linux/net/unix/scm.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include <net/scm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "scm.h"
unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_tot_inflight);
LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(gc_inflight_list);
DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_gc_lock);
struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
{
struct sock *u_sock = NULL;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
/* Socket ? */
if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
net: annotate data-races around sock->ops IPV6_ADDRFORM socket option is evil, because it can change sock->ops while other threads might read it. Same issue for sk->sk_family being set to AF_INET. Adding READ_ONCE() over sock->ops reads is needed for sockets that might be impacted by IPV6_ADDRFORM. Note that mptcp_is_tcpsk() can also overwrite sock->ops. Adding annotations for all sk->sk_family reads will require more patches :/ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ____sys_sendmsg / do_ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff888109f24ca0 of 8 bytes by task 4470 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2c5e/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:491 ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012 udpv6_setsockopt+0x95/0xa0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1690 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3663 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c3/0x230 net/socket.c:2273 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2284 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2281 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2281 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd read to 0xffff888109f24ca0 of 8 bytes by task 4469 on cpu 1: sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x349/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x263/0x500 net/socket.c:2643 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x60 net/socket.c:2669 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0xffffffff850e32b8 -> 0xffffffff850da890 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 4469 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-syzkaller-00313-g4c605260bc60 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230808135809.2300241-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-08-08 21:58:09 +08:00
const struct proto_ops *ops = READ_ONCE(sock->ops);
struct sock *s = sock->sk;
/* PF_UNIX ? */
net: annotate data-races around sock->ops IPV6_ADDRFORM socket option is evil, because it can change sock->ops while other threads might read it. Same issue for sk->sk_family being set to AF_INET. Adding READ_ONCE() over sock->ops reads is needed for sockets that might be impacted by IPV6_ADDRFORM. Note that mptcp_is_tcpsk() can also overwrite sock->ops. Adding annotations for all sk->sk_family reads will require more patches :/ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ____sys_sendmsg / do_ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff888109f24ca0 of 8 bytes by task 4470 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2c5e/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:491 ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012 udpv6_setsockopt+0x95/0xa0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1690 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3663 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c3/0x230 net/socket.c:2273 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2284 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2281 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2281 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd read to 0xffff888109f24ca0 of 8 bytes by task 4469 on cpu 1: sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x349/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x263/0x500 net/socket.c:2643 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x60 net/socket.c:2669 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0xffffffff850e32b8 -> 0xffffffff850da890 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 4469 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-syzkaller-00313-g4c605260bc60 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230808135809.2300241-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-08-08 21:58:09 +08:00
if (s && ops && ops->family == PF_UNIX)
u_sock = s;
}
return u_sock;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_get_socket);
/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file
* descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
*/
void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress wait_for_unix_gc() reads unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress without synchronization. Adds READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() and their associated comments to better document the intent. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / wait_for_unix_gc write to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9380 on cpu 0: unix_inflight+0x1e8/0x260 net/unix/scm.c:63 unix_attach_fds+0x10c/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:121 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1674 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x679/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1817 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9375 on cpu 1: wait_for_unix_gc+0x24/0x160 net/unix/garbage.c:196 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x8e/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1772 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x00000002 -> 0x00000004 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 9375 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 9915672d4127 ("af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220114164328.2038499-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-01-15 00:43:28 +08:00
/* Paired with READ_ONCE() in wait_for_unix_gc() */
WRITE_ONCE(unix_tot_inflight, unix_tot_inflight + 1);
}
af_unix: Fix data-races around user->unix_inflight. user->unix_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but too_many_unix_fds() reads it locklessly. Let's annotate the write/read accesses to user->unix_inflight. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_attach_fds / unix_inflight write to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44798 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x157/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:66 unix_attach_fds+0x147/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 read to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44814 on cpu 0: too_many_unix_fds net/unix/scm.c:101 [inline] unix_attach_fds+0x54/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:110 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 value changed: 0x000000000000000c -> 0x000000000000000d Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 44814 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-11989-g6843306689af #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 712f4aad406b ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-09-02 08:27:05 +08:00
WRITE_ONCE(user->unix_inflight, user->unix_inflight + 1);
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight));
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
list_del_init(&u->link);
af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress wait_for_unix_gc() reads unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress without synchronization. Adds READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() and their associated comments to better document the intent. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / wait_for_unix_gc write to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9380 on cpu 0: unix_inflight+0x1e8/0x260 net/unix/scm.c:63 unix_attach_fds+0x10c/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:121 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1674 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x679/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1817 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9375 on cpu 1: wait_for_unix_gc+0x24/0x160 net/unix/garbage.c:196 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x8e/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1772 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x00000002 -> 0x00000004 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 9375 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 9915672d4127 ("af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220114164328.2038499-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-01-15 00:43:28 +08:00
/* Paired with READ_ONCE() in wait_for_unix_gc() */
WRITE_ONCE(unix_tot_inflight, unix_tot_inflight - 1);
}
af_unix: Fix data-races around user->unix_inflight. user->unix_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but too_many_unix_fds() reads it locklessly. Let's annotate the write/read accesses to user->unix_inflight. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_attach_fds / unix_inflight write to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44798 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x157/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:66 unix_attach_fds+0x147/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 read to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44814 on cpu 0: too_many_unix_fds net/unix/scm.c:101 [inline] unix_attach_fds+0x54/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:110 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 value changed: 0x000000000000000c -> 0x000000000000000d Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 44814 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-11989-g6843306689af #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 712f4aad406b ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-09-02 08:27:05 +08:00
WRITE_ONCE(user->unix_inflight, user->unix_inflight - 1);
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
/*
* The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
* collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
* over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
* it across threads. Tough.
*/
static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
af_unix: Fix data-races around user->unix_inflight. user->unix_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but too_many_unix_fds() reads it locklessly. Let's annotate the write/read accesses to user->unix_inflight. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_attach_fds / unix_inflight write to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44798 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x157/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:66 unix_attach_fds+0x147/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 read to 0xffffffff8546f2d0 of 8 bytes by task 44814 on cpu 0: too_many_unix_fds net/unix/scm.c:101 [inline] unix_attach_fds+0x54/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:110 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1827 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1950 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg net/unix/af_unix.c:2308 [inline] unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xba/0x130 net/unix/af_unix.c:2292 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:748 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2494 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2548 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2577 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 value changed: 0x000000000000000c -> 0x000000000000000d Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 44814 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-11989-g6843306689af #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 712f4aad406b ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-09-02 08:27:05 +08:00
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(user->unix_inflight) > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
return false;
}
int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
/*
* Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
* collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
* candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
*/
UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_attach_fds);
void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_detach_fds);
void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct scm_cookie scm;
memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
/* Alas, it calls VFS */
/* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
scm_destroy(&scm);
sock_wfree(skb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_destruct_scm);
void io_uring_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unix_destruct_scm(skb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(io_uring_destruct_scm);