linux/fs/proc/fd.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ Android captures per-process system memory state when certain low memory events (e.g a foreground app kill) occur, to identify potential memory hoggers. In order to measure how much memory a process actually consumes, it is necessary to include the DMA buffer sizes for that process in the memory accounting. Since the handle to DMA buffers are raw FDs, it is important to be able to identify which processes have FD references to a DMA buffer. Currently, DMA buffer FDs can be accounted using /proc/<pid>/fd/* and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo -- both are only readable by the process owner, as follows: 1. Do a readlink on each FD. 2. If the target path begins with "/dmabuf", then the FD is a dmabuf FD. 3. stat the file to get the dmabuf inode number. 4. Read/ proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd>, to get the DMA buffer size. Accessing other processes' fdinfo requires root privileges. This limits the use of the interface to debugging environments and is not suitable for production builds. Granting root privileges even to a system process increases the attack surface and is highly undesirable. Since fdinfo doesn't permit reading process memory and manipulating process state, allow accessing fdinfo under PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCRED. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-1-kaleshsingh@google.com Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:54:44 +08:00
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
proc: report open files as size in stat() for /proc/pid/fd Many monitoring tools include open file count as a metric. Currently the only way to get this number is to enumerate the files in /proc/pid/fd. The problem with the current approach is that it does many things people generally don't care about when they need one number for a metric. In our tests for cadvisor, which reports open file counts per cgroup, we observed that reading the number of open files is slow. Out of 35.23% of CPU time spent in `proc_readfd_common`, we see 29.43% spent in `proc_fill_cache`, which is responsible for filling dentry info. Some of this extra time is spinlock contention, but it's a contention for the lock we don't want to take to begin with. We considered putting the number of open files in /proc/pid/status. Unfortunately, counting the number of fds involves iterating the open_files bitmap, which has a linear complexity in proportion with the number of open files (bitmap slots really, but it's close). We don't want to make /proc/pid/status any slower, so instead we put this info in /proc/pid/fd as a size member of the stat syscall result. Previously the reported number was zero, so there's very little risk of breaking anything, while still providing a somewhat logical way to count the open files with a fallback if it's zero. RFC for this patch included iterating open fds under RCU. Thanks to Frank Hofmann for the suggestion to use the bitmap instead. Previously: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` With this patch: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 65 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` Correctness check: ``` $ sudo ls /proc/1/fd | wc -l 65 ``` I added the docs for /proc/<pid>/fd while I'm at it. [ivan@cloudflare.com: use bitmap_weight() to count the bits] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018045844.37697-1-ivan@cloudflare.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include linux/bitmap.h for bitmap_weight()] [ivan@cloudflare.com: return errno from proc_fd_getattr() instead of setting negative size] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024173140.30673-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220922224027.59266-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Anton Mitterer <mail@christoph.anton.mitterer.name> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-23 06:40:26 +08:00
#include <linux/bitmap.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in its fdinfo file. Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be reused by another process. $ cat /proc/locks ... 6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF ... $ ps -C rpcbind PID TTY TIME CMD 332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind $ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4 pos: 0 flags: 0100000 mnt_id: 22 lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF $ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4 lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock $ ls -l /proc/324/fd/ total 0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0 You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock. This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file locks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:49:38 +08:00
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/filelock.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include "../mount.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include "fd.h"
static int seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct files_struct *files = NULL;
int f_flags = 0, ret = -ENOENT;
struct file *file = NULL;
struct task_struct *task;
task = get_proc_task(m->private);
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
task_lock(task);
files = task->files;
if (files) {
unsigned int fd = proc_fd(m->private);
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
file = files_lookup_fd_locked(files, fd);
if (file) {
struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
f_flags = file->f_flags;
if (close_on_exec(fd, fdt))
f_flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
get_file(file);
ret = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
}
task_unlock(task);
put_task_struct(task);
proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in its fdinfo file. Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be reused by another process. $ cat /proc/locks ... 6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF ... $ ps -C rpcbind PID TTY TIME CMD 332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind $ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4 pos: 0 flags: 0100000 mnt_id: 22 lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF $ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4 lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock $ ls -l /proc/324/fd/ total 0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0 You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock. This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file locks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:49:38 +08:00
if (ret)
return ret;
procfs/dmabuf: add inode number to /proc/*/fdinfo And 'ino' field to /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<FD> and /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/fdinfo/<FD>. The inode numbers can be used to uniquely identify DMA buffers in user space and avoids a dependency on /proc/<pid>/fd/* when accounting per-process DMA buffer sizes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-2-kaleshsingh@google.com Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:54:49 +08:00
seq_printf(m, "pos:\t%lli\nflags:\t0%o\nmnt_id:\t%i\nino:\t%lu\n",
proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in its fdinfo file. Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be reused by another process. $ cat /proc/locks ... 6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF ... $ ps -C rpcbind PID TTY TIME CMD 332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind $ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4 pos: 0 flags: 0100000 mnt_id: 22 lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF $ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4 lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock $ ls -l /proc/324/fd/ total 0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0 You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock. This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file locks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:49:38 +08:00
(long long)file->f_pos, f_flags,
procfs/dmabuf: add inode number to /proc/*/fdinfo And 'ino' field to /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<FD> and /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/fdinfo/<FD>. The inode numbers can be used to uniquely identify DMA buffers in user space and avoids a dependency on /proc/<pid>/fd/* when accounting per-process DMA buffer sizes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-2-kaleshsingh@google.com Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:54:49 +08:00
real_mount(file->f_path.mnt)->mnt_id,
file_inode(file)->i_ino);
proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in its fdinfo file. Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be reused by another process. $ cat /proc/locks ... 6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF ... $ ps -C rpcbind PID TTY TIME CMD 332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind $ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4 pos: 0 flags: 0100000 mnt_id: 22 lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF $ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4 lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock $ ls -l /proc/324/fd/ total 0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0 You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock. This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file locks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:49:38 +08:00
/* show_fd_locks() never deferences files so a stale value is safe */
proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in its fdinfo file. Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be reused by another process. $ cat /proc/locks ... 6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF ... $ ps -C rpcbind PID TTY TIME CMD 332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind $ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4 pos: 0 flags: 0100000 mnt_id: 22 lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF $ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4 lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock $ ls -l /proc/324/fd/ total 0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0 You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock. This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file locks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:49:38 +08:00
show_fd_locks(m, file, files);
if (seq_has_overflowed(m))
goto out;
if (file->f_op->show_fdinfo)
file->f_op->show_fdinfo(m, file);
proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in its fdinfo file. Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock. We can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there can be wrong. For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and dies. In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be reused by another process. $ cat /proc/locks ... 6: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF ... $ ps -C rpcbind PID TTY TIME CMD 332 ? 00:00:00 rpcbind $ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4 pos: 0 flags: 0100000 mnt_id: 22 lock: 1: FLOCK ADVISORY WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF $ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4 lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar 5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock $ ls -l /proc/324/fd/ total 0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0 You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock. This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file locks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:49:38 +08:00
out:
fput(file);
return 0;
}
static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
{
procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ Android captures per-process system memory state when certain low memory events (e.g a foreground app kill) occur, to identify potential memory hoggers. In order to measure how much memory a process actually consumes, it is necessary to include the DMA buffer sizes for that process in the memory accounting. Since the handle to DMA buffers are raw FDs, it is important to be able to identify which processes have FD references to a DMA buffer. Currently, DMA buffer FDs can be accounted using /proc/<pid>/fd/* and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo -- both are only readable by the process owner, as follows: 1. Do a readlink on each FD. 2. If the target path begins with "/dmabuf", then the FD is a dmabuf FD. 3. stat the file to get the dmabuf inode number. 4. Read/ proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd>, to get the DMA buffer size. Accessing other processes' fdinfo requires root privileges. This limits the use of the interface to debugging environments and is not suitable for production builds. Granting root privileges even to a system process increases the attack surface and is highly undesirable. Since fdinfo doesn't permit reading process memory and manipulating process state, allow accessing fdinfo under PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCRED. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-1-kaleshsingh@google.com Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:54:44 +08:00
bool allowed = false;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!allowed)
return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
return single_open(file, seq_show, inode);
}
static const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_file_operations = {
.open = seq_fdinfo_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
static bool tid_fd_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, fmode_t *mode)
{
struct file *file;
rcu_read_lock();
file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU In recent discussions around some performance improvements in the file handling area we discussed switching the file cache to rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU which allows us to get rid of call_rcu() based freeing for files completely. This is a pretty sensitive change overall but it might actually be worth doing. The main downside is the subtlety. The other one is that we should really wait for Jann's patch to land that enables KASAN to handle SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU UAFs. Currently it doesn't but a patch for this exists. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU objects may be freed and reused multiple times which requires a few changes. So it isn't sufficient anymore to just acquire a reference to the file in question under rcu using atomic_long_inc_not_zero() since the file might have already been recycled and someone else might have bumped the reference. In other words, callers might see reference count bumps from newer users. For this reason it is necessary to verify that the pointer is the same before and after the reference count increment. This pattern can be seen in get_file_rcu() and __files_get_rcu(). In addition, it isn't possible to access or check fields in struct file without first aqcuiring a reference on it. Not doing that was always very dodgy and it was only usable for non-pointer data in struct file. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU it is necessary that callers first acquire a reference under rcu or they must hold the files_lock of the fdtable. Failing to do either one of this is a bug. Thanks to Jann for pointing out that we need to ensure memory ordering between reallocations and pointer check by ensuring that all subsequent loads have a dependency on the second load in get_file_rcu() and providing a fixup that was folded into this patch. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-09-29 14:45:59 +08:00
file = task_lookup_fdget_rcu(task, fd);
rcu_read_unlock();
file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU In recent discussions around some performance improvements in the file handling area we discussed switching the file cache to rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU which allows us to get rid of call_rcu() based freeing for files completely. This is a pretty sensitive change overall but it might actually be worth doing. The main downside is the subtlety. The other one is that we should really wait for Jann's patch to land that enables KASAN to handle SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU UAFs. Currently it doesn't but a patch for this exists. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU objects may be freed and reused multiple times which requires a few changes. So it isn't sufficient anymore to just acquire a reference to the file in question under rcu using atomic_long_inc_not_zero() since the file might have already been recycled and someone else might have bumped the reference. In other words, callers might see reference count bumps from newer users. For this reason it is necessary to verify that the pointer is the same before and after the reference count increment. This pattern can be seen in get_file_rcu() and __files_get_rcu(). In addition, it isn't possible to access or check fields in struct file without first aqcuiring a reference on it. Not doing that was always very dodgy and it was only usable for non-pointer data in struct file. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU it is necessary that callers first acquire a reference under rcu or they must hold the files_lock of the fdtable. Failing to do either one of this is a bug. Thanks to Jann for pointing out that we need to ensure memory ordering between reallocations and pointer check by ensuring that all subsequent loads have a dependency on the second load in get_file_rcu() and providing a fixup that was folded into this patch. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-09-29 14:45:59 +08:00
if (file) {
*mode = file->f_mode;
fput(file);
}
return !!file;
}
static void tid_fd_update_inode(struct task_struct *task, struct inode *inode,
fmode_t f_mode)
{
task_dump_owner(task, 0, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
unsigned i_mode = S_IFLNK;
if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
i_mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR;
if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
i_mode |= S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR;
inode->i_mode = i_mode;
}
security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
}
static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct inode *inode;
unsigned int fd;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
inode = d_inode(dentry);
task = get_proc_task(inode);
fd = proc_fd(inode);
if (task) {
fmode_t f_mode;
if (tid_fd_mode(task, fd, &f_mode)) {
tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, f_mode);
put_task_struct(task);
return 1;
}
put_task_struct(task);
}
return 0;
}
static const struct dentry_operations tid_fd_dentry_operations = {
.d_revalidate = tid_fd_revalidate,
.d_delete = pid_delete_dentry,
};
static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task;
int ret = -ENOENT;
task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
if (task) {
unsigned int fd = proc_fd(d_inode(dentry));
struct file *fd_file;
fd_file = fget_task(task, fd);
if (fd_file) {
*path = fd_file->f_path;
path_get(&fd_file->f_path);
ret = 0;
fput(fd_file);
}
put_task_struct(task);
}
return ret;
}
struct fd_data {
fmode_t mode;
unsigned fd;
};
static struct dentry *proc_fd_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
const struct fd_data *data = ptr;
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, S_IFLNK);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
ei = PROC_I(inode);
ei->fd = data->fd;
inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
inode->i_size = 64;
ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_fd_link;
tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, data->mode);
d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_fd_dentry_operations);
return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
}
static struct dentry *proc_lookupfd_common(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
instantiate_t instantiate)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(dir);
struct fd_data data = {.fd = name_to_int(&dentry->d_name)};
struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
if (data.fd == ~0U)
goto out;
if (!tid_fd_mode(task, data.fd, &data.mode))
goto out;
result = instantiate(dentry, task, &data);
out:
put_task_struct(task);
out_no_task:
return result;
}
static int proc_readfd_common(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
instantiate_t instantiate)
{
struct task_struct *p = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
unsigned int fd;
if (!p)
return -ENOENT;
if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
for (fd = ctx->pos - 2;; fd++) {
struct file *f;
struct fd_data data;
char name[10 + 1];
unsigned int len;
file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU In recent discussions around some performance improvements in the file handling area we discussed switching the file cache to rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU which allows us to get rid of call_rcu() based freeing for files completely. This is a pretty sensitive change overall but it might actually be worth doing. The main downside is the subtlety. The other one is that we should really wait for Jann's patch to land that enables KASAN to handle SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU UAFs. Currently it doesn't but a patch for this exists. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU objects may be freed and reused multiple times which requires a few changes. So it isn't sufficient anymore to just acquire a reference to the file in question under rcu using atomic_long_inc_not_zero() since the file might have already been recycled and someone else might have bumped the reference. In other words, callers might see reference count bumps from newer users. For this reason it is necessary to verify that the pointer is the same before and after the reference count increment. This pattern can be seen in get_file_rcu() and __files_get_rcu(). In addition, it isn't possible to access or check fields in struct file without first aqcuiring a reference on it. Not doing that was always very dodgy and it was only usable for non-pointer data in struct file. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU it is necessary that callers first acquire a reference under rcu or they must hold the files_lock of the fdtable. Failing to do either one of this is a bug. Thanks to Jann for pointing out that we need to ensure memory ordering between reallocations and pointer check by ensuring that all subsequent loads have a dependency on the second load in get_file_rcu() and providing a fixup that was folded into this patch. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-09-29 14:45:59 +08:00
f = task_lookup_next_fdget_rcu(p, &fd);
ctx->pos = fd + 2LL;
if (!f)
break;
data.mode = f->f_mode;
rcu_read_unlock();
file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU In recent discussions around some performance improvements in the file handling area we discussed switching the file cache to rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU which allows us to get rid of call_rcu() based freeing for files completely. This is a pretty sensitive change overall but it might actually be worth doing. The main downside is the subtlety. The other one is that we should really wait for Jann's patch to land that enables KASAN to handle SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU UAFs. Currently it doesn't but a patch for this exists. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU objects may be freed and reused multiple times which requires a few changes. So it isn't sufficient anymore to just acquire a reference to the file in question under rcu using atomic_long_inc_not_zero() since the file might have already been recycled and someone else might have bumped the reference. In other words, callers might see reference count bumps from newer users. For this reason it is necessary to verify that the pointer is the same before and after the reference count increment. This pattern can be seen in get_file_rcu() and __files_get_rcu(). In addition, it isn't possible to access or check fields in struct file without first aqcuiring a reference on it. Not doing that was always very dodgy and it was only usable for non-pointer data in struct file. With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU it is necessary that callers first acquire a reference under rcu or they must hold the files_lock of the fdtable. Failing to do either one of this is a bug. Thanks to Jann for pointing out that we need to ensure memory ordering between reallocations and pointer check by ensuring that all subsequent loads have a dependency on the second load in get_file_rcu() and providing a fixup that was folded into this patch. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-09-29 14:45:59 +08:00
fput(f);
data.fd = fd;
len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", fd);
if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx,
name, len, instantiate, p,
&data))
goto out;
cond_resched();
rcu_read_lock();
}
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
put_task_struct(p);
return 0;
}
proc: report open files as size in stat() for /proc/pid/fd Many monitoring tools include open file count as a metric. Currently the only way to get this number is to enumerate the files in /proc/pid/fd. The problem with the current approach is that it does many things people generally don't care about when they need one number for a metric. In our tests for cadvisor, which reports open file counts per cgroup, we observed that reading the number of open files is slow. Out of 35.23% of CPU time spent in `proc_readfd_common`, we see 29.43% spent in `proc_fill_cache`, which is responsible for filling dentry info. Some of this extra time is spinlock contention, but it's a contention for the lock we don't want to take to begin with. We considered putting the number of open files in /proc/pid/status. Unfortunately, counting the number of fds involves iterating the open_files bitmap, which has a linear complexity in proportion with the number of open files (bitmap slots really, but it's close). We don't want to make /proc/pid/status any slower, so instead we put this info in /proc/pid/fd as a size member of the stat syscall result. Previously the reported number was zero, so there's very little risk of breaking anything, while still providing a somewhat logical way to count the open files with a fallback if it's zero. RFC for this patch included iterating open fds under RCU. Thanks to Frank Hofmann for the suggestion to use the bitmap instead. Previously: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` With this patch: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 65 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` Correctness check: ``` $ sudo ls /proc/1/fd | wc -l 65 ``` I added the docs for /proc/<pid>/fd while I'm at it. [ivan@cloudflare.com: use bitmap_weight() to count the bits] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018045844.37697-1-ivan@cloudflare.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include linux/bitmap.h for bitmap_weight()] [ivan@cloudflare.com: return errno from proc_fd_getattr() instead of setting negative size] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024173140.30673-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220922224027.59266-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Anton Mitterer <mail@christoph.anton.mitterer.name> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-23 06:40:26 +08:00
static int proc_readfd_count(struct inode *inode, loff_t *count)
{
struct task_struct *p = get_proc_task(inode);
struct fdtable *fdt;
if (!p)
return -ENOENT;
task_lock(p);
if (p->files) {
rcu_read_lock();
fdt = files_fdtable(p->files);
*count = bitmap_weight(fdt->open_fds, fdt->max_fds);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
task_unlock(p);
put_task_struct(p);
return 0;
}
static int proc_readfd(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
return proc_readfd_common(file, ctx, proc_fd_instantiate);
}
const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = {
.read = generic_read_dir,
.iterate_shared = proc_readfd,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static struct dentry *proc_lookupfd(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
return proc_lookupfd_common(dir, dentry, proc_fd_instantiate);
}
/*
* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
*/
int proc_fd_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
struct task_struct *p;
int rv;
rv = generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask);
if (rv == 0)
return rv;
rcu_read_lock();
p = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (p && same_thread_group(p, current))
rv = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
return rv;
}
static int proc_fd_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
proc: report open files as size in stat() for /proc/pid/fd Many monitoring tools include open file count as a metric. Currently the only way to get this number is to enumerate the files in /proc/pid/fd. The problem with the current approach is that it does many things people generally don't care about when they need one number for a metric. In our tests for cadvisor, which reports open file counts per cgroup, we observed that reading the number of open files is slow. Out of 35.23% of CPU time spent in `proc_readfd_common`, we see 29.43% spent in `proc_fill_cache`, which is responsible for filling dentry info. Some of this extra time is spinlock contention, but it's a contention for the lock we don't want to take to begin with. We considered putting the number of open files in /proc/pid/status. Unfortunately, counting the number of fds involves iterating the open_files bitmap, which has a linear complexity in proportion with the number of open files (bitmap slots really, but it's close). We don't want to make /proc/pid/status any slower, so instead we put this info in /proc/pid/fd as a size member of the stat syscall result. Previously the reported number was zero, so there's very little risk of breaking anything, while still providing a somewhat logical way to count the open files with a fallback if it's zero. RFC for this patch included iterating open fds under RCU. Thanks to Frank Hofmann for the suggestion to use the bitmap instead. Previously: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` With this patch: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 65 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` Correctness check: ``` $ sudo ls /proc/1/fd | wc -l 65 ``` I added the docs for /proc/<pid>/fd while I'm at it. [ivan@cloudflare.com: use bitmap_weight() to count the bits] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018045844.37697-1-ivan@cloudflare.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include linux/bitmap.h for bitmap_weight()] [ivan@cloudflare.com: return errno from proc_fd_getattr() instead of setting negative size] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024173140.30673-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220922224027.59266-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Anton Mitterer <mail@christoph.anton.mitterer.name> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-23 06:40:26 +08:00
const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
int rv = 0;
generic_fillattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, request_mask, inode, stat);
proc: report open files as size in stat() for /proc/pid/fd Many monitoring tools include open file count as a metric. Currently the only way to get this number is to enumerate the files in /proc/pid/fd. The problem with the current approach is that it does many things people generally don't care about when they need one number for a metric. In our tests for cadvisor, which reports open file counts per cgroup, we observed that reading the number of open files is slow. Out of 35.23% of CPU time spent in `proc_readfd_common`, we see 29.43% spent in `proc_fill_cache`, which is responsible for filling dentry info. Some of this extra time is spinlock contention, but it's a contention for the lock we don't want to take to begin with. We considered putting the number of open files in /proc/pid/status. Unfortunately, counting the number of fds involves iterating the open_files bitmap, which has a linear complexity in proportion with the number of open files (bitmap slots really, but it's close). We don't want to make /proc/pid/status any slower, so instead we put this info in /proc/pid/fd as a size member of the stat syscall result. Previously the reported number was zero, so there's very little risk of breaking anything, while still providing a somewhat logical way to count the open files with a fallback if it's zero. RFC for this patch included iterating open fds under RCU. Thanks to Frank Hofmann for the suggestion to use the bitmap instead. Previously: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` With this patch: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 65 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` Correctness check: ``` $ sudo ls /proc/1/fd | wc -l 65 ``` I added the docs for /proc/<pid>/fd while I'm at it. [ivan@cloudflare.com: use bitmap_weight() to count the bits] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018045844.37697-1-ivan@cloudflare.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include linux/bitmap.h for bitmap_weight()] [ivan@cloudflare.com: return errno from proc_fd_getattr() instead of setting negative size] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024173140.30673-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220922224027.59266-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Anton Mitterer <mail@christoph.anton.mitterer.name> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-23 06:40:26 +08:00
/* If it's a directory, put the number of open fds there */
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
rv = proc_readfd_count(inode, &stat->size);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
}
return rv;
}
const struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_lookupfd,
.permission = proc_fd_permission,
proc: report open files as size in stat() for /proc/pid/fd Many monitoring tools include open file count as a metric. Currently the only way to get this number is to enumerate the files in /proc/pid/fd. The problem with the current approach is that it does many things people generally don't care about when they need one number for a metric. In our tests for cadvisor, which reports open file counts per cgroup, we observed that reading the number of open files is slow. Out of 35.23% of CPU time spent in `proc_readfd_common`, we see 29.43% spent in `proc_fill_cache`, which is responsible for filling dentry info. Some of this extra time is spinlock contention, but it's a contention for the lock we don't want to take to begin with. We considered putting the number of open files in /proc/pid/status. Unfortunately, counting the number of fds involves iterating the open_files bitmap, which has a linear complexity in proportion with the number of open files (bitmap slots really, but it's close). We don't want to make /proc/pid/status any slower, so instead we put this info in /proc/pid/fd as a size member of the stat syscall result. Previously the reported number was zero, so there's very little risk of breaking anything, while still providing a somewhat logical way to count the open files with a fallback if it's zero. RFC for this patch included iterating open fds under RCU. Thanks to Frank Hofmann for the suggestion to use the bitmap instead. Previously: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` With this patch: ``` $ sudo stat /proc/1/fd | head -n2 File: /proc/1/fd Size: 65 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 1024 directory ``` Correctness check: ``` $ sudo ls /proc/1/fd | wc -l 65 ``` I added the docs for /proc/<pid>/fd while I'm at it. [ivan@cloudflare.com: use bitmap_weight() to count the bits] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221018045844.37697-1-ivan@cloudflare.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: include linux/bitmap.h for bitmap_weight()] [ivan@cloudflare.com: return errno from proc_fd_getattr() instead of setting negative size] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024173140.30673-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220922224027.59266-1-ivan@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Anton Mitterer <mail@christoph.anton.mitterer.name> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-23 06:40:26 +08:00
.getattr = proc_fd_getattr,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
static struct dentry *proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
const struct fd_data *data = ptr;
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ Android captures per-process system memory state when certain low memory events (e.g a foreground app kill) occur, to identify potential memory hoggers. In order to measure how much memory a process actually consumes, it is necessary to include the DMA buffer sizes for that process in the memory accounting. Since the handle to DMA buffers are raw FDs, it is important to be able to identify which processes have FD references to a DMA buffer. Currently, DMA buffer FDs can be accounted using /proc/<pid>/fd/* and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo -- both are only readable by the process owner, as follows: 1. Do a readlink on each FD. 2. If the target path begins with "/dmabuf", then the FD is a dmabuf FD. 3. stat the file to get the dmabuf inode number. 4. Read/ proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd>, to get the DMA buffer size. Accessing other processes' fdinfo requires root privileges. This limits the use of the interface to debugging environments and is not suitable for production builds. Granting root privileges even to a system process increases the attack surface and is highly undesirable. Since fdinfo doesn't permit reading process memory and manipulating process state, allow accessing fdinfo under PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCRED. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210308170651.919148-1-kaleshsingh@google.com Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:54:44 +08:00
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dentry->d_sb, task, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
ei = PROC_I(inode);
ei->fd = data->fd;
inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations;
tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, 0);
d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_fd_dentry_operations);
return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
}
static struct dentry *
proc_lookupfdinfo(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
return proc_lookupfd_common(dir, dentry, proc_fdinfo_instantiate);
}
static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
return proc_readfd_common(file, ctx,
proc_fdinfo_instantiate);
}
static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo,
.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = {
.open = proc_open_fdinfo,
.read = generic_read_dir,
.iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};