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net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
#!/bin/bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#
# Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
#
# This script tests the below topology:
#
# ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐
# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns0 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │
# │ │ │ │ │ │
# │┌────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐│
# ││ wg0 │───────────┼───┼────────────│ lo │────────────┼───┼───────────│ wg0 ││
# │├────────┴──────────┐│ │ ┌───────┴────────┴────────┐ │ │┌──────────┴────────┤│
# ││192.168.241.1/24 ││ │ │(ns1) (ns2) │ │ ││192.168.241.2/24 ││
# ││fd00::1/24 ││ │ │127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2│ │ ││fd00::2/24 ││
# │└───────────────────┘│ │ │[::]:1 [::]:2 │ │ │└───────────────────┘│
# └─────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────────┘
# └──────────────────────────────────┘
#
# After the topology is prepared we run a series of TCP/UDP iperf3 tests between the
# wireguard peers in $ns1 and $ns2. Note that $ns0 is the endpoint for the wg0
# interfaces in $ns1 and $ns2. See https://www.wireguard.com/netns/ for further
# details on how this is accomplished.
set -e
exec 3>&1
wireguard: device: use icmp_ndo_send helper Because wireguard is calling icmp from network device context, it should use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. This commit adds a small test to the wireguard test suite to ensure that the new functions continue doing the right thing in the context of wireguard. It does this by setting up a condition that will definately evoke an icmp error message from the driver, but along a nat'd path. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-12 03:47:08 +08:00
export LANG=C
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
export WG_HIDE_KEYS=never
netns0="wg-test-$$-0"
netns1="wg-test-$$-1"
netns2="wg-test-$$-2"
pretty() { echo -e "\x1b[32m\x1b[1m[+] ${1:+NS$1: }${2}\x1b[0m" >&3; }
pp() { pretty "" "$*"; "$@"; }
maybe_exec() { if [[ $BASHPID -eq $$ ]]; then "$@"; else exec "$@"; fi; }
n0() { pretty 0 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns0 "$@"; }
n1() { pretty 1 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns1 "$@"; }
n2() { pretty 2 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netns exec $netns2 "$@"; }
ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 "$@"; }
ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; }
ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; }
wireguard: selftests: remove ancient kernel compatibility code Quite a bit of the test suite was designed to work with ancient kernels. Thankfully we no longer have to deal with this. This commit updates things that we can finally update and removes things that we can finally remove, to avoid the build-up of the last several years as a result of having to support ancient kernels. We can finally rely on suppress_ prefixlength being available. On the build side of things, the no-PIE hack is no longer required, and we can bump some of the tools, repair our m68k and i686-kvm support, and get better coverage of the static branches used in the crypto lib and in udp_tunnel. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-03 00:47:49 +08:00
sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; }
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH 'sport = 5201') != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulpH 'sport = 1111') != *\"ncat\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; }
cleanup() {
set +e
exec 2>/dev/null
printf "$orig_message_cost" > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost
ip0 link del dev wg0
ip1 link del dev wg0
ip2 link del dev wg0
local to_kill="$(ip netns pids $netns0) $(ip netns pids $netns1) $(ip netns pids $netns2)"
[[ -n $to_kill ]] && kill $to_kill
pp ip netns del $netns1
pp ip netns del $netns2
pp ip netns del $netns0
exit
}
orig_message_cost="$(< /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost)"
trap cleanup EXIT
printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost
ip netns del $netns0 2>/dev/null || true
ip netns del $netns1 2>/dev/null || true
ip netns del $netns2 2>/dev/null || true
pp ip netns add $netns0
pp ip netns add $netns1
pp ip netns add $netns2
ip0 link set up dev lo
ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns1
ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns2
key1="$(pp wg genkey)"
key2="$(pp wg genkey)"
key3="$(pp wg genkey)"
pub1="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key1")"
pub2="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key2")"
pub3="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key3")"
psk="$(pp wg genpsk)"
[[ -n $key1 && -n $key2 && -n $psk ]]
configure_peers() {
ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg0
ip1 addr add fd00::1/24 dev wg0
ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg0
ip2 addr add fd00::2/24 dev wg0
n1 wg set wg0 \
private-key <(echo "$key1") \
listen-port 1 \
peer "$pub2" \
preshared-key <(echo "$psk") \
allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32,fd00::2/128
n2 wg set wg0 \
private-key <(echo "$key2") \
listen-port 2 \
peer "$pub1" \
preshared-key <(echo "$psk") \
allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32,fd00::1/128
ip1 link set up dev wg0
ip2 link set up dev wg0
}
configure_peers
tests() {
# Ping over IPv4
n2 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.1
n1 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.2
# Ping over IPv6
n2 ping6 -c 10 -f -W 1 fd00::1
n1 ping6 -c 10 -f -W 1 fd00::2
# TCP over IPv4
n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 &
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitiperf $netns2 $!
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c 192.168.241.2
# TCP over IPv6
n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::1 &
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitiperf $netns1 $!
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c fd00::1
# UDP over IPv4
n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.1 &
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitiperf $netns1 $!
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c 192.168.241.1
# UDP over IPv6
n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 &
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitiperf $netns2 $!
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2
}
[[ $(ip1 link show dev wg0) =~ mtu\ ([0-9]+) ]] && orig_mtu="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
big_mtu=$(( 34816 - 1500 + $orig_mtu ))
# Test using IPv4 as outer transport
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 127.0.0.1:1
# Before calling tests, we first make sure that the stats counters and timestamper are working
n2 ping -c 10 -f -W 1 192.168.241.1
{ read _; read _; read _; read rx_bytes _; read _; read tx_bytes _; } < <(ip2 -stats link show dev wg0)
(( rx_bytes == 1372 && (tx_bytes == 1428 || tx_bytes == 1460) ))
{ read _; read _; read _; read rx_bytes _; read _; read tx_bytes _; } < <(ip1 -stats link show dev wg0)
(( tx_bytes == 1372 && (rx_bytes == 1428 || rx_bytes == 1460) ))
read _ rx_bytes tx_bytes < <(n2 wg show wg0 transfer)
(( rx_bytes == 1372 && (tx_bytes == 1428 || tx_bytes == 1460) ))
read _ rx_bytes tx_bytes < <(n1 wg show wg0 transfer)
(( tx_bytes == 1372 && (rx_bytes == 1428 || rx_bytes == 1460) ))
read _ timestamp < <(n1 wg show wg0 latest-handshakes)
(( timestamp != 0 ))
tests
ip1 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu
ip2 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu
tests
ip1 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu
ip2 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu
# Test using IPv6 as outer transport
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [::1]:2
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [::1]:1
tests
ip1 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu
ip2 link set wg0 mtu $big_mtu
tests
# Test that route MTUs work with the padding
ip1 link set wg0 mtu 1300
ip2 link set wg0 mtu 1300
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 127.0.0.1:1
n0 iptables -A INPUT -m length --length 1360 -j DROP
n1 ip route add 192.168.241.2/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299
n2 ip route add 192.168.241.1/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299
n2 ping -c 1 -W 1 -s 1269 192.168.241.1
n2 ip route delete 192.168.241.1/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299
n1 ip route delete 192.168.241.2/32 dev wg0 mtu 1299
n0 iptables -F INPUT
ip1 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu
ip2 link set wg0 mtu $orig_mtu
# Test using IPv4 that roaming works
ip0 -4 addr del 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo
ip0 -4 addr add 127.212.121.99/8 dev lo
n1 wg set wg0 listen-port 9999
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 127.0.0.1:2
n1 ping6 -W 1 -c 1 fd00::2
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 127.212.121.99:9999" ]]
# Test using IPv6 that roaming works
n1 wg set wg0 listen-port 9998
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [::1]:2
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [::1]:9998" ]]
# Test that crypto-RP filter works
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.241.0/24
exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111)
ncat_pid=$!
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X"
read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 && [[ $out == "X" ]]
kill $ncat_pid
more_specific_key="$(pp wg genkey | pp wg pubkey)"
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32
n2 wg set wg0 listen-port 9997
exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111)
ncat_pid=$!
wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target pid Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:29 +08:00
waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X"
! read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 || false
kill $ncat_pid
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key" remove
[[ $(n1 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub2 [::1]:9997" ]]
# Test that we can change private keys keys and immediately handshake
n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32 endpoint 127.0.0.1:2
n2 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") listen-port 2 peer "$pub1" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key3")
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 peer "$pub1" remove
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
ip1 link del wg0
ip2 link del wg0
# Test using NAT. We now change the topology to this:
# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns0 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │
# │ │ │ │ │ │
# │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ │ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ │ │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │
# │ │ wg0 │─────────────│vethc│───────────┼────┼────│vethrc│ │vethrs│──────────────┼─────┼──│veths│────────────│ wg0 │ │
# │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐│ │ ├──────┴─────────┐ ├──────┴────────────┐ │ │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐ │
# │ │192.168.241.1/24│ │192.168.1.100/24││ │ │192.168.1.1/24 │ │10.0.0.1/24 │ │ │ │10.0.0.100/24 │ │192.168.241.2/24│ │
# │ │fd00::1/24 │ │ ││ │ │ │ │SNAT:192.168.1.0/24│ │ │ │ │ │fd00::2/24 │ │
# │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘│ │ └────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ │ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
# └────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────┘
ip1 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
ip2 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
configure_peers
ip0 link add vethrc type veth peer name vethc
ip0 link add vethrs type veth peer name veths
ip0 link set vethc netns $netns1
ip0 link set veths netns $netns2
ip0 link set vethrc up
ip0 link set vethrs up
ip0 addr add 192.168.1.1/24 dev vethrc
ip0 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev vethrs
ip1 addr add 192.168.1.100/24 dev vethc
ip1 link set vethc up
ip1 route add default via 192.168.1.1
ip2 addr add 10.0.0.100/24 dev veths
ip2 link set veths up
waitiface $netns0 vethrc
waitiface $netns0 vethrs
waitiface $netns1 vethc
waitiface $netns2 veths
n0 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward'
n0 bash -c 'printf 2 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_udp_timeout'
n0 bash -c 'printf 2 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_udp_timeout_stream'
n0 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.1.0/24 -d 10.0.0.0/24 -j SNAT --to 10.0.0.1
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.100:2 persistent-keepalive 1
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]]
# Demonstrate n2 can still send packets to n1, since persistent-keepalive will prevent connection tracking entry from expiring (to see entries: `n0 conntrack -L`).
pp sleep 3
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0
# Do a wg-quick(8)-style policy routing for the default route, making sure vethc has a v6 address to tease out bugs.
ip1 -6 addr add fc00::9/96 dev vethc
ip1 -6 route add default via fc00::1
ip2 -4 addr add 192.168.99.7/32 dev wg0
ip2 -6 addr add abab::1111/128 dev wg0
n1 wg set wg0 fwmark 51820 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.99.7,abab::1111
ip1 -6 route add default dev wg0 table 51820
ip1 -6 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820
ip1 -6 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0
ip1 -4 route add default dev wg0 table 51820
ip1 -4 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820
ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0
wireguard: selftests: remove ancient kernel compatibility code Quite a bit of the test suite was designed to work with ancient kernels. Thankfully we no longer have to deal with this. This commit updates things that we can finally update and removes things that we can finally remove, to avoid the build-up of the last several years as a result of having to support ancient kernels. We can finally rely on suppress_ prefixlength being available. On the build side of things, the no-PIE hack is no longer required, and we can bump some of the tools, repair our m68k and i686-kvm support, and get better coverage of the static branches used in the crypto lib and in udp_tunnel. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-03 00:47:49 +08:00
# Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs.
n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7
n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
wireguard: device: use icmp_ndo_send helper Because wireguard is calling icmp from network device context, it should use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. This commit adds a small test to the wireguard test suite to ensure that the new functions continue doing the right thing in the context of wireguard. It does this by setting up a condition that will definately evoke an icmp error message from the driver, but along a nat'd path. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-12 03:47:08 +08:00
# Have ns2 NAT into wg0 packets from ns0, but return an icmp error along the right route.
n2 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d 192.168.241.0/24 -j SNAT --to 192.168.241.2
n0 iptables -t filter -A INPUT \! -s 10.0.0.0/24 -i vethrs -j DROP # Manual rpfilter just to be explicit.
n2 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward'
ip0 -4 route add 192.168.241.1 via 10.0.0.100
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" remove
[[ $(! n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 || false) == *"From 10.0.0.100 icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable"* ]]
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
n0 iptables -t nat -F
wireguard: device: use icmp_ndo_send helper Because wireguard is calling icmp from network device context, it should use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. This commit adds a small test to the wireguard test suite to ensure that the new functions continue doing the right thing in the context of wireguard. It does this by setting up a condition that will definately evoke an icmp error message from the driver, but along a nat'd path. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-12 03:47:08 +08:00
n0 iptables -t filter -F
n2 iptables -t nat -F
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
ip0 link del vethrc
ip0 link del vethrs
ip1 link del wg0
ip2 link del wg0
# Test that saddr routing is sticky but not too sticky, changing to this topology:
# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
# │ $ns1 namespace │ │ $ns2 namespace │
# │ │ │ │
# │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │ │ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐ │
# │ │ wg0 │─────────────│veth1│───────────┼────┼──│veth2│────────────│ wg0 │ │
# │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐│ │ ├─────┴──────────┐ ├─────┴──────────┐ │
# │ │192.168.241.1/24│ │10.0.0.1/24 ││ │ │10.0.0.2/24 │ │192.168.241.2/24│ │
# │ │fd00::1/24 │ │fd00:aa::1/96 ││ │ │fd00:aa::2/96 │ │fd00::2/24 │ │
# │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘│ │ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
# └────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────────────────┘
ip1 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
ip2 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
configure_peers
ip1 link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
ip1 link set veth2 netns $netns2
n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad'
n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad'
n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/veth1/accept_dad'
n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/veth2/accept_dad'
n1 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth1/promote_secondaries'
# First we check that we aren't overly sticky and can fall over to new IPs when old ones are removed
ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1
ip1 addr add fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1
ip2 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth2
ip2 addr add fd00:aa::2/96 dev veth2
ip1 link set veth1 up
ip2 link set veth2 up
waitiface $netns1 veth1
waitiface $netns2 veth2
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.2:2
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
ip1 addr add 10.0.0.10/24 dev veth1
ip1 addr del 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint [fd00:aa::2]:2
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
ip1 addr add fd00:aa::10/96 dev veth1
ip1 addr del fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
# Now we show that we can successfully do reply to sender routing
ip1 link set veth1 down
ip2 link set veth2 down
ip1 addr flush dev veth1
ip2 addr flush dev veth2
ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1
ip1 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1
ip1 addr add fd00:aa::1/96 dev veth1
ip1 addr add fd00:aa::2/96 dev veth1
ip2 addr add 10.0.0.3/24 dev veth2
ip2 addr add fd00:aa::3/96 dev veth2
ip1 link set veth1 up
ip2 link set veth2 up
waitiface $netns1 veth1
waitiface $netns2 veth2
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.0.0.1:1
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]]
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [fd00:aa::1]:1
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [fd00:aa::1]:1" ]]
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.0.0.2:1
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.2:1" ]]
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint [fd00:aa::2]:1
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 [fd00:aa::2]:1" ]]
# What happens if the inbound destination address belongs to a different interface as the default route?
ip1 link add dummy0 type dummy
ip1 addr add 10.50.0.1/24 dev dummy0
ip1 link set dummy0 up
ip2 route add 10.50.0.0/24 dev veth2
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" endpoint 10.50.0.1:1
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.50.0.1:1" ]]
ip1 link del dummy0
ip1 addr flush dev veth1
ip2 addr flush dev veth2
ip1 route flush dev veth1
ip2 route flush dev veth2
# Now we see what happens if another interface route takes precedence over an ongoing one
ip1 link add veth3 type veth peer name veth4
ip1 link set veth4 netns $netns2
ip1 addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth1
ip2 addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth2
ip1 addr add 10.0.0.3/24 dev veth3
ip1 link set veth1 up
ip2 link set veth2 up
ip1 link set veth3 up
ip2 link set veth4 up
waitiface $netns1 veth1
waitiface $netns2 veth2
waitiface $netns1 veth3
waitiface $netns2 veth4
ip1 route flush dev veth1
ip1 route flush dev veth3
ip1 route add 10.0.0.0/24 dev veth1 src 10.0.0.1 metric 2
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 10.0.0.2:2
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.1:1" ]]
ip1 route add 10.0.0.0/24 dev veth3 src 10.0.0.3 metric 1
n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth1/rp_filter'
n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/veth4/rp_filter'
n1 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter'
n2 bash -c 'printf 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter'
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
[[ $(n2 wg show wg0 endpoints) == "$pub1 10.0.0.3:1" ]]
ip1 link del veth1
ip1 link del veth3
ip1 link del wg0
ip2 link del wg0
# We test that Netlink/IPC is working properly by doing things that usually cause split responses
ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
config=( "[Interface]" "PrivateKey=$(wg genkey)" "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" )
for a in {1..255}; do
for b in {0..255}; do
config+=( "AllowedIPs=$a.$b.0.0/16,$a::$b/128" )
done
done
n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}")
i=0
for ip in $(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips); do
((++i))
done
((i == 255*256*2+1))
ip0 link del wg0
ip0 link add dev wg0 type wireguard
config=( "[Interface]" "PrivateKey=$(wg genkey)" )
for a in {1..40}; do
config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" )
for b in {1..52}; do
config+=( "AllowedIPs=$a.$b.0.0/16" )
done
done
n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}")
i=0
while read -r line; do
j=0
for ip in $line; do
((++j))
done
((j == 53))
((++i))
done < <(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips)
((i == 40))
ip0 link del wg0
ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard
config=( )
for i in {1..29}; do
config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" )
done
config+=( "[Peer]" "PublicKey=$(wg genkey)" "AllowedIPs=255.2.3.4/32,abcd::255/128" )
n0 wg setconf wg0 <(printf '%s\n' "${config[@]}")
n0 wg showconf wg0 > /dev/null
ip0 link del wg0
allowedips=( )
for i in {1..197}; do
allowedips+=( abcd::$i )
done
saved_ifs="$IFS"
IFS=,
allowedips="${allowedips[*]}"
IFS="$saved_ifs"
ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1"
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips "$allowedips"
{
read -r pub allowedips
[[ $pub == "$pub1" && $allowedips == "(none)" ]]
read -r pub allowedips
[[ $pub == "$pub2" ]]
i=0
for _ in $allowedips; do
((++i))
done
((i == 197))
} < <(n0 wg show wg0 allowed-ips)
ip0 link del wg0
! n0 wg show doesnotexist || false
ip0 link add wg0 type wireguard
n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk")
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "$key1" ]]
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 preshared-keys) == "$pub2 $psk" ]]
n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer "$pub2" preshared-key /dev/null
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "(none)" ]]
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 preshared-keys) == "$pub2 (none)" ]]
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2"
n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2")
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 public-key) == "$pub2" ]]
[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2"
[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1")
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2"
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) == "$pub2" ]]
n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "/${key1:1}")
[[ $(n0 wg show wg0 private-key) == "+${key1:1}" ]]
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0,10.0.0.0/8,100.0.0.0/10,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0
wireguard: selftests: ensure non-addition of peers with failed precomputation Ensure that peers with low order points are ignored, both in the case where we already have a device private key and in the case where we do not. This adds points that naturally give a zero output. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-05 05:17:27 +08:00
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove
low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= )
n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer }
[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer }
[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
net: WireGuard secure network tunnel WireGuard is a layer 3 secure networking tunnel made specifically for the kernel, that aims to be much simpler and easier to audit than IPsec. Extensive documentation and description of the protocol and considerations, along with formal proofs of the cryptography, are available at: * https://www.wireguard.com/ * https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf This commit implements WireGuard as a simple network device driver, accessible in the usual RTNL way used by virtual network drivers. It makes use of the udp_tunnel APIs, GRO, GSO, NAPI, and the usual set of networking subsystem APIs. It has a somewhat novel multicore queueing system designed for maximum throughput and minimal latency of encryption operations, but it is implemented modestly using workqueues and NAPI. Configuration is done via generic Netlink, and following a review from the Netlink maintainer a year ago, several high profile userspace tools have already implemented the API. This commit also comes with several different tests, both in-kernel tests and out-of-kernel tests based on network namespaces, taking profit of the fact that sockets used by WireGuard intentionally stay in the namespace the WireGuard interface was originally created, exactly like the semantics of userspace tun devices. See wireguard.com/netns/ for pictures and examples. The source code is fairly short, but rather than combining everything into a single file, WireGuard is developed as cleanly separable files, making auditing and comprehension easier. Things are laid out as follows: * noise.[ch], cookie.[ch], messages.h: These implement the bulk of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, and are mostly data-only in nature, taking in buffers of bytes and spitting out buffers of bytes. They also handle reference counting for their various shared pieces of data, like keys and key lists. * ratelimiter.[ch]: Used as an integral part of cookie.[ch] for ratelimiting certain types of cryptographic operations in accordance with particular WireGuard semantics. * allowedips.[ch], peerlookup.[ch]: The main lookup structures of WireGuard, the former being trie-like with particular semantics, an integral part of the design of the protocol, and the latter just being nice helper functions around the various hashtables we use. * device.[ch]: Implementation of functions for the netdevice and for rtnl, responsible for maintaining the life of a given interface and wiring it up to the rest of WireGuard. * peer.[ch]: Each interface has a list of peers, with helper functions available here for creation, destruction, and reference counting. * socket.[ch]: Implementation of functions related to udp_socket and the general set of kernel socket APIs, for sending and receiving ciphertext UDP packets, and taking care of WireGuard-specific sticky socket routing semantics for the automatic roaming. * netlink.[ch]: Userspace API entry point for configuring WireGuard peers and devices. The API has been implemented by several userspace tools and network management utility, and the WireGuard project distributes the basic wg(8) tool. * queueing.[ch]: Shared function on the rx and tx path for handling the various queues used in the multicore algorithms. * send.c: Handles encrypting outgoing packets in parallel on multiple cores, before sending them in order on a single core, via workqueues and ring buffers. Also handles sending handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * receive.c: Handles decrypting incoming packets in parallel on multiple cores, before passing them off in order to be ingested via the rest of the networking subsystem with GRO via the typical NAPI poll function. Also handles receiving handshake and cookie messages as part of the protocol, in parallel. * timers.[ch]: Uses the timer wheel to implement protocol particular event timeouts, and gives a set of very simple event-driven entry point functions for callers. * main.c, version.h: Initialization and deinitialization of the module. * selftest/*.h: Runtime unit tests for some of the most security sensitive functions. * tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh: Aforementioned testing script using network namespaces. This commit aims to be as self-contained as possible, implementing WireGuard as a standalone module not needing much special handling or coordination from the network subsystem. I expect for future optimizations to the network stack to positively improve WireGuard, and vice-versa, but for the time being, this exists as intentionally standalone. We introduce a menu option for CONFIG_WIREGUARD, as well as providing a verbose debug log and self-tests via CONFIG_WIREGUARD_DEBUG. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-09 07:27:34 +08:00
ip0 link del wg0
declare -A objects
while read -t 0.1 -r line 2>/dev/null || [[ $? -ne 142 ]]; do
[[ $line =~ .*(wg[0-9]+:\ [A-Z][a-z]+\ [0-9]+)\ .*(created|destroyed).* ]] || continue
objects["${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"]+="${BASH_REMATCH[2]}"
done < /dev/kmsg
alldeleted=1
for object in "${!objects[@]}"; do
if [[ ${objects["$object"]} != *createddestroyed ]]; then
echo "Error: $object: merely ${objects["$object"]}" >&3
alldeleted=0
fi
done
[[ $alldeleted -eq 1 ]]
pretty "" "Objects that were created were also destroyed."
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