linux/net/core/net_namespace.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/net_namespace.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
bpf, net: Rework cookie generator as per-cpu one With its use in BPF, the cookie generator can be called very frequently in particular when used out of cgroup v2 hooks (e.g. connect / sendmsg) and attached to the root cgroup, for example, when used in v1/v2 mixed environments. In particular, when there's a high churn on sockets in the system there can be many parallel requests to the bpf_get_socket_cookie() and bpf_get_netns_cookie() helpers which then cause contention on the atomic counter. As similarly done in f991bd2e1421 ("fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator"), add a small helper library that both can use for the 64 bit counters. Given this can be called from different contexts, we also need to deal with potential nested calls even though in practice they are considered extremely rare. One idea as suggested by Eric Dumazet was to use a reverse counter for this situation since we don't expect 64 bit overflows anyways; that way, we can avoid bigger gaps in the 64 bit counter space compared to just batch-wise increase. Even on machines with small number of cores (e.g. 4) the cookie generation shrinks from min/max/med/avg (ns) of 22/50/40/38.9 down to 10/35/14/17.3 when run in parallel from multiple CPUs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8a80b8d27d3c49f9a14e1d5213c19d8be87d1dc8.1601477936.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-09-30 23:18:16 +08:00
#include <linux/cookie.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netns/generic.h>
/*
* Our network namespace constructor/destructor lists
*/
static LIST_HEAD(pernet_list);
static struct list_head *first_device = &pernet_list;
LIST_HEAD(net_namespace_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(net_namespace_list);
/* Protects net_namespace_list. Nests iside rtnl_lock() */
DECLARE_RWSEM(net_rwsem);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(net_rwsem);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static struct key_tag init_net_key_domain = { .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1) };
#endif
struct net init_net = {
net: Use generic ns_common::count Switch over network namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime counter. Network namespaces have an additional counter named "passive". This counter does not guarantee that the network namespace is not already de-initialized and so isn't concerned with the actual lifetime of the network namespace; only the "count" counter is. So the latter is moved into struct ns_common. Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and these are not altered. This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them. It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces. Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace struct out of struct ns_common. Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: rewrite commit] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644977635.604812.1319877322927063560.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-08-19 20:06:36 +08:00
.ns.count = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
.dev_base_head = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_net.dev_base_head),
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
.key_domain = &init_net_key_domain,
#endif
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_net);
static bool init_net_initialized;
net: Introduce net_sem for protection of pernet_list Currently, the mutex is mostly used to protect pernet operations list. It orders setup_net() and cleanup_net() with parallel {un,}register_pernet_operations() calls, so ->exit{,batch} methods of the same pernet operations are executed for a dying net, as were used to call ->init methods, even after the net namespace is unlinked from net_namespace_list in cleanup_net(). But there are several problems with scalability. The first one is that more than one net can't be created or destroyed at the same moment on the node. For big machines with many cpus running many containers it's very sensitive. The second one is that it's need to synchronize_rcu() after net is removed from net_namespace_list(): Destroy net_ns: cleanup_net() mutex_lock(&net_mutex) list_del_rcu(&net->list) synchronize_rcu() <--- Sleep there for ages list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list) list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list) mutex_unlock(&net_mutex) This primitive is not fast, especially on the systems with many processors and/or when preemptible RCU is enabled in config. So, all the time, while cleanup_net() is waiting for RCU grace period, creation of new net namespaces is not possible, the tasks, who makes it, are sleeping on the same mutex: Create net_ns: copy_net_ns() mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex) <--- Sleep there for ages I observed 20-30 seconds hangs of "unshare -n" on ordinary 8-cpu laptop with preemptible RCU enabled after CRIU tests round is finished. The solution is to convert net_mutex to the rw_semaphore and add fine grain locks to really small number of pernet_operations, what really need them. Then, pernet_operations::init/::exit methods, modifying the net-related data, will require down_read() locking only, while down_write() will be used for changing pernet_list (i.e., when modules are being loaded and unloaded). This gives signify performance increase, after all patch set is applied, like you may see here: %for i in {1..10000}; do unshare -n bash -c exit; done *before* real 1m40,377s user 0m9,672s sys 0m19,928s *after* real 0m17,007s user 0m5,311s sys 0m11,779 (5.8 times faster) This patch starts replacing net_mutex to net_sem. It adds rw_semaphore, describes the variables it protects, and makes to use, where appropriate. net_mutex is still present, and next patches will kick it out step-by-step. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-13 17:26:23 +08:00
/*
* pernet_ops_rwsem: protects: pernet_list, net_generic_ids,
net: Introduce net_sem for protection of pernet_list Currently, the mutex is mostly used to protect pernet operations list. It orders setup_net() and cleanup_net() with parallel {un,}register_pernet_operations() calls, so ->exit{,batch} methods of the same pernet operations are executed for a dying net, as were used to call ->init methods, even after the net namespace is unlinked from net_namespace_list in cleanup_net(). But there are several problems with scalability. The first one is that more than one net can't be created or destroyed at the same moment on the node. For big machines with many cpus running many containers it's very sensitive. The second one is that it's need to synchronize_rcu() after net is removed from net_namespace_list(): Destroy net_ns: cleanup_net() mutex_lock(&net_mutex) list_del_rcu(&net->list) synchronize_rcu() <--- Sleep there for ages list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list) list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list) mutex_unlock(&net_mutex) This primitive is not fast, especially on the systems with many processors and/or when preemptible RCU is enabled in config. So, all the time, while cleanup_net() is waiting for RCU grace period, creation of new net namespaces is not possible, the tasks, who makes it, are sleeping on the same mutex: Create net_ns: copy_net_ns() mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex) <--- Sleep there for ages I observed 20-30 seconds hangs of "unshare -n" on ordinary 8-cpu laptop with preemptible RCU enabled after CRIU tests round is finished. The solution is to convert net_mutex to the rw_semaphore and add fine grain locks to really small number of pernet_operations, what really need them. Then, pernet_operations::init/::exit methods, modifying the net-related data, will require down_read() locking only, while down_write() will be used for changing pernet_list (i.e., when modules are being loaded and unloaded). This gives signify performance increase, after all patch set is applied, like you may see here: %for i in {1..10000}; do unshare -n bash -c exit; done *before* real 1m40,377s user 0m9,672s sys 0m19,928s *after* real 0m17,007s user 0m5,311s sys 0m11,779 (5.8 times faster) This patch starts replacing net_mutex to net_sem. It adds rw_semaphore, describes the variables it protects, and makes to use, where appropriate. net_mutex is still present, and next patches will kick it out step-by-step. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-13 17:26:23 +08:00
* init_net_initialized and first_device pointer.
* This is internal net namespace object. Please, don't use it
* outside.
net: Introduce net_sem for protection of pernet_list Currently, the mutex is mostly used to protect pernet operations list. It orders setup_net() and cleanup_net() with parallel {un,}register_pernet_operations() calls, so ->exit{,batch} methods of the same pernet operations are executed for a dying net, as were used to call ->init methods, even after the net namespace is unlinked from net_namespace_list in cleanup_net(). But there are several problems with scalability. The first one is that more than one net can't be created or destroyed at the same moment on the node. For big machines with many cpus running many containers it's very sensitive. The second one is that it's need to synchronize_rcu() after net is removed from net_namespace_list(): Destroy net_ns: cleanup_net() mutex_lock(&net_mutex) list_del_rcu(&net->list) synchronize_rcu() <--- Sleep there for ages list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list) list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list) mutex_unlock(&net_mutex) This primitive is not fast, especially on the systems with many processors and/or when preemptible RCU is enabled in config. So, all the time, while cleanup_net() is waiting for RCU grace period, creation of new net namespaces is not possible, the tasks, who makes it, are sleeping on the same mutex: Create net_ns: copy_net_ns() mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex) <--- Sleep there for ages I observed 20-30 seconds hangs of "unshare -n" on ordinary 8-cpu laptop with preemptible RCU enabled after CRIU tests round is finished. The solution is to convert net_mutex to the rw_semaphore and add fine grain locks to really small number of pernet_operations, what really need them. Then, pernet_operations::init/::exit methods, modifying the net-related data, will require down_read() locking only, while down_write() will be used for changing pernet_list (i.e., when modules are being loaded and unloaded). This gives signify performance increase, after all patch set is applied, like you may see here: %for i in {1..10000}; do unshare -n bash -c exit; done *before* real 1m40,377s user 0m9,672s sys 0m19,928s *after* real 0m17,007s user 0m5,311s sys 0m11,779 (5.8 times faster) This patch starts replacing net_mutex to net_sem. It adds rw_semaphore, describes the variables it protects, and makes to use, where appropriate. net_mutex is still present, and next patches will kick it out step-by-step. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-13 17:26:23 +08:00
*/
DECLARE_RWSEM(pernet_ops_rwsem);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pernet_ops_rwsem);
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 09:21:32 +08:00
#define MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID \
((sizeof(struct net_generic) + sizeof(void *) - 1) / sizeof(void *))
#define INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS 13 /* +1 for len +2 for rcu_head */
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 08:41:38 +08:00
static unsigned int max_gen_ptrs = INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS;
bpf, net: Rework cookie generator as per-cpu one With its use in BPF, the cookie generator can be called very frequently in particular when used out of cgroup v2 hooks (e.g. connect / sendmsg) and attached to the root cgroup, for example, when used in v1/v2 mixed environments. In particular, when there's a high churn on sockets in the system there can be many parallel requests to the bpf_get_socket_cookie() and bpf_get_netns_cookie() helpers which then cause contention on the atomic counter. As similarly done in f991bd2e1421 ("fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator"), add a small helper library that both can use for the 64 bit counters. Given this can be called from different contexts, we also need to deal with potential nested calls even though in practice they are considered extremely rare. One idea as suggested by Eric Dumazet was to use a reverse counter for this situation since we don't expect 64 bit overflows anyways; that way, we can avoid bigger gaps in the 64 bit counter space compared to just batch-wise increase. Even on machines with small number of cores (e.g. 4) the cookie generation shrinks from min/max/med/avg (ns) of 22/50/40/38.9 down to 10/35/14/17.3 when run in parallel from multiple CPUs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8a80b8d27d3c49f9a14e1d5213c19d8be87d1dc8.1601477936.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-09-30 23:18:16 +08:00
DEFINE_COOKIE(net_cookie);
bpf: Add netns cookie and enable it for bpf cgroup hooks In Cilium we're mainly using BPF cgroup hooks today in order to implement kube-proxy free Kubernetes service translation for ClusterIP, NodePort (*), ExternalIP, and LoadBalancer as well as HostPort mapping [0] for all traffic between Cilium managed nodes. While this works in its current shape and avoids packet-level NAT for inter Cilium managed node traffic, there is one major limitation we're facing today, that is, lack of netns awareness. In Kubernetes, the concept of Pods (which hold one or multiple containers) has been built around network namespaces, so while we can use the global scope of attaching to root BPF cgroup hooks also to our advantage (e.g. for exposing NodePort ports on loopback addresses), we also have the need to differentiate between initial network namespaces and non-initial one. For example, ExternalIP services mandate that non-local service IPs are not to be translated from the host (initial) network namespace as one example. Right now, we have an ugly work-around in place where non-local service IPs for ExternalIP services are not xlated from connect() and friends BPF hooks but instead via less efficient packet-level NAT on the veth tc ingress hook for Pod traffic. On top of determining whether we're in initial or non-initial network namespace we also have a need for a socket-cookie like mechanism for network namespaces scope. Socket cookies have the nice property that they can be combined as part of the key structure e.g. for BPF LRU maps without having to worry that the cookie could be recycled. We are planning to use this for our sessionAffinity implementation for services. Therefore, add a new bpf_get_netns_cookie() helper which would resolve both use cases at once: bpf_get_netns_cookie(NULL) would provide the cookie for the initial network namespace while passing the context instead of NULL would provide the cookie from the application's network namespace. We're using a hole, so no size increase; the assignment happens only once. Therefore this allows for a comparison on initial namespace as well as regular cookie usage as we have today with socket cookies. We could later on enable this helper for other program types as well as we would see need. (*) Both externalTrafficPolicy={Local|Cluster} types [0] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/blob/master/bpf/bpf_sock.c Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/c47d2346982693a9cf9da0e12690453aded4c788.1585323121.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-03-27 23:58:52 +08:00
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 08:41:38 +08:00
static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void)
{
struct net_generic *ng;
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 09:21:32 +08:00
unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]);
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 08:41:38 +08:00
ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ng)
ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs;
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 08:41:38 +08:00
return ng;
}
netns: make struct pernet_operations::id unsigned int Make struct pernet_operations::id unsigned. There are 2 reasons to do so: 1) This field is really an index into an zero based array and thus is unsigned entity. Using negative value is out-of-bound access by definition. 2) On x86_64 unsigned 32-bit data which are mixed with pointers via array indexing or offsets added or subtracted to pointers are preffered to signed 32-bit data. "int" being used as an array index needs to be sign-extended to 64-bit before being used. void f(long *p, int i) { g(p[i]); } roughly translates to movsx rsi, esi mov rdi, [rsi+...] call g MOVSX is 3 byte instruction which isn't necessary if the variable is unsigned because x86_64 is zero extending by default. Now, there is net_generic() function which, you guessed it right, uses "int" as an array index: static inline void *net_generic(const struct net *net, int id) { ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... } And this function is used a lot, so those sign extensions add up. Patch snipes ~1730 bytes on allyesconfig kernel (without all junk messing with code generation): add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 70/598 up/down: 396/-2126 (-1730) Unfortunately some functions actually grow bigger. This is a semmingly random artefact of code generation with register allocator being used differently. gcc decides that some variable needs to live in new r8+ registers and every access now requires REX prefix. Or it is shifted into r12, so [r12+0] addressing mode has to be used which is longer than [r8] However, overall balance is in negative direction: add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 70/598 up/down: 396/-2126 (-1730) function old new delta nfsd4_lock 3886 3959 +73 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1096 1140 +44 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2776 2808 +32 tipc_mon_rcv 1032 1058 +26 svcauth_gss_legacy_init 1413 1429 +16 tipc_bcbase_select_primary 379 392 +13 nfsd4_exchange_id 1247 1260 +13 nfsd4_setclientid_confirm 782 793 +11 ... put_client_renew_locked 494 480 -14 ip_set_sockfn_get 730 716 -14 geneve_sock_add 829 813 -16 nfsd4_sequence_done 721 703 -18 nlmclnt_lookup_host 708 686 -22 nfsd4_lockt 1085 1063 -22 nfs_get_client 1077 1050 -27 tcf_bpf_init 1106 1076 -30 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5997 5930 -67 Total: Before=154856051, After=154854321, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-17 09:58:21 +08:00
static int net_assign_generic(struct net *net, unsigned int id, void *data)
{
struct net_generic *ng, *old_ng;
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 09:21:32 +08:00
BUG_ON(id < MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID);
old_ng = rcu_dereference_protected(net->gen,
lockdep_is_held(&pernet_ops_rwsem));
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 09:21:32 +08:00
if (old_ng->s.len > id) {
old_ng->ptr[id] = data;
return 0;
}
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 08:41:38 +08:00
ng = net_alloc_generic();
if (!ng)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* Some synchronisation notes:
*
* The net_generic explores the net->gen array inside rcu
* read section. Besides once set the net->gen->ptr[x]
* pointer never changes (see rules in netns/generic.h).
*
* That said, we simply duplicate this array and schedule
* the old copy for kfree after a grace period.
*/
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 09:21:32 +08:00
memcpy(&ng->ptr[MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID], &old_ng->ptr[MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID],
(old_ng->s.len - MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID) * sizeof(void *));
ng->ptr[id] = data;
rcu_assign_pointer(net->gen, ng);
kfree_rcu(old_ng, s.rcu);
return 0;
}
static int ops_init(const struct pernet_operations *ops, struct net *net)
{
int err = -ENOMEM;
void *data = NULL;
if (ops->id && ops->size) {
data = kzalloc(ops->size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
goto out;
err = net_assign_generic(net, *ops->id, data);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
err = 0;
if (ops->init)
err = ops->init(net);
if (!err)
return 0;
cleanup:
kfree(data);
out:
return err;
}
static void ops_pre_exit_list(const struct pernet_operations *ops,
struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
struct net *net;
if (ops->pre_exit) {
list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list)
ops->pre_exit(net);
}
}
static void ops_exit_list(const struct pernet_operations *ops,
struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
struct net *net;
if (ops->exit) {
list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
ops->exit(net);
cond_resched();
}
}
if (ops->exit_batch)
ops->exit_batch(net_exit_list);
}
static void ops_free_list(const struct pernet_operations *ops,
struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
struct net *net;
if (ops->size && ops->id) {
list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list)
kfree(net_generic(net, *ops->id));
}
}
/* should be called with nsid_lock held */
static int alloc_netid(struct net *net, struct net *peer, int reqid)
{
int min = 0, max = 0;
if (reqid >= 0) {
min = reqid;
max = reqid + 1;
}
return idr_alloc(&net->netns_ids, peer, min, max, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
/* This function is used by idr_for_each(). If net is equal to peer, the
* function returns the id so that idr_for_each() stops. Because we cannot
* returns the id 0 (idr_for_each() will not stop), we return the magic value
* NET_ID_ZERO (-1) for it.
*/
#define NET_ID_ZERO -1
static int net_eq_idr(int id, void *net, void *peer)
{
if (net_eq(net, peer))
return id ? : NET_ID_ZERO;
return 0;
}
/* Must be called from RCU-critical section or with nsid_lock held */
static int __peernet2id(const struct net *net, struct net *peer)
{
int id = idr_for_each(&net->netns_ids, net_eq_idr, peer);
/* Magic value for id 0. */
if (id == NET_ID_ZERO)
return 0;
if (id > 0)
return id;
return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
}
static void rtnl_net_notifyid(struct net *net, int cmd, int id, u32 portid,
struct nlmsghdr *nlh, gfp_t gfp);
/* This function returns the id of a peer netns. If no id is assigned, one will
* be allocated and returned.
*/
int peernet2id_alloc(struct net *net, struct net *peer, gfp_t gfp)
{
int id;
net: Use generic ns_common::count Switch over network namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime counter. Network namespaces have an additional counter named "passive". This counter does not guarantee that the network namespace is not already de-initialized and so isn't concerned with the actual lifetime of the network namespace; only the "count" counter is. So the latter is moved into struct ns_common. Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and these are not altered. This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them. It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces. Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace struct out of struct ns_common. Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: rewrite commit] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644977635.604812.1319877322927063560.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-08-19 20:06:36 +08:00
if (refcount_read(&net->ns.count) == 0)
return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
id = __peernet2id(net, peer);
if (id >= 0) {
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
return id;
}
/* When peer is obtained from RCU lists, we may race with
* its cleanup. Check whether it's alive, and this guarantees
* we never hash a peer back to net->netns_ids, after it has
* just been idr_remove()'d from there in cleanup_net().
*/
if (!maybe_get_net(peer)) {
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
}
id = alloc_netid(net, peer, -1);
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
put_net(peer);
if (id < 0)
return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
rtnl_net_notifyid(net, RTM_NEWNSID, id, 0, NULL, gfp);
return id;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(peernet2id_alloc);
/* This function returns, if assigned, the id of a peer netns. */
int peernet2id(const struct net *net, struct net *peer)
{
int id;
rcu_read_lock();
id = __peernet2id(net, peer);
rcu_read_unlock();
return id;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(peernet2id);
/* This function returns true is the peer netns has an id assigned into the
* current netns.
*/
bool peernet_has_id(const struct net *net, struct net *peer)
{
return peernet2id(net, peer) >= 0;
}
struct net *get_net_ns_by_id(const struct net *net, int id)
{
struct net *peer;
if (id < 0)
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id);
if (peer)
net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id() (I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB) Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr. It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory corruption: put_net(peer) rtnl_lock() atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ... __put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id) spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list) spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id) | get_net(peer) [count=1] | ... | (use after final put) v ... cleanup_net() ... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... ... ... ... put_net(peer) ... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list) ... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... queue_work() ... rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() ... for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ... spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ... idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ... ... ... net_drop_ns() ... net_free(peer) ... } ... | v cleanup_net() ... (Second free of peer) Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list will be corrupted. Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely. The patch fixes the problem in standard way. (Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send a separate message to netdev@ later). Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids" Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-12-20 01:27:56 +08:00
peer = maybe_get_net(peer);
rcu_read_unlock();
return peer;
}
/*
* setup_net runs the initializers for the network namespace object.
*/
static __net_init int setup_net(struct net *net, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
/* Must be called with pernet_ops_rwsem held */
const struct pernet_operations *ops, *saved_ops;
int error = 0;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
net: Use generic ns_common::count Switch over network namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime counter. Network namespaces have an additional counter named "passive". This counter does not guarantee that the network namespace is not already de-initialized and so isn't concerned with the actual lifetime of the network namespace; only the "count" counter is. So the latter is moved into struct ns_common. Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and these are not altered. This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them. It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces. Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace struct out of struct ns_common. Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: rewrite commit] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644977635.604812.1319877322927063560.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-08-19 20:06:36 +08:00
refcount_set(&net->ns.count, 1);
ref_tracker_dir_init(&net->refcnt_tracker, 128);
refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
get_random_bytes(&net->hash_mix, sizeof(u32));
preempt_disable();
net->net_cookie = gen_cookie_next(&net_cookie);
preempt_enable();
net->dev_base_seq = 1;
net->user_ns = user_ns;
idr_init(&net->netns_ids);
spin_lock_init(&net->nsid_lock);
mutex_init(&net->ipv4.ra_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(ops, &pernet_list, list) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error < 0)
goto out_undo;
}
down_write(&net_rwsem);
list_add_tail_rcu(&net->list, &net_namespace_list);
up_write(&net_rwsem);
out:
return error;
out_undo:
/* Walk through the list backwards calling the exit functions
* for the pernet modules whose init functions did not fail.
*/
list_add(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
saved_ops = ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_pre_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
synchronize_rcu();
ops = saved_ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops = saved_ops;
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
rcu_barrier();
goto out;
}
static int __net_init net_defaults_init_net(struct net *net)
{
net->core.sysctl_somaxconn = SOMAXCONN;
return 0;
}
static struct pernet_operations net_defaults_ops = {
.init = net_defaults_init_net,
};
static __init int net_defaults_init(void)
{
if (register_pernet_subsys(&net_defaults_ops))
panic("Cannot initialize net default settings");
return 0;
}
core_initcall(net_defaults_init);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
static struct ucounts *inc_net_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_NET_NAMESPACES);
}
static void dec_net_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_NET_NAMESPACES);
}
static struct kmem_cache *net_cachep __ro_after_init;
static struct workqueue_struct *netns_wq;
static struct net *net_alloc(void)
{
struct net *net = NULL;
struct net_generic *ng;
ng = net_alloc_generic();
if (!ng)
goto out;
net = kmem_cache_zalloc(net_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!net)
goto out_free;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
net->key_domain = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_tag), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!net->key_domain)
goto out_free_2;
refcount_set(&net->key_domain->usage, 1);
#endif
rcu_assign_pointer(net->gen, ng);
out:
return net;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
out_free_2:
kmem_cache_free(net_cachep, net);
net = NULL;
#endif
out_free:
kfree(ng);
goto out;
}
static void net_free(struct net *net)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&net->passive)) {
kfree(rcu_access_pointer(net->gen));
kmem_cache_free(net_cachep, net);
}
}
void net_drop_ns(void *p)
{
struct net *net = (struct net *)p;
if (net)
net_free(net);
}
struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct net *old_net)
{
struct ucounts *ucounts;
struct net *net;
int rv;
if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWNET))
return get_net(old_net);
ucounts = inc_net_namespaces(user_ns);
if (!ucounts)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
net = net_alloc();
if (!net) {
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto dec_ucounts;
}
refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
net->ucounts = ucounts;
get_user_ns(user_ns);
rv = down_read_killable(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
if (rv < 0)
goto put_userns;
rv = setup_net(net, user_ns);
up_read(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
if (rv < 0) {
put_userns:
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
keys: Fix memory leak in copy_net_ns If copy_net_ns() failed after net_alloc(), net->key_domain is leaked. Fix this, by freeing key_domain in error path. syzbot report: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8881175007e0 (size 32): comm "syz-executor902", pid 7069, jiffies 4294944350 (age 28.400s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000a83ed741>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline] [<00000000a83ed741>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline] [<00000000a83ed741>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline] [<00000000a83ed741>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13d/0x280 mm/slab.c:3553 [<0000000059fc92b9>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline] [<0000000059fc92b9>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline] [<0000000059fc92b9>] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:398 [inline] [<0000000059fc92b9>] copy_net_ns+0xb2/0x220 net/core/net_namespace.c:445 [<00000000a9d74bbc>] create_new_namespaces+0x141/0x2a0 kernel/nsproxy.c:103 [<000000008047d645>] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x7f/0x100 kernel/nsproxy.c:202 [<000000005993ea6e>] ksys_unshare+0x236/0x490 kernel/fork.c:2674 [<0000000019417e75>] __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2742 [inline] [<0000000019417e75>] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2740 [inline] [<0000000019417e75>] __x64_sys_unshare+0x16/0x20 kernel/fork.c:2740 [<00000000f4c5f2c8>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 [<0000000038550184>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 syzbot also reported other leak in copy_net_ns -> setup_net. This problem is already fixed by cf47a0b882a4e5f6b34c7949d7b293e9287f1972. Fixes: 9b242610514f ("keys: Network namespace domain tag") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3b3296d032353c33184b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Takeshi Misawa <jeliantsurux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-19 14:34:43 +08:00
key_remove_domain(net->key_domain);
#endif
put_user_ns(user_ns);
net_free(net);
dec_ucounts:
dec_net_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(rv);
}
return net;
}
/**
* net_ns_get_ownership - get sysfs ownership data for @net
* @net: network namespace in question (can be NULL)
* @uid: kernel user ID for sysfs objects
* @gid: kernel group ID for sysfs objects
*
* Returns the uid/gid pair of root in the user namespace associated with the
* given network namespace.
*/
void net_ns_get_ownership(const struct net *net, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
{
if (net) {
kuid_t ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
kgid_t ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid))
*uid = ns_root_uid;
if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid))
*gid = ns_root_gid;
} else {
*uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
*gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(net_ns_get_ownership);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
static void unhash_nsid(struct net *net, struct net *last)
{
struct net *tmp;
/* This function is only called from cleanup_net() work,
* and this work is the only process, that may delete
* a net from net_namespace_list. So, when the below
* is executing, the list may only grow. Thus, we do not
* use for_each_net_rcu() or net_rwsem.
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
*/
for_each_net(tmp) {
int id;
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_lock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
id = __peernet2id(tmp, net);
if (id >= 0)
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id);
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
if (id >= 0)
rtnl_net_notifyid(tmp, RTM_DELNSID, id, 0, NULL,
GFP_KERNEL);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
if (tmp == last)
break;
}
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
idr_destroy(&net->netns_ids);
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
}
static LLIST_HEAD(cleanup_list);
static void cleanup_net(struct work_struct *work)
{
const struct pernet_operations *ops;
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
struct net *net, *tmp, *last;
struct llist_node *net_kill_list;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
/* Atomically snapshot the list of namespaces to cleanup */
net_kill_list = llist_del_all(&cleanup_list);
down_read(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
/* Don't let anyone else find us. */
down_write(&net_rwsem);
llist_for_each_entry(net, net_kill_list, cleanup_list)
list_del_rcu(&net->list);
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
/* Cache last net. After we unlock rtnl, no one new net
* added to net_namespace_list can assign nsid pointer
* to a net from net_kill_list (see peernet2id_alloc()).
* So, we skip them in unhash_nsid().
*
* Note, that unhash_nsid() does not delete nsid links
* between net_kill_list's nets, as they've already
* deleted from net_namespace_list. But, this would be
* useless anyway, as netns_ids are destroyed there.
*/
last = list_last_entry(&net_namespace_list, struct net, list);
up_write(&net_rwsem);
llist_for_each_entry(net, net_kill_list, cleanup_list) {
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-20 00:14:53 +08:00
unhash_nsid(net, last);
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
}
/* Run all of the network namespace pre_exit methods */
list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_pre_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
/*
* Another CPU might be rcu-iterating the list, wait for it.
* This needs to be before calling the exit() notifiers, so
* the rcu_barrier() below isn't sufficient alone.
* Also the pre_exit() and exit() methods need this barrier.
*/
synchronize_rcu();
/* Run all of the network namespace exit methods */
list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
/* Free the net generic variables */
list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
up_read(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
/* Ensure there are no outstanding rcu callbacks using this
* network namespace.
*/
rcu_barrier();
/* Finally it is safe to free my network namespace structure */
list_for_each_entry_safe(net, tmp, &net_exit_list, exit_list) {
list_del_init(&net->exit_list);
dec_net_namespaces(net->ucounts);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
key_remove_domain(net->key_domain);
#endif
put_user_ns(net->user_ns);
net_free(net);
}
}
/**
* net_ns_barrier - wait until concurrent net_cleanup_work is done
*
* cleanup_net runs from work queue and will first remove namespaces
* from the global list, then run net exit functions.
*
* Call this in module exit path to make sure that all netns
* ->exit ops have been invoked before the function is removed.
*/
void net_ns_barrier(void)
{
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(net_ns_barrier);
static DECLARE_WORK(net_cleanup_work, cleanup_net);
void __put_net(struct net *net)
{
ref_tracker_dir_exit(&net->refcnt_tracker);
/* Cleanup the network namespace in process context */
if (llist_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list))
queue_work(netns_wq, &net_cleanup_work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__put_net);
/**
* get_net_ns - increment the refcount of the network namespace
* @ns: common namespace (net)
*
* Returns the net's common namespace.
*/
struct ns_common *get_net_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return &get_net(container_of(ns, struct net, ns))->ns;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_net_ns);
struct net *get_net_ns_by_fd(int fd)
{
struct file *file;
struct ns_common *ns;
struct net *net;
file = proc_ns_fget(fd);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return ERR_CAST(file);
ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(file));
if (ns->ops == &netns_operations)
net = get_net(container_of(ns, struct net, ns));
else
net = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
fput(file);
return net;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_net_ns_by_fd);
#endif
struct net *get_net_ns_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct net *net;
/* Lookup the network namespace */
net = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
rcu_read_lock();
tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (tsk) {
struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
task_lock(tsk);
nsproxy = tsk->nsproxy;
if (nsproxy)
net = get_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
task_unlock(tsk);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return net;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_net_ns_by_pid);
static __net_init int net_ns_net_init(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
net->ns.ops = &netns_operations;
#endif
return ns_alloc_inum(&net->ns);
}
static __net_exit void net_ns_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
ns_free_inum(&net->ns);
}
static struct pernet_operations __net_initdata net_ns_ops = {
.init = net_ns_net_init,
.exit = net_ns_net_exit,
};
static const struct nla_policy rtnl_net_policy[NETNSA_MAX + 1] = {
[NETNSA_NONE] = { .type = NLA_UNSPEC },
[NETNSA_NSID] = { .type = NLA_S32 },
[NETNSA_PID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[NETNSA_FD] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[NETNSA_TARGET_NSID] = { .type = NLA_S32 },
};
static int rtnl_net_newid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlattr *tb[NETNSA_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *nla;
struct net *peer;
int nsid, err;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb,
NETNSA_MAX, rtnl_net_policy, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!tb[NETNSA_NSID]) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "nsid is missing");
return -EINVAL;
}
nsid = nla_get_s32(tb[NETNSA_NSID]);
if (tb[NETNSA_PID]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_pid(nla_get_u32(tb[NETNSA_PID]));
nla = tb[NETNSA_PID];
} else if (tb[NETNSA_FD]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_fd(nla_get_u32(tb[NETNSA_FD]));
nla = tb[NETNSA_FD];
} else {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Peer netns reference is missing");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Peer netns reference is invalid");
return PTR_ERR(peer);
}
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
if (__peernet2id(net, peer) >= 0) {
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
err = -EEXIST;
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"Peer netns already has a nsid assigned");
goto out;
}
err = alloc_netid(net, peer, nsid);
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 23:54:41 +08:00
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
if (err >= 0) {
rtnl_net_notifyid(net, RTM_NEWNSID, err, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlh, GFP_KERNEL);
err = 0;
} else if (err == -ENOSPC && nsid >= 0) {
err = -EEXIST;
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, tb[NETNSA_NSID]);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "The specified nsid is already used");
}
out:
put_net(peer);
return err;
}
static int rtnl_net_get_size(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(s32)) /* NETNSA_NSID */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(s32)) /* NETNSA_CURRENT_NSID */
;
}
struct net_fill_args {
u32 portid;
u32 seq;
int flags;
int cmd;
int nsid;
bool add_ref;
int ref_nsid;
};
static int rtnl_net_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_fill_args *args)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct rtgenmsg *rth;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, args->portid, args->seq, args->cmd, sizeof(*rth),
args->flags);
if (!nlh)
return -EMSGSIZE;
rth = nlmsg_data(nlh);
rth->rtgen_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (nla_put_s32(skb, NETNSA_NSID, args->nsid))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (args->add_ref &&
nla_put_s32(skb, NETNSA_CURRENT_NSID, args->ref_nsid))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
static int rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **tb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int i, err;
if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
return nlmsg_parse_deprecated(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg),
tb, NETNSA_MAX, rtnl_net_policy,
extack);
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb,
NETNSA_MAX, rtnl_net_policy,
extack);
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0; i <= NETNSA_MAX; i++) {
if (!tb[i])
continue;
switch (i) {
case NETNSA_PID:
case NETNSA_FD:
case NETNSA_NSID:
case NETNSA_TARGET_NSID:
break;
default:
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unsupported attribute in peer netns getid request");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int rtnl_net_getid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlattr *tb[NETNSA_MAX + 1];
struct net_fill_args fillargs = {
.portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq,
.cmd = RTM_NEWNSID,
};
struct net *peer, *target = net;
struct nlattr *nla;
struct sk_buff *msg;
int err;
err = rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(skb, nlh, tb, extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[NETNSA_PID]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_pid(nla_get_u32(tb[NETNSA_PID]));
nla = tb[NETNSA_PID];
} else if (tb[NETNSA_FD]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_fd(nla_get_u32(tb[NETNSA_FD]));
nla = tb[NETNSA_FD];
} else if (tb[NETNSA_NSID]) {
peer = get_net_ns_by_id(net, nla_get_s32(tb[NETNSA_NSID]));
if (!peer)
peer = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
nla = tb[NETNSA_NSID];
} else {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Peer netns reference is missing");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Peer netns reference is invalid");
return PTR_ERR(peer);
}
if (tb[NETNSA_TARGET_NSID]) {
int id = nla_get_s32(tb[NETNSA_TARGET_NSID]);
target = rtnl_get_net_ns_capable(NETLINK_CB(skb).sk, id);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, tb[NETNSA_TARGET_NSID]);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"Target netns reference is invalid");
err = PTR_ERR(target);
goto out;
}
fillargs.add_ref = true;
fillargs.ref_nsid = peernet2id(net, peer);
}
msg = nlmsg_new(rtnl_net_get_size(), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
fillargs.nsid = peernet2id(target, peer);
err = rtnl_net_fill(msg, &fillargs);
if (err < 0)
goto err_out;
err = rtnl_unicast(msg, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
goto out;
err_out:
nlmsg_free(msg);
out:
if (fillargs.add_ref)
put_net(target);
put_net(peer);
return err;
}
struct rtnl_net_dump_cb {
struct net *tgt_net;
struct net *ref_net;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_fill_args fillargs;
int idx;
int s_idx;
};
/* Runs in RCU-critical section. */
static int rtnl_net_dumpid_one(int id, void *peer, void *data)
{
struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *net_cb = (struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *)data;
int ret;
if (net_cb->idx < net_cb->s_idx)
goto cont;
net_cb->fillargs.nsid = id;
if (net_cb->fillargs.add_ref)
net_cb->fillargs.ref_nsid = __peernet2id(net_cb->ref_net, peer);
ret = rtnl_net_fill(net_cb->skb, &net_cb->fillargs);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cont:
net_cb->idx++;
return 0;
}
static int rtnl_valid_dump_net_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, struct sock *sk,
struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *net_cb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack = cb->extack;
struct nlattr *tb[NETNSA_MAX + 1];
int err, i;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb,
NETNSA_MAX, rtnl_net_policy,
extack);
if (err < 0)
return err;
for (i = 0; i <= NETNSA_MAX; i++) {
if (!tb[i])
continue;
if (i == NETNSA_TARGET_NSID) {
struct net *net;
net = rtnl_get_net_ns_capable(sk, nla_get_s32(tb[i]));
if (IS_ERR(net)) {
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, tb[i]);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"Invalid target network namespace id");
return PTR_ERR(net);
}
net_cb->fillargs.add_ref = true;
net_cb->ref_net = net_cb->tgt_net;
net_cb->tgt_net = net;
} else {
NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, tb[i]);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
"Unsupported attribute in dump request");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int rtnl_net_dumpid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct rtnl_net_dump_cb net_cb = {
.tgt_net = sock_net(skb->sk),
.skb = skb,
.fillargs = {
.portid = NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
.seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
.flags = NLM_F_MULTI,
.cmd = RTM_NEWNSID,
},
.idx = 0,
.s_idx = cb->args[0],
};
int err = 0;
if (cb->strict_check) {
err = rtnl_valid_dump_net_req(cb->nlh, skb->sk, &net_cb, cb);
if (err < 0)
goto end;
}
rcu_read_lock();
idr_for_each(&net_cb.tgt_net->netns_ids, rtnl_net_dumpid_one, &net_cb);
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = net_cb.idx;
end:
if (net_cb.fillargs.add_ref)
put_net(net_cb.tgt_net);
return err < 0 ? err : skb->len;
}
static void rtnl_net_notifyid(struct net *net, int cmd, int id, u32 portid,
struct nlmsghdr *nlh, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net_fill_args fillargs = {
.portid = portid,
.seq = nlh ? nlh->nlmsg_seq : 0,
.cmd = cmd,
.nsid = id,
};
struct sk_buff *msg;
int err = -ENOMEM;
msg = nlmsg_new(rtnl_net_get_size(), gfp);
if (!msg)
goto out;
err = rtnl_net_fill(msg, &fillargs);
if (err < 0)
goto err_out;
rtnl_notify(msg, net, portid, RTNLGRP_NSID, nlh, gfp);
return;
err_out:
nlmsg_free(msg);
out:
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_NSID, err);
}
static int __init net_ns_init(void)
{
struct net_generic *ng;
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
net_cachep = kmem_cache_create("net_namespace", sizeof(struct net),
SMP_CACHE_BYTES,
SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
/* Create workqueue for cleanup */
netns_wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("netns");
if (!netns_wq)
panic("Could not create netns workq");
#endif
ng = net_alloc_generic();
if (!ng)
panic("Could not allocate generic netns");
rcu_assign_pointer(init_net.gen, ng);
bpf, net: Rework cookie generator as per-cpu one With its use in BPF, the cookie generator can be called very frequently in particular when used out of cgroup v2 hooks (e.g. connect / sendmsg) and attached to the root cgroup, for example, when used in v1/v2 mixed environments. In particular, when there's a high churn on sockets in the system there can be many parallel requests to the bpf_get_socket_cookie() and bpf_get_netns_cookie() helpers which then cause contention on the atomic counter. As similarly done in f991bd2e1421 ("fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator"), add a small helper library that both can use for the 64 bit counters. Given this can be called from different contexts, we also need to deal with potential nested calls even though in practice they are considered extremely rare. One idea as suggested by Eric Dumazet was to use a reverse counter for this situation since we don't expect 64 bit overflows anyways; that way, we can avoid bigger gaps in the 64 bit counter space compared to just batch-wise increase. Even on machines with small number of cores (e.g. 4) the cookie generation shrinks from min/max/med/avg (ns) of 22/50/40/38.9 down to 10/35/14/17.3 when run in parallel from multiple CPUs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8a80b8d27d3c49f9a14e1d5213c19d8be87d1dc8.1601477936.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-09-30 23:18:16 +08:00
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
if (setup_net(&init_net, &init_user_ns))
panic("Could not setup the initial network namespace");
init_net_initialized = true;
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
if (register_pernet_subsys(&net_ns_ops))
panic("Could not register network namespace subsystems");
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_NEWNSID, rtnl_net_newid, NULL,
RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETNSID, rtnl_net_getid, rtnl_net_dumpid,
RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED);
return 0;
}
pure_initcall(net_ns_init);
static void free_exit_list(struct pernet_operations *ops, struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
ops_pre_exit_list(ops, net_exit_list);
synchronize_rcu();
ops_exit_list(ops, net_exit_list);
ops_free_list(ops, net_exit_list);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
static int __register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
struct net *net;
int error;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_add_tail(&ops->list, list);
if (ops->init || (ops->id && ops->size)) {
/* We held write locked pernet_ops_rwsem, and parallel
* setup_net() and cleanup_net() are not possible.
*/
for_each_net(net) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error)
goto out_undo;
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
}
}
return 0;
out_undo:
/* If I have an error cleanup all namespaces I initialized */
list_del(&ops->list);
free_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
return error;
}
static void __unregister_pernet_operations(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
struct net *net;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_del(&ops->list);
/* See comment in __register_pernet_operations() */
for_each_net(net)
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
free_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
}
#else
static int __register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
if (!init_net_initialized) {
list_add_tail(&ops->list, list);
return 0;
}
return ops_init(ops, &init_net);
}
static void __unregister_pernet_operations(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
if (!init_net_initialized) {
list_del(&ops->list);
} else {
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_add(&init_net.exit_list, &net_exit_list);
free_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NET_NS */
static DEFINE_IDA(net_generic_ids);
static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
int error;
if (ops->id) {
error = ida_alloc_min(&net_generic_ids, MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (error < 0)
return error;
*ops->id = error;
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 09:21:32 +08:00
max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1);
}
error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops);
if (error) {
rcu_barrier();
if (ops->id)
ida_free(&net_generic_ids, *ops->id);
}
return error;
}
static void unregister_pernet_operations(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
__unregister_pernet_operations(ops);
rcu_barrier();
if (ops->id)
ida_free(&net_generic_ids, *ops->id);
}
/**
* register_pernet_subsys - register a network namespace subsystem
* @ops: pernet operations structure for the subsystem
*
* Register a subsystem which has init and exit functions
* that are called when network namespaces are created and
* destroyed respectively.
*
* When registered all network namespace init functions are
* called for every existing network namespace. Allowing kernel
* modules to have a race free view of the set of network namespaces.
*
* When a new network namespace is created all of the init
* methods are called in the order in which they were registered.
*
* When a network namespace is destroyed all of the exit methods
* are called in the reverse of the order with which they were
* registered.
*/
int register_pernet_subsys(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
int error;
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
error = register_pernet_operations(first_device, ops);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_pernet_subsys);
/**
* unregister_pernet_subsys - unregister a network namespace subsystem
* @ops: pernet operations structure to manipulate
*
* Remove the pernet operations structure from the list to be
* used when network namespaces are created or destroyed. In
* addition run the exit method for all existing network
* namespaces.
*/
void unregister_pernet_subsys(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
unregister_pernet_operations(ops);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_pernet_subsys);
/**
* register_pernet_device - register a network namespace device
* @ops: pernet operations structure for the subsystem
*
* Register a device which has init and exit functions
* that are called when network namespaces are created and
* destroyed respectively.
*
* When registered all network namespace init functions are
* called for every existing network namespace. Allowing kernel
* modules to have a race free view of the set of network namespaces.
*
* When a new network namespace is created all of the init
* methods are called in the order in which they were registered.
*
* When a network namespace is destroyed all of the exit methods
* are called in the reverse of the order with which they were
* registered.
*/
int register_pernet_device(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
int error;
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
error = register_pernet_operations(&pernet_list, ops);
if (!error && (first_device == &pernet_list))
first_device = &ops->list;
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_pernet_device);
/**
* unregister_pernet_device - unregister a network namespace netdevice
* @ops: pernet operations structure to manipulate
*
* Remove the pernet operations structure from the list to be
* used when network namespaces are created or destroyed. In
* addition run the exit method for all existing network
* namespaces.
*/
void unregister_pernet_device(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
if (&ops->list == first_device)
first_device = first_device->next;
unregister_pernet_operations(ops);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_pernet_device);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
static struct ns_common *netns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct net *net = NULL;
struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
task_lock(task);
nsproxy = task->nsproxy;
if (nsproxy)
net = get_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
task_unlock(task);
return net ? &net->ns : NULL;
}
static inline struct net *to_net_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return container_of(ns, struct net, ns);
}
static void netns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
{
put_net(to_net_ns(ns));
}
nsproxy: add struct nsset Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons. First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed. The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this should have functional consequences. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 22:04:30 +08:00
static int netns_install(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns)
{
nsproxy: add struct nsset Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons. First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed. The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this should have functional consequences. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 22:04:30 +08:00
struct nsproxy *nsproxy = nsset->nsproxy;
struct net *net = to_net_ns(ns);
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
nsproxy: add struct nsset Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons. First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed. The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this should have functional consequences. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 22:04:30 +08:00
!ns_capable(nsset->cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
nsproxy->net_ns = get_net(net);
return 0;
}
static struct user_namespace *netns_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return to_net_ns(ns)->user_ns;
}
const struct proc_ns_operations netns_operations = {
.name = "net",
.type = CLONE_NEWNET,
.get = netns_get,
.put = netns_put,
.install = netns_install,
.owner = netns_owner,
};
#endif