License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_H
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#define __KVM_X86_MMU_H
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2007-12-16 17:02:48 +08:00
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#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
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2009-12-07 18:16:48 +08:00
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#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT64_PT_BITS 9
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#define PT64_ENT_PER_PAGE (1 << PT64_PT_BITS)
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#define PT32_PT_BITS 10
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#define PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE (1 << PT32_PT_BITS)
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#define PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT 1
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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#define PT_USER_SHIFT 2
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT_PRESENT_MASK (1ULL << 0)
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#define PT_WRITABLE_MASK (1ULL << PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT)
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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#define PT_USER_MASK (1ULL << PT_USER_SHIFT)
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT_PWT_MASK (1ULL << 3)
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#define PT_PCD_MASK (1ULL << 4)
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2008-05-15 18:51:35 +08:00
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#define PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT 5
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#define PT_ACCESSED_MASK (1ULL << PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT)
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2012-09-12 18:44:53 +08:00
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#define PT_DIRTY_SHIFT 6
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#define PT_DIRTY_MASK (1ULL << PT_DIRTY_SHIFT)
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2012-09-13 01:46:56 +08:00
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#define PT_PAGE_SIZE_SHIFT 7
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#define PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK (1ULL << PT_PAGE_SIZE_SHIFT)
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT_PAT_MASK (1ULL << 7)
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#define PT_GLOBAL_MASK (1ULL << 8)
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#define PT64_NX_SHIFT 63
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#define PT64_NX_MASK (1ULL << PT64_NX_SHIFT)
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#define PT_PAT_SHIFT 7
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#define PT_DIR_PAT_SHIFT 12
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#define PT_DIR_PAT_MASK (1ULL << PT_DIR_PAT_SHIFT)
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#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE 4
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#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT 13
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#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK \
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(((1ULL << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE) - 1) << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT)
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2017-08-24 20:27:55 +08:00
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#define PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL 5
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2017-08-24 20:27:54 +08:00
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#define PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL 4
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2008-04-25 10:17:08 +08:00
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#define PT32_ROOT_LEVEL 2
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#define PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL 3
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2014-09-01 18:44:04 +08:00
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static inline u64 rsvd_bits(int s, int e)
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{
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2017-08-24 20:27:53 +08:00
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if (e < s)
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return 0;
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2014-09-01 18:44:04 +08:00
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return ((1ULL << (e - s + 1)) - 1) << s;
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}
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2019-08-02 04:35:22 +08:00
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void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask, u64 mmio_value, u64 access_mask);
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2013-06-07 16:51:25 +08:00
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2015-08-05 12:04:24 +08:00
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void
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reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context);
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2018-06-28 05:59:10 +08:00
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void kvm_init_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reset_roots);
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2013-10-02 22:56:14 +08:00
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void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2017-03-30 17:55:30 +08:00
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void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
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2018-06-28 05:59:11 +08:00
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bool accessed_dirty, gpa_t new_eptp);
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2017-06-09 11:13:40 +08:00
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bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
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2017-07-14 09:30:40 +08:00
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int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
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2017-08-12 00:36:43 +08:00
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u64 fault_address, char *insn, int insn_len);
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2009-06-11 23:07:42 +08:00
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2019-04-09 02:07:30 +08:00
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static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
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2010-08-20 09:11:05 +08:00
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{
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2013-03-13 09:36:43 +08:00
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if (kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages > kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages)
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return kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages -
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kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages;
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return 0;
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2010-08-20 09:11:05 +08:00
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}
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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static inline int kvm_mmu_reload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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2018-10-09 03:28:05 +08:00
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if (likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->root_hpa != INVALID_PAGE))
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2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
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return 0;
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return kvm_mmu_load(vcpu);
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}
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2018-06-28 05:59:13 +08:00
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static inline unsigned long kvm_get_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr3)
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{
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BUILD_BUG_ON((X86_CR3_PCID_MASK & PAGE_MASK) != 0);
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return kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)
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? cr3 & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK
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: 0;
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}
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static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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return kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
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}
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2018-06-28 05:59:08 +08:00
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static inline void kvm_mmu_load_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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2018-10-09 03:28:05 +08:00
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if (VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root_hpa))
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vcpu->arch.mmu->set_cr3(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu->root_hpa |
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kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu));
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2018-06-28 05:59:08 +08:00
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}
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2014-04-17 17:06:16 +08:00
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/*
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* Currently, we have two sorts of write-protection, a) the first one
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* write-protects guest page to sync the guest modification, b) another one is
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* used to sync dirty bitmap when we do KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG. The differences
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* between these two sorts are:
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* 1) the first case clears SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE bit.
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* 2) the first case requires flushing tlb immediately avoiding corrupting
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* shadow page table between all vcpus so it should be in the protection of
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* mmu-lock. And the another case does not need to flush tlb until returning
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* the dirty bitmap to userspace since it only write-protects the page
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* logged in the bitmap, that means the page in the dirty bitmap is not
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* missed, so it can flush tlb out of mmu-lock.
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*
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* So, there is the problem: the first case can meet the corrupted tlb caused
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* by another case which write-protects pages but without flush tlb
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* immediately. In order to making the first case be aware this problem we let
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* it flush tlb if we try to write-protect a spte whose SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE bit
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* is set, it works since another case never touches SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE bit.
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*
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* Anyway, whenever a spte is updated (only permission and status bits are
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* changed) we need to check whether the spte with SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE becomes
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* readonly, if that happens, we need to flush tlb. Fortunately,
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* mmu_spte_update() has already handled it perfectly.
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*
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* The rules to use SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE and PT_WRITABLE_MASK:
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* - if we want to see if it has writable tlb entry or if the spte can be
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* writable on the mmu mapping, check SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE, this is the most
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* case, otherwise
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* - if we fix page fault on the spte or do write-protection by dirty logging,
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* check PT_WRITABLE_MASK.
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*
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* TODO: introduce APIs to split these two cases.
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*/
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2011-07-12 03:23:20 +08:00
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static inline int is_writable_pte(unsigned long pte)
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{
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return pte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
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}
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static inline bool is_write_protection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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return kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_WP);
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}
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KVM: MMU: Optimize pte permission checks
walk_addr_generic() permission checks are a maze of branchy code, which is
performed four times per lookup. It depends on the type of access, efer.nxe,
cr0.wp, cr4.smep, and in the near future, cr4.smap.
Optimize this away by precalculating all variants and storing them in a
bitmap. The bitmap is recalculated when rarely-changing variables change
(cr0, cr4) and is indexed by the often-changing variables (page fault error
code, pte access permissions).
The permission check is moved to the end of the loop, otherwise an SMEP
fault could be reported as a false positive, when PDE.U=1 but PTE.U=0.
Noted by Xiao Guangrong.
The result is short, branch-free code.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 19:52:00 +08:00
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/*
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2016-03-08 17:08:16 +08:00
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* Check if a given access (described through the I/D, W/R and U/S bits of a
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* page fault error code pfec) causes a permission fault with the given PTE
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* access rights (in ACC_* format).
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*
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* Return zero if the access does not fault; return the page fault error code
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* if the access faults.
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KVM: MMU: Optimize pte permission checks
walk_addr_generic() permission checks are a maze of branchy code, which is
performed four times per lookup. It depends on the type of access, efer.nxe,
cr0.wp, cr4.smep, and in the near future, cr4.smap.
Optimize this away by precalculating all variants and storing them in a
bitmap. The bitmap is recalculated when rarely-changing variables change
(cr0, cr4) and is indexed by the often-changing variables (page fault error
code, pte access permissions).
The permission check is moved to the end of the loop, otherwise an SMEP
fault could be reported as a false positive, when PDE.U=1 but PTE.U=0.
Noted by Xiao Guangrong.
The result is short, branch-free code.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 19:52:00 +08:00
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*/
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2016-03-08 17:08:16 +08:00
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static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
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unsigned pfec)
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2011-07-12 03:23:20 +08:00
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{
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2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
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int cpl = kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu);
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unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu);
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/*
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* If CPL < 3, SMAP prevention are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1.
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*
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* If CPL = 3, SMAP applies to all supervisor-mode data accesses
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* (these are implicit supervisor accesses) regardless of the value
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* of EFLAGS.AC.
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*
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* This computes (cpl < 3) && (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC), leaving
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* the result in X86_EFLAGS_AC. We then insert it in place of
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* the PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit; this bit will always be zero in pfec,
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* but it will be one in index if SMAP checks are being overridden.
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* It is important to keep this branchless.
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*/
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unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
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int index = (pfec >> 1) +
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(smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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bool fault = (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1;
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2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
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u32 errcode = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
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2014-04-01 17:46:34 +08:00
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
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if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
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u32 pkru_bits, offset;
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/*
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* PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
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* attribute bits per domain in pkru. pte_pkey is the
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* index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is
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* is the index of the first bit for the domain.
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*/
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2017-08-24 05:14:38 +08:00
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pkru_bits = (vcpu->arch.pkru >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
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/* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
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2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
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offset = (pfec & ~1) +
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2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) << (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> offset;
|
2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
|
|
|
errcode |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
|
2016-03-22 16:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
fault |= (pkru_bits != 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-25 21:19:35 +08:00
|
|
|
return -(u32)fault & errcode;
|
2011-07-12 03:23:20 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
KVM: MMU: Optimize pte permission checks
walk_addr_generic() permission checks are a maze of branchy code, which is
performed four times per lookup. It depends on the type of access, efer.nxe,
cr0.wp, cr4.smep, and in the near future, cr4.smap.
Optimize this away by precalculating all variants and storing them in a
bitmap. The bitmap is recalculated when rarely-changing variables change
(cr0, cr4) and is indexed by the often-changing variables (page fault error
code, pte access permissions).
The permission check is moved to the end of the loop, otherwise an SMEP
fault could be reported as a false positive, when PDE.U=1 but PTE.U=0.
Noted by Xiao Guangrong.
The result is short, branch-free code.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
2012-09-12 19:52:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-13 14:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end);
|
2016-02-24 17:51:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
|
2016-02-24 17:51:08 +08:00
|
|
|
bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn);
|
2017-05-06 03:25:13 +08:00
|
|
|
int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
2019-11-05 03:26:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
|
|
|
|
void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-14 09:35:10 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|