is desirable to have the
ability to chunk the firmware transfer down to smaller pieces, so that
one operation does not monopolize the mailbox, locking out any other
long running background commands entirely - e.g. security commands like
'sanitize' or poison scanning operations.
The firmware loader mechanism allows a natural way to perform this
chunking, as after each mailbox command, that is restricted to the
maximum mailbox payload size, the cxl memdev driver relinquishes control
back to the fw_loader system and awaits the next chunk of data to
transfer. This opens opportunities for other background commands to
access the mailbox and send their own slices of background commands.
Add the necessary helpers and state tracking to be able to perform the
'Get FW Info', 'Transfer FW', and 'Activate FW' mailbox commands as
described in the CXL spec. Wire these up to the firmware loader
callbacks, and register with that system to create the memX/firmware/
sysfs ABI.
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602-vv-fw_update-v4-1-c6265bd7343b@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-06-15 01:17:40 +08:00
|
|
|
* @fw: firmware upload / activation state
|
2021-09-09 13:12:21 +08:00
|
|
|
* @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands
|
2021-09-14 06:24:32 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
* See CXL 3.0 8.2.9.8.2 Capacity Configuration and Label Storage for
|
2021-09-14 06:24:32 +08:00
|
|
|
* details on capacity parameters.
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_memdev_state {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_dev_state cxlds;
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t payload_size;
|
2021-05-21 03:47:45 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t lsa_size;
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
struct mutex mbox_mutex; /* Protects device mailbox and firmware */
|
|
|
|
char firmware_version[0x10];
|
2021-09-09 13:12:44 +08:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX);
|
2021-09-15 03:03:04 +08:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_BITMAP(exclusive_cmds, CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX);
|
2021-06-18 06:16:18 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 total_bytes;
|
|
|
|
u64 volatile_only_bytes;
|
|
|
|
u64 persistent_only_bytes;
|
|
|
|
u64 partition_align_bytes;
|
2021-08-11 02:57:59 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 active_volatile_bytes;
|
|
|
|
u64 active_persistent_bytes;
|
|
|
|
u64 next_volatile_bytes;
|
|
|
|
u64 next_persistent_bytes;
|
2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_state event;
|
2023-04-19 01:39:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_poison_state poison;
|
2023-06-13 02:10:33 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_security_state security;
|
cxl: add a firmware update mechanism using the sysfs firmware loader
The sysfs based firmware loader mechanism was created to easily allow
userspace to upload firmware images to FPGA cards. This also happens to
be pretty suitable to create a user-initiated but kernel-controlled
firmware update mechanism for CXL devices, using the CXL specified
mailbox commands.
Since firmware update commands can be long-running, and can be processed
in the background by the endpoint device, it is desirable to have the
ability to chunk the firmware transfer down to smaller pieces, so that
one operation does not monopolize the mailbox, locking out any other
long running background commands entirely - e.g. security commands like
'sanitize' or poison scanning operations.
The firmware loader mechanism allows a natural way to perform this
chunking, as after each mailbox command, that is restricted to the
maximum mailbox payload size, the cxl memdev driver relinquishes control
back to the fw_loader system and awaits the next chunk of data to
transfer. This opens opportunities for other background commands to
access the mailbox and send their own slices of background commands.
Add the necessary helpers and state tracking to be able to perform the
'Get FW Info', 'Transfer FW', and 'Activate FW' mailbox commands as
described in the CXL spec. Wire these up to the firmware loader
callbacks, and register with that system to create the memX/firmware/
sysfs ABI.
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602-vv-fw_update-v4-1-c6265bd7343b@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-06-15 01:17:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_fw_state fw;
|
2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-24 01:09:27 +08:00
|
|
|
struct rcuwait mbox_wait;
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
int (*mbox_send)(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds,
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd);
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline struct cxl_memdev_state *
|
|
|
|
to_cxl_memdev_state(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-06-15 09:30:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cxlds->type != CXL_DEVTYPE_CLASSMEM)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
return container_of(cxlds, struct cxl_memdev_state, cxlds);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
enum cxl_opcode {
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID = 0x0000,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_RAW = CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID,
|
2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_EVENT_RECORD = 0x0100,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_EVENT_RECORD = 0x0101,
|
2023-01-18 13:53:37 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_EVT_INT_POLICY = 0x0102,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_EVT_INT_POLICY = 0x0103,
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_FW_INFO = 0x0200,
|
cxl: add a firmware update mechanism using the sysfs firmware loader
The sysfs based firmware loader mechanism was created to easily allow
userspace to upload firmware images to FPGA cards. This also happens to
be pretty suitable to create a user-initiated but kernel-controlled
firmware update mechanism for CXL devices, using the CXL specified
mailbox commands.
Since firmware update commands can be long-running, and can be processed
in the background by the endpoint device, it is desirable to have the
ability to chunk the firmware transfer down to smaller pieces, so that
one operation does not monopolize the mailbox, locking out any other
long running background commands entirely - e.g. security commands like
'sanitize' or poison scanning operations.
The firmware loader mechanism allows a natural way to perform this
chunking, as after each mailbox command, that is restricted to the
maximum mailbox payload size, the cxl memdev driver relinquishes control
back to the fw_loader system and awaits the next chunk of data to
transfer. This opens opportunities for other background commands to
access the mailbox and send their own slices of background commands.
Add the necessary helpers and state tracking to be able to perform the
'Get FW Info', 'Transfer FW', and 'Activate FW' mailbox commands as
described in the CXL spec. Wire these up to the firmware loader
callbacks, and register with that system to create the memX/firmware/
sysfs ABI.
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602-vv-fw_update-v4-1-c6265bd7343b@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-06-15 01:17:40 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_TRANSFER_FW = 0x0201,
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW = 0x0202,
|
2023-01-30 23:13:27 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_TIMESTAMP = 0x0301,
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SUPPORTED_LOGS = 0x0400,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_LOG = 0x0401,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_IDENTIFY = 0x4000,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_PARTITION_INFO = 0x4100,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO = 0x4101,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_LSA = 0x4102,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA = 0x4103,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_HEALTH_INFO = 0x4200,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_ALERT_CONFIG = 0x4201,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_ALERT_CONFIG = 0x4202,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SHUTDOWN_STATE = 0x4203,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE = 0x4204,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON = 0x4300,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON = 0x4301,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON = 0x4302,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS = 0x4303,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304,
|
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305,
|
2023-06-13 02:10:34 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE = 0x4400,
|
2023-06-13 02:10:37 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4401,
|
2022-12-01 03:21:36 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500,
|
2022-12-01 03:21:47 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501,
|
2022-12-01 03:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
|
2022-12-01 03:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK = 0x4503,
|
2022-12-01 03:22:10 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY = 0x4504,
|
2022-12-01 03:22:32 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4505,
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-09 13:13:15 +08:00
|
|
|
#define DEFINE_CXL_CEL_UUID \
|
|
|
|
UUID_INIT(0xda9c0b5, 0xbf41, 0x4b78, 0x8f, 0x79, 0x96, 0xb1, 0x62, \
|
|
|
|
0x3b, 0x3f, 0x17)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define DEFINE_CXL_VENDOR_DEBUG_UUID \
|
|
|
|
UUID_INIT(0xe1819d9, 0x11a9, 0x400c, 0x81, 0x1f, 0xd6, 0x07, 0x19, \
|
|
|
|
0x40, 0x3d, 0x86)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_get_supported_logs {
|
|
|
|
__le16 entries;
|
|
|
|
u8 rsvd[6];
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_gsl_entry {
|
|
|
|
uuid_t uuid;
|
|
|
|
__le32 size;
|
|
|
|
} __packed entry[];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_cel_entry {
|
|
|
|
__le16 opcode;
|
|
|
|
__le16 effect;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_get_log {
|
|
|
|
uuid_t uuid;
|
|
|
|
__le32 offset;
|
|
|
|
__le32 length;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* See CXL 2.0 Table 175 Identify Memory Device Output Payload */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_identify {
|
|
|
|
char fw_revision[0x10];
|
|
|
|
__le64 total_capacity;
|
|
|
|
__le64 volatile_capacity;
|
|
|
|
__le64 persistent_capacity;
|
|
|
|
__le64 partition_align;
|
|
|
|
__le16 info_event_log_size;
|
|
|
|
__le16 warning_event_log_size;
|
|
|
|
__le16 failure_event_log_size;
|
|
|
|
__le16 fatal_event_log_size;
|
|
|
|
__le32 lsa_size;
|
|
|
|
u8 poison_list_max_mer[3];
|
|
|
|
__le16 inject_poison_limit;
|
|
|
|
u8 poison_caps;
|
|
|
|
u8 qos_telemetry_caps;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-18 13:53:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common Event Record Format
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.1; Table 8-42
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_hdr {
|
|
|
|
uuid_t id;
|
|
|
|
u8 length;
|
|
|
|
u8 flags[3];
|
|
|
|
__le16 handle;
|
|
|
|
__le16 related_handle;
|
|
|
|
__le64 timestamp;
|
|
|
|
u8 maint_op_class;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[15];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_EVENT_RECORD_DATA_LENGTH 0x50
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_raw {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_hdr hdr;
|
|
|
|
u8 data[CXL_EVENT_RECORD_DATA_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get Event Records output payload
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.2; Table 8-50
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_GET_EVENT_FLAG_OVERFLOW BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_GET_EVENT_FLAG_MORE_RECORDS BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_get_event_payload {
|
|
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved1;
|
|
|
|
__le16 overflow_err_count;
|
|
|
|
__le64 first_overflow_timestamp;
|
|
|
|
__le64 last_overflow_timestamp;
|
|
|
|
__le16 record_count;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved2[10];
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_raw records[];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.2; Table 8-49
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
enum cxl_event_log_type {
|
|
|
|
CXL_EVENT_TYPE_INFO = 0x00,
|
|
|
|
CXL_EVENT_TYPE_WARN,
|
|
|
|
CXL_EVENT_TYPE_FAIL,
|
|
|
|
CXL_EVENT_TYPE_FATAL,
|
|
|
|
CXL_EVENT_TYPE_MAX
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Clear Event Records input payload
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.3; Table 8-51
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_clear_event_payload {
|
|
|
|
u8 event_log; /* enum cxl_event_log_type */
|
|
|
|
u8 clear_flags;
|
|
|
|
u8 nr_recs;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[3];
|
|
|
|
__le16 handles[];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_CLEAR_EVENT_MAX_HANDLES U8_MAX
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-18 13:53:38 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* General Media Event Record
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 Section 8.2.9.2.1.1; Table 8-43
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_EVENT_GEN_MED_COMP_ID_SIZE 0x10
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_gen_media {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_hdr hdr;
|
|
|
|
__le64 phys_addr;
|
|
|
|
u8 descriptor;
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
u8 transaction_type;
|
|
|
|
u8 validity_flags[2];
|
|
|
|
u8 channel;
|
|
|
|
u8 rank;
|
|
|
|
u8 device[3];
|
|
|
|
u8 component_id[CXL_EVENT_GEN_MED_COMP_ID_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[46];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-18 13:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DRAM Event Record - DER
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.1.2; Table 3-44
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_EVENT_DER_CORRECTION_MASK_SIZE 0x20
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_dram {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_hdr hdr;
|
|
|
|
__le64 phys_addr;
|
|
|
|
u8 descriptor;
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
u8 transaction_type;
|
|
|
|
u8 validity_flags[2];
|
|
|
|
u8 channel;
|
|
|
|
u8 rank;
|
|
|
|
u8 nibble_mask[3];
|
|
|
|
u8 bank_group;
|
|
|
|
u8 bank;
|
|
|
|
u8 row[3];
|
|
|
|
u8 column[2];
|
|
|
|
u8 correction_mask[CXL_EVENT_DER_CORRECTION_MASK_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[0x17];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-18 13:53:40 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get Health Info Record
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.8.3.1; Table 8-100
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_get_health_info {
|
|
|
|
u8 health_status;
|
|
|
|
u8 media_status;
|
|
|
|
u8 add_status;
|
|
|
|
u8 life_used;
|
|
|
|
u8 device_temp[2];
|
|
|
|
u8 dirty_shutdown_cnt[4];
|
|
|
|
u8 cor_vol_err_cnt[4];
|
|
|
|
u8 cor_per_err_cnt[4];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Memory Module Event Record
|
|
|
|
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.1.3; Table 8-45
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_mem_module {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_event_record_hdr hdr;
|
|
|
|
u8 event_type;
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_get_health_info info;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[0x3d];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-24 14:26:11 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_get_partition_info {
|
|
|
|
__le64 active_volatile_cap;
|
|
|
|
__le64 active_persistent_cap;
|
|
|
|
__le64 next_volatile_cap;
|
|
|
|
__le64 next_persistent_cap;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-09 13:13:15 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa {
|
2022-02-26 06:14:56 +08:00
|
|
|
__le32 offset;
|
|
|
|
__le32 length;
|
2021-09-09 13:13:15 +08:00
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_set_lsa {
|
2022-02-26 06:14:56 +08:00
|
|
|
__le32 offset;
|
|
|
|
__le32 reserved;
|
2021-09-09 13:13:15 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 data[];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-31 09:27:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_set_partition_info {
|
|
|
|
__le64 volatile_capacity;
|
|
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_SET_PARTITION_IMMEDIATE_FLAG BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-30 23:13:27 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Set Timestamp CXL 3.0 Spec 8.2.9.4.2 */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_set_timestamp_in {
|
|
|
|
__le64 timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-04-19 01:39:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Get Poison List CXL 3.0 Spec 8.2.9.8.4.1 */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_poison_in {
|
|
|
|
__le64 offset;
|
|
|
|
__le64 length;
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_poison_out {
|
|
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
|
|
u8 rsvd1;
|
|
|
|
__le64 overflow_ts;
|
|
|
|
__le16 count;
|
|
|
|
u8 rsvd2[20];
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_poison_record {
|
|
|
|
__le64 address;
|
|
|
|
__le32 length;
|
|
|
|
__le32 rsvd;
|
|
|
|
} __packed record[];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get Poison List address field encodes the starting
|
|
|
|
* address of poison, and the source of the poison.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_START_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 6)
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_MASK GENMASK(2, 0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get Poison List record length is in units of 64 bytes */
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_LEN_MULT 64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Kernel defined maximum for a list of poison errors */
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_LIST_MAX 1024
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get Poison List: Payload out flags */
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_FLAG_MORE BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_FLAG_OVERFLOW BIT(1)
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_FLAG_SCANNING BIT(2)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get Poison List: Poison Source */
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_UNKNOWN 0
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_EXTERNAL 1
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_INTERNAL 2
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_INJECTED 3
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_POISON_SOURCE_VENDOR 7
|
|
|
|
|
cxl/memdev: Add support for the Inject Poison mailbox command
CXL devices optionally support the INJECT POISON mailbox command. Add
memdev driver support for the mailbox command.
Per the CXL Specification (3.0 8.2.9.8.4.2), after receiving a valid
inject poison request, the device will return poison when the address
is accessed through the CXL.mem driver. Injecting poison adds the address
to the device's Poison List and the error source is set to Injected.
In addition, the device adds a poison creation event to its internal
Informational Event log, updates the Event Status register, and if
configured, interrupts the host.
Also, per the CXL Specification, it is not an error to inject poison
into an address that already has poison present and no error is
returned from the device.
If the address is not contained in the device's dpa resource, or is
not 64 byte aligned, return -EINVAL without issuing the mbox command.
Poison injection is intended for debug only and will be exposed to
userspace through debugfs. Restrict compilation to CONFIG_DEBUG_FS.
Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/241c64115e6bd2effed9c7a20b08b3908dd7be8f.1681874357.git.alison.schofield@intel.com
Tested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-04-19 11:26:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Inject & Clear Poison CXL 3.0 Spec 8.2.9.8.4.2/3 */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_inject_poison {
|
|
|
|
__le64 address;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2023-04-19 11:26:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Clear Poison CXL 3.0 Spec 8.2.9.8.4.3 */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_clear_poison {
|
|
|
|
__le64 address;
|
|
|
|
u8 write_data[CXL_POISON_LEN_MULT];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-09 13:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct cxl_mem_command - Driver representation of a memory device command
|
|
|
|
* @info: Command information as it exists for the UAPI
|
|
|
|
* @opcode: The actual bits used for the mailbox protocol
|
|
|
|
* @flags: Set of flags effecting driver behavior.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* * %CXL_CMD_FLAG_FORCE_ENABLE: In cases of error, commands with this flag
|
|
|
|
* will be enabled by the driver regardless of what hardware may have
|
|
|
|
* advertised.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The cxl_mem_command is the driver's internal representation of commands that
|
|
|
|
* are supported by the driver. Some of these commands may not be supported by
|
|
|
|
* the hardware. The driver will use @info to validate the fields passed in by
|
|
|
|
* the user then submit the @opcode to the hardware.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* See struct cxl_command_info.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_mem_command {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_command_info info;
|
|
|
|
enum cxl_opcode opcode;
|
|
|
|
u32 flags;
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_CMD_FLAG_FORCE_ENABLE BIT(0)
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-01 03:21:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#define CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET 0x01
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET 0x02
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED 0x04
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN 0x08
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT 0x10
|
|
|
|
#define CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT 0x20
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-01 03:21:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* set passphrase input payload */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_set_pass {
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[31];
|
|
|
|
/* CXL field using NVDIMM define, same length */
|
|
|
|
u8 old_pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
u8 new_pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-01 03:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
/* disable passphrase input payload */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_disable_pass {
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[31];
|
|
|
|
u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-01 03:22:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* passphrase secure erase payload */
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_pass_erase {
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
u8 reserved[31];
|
|
|
|
u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-01 03:21:47 +08:00
|
|
|
enum {
|
|
|
|
CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER = 0,
|
|
|
|
CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_internal_send_cmd(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds,
|
2022-12-06 12:22:33 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd);
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds);
|
2022-05-19 07:34:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_await_media_ready(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
|
2023-06-15 09:30:02 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_enumerate_cmds(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds);
|
|
|
|
int cxl_mem_create_range_info(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds);
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_memdev_state *cxl_memdev_state_create(struct device *dev);
|
|
|
|
void set_exclusive_cxl_commands(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *cmds);
|
|
|
|
void clear_exclusive_cxl_commands(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *cmds);
|
|
|
|
void cxl_mem_get_event_records(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, u32 status);
|
|
|
|
int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds);
|
|
|
|
int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds);
|
2023-04-19 01:39:04 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_region *cxlr);
|
2023-04-19 01:39:06 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_trigger_poison_list(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd);
|
cxl/memdev: Add support for the Inject Poison mailbox command
CXL devices optionally support the INJECT POISON mailbox command. Add
memdev driver support for the mailbox command.
Per the CXL Specification (3.0 8.2.9.8.4.2), after receiving a valid
inject poison request, the device will return poison when the address
is accessed through the CXL.mem driver. Injecting poison adds the address
to the device's Poison List and the error source is set to Injected.
In addition, the device adds a poison creation event to its internal
Informational Event log, updates the Event Status register, and if
configured, interrupts the host.
Also, per the CXL Specification, it is not an error to inject poison
into an address that already has poison present and no error is
returned from the device.
If the address is not contained in the device's dpa resource, or is
not 64 byte aligned, return -EINVAL without issuing the mbox command.
Poison injection is intended for debug only and will be exposed to
userspace through debugfs. Restrict compilation to CONFIG_DEBUG_FS.
Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/241c64115e6bd2effed9c7a20b08b3908dd7be8f.1681874357.git.alison.schofield@intel.com
Tested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2023-04-19 11:26:25 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_inject_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 dpa);
|
2023-04-19 11:26:26 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_clear_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 dpa);
|
2023-01-30 23:13:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-23 06:58:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CXL_SUSPEND
|
|
|
|
void cxl_mem_active_inc(void);
|
|
|
|
void cxl_mem_active_dec(void);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline void cxl_mem_active_inc(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void cxl_mem_active_dec(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2022-02-02 04:24:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2023-06-26 08:16:51 +08:00
|
|
|
int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, u16 cmd);
|
2023-06-13 02:10:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-02 04:24:30 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cxl_hdm {
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_component_regs regs;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int decoder_count;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int target_count;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int interleave_mask;
|
|
|
|
struct cxl_port *port;
|
|
|
|
};
|
2022-05-27 03:15:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct seq_file;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *cxl_debugfs_create_dir(const char *dir);
|
|
|
|
void cxl_dpa_debug(struct seq_file *file, struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
|
2021-05-14 13:21:49 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* __CXL_MEM_H__ */
|