linux/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Topspin Communications. All rights reserved.
IB/uverbs: Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() to modules Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() and put low-level drivers in control of when to call ib_umem_get() to pin and DMA map userspace, rather than always calling it in ib_uverbs_reg_mr() before calling the low-level driver's reg_user_mr method. Also move these functions to be in the ib_core module instead of ib_uverbs, so that driver modules using them do not depend on ib_uverbs. This has a number of advantages: - It is better design from the standpoint of making generic code a library that can be used or overridden by device-specific code as the details of specific devices dictate. - Drivers that do not need to pin userspace memory regions do not need to take the performance hit of calling ib_mem_get(). For example, although I have not tried to implement it in this patch, the ipath driver should be able to avoid pinning memory and just use copy_{to,from}_user() to access userspace memory regions. - Buffers that need special mapping treatment can be identified by the low-level driver. For example, it may be possible to solve some Altix-specific memory ordering issues with mthca CQs in userspace by mapping CQ buffers with extra flags. - Drivers that need to pin and DMA map userspace memory for things other than memory regions can use ib_umem_get() directly, instead of hacks using extra parameters to their reg_phys_mr method. For example, the mlx4 driver that is pending being merged needs to pin and DMA map QP and CQ buffers, but it does not need to create a memory key for these buffers. So the cleanest solution is for mlx4 to call ib_umem_get() in the create_qp and create_cq methods. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
2007-03-05 08:15:11 +08:00
* Copyright (c) 2005, 2006, 2007 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 PathScale, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2006 Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
*
* This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
* licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
* General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
* COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
* OpenIB.org BSD license below:
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
* without modification, are permitted provided that the following
* conditions are met:
*
* - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer.
*
* - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
* provided with the distribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <rdma/uverbs_types.h>
#include <rdma/uverbs_std_types.h>
#include "rdma_core.h"
#include "uverbs.h"
#include "core_priv.h"
/*
* Copy a response to userspace. If the provided 'resp' is larger than the
* user buffer it is silently truncated. If the user provided a larger buffer
* then the trailing portion is zero filled.
*
* These semantics are intended to support future extension of the output
* structures.
*/
static int uverbs_response(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs, const void *resp,
size_t resp_len)
{
int ret;
if (uverbs_attr_is_valid(attrs, UVERBS_ATTR_CORE_OUT))
return uverbs_copy_to_struct_or_zero(
attrs, UVERBS_ATTR_CORE_OUT, resp, resp_len);
if (copy_to_user(attrs->ucore.outbuf, resp,
min(attrs->ucore.outlen, resp_len)))
return -EFAULT;
if (resp_len < attrs->ucore.outlen) {
/*
* Zero fill any extra memory that user
* space might have provided.
*/
ret = clear_user(attrs->ucore.outbuf + resp_len,
attrs->ucore.outlen - resp_len);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Copy a request from userspace. If the provided 'req' is larger than the
* user buffer then the user buffer is zero extended into the 'req'. If 'req'
* is smaller than the user buffer then the uncopied bytes in the user buffer
* must be zero.
*/
static int uverbs_request(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs, void *req,
size_t req_len)
{
if (copy_from_user(req, attrs->ucore.inbuf,
min(attrs->ucore.inlen, req_len)))
return -EFAULT;
if (attrs->ucore.inlen < req_len) {
memset(req + attrs->ucore.inlen, 0,
req_len - attrs->ucore.inlen);
} else if (attrs->ucore.inlen > req_len) {
if (!ib_is_buffer_cleared(attrs->ucore.inbuf + req_len,
attrs->ucore.inlen - req_len))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Generate the value for the 'response_length' protocol used by write_ex.
* This is the number of bytes the kernel actually wrote. Userspace can use
* this to detect what structure members in the response the kernel
* understood.
*/
static u32 uverbs_response_length(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
size_t resp_len)
{
return min_t(size_t, attrs->ucore.outlen, resp_len);
}
/*
* The iterator version of the request interface is for handlers that need to
* step over a flex array at the end of a command header.
*/
struct uverbs_req_iter {
const void __user *cur;
const void __user *end;
};
static int uverbs_request_start(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct uverbs_req_iter *iter,
void *req,
size_t req_len)
{
if (attrs->ucore.inlen < req_len)
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(req, attrs->ucore.inbuf, req_len))
return -EFAULT;
iter->cur = attrs->ucore.inbuf + req_len;
iter->end = attrs->ucore.inbuf + attrs->ucore.inlen;
return 0;
}
static int uverbs_request_next(struct uverbs_req_iter *iter, void *val,
size_t len)
{
if (iter->cur + len > iter->end)
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(val, iter->cur, len))
return -EFAULT;
iter->cur += len;
return 0;
}
static const void __user *uverbs_request_next_ptr(struct uverbs_req_iter *iter,
size_t len)
{
const void __user *res = iter->cur;
if (iter->cur + len > iter->end)
return (void __force __user *)ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
iter->cur += len;
return res;
}
static int uverbs_request_finish(struct uverbs_req_iter *iter)
{
if (!ib_is_buffer_cleared(iter->cur, iter->end - iter->cur))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return 0;
}
/*
* When calling a destroy function during an error unwind we need to pass in
* the udata that is sanitized of all user arguments. Ie from the driver
* perspective it looks like no udata was passed.
*/
struct ib_udata *uverbs_get_cleared_udata(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
attrs->driver_udata = (struct ib_udata){};
return &attrs->driver_udata;
}
static struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *
_ib_uverbs_lookup_comp_file(s32 fd, struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uobject *uobj = ufd_get_read(UVERBS_OBJECT_COMP_CHANNEL,
fd, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return (void *)uobj;
uverbs_uobject_get(uobj);
uobj_put_read(uobj);
return container_of(uobj, struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file,
uobj);
}
#define ib_uverbs_lookup_comp_file(_fd, _ufile) \
_ib_uverbs_lookup_comp_file((_fd)*typecheck(s32, _fd), _ufile)
int ib_alloc_ucontext(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *ufile = attrs->ufile;
struct ib_ucontext *ucontext;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ib_dev = srcu_dereference(ufile->device->ib_dev,
&ufile->device->disassociate_srcu);
if (!ib_dev)
return -EIO;
ucontext = rdma_zalloc_drv_obj(ib_dev, ib_ucontext);
if (!ucontext)
return -ENOMEM;
ucontext->device = ib_dev;
ucontext->ufile = ufile;
xa_init_flags(&ucontext->mmap_xa, XA_FLAGS_ALLOC);
rdma_restrack_new(&ucontext->res, RDMA_RESTRACK_CTX);
rdma_restrack_set_name(&ucontext->res, NULL);
attrs->context = ucontext;
return 0;
}
int ib_init_ucontext(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_ucontext *ucontext = attrs->context;
struct ib_uverbs_file *file = attrs->ufile;
int ret;
if (!down_read_trylock(&file->hw_destroy_rwsem))
return -EIO;
mutex_lock(&file->ucontext_lock);
if (file->ucontext) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
ret = ib_rdmacg_try_charge(&ucontext->cg_obj, ucontext->device,
RDMACG_RESOURCE_HCA_HANDLE);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = ucontext->device->ops.alloc_ucontext(ucontext,
&attrs->driver_udata);
if (ret)
goto err_uncharge;
rdma_restrack_add(&ucontext->res);
/*
* Make sure that ib_uverbs_get_ucontext() sees the pointer update
* only after all writes to setup the ucontext have completed
*/
smp_store_release(&file->ucontext, ucontext);
mutex_unlock(&file->ucontext_lock);
up_read(&file->hw_destroy_rwsem);
return 0;
err_uncharge:
ib_rdmacg_uncharge(&ucontext->cg_obj, ucontext->device,
RDMACG_RESOURCE_HCA_HANDLE);
err:
mutex_unlock(&file->ucontext_lock);
up_read(&file->hw_destroy_rwsem);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_get_context(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_get_context_resp resp;
struct ib_uverbs_get_context cmd;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ib_alloc_ucontext(attrs);
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_ASYNC_EVENT, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uobj);
goto err_ucontext;
}
resp = (struct ib_uverbs_get_context_resp){
.num_comp_vectors = attrs->ufile->device->num_comp_vectors,
.async_fd = uobj->id,
};
ret = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret)
goto err_uobj;
ret = ib_init_ucontext(attrs);
if (ret)
goto err_uobj;
ib_uverbs_init_async_event_file(
container_of(uobj, struct ib_uverbs_async_event_file, uobj));
rdma_alloc_commit_uobject(uobj, attrs);
return 0;
err_uobj:
rdma_alloc_abort_uobject(uobj, attrs, false);
err_ucontext:
rdma_restrack_put(&attrs->context->res);
kfree(attrs->context);
attrs->context = NULL;
return ret;
}
static void copy_query_dev_fields(struct ib_ucontext *ucontext,
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
struct ib_uverbs_query_device_resp *resp,
struct ib_device_attr *attr)
{
struct ib_device *ib_dev = ucontext->device;
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
resp->fw_ver = attr->fw_ver;
resp->node_guid = ib_dev->node_guid;
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
resp->sys_image_guid = attr->sys_image_guid;
resp->max_mr_size = attr->max_mr_size;
resp->page_size_cap = attr->page_size_cap;
resp->vendor_id = attr->vendor_id;
resp->vendor_part_id = attr->vendor_part_id;
resp->hw_ver = attr->hw_ver;
resp->max_qp = attr->max_qp;
resp->max_qp_wr = attr->max_qp_wr;
resp->device_cap_flags = lower_32_bits(attr->device_cap_flags);
resp->max_sge = min(attr->max_send_sge, attr->max_recv_sge);
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
resp->max_sge_rd = attr->max_sge_rd;
resp->max_cq = attr->max_cq;
resp->max_cqe = attr->max_cqe;
resp->max_mr = attr->max_mr;
resp->max_pd = attr->max_pd;
resp->max_qp_rd_atom = attr->max_qp_rd_atom;
resp->max_ee_rd_atom = attr->max_ee_rd_atom;
resp->max_res_rd_atom = attr->max_res_rd_atom;
resp->max_qp_init_rd_atom = attr->max_qp_init_rd_atom;
resp->max_ee_init_rd_atom = attr->max_ee_init_rd_atom;
resp->atomic_cap = attr->atomic_cap;
resp->max_ee = attr->max_ee;
resp->max_rdd = attr->max_rdd;
resp->max_mw = attr->max_mw;
resp->max_raw_ipv6_qp = attr->max_raw_ipv6_qp;
resp->max_raw_ethy_qp = attr->max_raw_ethy_qp;
resp->max_mcast_grp = attr->max_mcast_grp;
resp->max_mcast_qp_attach = attr->max_mcast_qp_attach;
resp->max_total_mcast_qp_attach = attr->max_total_mcast_qp_attach;
resp->max_ah = attr->max_ah;
resp->max_srq = attr->max_srq;
resp->max_srq_wr = attr->max_srq_wr;
resp->max_srq_sge = attr->max_srq_sge;
resp->max_pkeys = attr->max_pkeys;
resp->local_ca_ack_delay = attr->local_ca_ack_delay;
RDMA: Support more than 255 rdma ports Current code uses many different types when dealing with a port of a RDMA device: u8, unsigned int and u32. Switch to u32 to clean up the logic. This allows us to make (at least) the core view consistent and use the same type. Unfortunately not all places can be converted. Many uverbs functions expect port to be u8 so keep those places in order not to break UAPIs. HW/Spec defined values must also not be changed. With the switch to u32 we now can support devices with more than 255 ports. U32_MAX is reserved to make control logic a bit easier to deal with. As a device with U32_MAX ports probably isn't going to happen any time soon this seems like a non issue. When a device with more than 255 ports is created uverbs will report the RDMA device as having 255 ports as this is the max currently supported. The verbs interface is not changed yet because the IBTA spec limits the port size in too many places to be u8 and all applications that relies in verbs won't be able to cope with this change. At this stage, we are extending the interfaces that are using vendor channel solely Once the limitation is lifted mlx5 in switchdev mode will be able to have thousands of SFs created by the device. As the only instance of an RDMA device that reports more than 255 ports will be a representor device and it exposes itself as a RAW Ethernet only device CM/MAD/IPoIB and other ULPs aren't effected by this change and their sysfs/interfaces that are exposes to userspace can remain unchanged. While here cleanup some alignment issues and remove unneeded sanity checks (mainly in rdmavt), Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301070420.439400-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
2021-03-01 15:04:20 +08:00
resp->phys_port_cnt = min_t(u32, ib_dev->phys_port_cnt, U8_MAX);
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
}
static int ib_uverbs_query_device(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_query_device cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_query_device_resp resp;
struct ib_ucontext *ucontext;
int ret;
ucontext = ib_uverbs_get_ucontext(attrs);
if (IS_ERR(ucontext))
return PTR_ERR(ucontext);
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
copy_query_dev_fields(ucontext, &resp, &ucontext->device->attrs);
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int ib_uverbs_query_port(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_query_port cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_query_port_resp resp;
struct ib_port_attr attr;
int ret;
struct ib_ucontext *ucontext;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ucontext = ib_uverbs_get_ucontext(attrs);
if (IS_ERR(ucontext))
return PTR_ERR(ucontext);
ib_dev = ucontext->device;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ib_query_port(ib_dev, cmd.port_num, &attr);
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
copy_port_attr_to_resp(&attr, &resp, ib_dev, cmd.port_num);
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int ib_uverbs_alloc_pd(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_alloc_pd_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uverbs_alloc_pd cmd;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_pd *pd;
int ret;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
pd = rdma_zalloc_drv_obj(ib_dev, ib_pd);
if (!pd) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
pd->device = ib_dev;
pd->uobject = uobj;
atomic_set(&pd->usecnt, 0);
rdma_restrack_new(&pd->res, RDMA_RESTRACK_PD);
rdma_restrack_set_name(&pd->res, NULL);
ret = ib_dev->ops.alloc_pd(pd, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (ret)
goto err_alloc;
rdma_restrack_add(&pd->res);
uobj->object = pd;
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.pd_handle = uobj->id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_alloc:
rdma_restrack_put(&pd->res);
kfree(pd);
err:
uobj_alloc_abort(uobj, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd.pd_handle, attrs);
}
struct xrcd_table_entry {
struct rb_node node;
struct ib_xrcd *xrcd;
struct inode *inode;
};
static int xrcd_table_insert(struct ib_uverbs_device *dev,
struct inode *inode,
struct ib_xrcd *xrcd)
{
struct xrcd_table_entry *entry, *scan;
struct rb_node **p = &dev->xrcd_tree.rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
entry = kmalloc(sizeof *entry, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry)
return -ENOMEM;
entry->xrcd = xrcd;
entry->inode = inode;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
scan = rb_entry(parent, struct xrcd_table_entry, node);
if (inode < scan->inode) {
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
} else if (inode > scan->inode) {
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
} else {
kfree(entry);
return -EEXIST;
}
}
rb_link_node(&entry->node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&entry->node, &dev->xrcd_tree);
igrab(inode);
return 0;
}
static struct xrcd_table_entry *xrcd_table_search(struct ib_uverbs_device *dev,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct xrcd_table_entry *entry;
struct rb_node *p = dev->xrcd_tree.rb_node;
while (p) {
entry = rb_entry(p, struct xrcd_table_entry, node);
if (inode < entry->inode)
p = p->rb_left;
else if (inode > entry->inode)
p = p->rb_right;
else
return entry;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct ib_xrcd *find_xrcd(struct ib_uverbs_device *dev, struct inode *inode)
{
struct xrcd_table_entry *entry;
entry = xrcd_table_search(dev, inode);
if (!entry)
return NULL;
return entry->xrcd;
}
static void xrcd_table_delete(struct ib_uverbs_device *dev,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct xrcd_table_entry *entry;
entry = xrcd_table_search(dev, inode);
if (entry) {
iput(inode);
rb_erase(&entry->node, &dev->xrcd_tree);
kfree(entry);
}
}
static int ib_uverbs_open_xrcd(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_device *ibudev = attrs->ufile->device;
struct ib_uverbs_open_xrcd_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uverbs_open_xrcd cmd;
struct ib_uxrcd_object *obj;
struct ib_xrcd *xrcd = NULL;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
int new_xrcd = 0;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
struct fd f = {};
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
mutex_lock(&ibudev->xrcd_tree_mutex);
if (cmd.fd != -1) {
/* search for file descriptor */
f = fdget(cmd.fd);
if (!f.file) {
ret = -EBADF;
goto err_tree_mutex_unlock;
}
inode = file_inode(f.file);
xrcd = find_xrcd(ibudev, inode);
if (!xrcd && !(cmd.oflags & O_CREAT)) {
/* no file descriptor. Need CREATE flag */
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto err_tree_mutex_unlock;
}
if (xrcd && cmd.oflags & O_EXCL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_tree_mutex_unlock;
}
}
obj = (struct ib_uxrcd_object *)uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_XRCD, attrs,
&ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(obj)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(obj);
goto err_tree_mutex_unlock;
}
if (!xrcd) {
xrcd = ib_alloc_xrcd_user(ib_dev, inode, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (IS_ERR(xrcd)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(xrcd);
goto err;
}
new_xrcd = 1;
}
atomic_set(&obj->refcnt, 0);
obj->uobject.object = xrcd;
if (inode) {
if (new_xrcd) {
/* create new inode/xrcd table entry */
ret = xrcd_table_insert(ibudev, inode, xrcd);
if (ret)
goto err_dealloc_xrcd;
}
atomic_inc(&xrcd->usecnt);
}
if (f.file)
fdput(f);
mutex_unlock(&ibudev->xrcd_tree_mutex);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(&obj->uobject, attrs);
RDMA/uverbs: Fix circular locking dependency Avoid circular locking dependency by calling to uobj_alloc_commit() outside of xrcd_tree_mutex lock. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.15.0+ #87 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syzkaller401056/269 is trying to acquire lock: (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000006c12d2cd>] uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 but task is already holding lock: (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da010f09>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720 rdma_alloc_commit_uobject+0x22c/0x600 ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0x61a/0xdd0 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b -> #0 (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440 __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720 uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110 uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730 ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120 ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570 __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0 task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0 do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ucontext->uobjects_lock); lock(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex); lock(&ucontext->uobjects_lock); lock(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syzkaller401056/269: #0: (&file->cleanup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c9f0c252>] ib_uverbs_close+0xac/0x570 #1: (&ucontext->cleanup_rwsem){++++}, at: [<00000000b6994d49>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730 #2: (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da010f09>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syzkaller401056 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xde/0x164 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 ? console_unlock+0x502/0xbd0 print_circular_bug.isra.24+0x35e/0x396 ? print_circular_bug_header+0x12e/0x12e ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b validate_chain.isra.28+0x25d1/0x40c0 ? check_usage+0xb70/0xb70 ? graph_lock+0x160/0x160 ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280 ? __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630 __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630 lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 ? __mutex_lock+0x828/0x1720 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 ? __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0x1630 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110 uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200 ? uverbs_close_fd+0x1c0/0x1c0 ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120 ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50 __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0 task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0 do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520 ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x220/0x220 ? exit_notify+0x9f0/0x9f0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670 ? time_hardirqs_off+0x27/0x490 ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x6c/0x460 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b RIP: 0033:0x431ce9 Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Fixes: fd3c7904db6e ("IB/core: Change idr objects to use the new schema") Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-02-14 18:35:39 +08:00
resp.xrcd_handle = obj->uobject.id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_dealloc_xrcd:
ib_dealloc_xrcd_user(xrcd, uverbs_get_cleared_udata(attrs));
err:
uobj_alloc_abort(&obj->uobject, attrs);
err_tree_mutex_unlock:
if (f.file)
fdput(f);
mutex_unlock(&ibudev->xrcd_tree_mutex);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_close_xrcd(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_close_xrcd cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_XRCD, cmd.xrcd_handle, attrs);
}
int ib_uverbs_dealloc_xrcd(struct ib_uobject *uobject, struct ib_xrcd *xrcd,
enum rdma_remove_reason why,
struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct inode *inode;
int ret;
struct ib_uverbs_device *dev = attrs->ufile->device;
inode = xrcd->inode;
if (inode && !atomic_dec_and_test(&xrcd->usecnt))
return 0;
ret = ib_dealloc_xrcd_user(xrcd, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (ret) {
atomic_inc(&xrcd->usecnt);
return ret;
}
if (inode)
xrcd_table_delete(dev, inode);
return 0;
}
static int ib_uverbs_reg_mr(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_reg_mr_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uverbs_reg_mr cmd;
IB/uverbs: Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() to modules Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() and put low-level drivers in control of when to call ib_umem_get() to pin and DMA map userspace, rather than always calling it in ib_uverbs_reg_mr() before calling the low-level driver's reg_user_mr method. Also move these functions to be in the ib_core module instead of ib_uverbs, so that driver modules using them do not depend on ib_uverbs. This has a number of advantages: - It is better design from the standpoint of making generic code a library that can be used or overridden by device-specific code as the details of specific devices dictate. - Drivers that do not need to pin userspace memory regions do not need to take the performance hit of calling ib_mem_get(). For example, although I have not tried to implement it in this patch, the ipath driver should be able to avoid pinning memory and just use copy_{to,from}_user() to access userspace memory regions. - Buffers that need special mapping treatment can be identified by the low-level driver. For example, it may be possible to solve some Altix-specific memory ordering issues with mthca CQs in userspace by mapping CQ buffers with extra flags. - Drivers that need to pin and DMA map userspace memory for things other than memory regions can use ib_umem_get() directly, instead of hacks using extra parameters to their reg_phys_mr method. For example, the mlx4 driver that is pending being merged needs to pin and DMA map QP and CQ buffers, but it does not need to create a memory key for these buffers. So the cleanest solution is for mlx4 to call ib_umem_get() in the create_qp and create_cq methods. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
2007-03-05 08:15:11 +08:00
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_pd *pd;
struct ib_mr *mr;
int ret;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if ((cmd.start & ~PAGE_MASK) != (cmd.hca_va & ~PAGE_MASK))
return -EINVAL;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_MR, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
ret = ib_check_mr_access(ib_dev, cmd.access_flags);
if (ret)
goto err_free;
pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd.pd_handle, attrs);
if (!pd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
IB/uverbs: Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() to modules Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() and put low-level drivers in control of when to call ib_umem_get() to pin and DMA map userspace, rather than always calling it in ib_uverbs_reg_mr() before calling the low-level driver's reg_user_mr method. Also move these functions to be in the ib_core module instead of ib_uverbs, so that driver modules using them do not depend on ib_uverbs. This has a number of advantages: - It is better design from the standpoint of making generic code a library that can be used or overridden by device-specific code as the details of specific devices dictate. - Drivers that do not need to pin userspace memory regions do not need to take the performance hit of calling ib_mem_get(). For example, although I have not tried to implement it in this patch, the ipath driver should be able to avoid pinning memory and just use copy_{to,from}_user() to access userspace memory regions. - Buffers that need special mapping treatment can be identified by the low-level driver. For example, it may be possible to solve some Altix-specific memory ordering issues with mthca CQs in userspace by mapping CQ buffers with extra flags. - Drivers that need to pin and DMA map userspace memory for things other than memory regions can use ib_umem_get() directly, instead of hacks using extra parameters to their reg_phys_mr method. For example, the mlx4 driver that is pending being merged needs to pin and DMA map QP and CQ buffers, but it does not need to create a memory key for these buffers. So the cleanest solution is for mlx4 to call ib_umem_get() in the create_qp and create_cq methods. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
2007-03-05 08:15:11 +08:00
goto err_free;
}
mr = pd->device->ops.reg_user_mr(pd, cmd.start, cmd.length, cmd.hca_va,
cmd.access_flags,
&attrs->driver_udata);
if (IS_ERR(mr)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(mr);
goto err_put;
}
mr->device = pd->device;
mr->pd = pd;
mr->type = IB_MR_TYPE_USER;
mr->dm = NULL;
mr->sig_attrs = NULL;
IB/uverbs: Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() to modules Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() and put low-level drivers in control of when to call ib_umem_get() to pin and DMA map userspace, rather than always calling it in ib_uverbs_reg_mr() before calling the low-level driver's reg_user_mr method. Also move these functions to be in the ib_core module instead of ib_uverbs, so that driver modules using them do not depend on ib_uverbs. This has a number of advantages: - It is better design from the standpoint of making generic code a library that can be used or overridden by device-specific code as the details of specific devices dictate. - Drivers that do not need to pin userspace memory regions do not need to take the performance hit of calling ib_mem_get(). For example, although I have not tried to implement it in this patch, the ipath driver should be able to avoid pinning memory and just use copy_{to,from}_user() to access userspace memory regions. - Buffers that need special mapping treatment can be identified by the low-level driver. For example, it may be possible to solve some Altix-specific memory ordering issues with mthca CQs in userspace by mapping CQ buffers with extra flags. - Drivers that need to pin and DMA map userspace memory for things other than memory regions can use ib_umem_get() directly, instead of hacks using extra parameters to their reg_phys_mr method. For example, the mlx4 driver that is pending being merged needs to pin and DMA map QP and CQ buffers, but it does not need to create a memory key for these buffers. So the cleanest solution is for mlx4 to call ib_umem_get() in the create_qp and create_cq methods. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
2007-03-05 08:15:11 +08:00
mr->uobject = uobj;
atomic_inc(&pd->usecnt);
mr->iova = cmd.hca_va;
mr->length = cmd.length;
rdma_restrack_new(&mr->res, RDMA_RESTRACK_MR);
rdma_restrack_set_name(&mr->res, NULL);
rdma_restrack_add(&mr->res);
IB/uverbs: Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() to modules Export ib_umem_get()/ib_umem_release() and put low-level drivers in control of when to call ib_umem_get() to pin and DMA map userspace, rather than always calling it in ib_uverbs_reg_mr() before calling the low-level driver's reg_user_mr method. Also move these functions to be in the ib_core module instead of ib_uverbs, so that driver modules using them do not depend on ib_uverbs. This has a number of advantages: - It is better design from the standpoint of making generic code a library that can be used or overridden by device-specific code as the details of specific devices dictate. - Drivers that do not need to pin userspace memory regions do not need to take the performance hit of calling ib_mem_get(). For example, although I have not tried to implement it in this patch, the ipath driver should be able to avoid pinning memory and just use copy_{to,from}_user() to access userspace memory regions. - Buffers that need special mapping treatment can be identified by the low-level driver. For example, it may be possible to solve some Altix-specific memory ordering issues with mthca CQs in userspace by mapping CQ buffers with extra flags. - Drivers that need to pin and DMA map userspace memory for things other than memory regions can use ib_umem_get() directly, instead of hacks using extra parameters to their reg_phys_mr method. For example, the mlx4 driver that is pending being merged needs to pin and DMA map QP and CQ buffers, but it does not need to create a memory key for these buffers. So the cleanest solution is for mlx4 to call ib_umem_get() in the create_qp and create_cq methods. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
2007-03-05 08:15:11 +08:00
uobj->object = mr;
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.lkey = mr->lkey;
resp.rkey = mr->rkey;
resp.mr_handle = uobj->id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_put:
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
err_free:
uobj_alloc_abort(uobj, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_rereg_mr(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_rereg_mr cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_rereg_mr_resp resp;
struct ib_mr *mr;
int ret;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_uobject *new_uobj;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
struct ib_pd *orig_pd;
struct ib_pd *new_pd;
struct ib_mr *new_mr;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!cmd.flags)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flags & ~IB_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((cmd.flags & IB_MR_REREG_TRANS) &&
(cmd.start & ~PAGE_MASK) != (cmd.hca_va & ~PAGE_MASK))
return -EINVAL;
uobj = uobj_get_write(UVERBS_OBJECT_MR, cmd.mr_handle, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
mr = uobj->object;
if (mr->dm) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto put_uobjs;
}
if (cmd.flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
ret = ib_check_mr_access(mr->device, cmd.access_flags);
if (ret)
goto put_uobjs;
}
orig_pd = mr->pd;
if (cmd.flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
new_pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd.pd_handle,
attrs);
if (!new_pd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto put_uobjs;
}
} else {
new_pd = mr->pd;
}
/*
* The driver might create a new HW object as part of the rereg, we need
* to have a uobject ready to hold it.
*/
new_uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_MR, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(new_uobj)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_uobj);
goto put_uobj_pd;
}
new_mr = ib_dev->ops.rereg_user_mr(mr, cmd.flags, cmd.start, cmd.length,
cmd.hca_va, cmd.access_flags, new_pd,
&attrs->driver_udata);
if (IS_ERR(new_mr)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_mr);
goto put_new_uobj;
}
if (new_mr) {
new_mr->device = new_pd->device;
new_mr->pd = new_pd;
new_mr->type = IB_MR_TYPE_USER;
new_mr->uobject = uobj;
atomic_inc(&new_pd->usecnt);
new_uobj->object = new_mr;
rdma_restrack_new(&new_mr->res, RDMA_RESTRACK_MR);
rdma_restrack_set_name(&new_mr->res, NULL);
rdma_restrack_add(&new_mr->res);
/*
* The new uobj for the new HW object is put into the same spot
* in the IDR and the old uobj & HW object is deleted.
*/
rdma_assign_uobject(uobj, new_uobj, attrs);
rdma_alloc_commit_uobject(new_uobj, attrs);
uobj_put_destroy(uobj);
new_uobj = NULL;
uobj = NULL;
mr = new_mr;
} else {
if (cmd.flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
atomic_dec(&orig_pd->usecnt);
mr->pd = new_pd;
atomic_inc(&new_pd->usecnt);
}
if (cmd.flags & IB_MR_REREG_TRANS) {
mr->iova = cmd.hca_va;
mr->length = cmd.length;
}
}
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.lkey = mr->lkey;
resp.rkey = mr->rkey;
ret = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
put_new_uobj:
if (new_uobj)
uobj_alloc_abort(new_uobj, attrs);
put_uobj_pd:
if (cmd.flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD)
uobj_put_obj_read(new_pd);
put_uobjs:
if (uobj)
uobj_put_write(uobj);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_dereg_mr(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_dereg_mr cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_MR, cmd.mr_handle, attrs);
}
static int ib_uverbs_alloc_mw(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_alloc_mw cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_alloc_mw_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_pd *pd;
struct ib_mw *mw;
int ret;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_MW, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd.pd_handle, attrs);
if (!pd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
if (cmd.mw_type != IB_MW_TYPE_1 && cmd.mw_type != IB_MW_TYPE_2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
mw = rdma_zalloc_drv_obj(ib_dev, ib_mw);
if (!mw) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_put;
}
mw->device = ib_dev;
mw->pd = pd;
mw->uobject = uobj;
mw->type = cmd.mw_type;
ret = pd->device->ops.alloc_mw(mw, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (ret)
goto err_alloc;
atomic_inc(&pd->usecnt);
uobj->object = mw;
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.rkey = mw->rkey;
resp.mw_handle = uobj->id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_alloc:
kfree(mw);
err_put:
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
err_free:
uobj_alloc_abort(uobj, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_dealloc_mw(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_dealloc_mw cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_MW, cmd.mw_handle, attrs);
}
static int ib_uverbs_create_comp_channel(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_comp_channel cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_create_comp_channel_resp resp;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *ev_file;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_COMP_CHANNEL, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
ev_file = container_of(uobj, struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file,
uobj);
ib_uverbs_init_event_queue(&ev_file->ev_queue);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.fd = uobj->id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int create_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq *cmd)
{
struct ib_ucq_object *obj;
struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *ev_file = NULL;
struct ib_cq *cq;
int ret;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq_resp resp = {};
struct ib_cq_init_attr attr = {};
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
if (cmd->comp_vector >= attrs->ufile->device->num_comp_vectors)
return -EINVAL;
obj = (struct ib_ucq_object *)uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, attrs,
&ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(obj))
return PTR_ERR(obj);
if (cmd->comp_channel >= 0) {
ev_file = ib_uverbs_lookup_comp_file(cmd->comp_channel, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(ev_file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ev_file);
goto err;
}
}
obj->uevent.uobject.user_handle = cmd->user_handle;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->comp_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->uevent.event_list);
attr.cqe = cmd->cqe;
attr.comp_vector = cmd->comp_vector;
attr.flags = cmd->flags;
cq = rdma_zalloc_drv_obj(ib_dev, ib_cq);
if (!cq) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_file;
}
cq->device = ib_dev;
cq->uobject = obj;
cq->comp_handler = ib_uverbs_comp_handler;
cq->event_handler = ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler;
cq->cq_context = ev_file ? &ev_file->ev_queue : NULL;
atomic_set(&cq->usecnt, 0);
rdma_restrack_new(&cq->res, RDMA_RESTRACK_CQ);
rdma_restrack_set_name(&cq->res, NULL);
ret = ib_dev->ops.create_cq(cq, &attr, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (ret)
goto err_free;
rdma_restrack_add(&cq->res);
obj->uevent.uobject.object = cq;
obj->uevent.event_file = READ_ONCE(attrs->ufile->default_async_file);
if (obj->uevent.event_file)
uverbs_uobject_get(&obj->uevent.event_file->uobj);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
resp.base.cq_handle = obj->uevent.uobject.id;
resp.base.cqe = cq->cqe;
resp.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp));
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_free:
rdma_restrack_put(&cq->res);
kfree(cq);
err_file:
if (ev_file)
ib_uverbs_release_ucq(ev_file, obj);
err:
uobj_alloc_abort(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_create_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_cq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq cmd_ex;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&cmd_ex, 0, sizeof(cmd_ex));
cmd_ex.user_handle = cmd.user_handle;
cmd_ex.cqe = cmd.cqe;
cmd_ex.comp_vector = cmd.comp_vector;
cmd_ex.comp_channel = cmd.comp_channel;
return create_cq(attrs, &cmd_ex);
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.reserved)
return -EINVAL;
return create_cq(attrs, &cmd);
}
static int ib_uverbs_resize_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_resize_cq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_resize_cq_resp resp = {};
struct ib_cq *cq;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
cq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, cmd.cq_handle, attrs);
if (!cq)
return -EINVAL;
ret = cq->device->ops.resize_cq(cq, cmd.cqe, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (ret)
goto out;
resp.cqe = cq->cqe;
ret = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
out:
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
static int copy_wc_to_user(struct ib_device *ib_dev, void __user *dest,
struct ib_wc *wc)
{
struct ib_uverbs_wc tmp;
tmp.wr_id = wc->wr_id;
tmp.status = wc->status;
tmp.opcode = wc->opcode;
tmp.vendor_err = wc->vendor_err;
tmp.byte_len = wc->byte_len;
tmp.ex.imm_data = wc->ex.imm_data;
tmp.qp_num = wc->qp->qp_num;
tmp.src_qp = wc->src_qp;
tmp.wc_flags = wc->wc_flags;
tmp.pkey_index = wc->pkey_index;
if (rdma_cap_opa_ah(ib_dev, wc->port_num))
tmp.slid = OPA_TO_IB_UCAST_LID(wc->slid);
else
tmp.slid = ib_lid_cpu16(wc->slid);
tmp.sl = wc->sl;
tmp.dlid_path_bits = wc->dlid_path_bits;
tmp.port_num = wc->port_num;
tmp.reserved = 0;
if (copy_to_user(dest, &tmp, sizeof tmp))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
static int ib_uverbs_poll_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_poll_cq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_poll_cq_resp resp;
u8 __user *header_ptr;
u8 __user *data_ptr;
struct ib_cq *cq;
struct ib_wc wc;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
cq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, cmd.cq_handle, attrs);
if (!cq)
return -EINVAL;
/* we copy a struct ib_uverbs_poll_cq_resp to user space */
header_ptr = attrs->ucore.outbuf;
data_ptr = header_ptr + sizeof resp;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
while (resp.count < cmd.ne) {
ret = ib_poll_cq(cq, 1, &wc);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_put;
if (!ret)
break;
ret = copy_wc_to_user(cq->device, data_ptr, &wc);
if (ret)
goto out_put;
data_ptr += sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_wc);
++resp.count;
}
if (copy_to_user(header_ptr, &resp, sizeof resp)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_put;
}
ret = 0;
if (uverbs_attr_is_valid(attrs, UVERBS_ATTR_CORE_OUT))
ret = uverbs_output_written(attrs, UVERBS_ATTR_CORE_OUT);
out_put:
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_req_notify_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_req_notify_cq cmd;
struct ib_cq *cq;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
cq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, cmd.cq_handle, attrs);
if (!cq)
return -EINVAL;
ib_req_notify_cq(cq, cmd.solicited_only ?
IB_CQ_SOLICITED : IB_CQ_NEXT_COMP);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return 0;
}
static int ib_uverbs_destroy_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_cq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_cq_resp resp;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_ucq_object *obj;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_get_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, cmd.cq_handle, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
obj = container_of(uobj, struct ib_ucq_object, uevent.uobject);
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.comp_events_reported = obj->comp_events_reported;
resp.async_events_reported = obj->uevent.events_reported;
uobj_put_destroy(uobj);
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int create_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp *cmd)
{
struct ib_uqp_object *obj;
struct ib_device *device;
struct ib_pd *pd = NULL;
struct ib_xrcd *xrcd = NULL;
struct ib_uobject *xrcd_uobj = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
struct ib_cq *scq = NULL, *rcq = NULL;
struct ib_srq *srq = NULL;
struct ib_qp *qp;
struct ib_qp_init_attr attr = {};
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp_resp resp = {};
int ret;
struct ib_rwq_ind_table *ind_tbl = NULL;
bool has_sq = true;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
switch (cmd->qp_type) {
case IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
break;
case IB_QPT_RC:
case IB_QPT_UC:
case IB_QPT_UD:
case IB_QPT_XRC_INI:
case IB_QPT_XRC_TGT:
case IB_QPT_DRIVER:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
obj = (struct ib_uqp_object *)uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, attrs,
&ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(obj))
return PTR_ERR(obj);
obj->uxrcd = NULL;
obj->uevent.uobject.user_handle = cmd->user_handle;
mutex_init(&obj->mcast_lock);
if (cmd->comp_mask & IB_UVERBS_CREATE_QP_MASK_IND_TABLE) {
ind_tbl = uobj_get_obj_read(rwq_ind_table,
UVERBS_OBJECT_RWQ_IND_TBL,
cmd->rwq_ind_tbl_handle, attrs);
if (!ind_tbl) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
attr.rwq_ind_tbl = ind_tbl;
}
if (ind_tbl && (cmd->max_recv_wr || cmd->max_recv_sge || cmd->is_srq)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
if (ind_tbl && !cmd->max_send_wr)
has_sq = false;
if (cmd->qp_type == IB_QPT_XRC_TGT) {
xrcd_uobj = uobj_get_read(UVERBS_OBJECT_XRCD, cmd->pd_handle,
attrs);
if (IS_ERR(xrcd_uobj)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
xrcd = (struct ib_xrcd *)xrcd_uobj->object;
if (!xrcd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
device = xrcd->device;
} else {
if (cmd->qp_type == IB_QPT_XRC_INI) {
cmd->max_recv_wr = 0;
cmd->max_recv_sge = 0;
} else {
if (cmd->is_srq) {
srq = uobj_get_obj_read(srq, UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ,
cmd->srq_handle, attrs);
if (!srq || srq->srq_type == IB_SRQT_XRC) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
}
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
if (!ind_tbl) {
if (cmd->recv_cq_handle != cmd->send_cq_handle) {
rcq = uobj_get_obj_read(
cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ,
cmd->recv_cq_handle, attrs);
if (!rcq) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
}
}
}
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
if (has_sq)
scq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ,
cmd->send_cq_handle, attrs);
if (!ind_tbl && cmd->qp_type != IB_QPT_XRC_INI)
rcq = rcq ?: scq;
pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd->pd_handle,
attrs);
if (!pd || (!scq && has_sq)) {
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
device = pd->device;
}
attr.event_handler = ib_uverbs_qp_event_handler;
attr.send_cq = scq;
attr.recv_cq = rcq;
attr.srq = srq;
attr.xrcd = xrcd;
attr.sq_sig_type = cmd->sq_sig_all ? IB_SIGNAL_ALL_WR :
IB_SIGNAL_REQ_WR;
attr.qp_type = cmd->qp_type;
attr.cap.max_send_wr = cmd->max_send_wr;
attr.cap.max_recv_wr = cmd->max_recv_wr;
attr.cap.max_send_sge = cmd->max_send_sge;
attr.cap.max_recv_sge = cmd->max_recv_sge;
attr.cap.max_inline_data = cmd->max_inline_data;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->uevent.event_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->mcast_list);
attr.create_flags = cmd->create_flags;
if (attr.create_flags & ~(IB_QP_CREATE_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK |
IB_QP_CREATE_CROSS_CHANNEL |
IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_SEND |
IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_RECV |
IB_QP_CREATE_SCATTER_FCS |
IB_QP_CREATE_CVLAN_STRIPPING |
IB_QP_CREATE_SOURCE_QPN |
IB_QP_CREATE_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
if (attr.create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_SOURCE_QPN) {
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto err_put;
}
attr.source_qpn = cmd->source_qpn;
}
qp = ib_create_qp_user(device, pd, &attr, &attrs->driver_udata, obj,
KBUILD_MODNAME);
if (IS_ERR(qp)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(qp);
goto err_put;
}
ib_qp_usecnt_inc(qp);
obj->uevent.uobject.object = qp;
obj->uevent.event_file = READ_ONCE(attrs->ufile->default_async_file);
if (obj->uevent.event_file)
uverbs_uobject_get(&obj->uevent.event_file->uobj);
if (xrcd) {
obj->uxrcd = container_of(xrcd_uobj, struct ib_uxrcd_object,
uobject);
atomic_inc(&obj->uxrcd->refcnt);
uobj_put_read(xrcd_uobj);
}
if (pd)
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
if (scq)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&scq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (rcq && rcq != scq)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&rcq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (srq)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&srq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (ind_tbl)
uobj_put_obj_read(ind_tbl);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
resp.base.qpn = qp->qp_num;
resp.base.qp_handle = obj->uevent.uobject.id;
resp.base.max_recv_sge = attr.cap.max_recv_sge;
resp.base.max_send_sge = attr.cap.max_send_sge;
resp.base.max_recv_wr = attr.cap.max_recv_wr;
resp.base.max_send_wr = attr.cap.max_send_wr;
resp.base.max_inline_data = attr.cap.max_inline_data;
resp.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp));
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_put:
if (!IS_ERR(xrcd_uobj))
uobj_put_read(xrcd_uobj);
if (pd)
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
if (scq)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&scq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (rcq && rcq != scq)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&rcq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (srq)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&srq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (ind_tbl)
uobj_put_obj_read(ind_tbl);
uobj_alloc_abort(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_create_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_qp cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp cmd_ex;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&cmd_ex, 0, sizeof(cmd_ex));
cmd_ex.user_handle = cmd.user_handle;
cmd_ex.pd_handle = cmd.pd_handle;
cmd_ex.send_cq_handle = cmd.send_cq_handle;
cmd_ex.recv_cq_handle = cmd.recv_cq_handle;
cmd_ex.srq_handle = cmd.srq_handle;
cmd_ex.max_send_wr = cmd.max_send_wr;
cmd_ex.max_recv_wr = cmd.max_recv_wr;
cmd_ex.max_send_sge = cmd.max_send_sge;
cmd_ex.max_recv_sge = cmd.max_recv_sge;
cmd_ex.max_inline_data = cmd.max_inline_data;
cmd_ex.sq_sig_all = cmd.sq_sig_all;
cmd_ex.qp_type = cmd.qp_type;
cmd_ex.is_srq = cmd.is_srq;
return create_qp(attrs, &cmd_ex);
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cmd.comp_mask & ~IB_UVERBS_CREATE_QP_SUP_COMP_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.reserved)
return -EINVAL;
return create_qp(attrs, &cmd);
}
static int ib_uverbs_open_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_qp_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uverbs_open_qp cmd;
struct ib_uqp_object *obj;
struct ib_xrcd *xrcd;
struct ib_qp *qp;
struct ib_qp_open_attr attr = {};
int ret;
struct ib_uobject *xrcd_uobj;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
obj = (struct ib_uqp_object *)uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, attrs,
&ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(obj))
return PTR_ERR(obj);
xrcd_uobj = uobj_get_read(UVERBS_OBJECT_XRCD, cmd.pd_handle, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(xrcd_uobj)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
xrcd = (struct ib_xrcd *)xrcd_uobj->object;
if (!xrcd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_xrcd;
}
attr.event_handler = ib_uverbs_qp_event_handler;
attr.qp_num = cmd.qpn;
attr.qp_type = cmd.qp_type;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->uevent.event_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->mcast_list);
qp = ib_open_qp(xrcd, &attr);
if (IS_ERR(qp)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(qp);
goto err_xrcd;
}
obj->uevent.uobject.object = qp;
obj->uevent.uobject.user_handle = cmd.user_handle;
obj->uxrcd = container_of(xrcd_uobj, struct ib_uxrcd_object, uobject);
atomic_inc(&obj->uxrcd->refcnt);
qp->uobject = obj;
uobj_put_read(xrcd_uobj);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
resp.qpn = qp->qp_num;
resp.qp_handle = obj->uevent.uobject.id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_xrcd:
uobj_put_read(xrcd_uobj);
err_put:
uobj_alloc_abort(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
return ret;
}
static void copy_ah_attr_to_uverbs(struct ib_uverbs_qp_dest *uverb_attr,
struct rdma_ah_attr *rdma_attr)
{
const struct ib_global_route *grh;
uverb_attr->dlid = rdma_ah_get_dlid(rdma_attr);
uverb_attr->sl = rdma_ah_get_sl(rdma_attr);
uverb_attr->src_path_bits = rdma_ah_get_path_bits(rdma_attr);
uverb_attr->static_rate = rdma_ah_get_static_rate(rdma_attr);
uverb_attr->is_global = !!(rdma_ah_get_ah_flags(rdma_attr) &
IB_AH_GRH);
if (uverb_attr->is_global) {
grh = rdma_ah_read_grh(rdma_attr);
memcpy(uverb_attr->dgid, grh->dgid.raw, 16);
uverb_attr->flow_label = grh->flow_label;
uverb_attr->sgid_index = grh->sgid_index;
uverb_attr->hop_limit = grh->hop_limit;
uverb_attr->traffic_class = grh->traffic_class;
}
uverb_attr->port_num = rdma_ah_get_port_num(rdma_attr);
}
static int ib_uverbs_query_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_query_qp cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_query_qp_resp resp;
struct ib_qp *qp;
struct ib_qp_attr *attr;
struct ib_qp_init_attr *init_attr;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
attr = kmalloc(sizeof *attr, GFP_KERNEL);
init_attr = kmalloc(sizeof *init_attr, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attr || !init_attr) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (!qp) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = ib_query_qp(qp, attr, cmd.attr_mask, init_attr);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (ret)
goto out;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
resp.qp_state = attr->qp_state;
resp.cur_qp_state = attr->cur_qp_state;
resp.path_mtu = attr->path_mtu;
resp.path_mig_state = attr->path_mig_state;
resp.qkey = attr->qkey;
resp.rq_psn = attr->rq_psn;
resp.sq_psn = attr->sq_psn;
resp.dest_qp_num = attr->dest_qp_num;
resp.qp_access_flags = attr->qp_access_flags;
resp.pkey_index = attr->pkey_index;
resp.alt_pkey_index = attr->alt_pkey_index;
resp.sq_draining = attr->sq_draining;
resp.max_rd_atomic = attr->max_rd_atomic;
resp.max_dest_rd_atomic = attr->max_dest_rd_atomic;
resp.min_rnr_timer = attr->min_rnr_timer;
resp.port_num = attr->port_num;
resp.timeout = attr->timeout;
resp.retry_cnt = attr->retry_cnt;
resp.rnr_retry = attr->rnr_retry;
resp.alt_port_num = attr->alt_port_num;
resp.alt_timeout = attr->alt_timeout;
copy_ah_attr_to_uverbs(&resp.dest, &attr->ah_attr);
copy_ah_attr_to_uverbs(&resp.alt_dest, &attr->alt_ah_attr);
resp.max_send_wr = init_attr->cap.max_send_wr;
resp.max_recv_wr = init_attr->cap.max_recv_wr;
resp.max_send_sge = init_attr->cap.max_send_sge;
resp.max_recv_sge = init_attr->cap.max_recv_sge;
resp.max_inline_data = init_attr->cap.max_inline_data;
resp.sq_sig_all = init_attr->sq_sig_type == IB_SIGNAL_ALL_WR;
ret = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
out:
kfree(attr);
kfree(init_attr);
return ret;
}
/* Remove ignored fields set in the attribute mask */
static int modify_qp_mask(enum ib_qp_type qp_type, int mask)
{
switch (qp_type) {
case IB_QPT_XRC_INI:
return mask & ~(IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC | IB_QP_MIN_RNR_TIMER);
case IB_QPT_XRC_TGT:
return mask & ~(IB_QP_MAX_QP_RD_ATOMIC | IB_QP_RETRY_CNT |
IB_QP_RNR_RETRY);
default:
return mask;
}
}
static void copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs(struct ib_device *dev,
struct rdma_ah_attr *rdma_attr,
struct ib_uverbs_qp_dest *uverb_attr)
{
rdma_attr->type = rdma_ah_find_type(dev, uverb_attr->port_num);
if (uverb_attr->is_global) {
rdma_ah_set_grh(rdma_attr, NULL,
uverb_attr->flow_label,
uverb_attr->sgid_index,
uverb_attr->hop_limit,
uverb_attr->traffic_class);
rdma_ah_set_dgid_raw(rdma_attr, uverb_attr->dgid);
} else {
rdma_ah_set_ah_flags(rdma_attr, 0);
}
rdma_ah_set_dlid(rdma_attr, uverb_attr->dlid);
rdma_ah_set_sl(rdma_attr, uverb_attr->sl);
rdma_ah_set_path_bits(rdma_attr, uverb_attr->src_path_bits);
rdma_ah_set_static_rate(rdma_attr, uverb_attr->static_rate);
rdma_ah_set_port_num(rdma_attr, uverb_attr->port_num);
rdma_ah_set_make_grd(rdma_attr, false);
}
static int modify_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp *cmd)
{
struct ib_qp_attr *attr;
struct ib_qp *qp;
int ret;
attr = kzalloc(sizeof(*attr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attr)
return -ENOMEM;
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd->base.qp_handle,
attrs);
if (!qp) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT) &&
!rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.port_num)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_AV)) {
if (!rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.dest.port_num)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_STATE &&
cmd->base.qp_state == IB_QPS_RTR) {
/* We are in INIT->RTR TRANSITION (if we are not,
* this transition will be rejected in subsequent checks).
* In the INIT->RTR transition, we cannot have IB_QP_PORT set,
* but the IB_QP_STATE flag is required.
*
* Since kernel 3.14 (commit dbf727de7440), the uverbs driver,
* when IB_QP_AV is set, has required inclusion of a valid
* port number in the primary AV. (AVs are created and handled
* differently for infiniband and ethernet (RoCE) ports).
*
* Check the port number included in the primary AV against
* the port number in the qp struct, which was set (and saved)
* in the RST->INIT transition.
*/
if (cmd->base.dest.port_num != qp->real_qp->port) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
} else {
/* We are in SQD->SQD. (If we are not, this transition will
* be rejected later in the verbs layer checks).
* Check for both IB_QP_PORT and IB_QP_AV, these can be set
* together in the SQD->SQD transition.
*
* If only IP_QP_AV was set, add in IB_QP_PORT as well (the
* verbs layer driver does not track primary port changes
* resulting from path migration. Thus, in SQD, if the primary
* AV is modified, the primary port should also be modified).
*
* Note that in this transition, the IB_QP_STATE flag
* is not allowed.
*/
if (((cmd->base.attr_mask & (IB_QP_AV | IB_QP_PORT))
== (IB_QP_AV | IB_QP_PORT)) &&
cmd->base.port_num != cmd->base.dest.port_num) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & (IB_QP_AV | IB_QP_PORT))
== IB_QP_AV) {
cmd->base.attr_mask |= IB_QP_PORT;
cmd->base.port_num = cmd->base.dest.port_num;
}
}
RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006476a198 by task syzkaller697701/265 CPU: 0 PID: 265 Comm: syzkaller697701 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #90 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xde/0x164 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c ? show_regs_print_info+0x17/0x17 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0 print_address_description+0x83/0x3e0 kasan_report+0x18c/0x4b0 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 ? lookup_get_idr_uobject+0x120/0x200 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 ? modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350 modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xf9/0x170 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0 ? attach_entity_load_avg+0x8b0/0x8b0 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110 ? kernel_read+0x170/0x170 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? finish_task_switch+0x1bd/0x7a0 ? finish_task_switch+0x194/0x7a0 ? prandom_u32_state+0xe/0x180 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x80/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0 ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b RIP: 0033:0x433c29 RSP: 002b:00007ffcf2be82a8 EFLAGS: 00000217 Allocated by task 62: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x141/0x480 dup_fd+0x101/0xcc0 copy_process.part.62+0x166f/0x4390 _do_fork+0x1cb/0xe90 kernel_thread+0x34/0x40 call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0x112/0x260 process_one_work+0x929/0x1aa0 worker_thread+0x5c6/0x12a0 kthread+0x346/0x510 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Freed by task 259: kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 kmem_cache_free+0xf3/0x4c0 put_files_struct+0x225/0x2c0 exit_files+0x88/0xc0 do_exit+0x67c/0x1520 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88006476a000 which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 832 The buggy address is located 408 bytes inside of 832-byte region [ffff88006476a000, ffff88006476a340) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea000191da80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head) raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100080008 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff88006bcf7a80 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88006476a080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88006476a100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88006476a180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88006476a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88006476a280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Fixes: 44c58487d51a ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types") Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-02-14 18:35:40 +08:00
}
if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH) &&
RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006476a198 by task syzkaller697701/265 CPU: 0 PID: 265 Comm: syzkaller697701 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #90 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xde/0x164 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c ? show_regs_print_info+0x17/0x17 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0 print_address_description+0x83/0x3e0 kasan_report+0x18c/0x4b0 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 ? lookup_get_idr_uobject+0x120/0x200 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0 ? modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350 modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xf9/0x170 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0 ? attach_entity_load_avg+0x8b0/0x8b0 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110 ? kernel_read+0x170/0x170 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 ? finish_task_switch+0x1bd/0x7a0 ? finish_task_switch+0x194/0x7a0 ? prandom_u32_state+0xe/0x180 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x80/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0 ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b RIP: 0033:0x433c29 RSP: 002b:00007ffcf2be82a8 EFLAGS: 00000217 Allocated by task 62: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x141/0x480 dup_fd+0x101/0xcc0 copy_process.part.62+0x166f/0x4390 _do_fork+0x1cb/0xe90 kernel_thread+0x34/0x40 call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0x112/0x260 process_one_work+0x929/0x1aa0 worker_thread+0x5c6/0x12a0 kthread+0x346/0x510 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Freed by task 259: kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 kmem_cache_free+0xf3/0x4c0 put_files_struct+0x225/0x2c0 exit_files+0x88/0xc0 do_exit+0x67c/0x1520 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88006476a000 which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 832 The buggy address is located 408 bytes inside of 832-byte region [ffff88006476a000, ffff88006476a340) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea000191da80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head) raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100080008 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff88006bcf7a80 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88006476a080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88006476a100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88006476a180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88006476a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88006476a280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Fixes: 44c58487d51a ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types") Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-02-14 18:35:40 +08:00
(!rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.alt_port_num) ||
!rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.alt_dest.port_num) ||
cmd->base.alt_port_num != cmd->base.alt_dest.port_num)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_CUR_STATE &&
cmd->base.cur_qp_state > IB_QPS_ERR) ||
(cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_STATE &&
cmd->base.qp_state > IB_QPS_ERR)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_STATE)
attr->qp_state = cmd->base.qp_state;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_CUR_STATE)
attr->cur_qp_state = cmd->base.cur_qp_state;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_PATH_MTU)
attr->path_mtu = cmd->base.path_mtu;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_PATH_MIG_STATE)
attr->path_mig_state = cmd->base.path_mig_state;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_QKEY)
attr->qkey = cmd->base.qkey;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_RQ_PSN)
attr->rq_psn = cmd->base.rq_psn;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_SQ_PSN)
attr->sq_psn = cmd->base.sq_psn;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_DEST_QPN)
attr->dest_qp_num = cmd->base.dest_qp_num;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_ACCESS_FLAGS)
attr->qp_access_flags = cmd->base.qp_access_flags;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX)
attr->pkey_index = cmd->base.pkey_index;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_EN_SQD_ASYNC_NOTIFY)
attr->en_sqd_async_notify = cmd->base.en_sqd_async_notify;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_MAX_QP_RD_ATOMIC)
attr->max_rd_atomic = cmd->base.max_rd_atomic;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC)
attr->max_dest_rd_atomic = cmd->base.max_dest_rd_atomic;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_MIN_RNR_TIMER)
attr->min_rnr_timer = cmd->base.min_rnr_timer;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT)
attr->port_num = cmd->base.port_num;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_TIMEOUT)
attr->timeout = cmd->base.timeout;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_RETRY_CNT)
attr->retry_cnt = cmd->base.retry_cnt;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_RNR_RETRY)
attr->rnr_retry = cmd->base.rnr_retry;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH) {
attr->alt_port_num = cmd->base.alt_port_num;
attr->alt_timeout = cmd->base.alt_timeout;
attr->alt_pkey_index = cmd->base.alt_pkey_index;
}
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_RATE_LIMIT)
attr->rate_limit = cmd->rate_limit;
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_AV)
copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs(qp->device, &attr->ah_attr,
&cmd->base.dest);
if (cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH)
copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs(qp->device, &attr->alt_ah_attr,
&cmd->base.alt_dest);
ret = ib_modify_qp_with_udata(qp, attr,
modify_qp_mask(qp->qp_type,
cmd->base.attr_mask),
&attrs->driver_udata);
release_qp:
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
out:
kfree(attr);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_modify_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd.base, sizeof(cmd.base));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cmd.base.attr_mask & ~IB_QP_ATTR_STANDARD_BITS)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return modify_qp(attrs, &cmd);
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp_resp resp = {
.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp))
};
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Last bit is reserved for extending the attr_mask by
* using another field.
*/
if (cmd.base.attr_mask & ~(IB_QP_ATTR_STANDARD_BITS | IB_QP_RATE_LIMIT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = modify_qp(attrs, &cmd);
if (ret)
return ret;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int ib_uverbs_destroy_qp(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_qp cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_qp_resp resp;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_uqp_object *obj;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_get_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
obj = container_of(uobj, struct ib_uqp_object, uevent.uobject);
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.events_reported = obj->uevent.events_reported;
uobj_put_destroy(uobj);
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static void *alloc_wr(size_t wr_size, __u32 num_sge)
{
if (num_sge >= (U32_MAX - ALIGN(wr_size, sizeof(struct ib_sge))) /
sizeof(struct ib_sge))
return NULL;
return kmalloc(ALIGN(wr_size, sizeof(struct ib_sge)) +
num_sge * sizeof(struct ib_sge),
GFP_KERNEL);
}
static int ib_uverbs_post_send(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_post_send cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_post_send_resp resp;
struct ib_uverbs_send_wr *user_wr;
struct ib_send_wr *wr = NULL, *last, *next;
const struct ib_send_wr *bad_wr;
struct ib_qp *qp;
int i, sg_ind;
int is_ud;
int ret, ret2;
size_t next_size;
const struct ib_sge __user *sgls;
const void __user *wqes;
struct uverbs_req_iter iter;
ret = uverbs_request_start(attrs, &iter, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
wqes = uverbs_request_next_ptr(&iter, cmd.wqe_size * cmd.wr_count);
if (IS_ERR(wqes))
return PTR_ERR(wqes);
sgls = uverbs_request_next_ptr(
&iter, cmd.sge_count * sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_sge));
if (IS_ERR(sgls))
return PTR_ERR(sgls);
ret = uverbs_request_finish(&iter);
if (ret)
return ret;
user_wr = kmalloc(cmd.wqe_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user_wr)
return -ENOMEM;
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (!qp) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
is_ud = qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD;
sg_ind = 0;
last = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < cmd.wr_count; ++i) {
if (copy_from_user(user_wr, wqes + i * cmd.wqe_size,
cmd.wqe_size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_put;
}
if (user_wr->num_sge + sg_ind > cmd.sge_count) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put;
}
if (is_ud) {
struct ib_ud_wr *ud;
if (user_wr->opcode != IB_WR_SEND &&
user_wr->opcode != IB_WR_SEND_WITH_IMM) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put;
}
next_size = sizeof(*ud);
ud = alloc_wr(next_size, user_wr->num_sge);
if (!ud) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put;
}
ud->ah = uobj_get_obj_read(ah, UVERBS_OBJECT_AH,
user_wr->wr.ud.ah, attrs);
if (!ud->ah) {
kfree(ud);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put;
}
ud->remote_qpn = user_wr->wr.ud.remote_qpn;
ud->remote_qkey = user_wr->wr.ud.remote_qkey;
next = &ud->wr;
} else if (user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE_WITH_IMM ||
user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE ||
user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_RDMA_READ) {
struct ib_rdma_wr *rdma;
next_size = sizeof(*rdma);
rdma = alloc_wr(next_size, user_wr->num_sge);
if (!rdma) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put;
}
rdma->remote_addr = user_wr->wr.rdma.remote_addr;
rdma->rkey = user_wr->wr.rdma.rkey;
next = &rdma->wr;
} else if (user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_ATOMIC_CMP_AND_SWP ||
user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_ATOMIC_FETCH_AND_ADD) {
struct ib_atomic_wr *atomic;
next_size = sizeof(*atomic);
atomic = alloc_wr(next_size, user_wr->num_sge);
if (!atomic) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put;
}
atomic->remote_addr = user_wr->wr.atomic.remote_addr;
atomic->compare_add = user_wr->wr.atomic.compare_add;
atomic->swap = user_wr->wr.atomic.swap;
atomic->rkey = user_wr->wr.atomic.rkey;
next = &atomic->wr;
} else if (user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_SEND ||
user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_SEND_WITH_IMM ||
user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV) {
next_size = sizeof(*next);
next = alloc_wr(next_size, user_wr->num_sge);
if (!next) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put;
}
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put;
}
if (user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_SEND_WITH_IMM ||
user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE_WITH_IMM) {
next->ex.imm_data =
(__be32 __force) user_wr->ex.imm_data;
} else if (user_wr->opcode == IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV) {
next->ex.invalidate_rkey = user_wr->ex.invalidate_rkey;
}
if (!last)
wr = next;
else
last->next = next;
last = next;
next->next = NULL;
next->wr_id = user_wr->wr_id;
next->num_sge = user_wr->num_sge;
next->opcode = user_wr->opcode;
next->send_flags = user_wr->send_flags;
if (next->num_sge) {
next->sg_list = (void *) next +
ALIGN(next_size, sizeof(struct ib_sge));
if (copy_from_user(next->sg_list, sgls + sg_ind,
next->num_sge *
sizeof(struct ib_sge))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_put;
}
sg_ind += next->num_sge;
} else
next->sg_list = NULL;
}
resp.bad_wr = 0;
ret = qp->device->ops.post_send(qp->real_qp, wr, &bad_wr);
if (ret)
for (next = wr; next; next = next->next) {
++resp.bad_wr;
if (next == bad_wr)
break;
}
ret2 = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret2)
ret = ret2;
out_put:
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
while (wr) {
if (is_ud && ud_wr(wr)->ah)
uobj_put_obj_read(ud_wr(wr)->ah);
next = wr->next;
kfree(wr);
wr = next;
}
out:
kfree(user_wr);
return ret;
}
static struct ib_recv_wr *
ib_uverbs_unmarshall_recv(struct uverbs_req_iter *iter, u32 wr_count,
u32 wqe_size, u32 sge_count)
{
struct ib_uverbs_recv_wr *user_wr;
struct ib_recv_wr *wr = NULL, *last, *next;
int sg_ind;
int i;
int ret;
const struct ib_sge __user *sgls;
const void __user *wqes;
if (wqe_size < sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_recv_wr))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
wqes = uverbs_request_next_ptr(iter, wqe_size * wr_count);
if (IS_ERR(wqes))
return ERR_CAST(wqes);
sgls = uverbs_request_next_ptr(
iter, sge_count * sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_sge));
if (IS_ERR(sgls))
return ERR_CAST(sgls);
ret = uverbs_request_finish(iter);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
user_wr = kmalloc(wqe_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user_wr)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
sg_ind = 0;
last = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < wr_count; ++i) {
if (copy_from_user(user_wr, wqes + i * wqe_size,
wqe_size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
if (user_wr->num_sge + sg_ind > sge_count) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (user_wr->num_sge >=
(U32_MAX - ALIGN(sizeof(*next), sizeof(struct ib_sge))) /
sizeof(struct ib_sge)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
next = kmalloc(ALIGN(sizeof(*next), sizeof(struct ib_sge)) +
user_wr->num_sge * sizeof(struct ib_sge),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!next) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
if (!last)
wr = next;
else
last->next = next;
last = next;
next->next = NULL;
next->wr_id = user_wr->wr_id;
next->num_sge = user_wr->num_sge;
if (next->num_sge) {
next->sg_list = (void *)next +
ALIGN(sizeof(*next), sizeof(struct ib_sge));
if (copy_from_user(next->sg_list, sgls + sg_ind,
next->num_sge *
sizeof(struct ib_sge))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
sg_ind += next->num_sge;
} else
next->sg_list = NULL;
}
kfree(user_wr);
return wr;
err:
kfree(user_wr);
while (wr) {
next = wr->next;
kfree(wr);
wr = next;
}
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
static int ib_uverbs_post_recv(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_post_recv cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_post_recv_resp resp;
struct ib_recv_wr *wr, *next;
const struct ib_recv_wr *bad_wr;
struct ib_qp *qp;
int ret, ret2;
struct uverbs_req_iter iter;
ret = uverbs_request_start(attrs, &iter, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
wr = ib_uverbs_unmarshall_recv(&iter, cmd.wr_count, cmd.wqe_size,
cmd.sge_count);
if (IS_ERR(wr))
return PTR_ERR(wr);
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (!qp) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
resp.bad_wr = 0;
ret = qp->device->ops.post_recv(qp->real_qp, wr, &bad_wr);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (ret) {
for (next = wr; next; next = next->next) {
++resp.bad_wr;
if (next == bad_wr)
break;
}
}
ret2 = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret2)
ret = ret2;
out:
while (wr) {
next = wr->next;
kfree(wr);
wr = next;
}
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_post_srq_recv(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_post_srq_recv cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_post_srq_recv_resp resp;
struct ib_recv_wr *wr, *next;
const struct ib_recv_wr *bad_wr;
struct ib_srq *srq;
int ret, ret2;
struct uverbs_req_iter iter;
ret = uverbs_request_start(attrs, &iter, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
wr = ib_uverbs_unmarshall_recv(&iter, cmd.wr_count, cmd.wqe_size,
cmd.sge_count);
if (IS_ERR(wr))
return PTR_ERR(wr);
srq = uobj_get_obj_read(srq, UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ, cmd.srq_handle, attrs);
if (!srq) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
resp.bad_wr = 0;
ret = srq->device->ops.post_srq_recv(srq, wr, &bad_wr);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&srq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (ret)
for (next = wr; next; next = next->next) {
++resp.bad_wr;
if (next == bad_wr)
break;
}
ret2 = uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret2)
ret = ret2;
out:
while (wr) {
next = wr->next;
kfree(wr);
wr = next;
}
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_create_ah(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_ah cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_create_ah_resp resp;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_pd *pd;
struct ib_ah *ah;
struct rdma_ah_attr attr = {};
int ret;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_AH, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
if (!rdma_is_port_valid(ib_dev, cmd.attr.port_num)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd.pd_handle, attrs);
if (!pd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
attr.type = rdma_ah_find_type(ib_dev, cmd.attr.port_num);
rdma_ah_set_make_grd(&attr, false);
rdma_ah_set_dlid(&attr, cmd.attr.dlid);
rdma_ah_set_sl(&attr, cmd.attr.sl);
rdma_ah_set_path_bits(&attr, cmd.attr.src_path_bits);
rdma_ah_set_static_rate(&attr, cmd.attr.static_rate);
rdma_ah_set_port_num(&attr, cmd.attr.port_num);
if (cmd.attr.is_global) {
rdma_ah_set_grh(&attr, NULL, cmd.attr.grh.flow_label,
cmd.attr.grh.sgid_index,
cmd.attr.grh.hop_limit,
cmd.attr.grh.traffic_class);
rdma_ah_set_dgid_raw(&attr, cmd.attr.grh.dgid);
} else {
rdma_ah_set_ah_flags(&attr, 0);
}
ah = rdma_create_user_ah(pd, &attr, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (IS_ERR(ah)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ah);
goto err_put;
}
ah->uobject = uobj;
uobj->user_handle = cmd.user_handle;
uobj->object = ah;
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.ah_handle = uobj->id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_put:
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
err:
uobj_alloc_abort(uobj, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_destroy_ah(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_ah cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_AH, cmd.ah_handle, attrs);
}
static int ib_uverbs_attach_mcast(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_attach_mcast cmd;
struct ib_qp *qp;
struct ib_uqp_object *obj;
struct ib_uverbs_mcast_entry *mcast;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (!qp)
return -EINVAL;
obj = qp->uobject;
mutex_lock(&obj->mcast_lock);
list_for_each_entry(mcast, &obj->mcast_list, list)
if (cmd.mlid == mcast->lid &&
!memcmp(cmd.gid, mcast->gid.raw, sizeof mcast->gid.raw)) {
ret = 0;
goto out_put;
}
mcast = kmalloc(sizeof *mcast, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mcast) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put;
}
mcast->lid = cmd.mlid;
memcpy(mcast->gid.raw, cmd.gid, sizeof mcast->gid.raw);
ret = ib_attach_mcast(qp, &mcast->gid, cmd.mlid);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&mcast->list, &obj->mcast_list);
else
kfree(mcast);
out_put:
mutex_unlock(&obj->mcast_lock);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_detach_mcast(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_detach_mcast cmd;
struct ib_uqp_object *obj;
struct ib_qp *qp;
struct ib_uverbs_mcast_entry *mcast;
int ret;
bool found = false;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (!qp)
return -EINVAL;
obj = qp->uobject;
mutex_lock(&obj->mcast_lock);
list_for_each_entry(mcast, &obj->mcast_list, list)
if (cmd.mlid == mcast->lid &&
!memcmp(cmd.gid, mcast->gid.raw, sizeof mcast->gid.raw)) {
list_del(&mcast->list);
kfree(mcast);
found = true;
break;
}
if (!found) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put;
}
ret = ib_detach_mcast(qp, (union ib_gid *)cmd.gid, cmd.mlid);
out_put:
mutex_unlock(&obj->mcast_lock);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
struct ib_uflow_resources *flow_resources_alloc(size_t num_specs)
{
struct ib_uflow_resources *resources;
resources = kzalloc(sizeof(*resources), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resources)
return NULL;
if (!num_specs)
goto out;
resources->counters =
kcalloc(num_specs, sizeof(*resources->counters), GFP_KERNEL);
resources->collection =
kcalloc(num_specs, sizeof(*resources->collection), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resources->counters || !resources->collection)
goto err;
out:
resources->max = num_specs;
return resources;
err:
kfree(resources->counters);
kfree(resources);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_resources_alloc);
void ib_uverbs_flow_resources_free(struct ib_uflow_resources *uflow_res)
{
unsigned int i;
if (!uflow_res)
return;
for (i = 0; i < uflow_res->collection_num; i++)
atomic_dec(&uflow_res->collection[i]->usecnt);
for (i = 0; i < uflow_res->counters_num; i++)
atomic_dec(&uflow_res->counters[i]->usecnt);
kfree(uflow_res->collection);
kfree(uflow_res->counters);
kfree(uflow_res);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_uverbs_flow_resources_free);
void flow_resources_add(struct ib_uflow_resources *uflow_res,
enum ib_flow_spec_type type,
void *ibobj)
{
WARN_ON(uflow_res->num >= uflow_res->max);
switch (type) {
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_HANDLE:
atomic_inc(&((struct ib_flow_action *)ibobj)->usecnt);
uflow_res->collection[uflow_res->collection_num++] =
(struct ib_flow_action *)ibobj;
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_COUNT:
atomic_inc(&((struct ib_counters *)ibobj)->usecnt);
uflow_res->counters[uflow_res->counters_num++] =
(struct ib_counters *)ibobj;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
}
uflow_res->num++;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_resources_add);
static int kern_spec_to_ib_spec_action(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec *kern_spec,
union ib_flow_spec *ib_spec,
struct ib_uflow_resources *uflow_res)
{
ib_spec->type = kern_spec->type;
switch (ib_spec->type) {
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_TAG:
if (kern_spec->flow_tag.size !=
sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_action_tag))
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->flow_tag.size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_action_tag);
ib_spec->flow_tag.tag_id = kern_spec->flow_tag.tag_id;
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_DROP:
if (kern_spec->drop.size !=
sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_action_drop))
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->drop.size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_action_drop);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_HANDLE:
if (kern_spec->action.size !=
sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_action_handle))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ib_spec->action.act = uobj_get_obj_read(flow_action,
UVERBS_OBJECT_FLOW_ACTION,
kern_spec->action.handle,
attrs);
if (!ib_spec->action.act)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->action.size =
sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_action_handle);
flow_resources_add(uflow_res,
IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_HANDLE,
ib_spec->action.act);
uobj_put_obj_read(ib_spec->action.act);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_COUNT:
if (kern_spec->flow_count.size !=
sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_action_count))
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->flow_count.counters =
uobj_get_obj_read(counters,
UVERBS_OBJECT_COUNTERS,
kern_spec->flow_count.handle,
attrs);
if (!ib_spec->flow_count.counters)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->flow_count.size =
sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_action_count);
flow_resources_add(uflow_res,
IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_COUNT,
ib_spec->flow_count.counters);
uobj_put_obj_read(ib_spec->flow_count.counters);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static ssize_t spec_filter_size(const void *kern_spec_filter, u16 kern_filter_size,
u16 ib_real_filter_sz)
{
/*
* User space filter structures must be 64 bit aligned, otherwise this
* may pass, but we won't handle additional new attributes.
*/
if (kern_filter_size > ib_real_filter_sz) {
if (memchr_inv(kern_spec_filter +
ib_real_filter_sz, 0,
kern_filter_size - ib_real_filter_sz))
return -EINVAL;
return ib_real_filter_sz;
}
return kern_filter_size;
}
int ib_uverbs_kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter(enum ib_flow_spec_type type,
const void *kern_spec_mask,
const void *kern_spec_val,
size_t kern_filter_sz,
union ib_flow_spec *ib_spec)
{
ssize_t actual_filter_sz;
ssize_t ib_filter_sz;
/* User flow spec size must be aligned to 4 bytes */
if (kern_filter_sz != ALIGN(kern_filter_sz, 4))
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->type = type;
if (ib_spec->type == (IB_FLOW_SPEC_INNER | IB_FLOW_SPEC_VXLAN_TUNNEL))
return -EINVAL;
switch (ib_spec->type & ~IB_FLOW_SPEC_INNER) {
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ETH:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_eth_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_eth);
memcpy(&ib_spec->eth.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->eth.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_IPV4:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_ipv4_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_ipv4);
memcpy(&ib_spec->ipv4.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->ipv4.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_IPV6:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_ipv6_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_ipv6);
memcpy(&ib_spec->ipv6.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->ipv6.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
if ((ntohl(ib_spec->ipv6.mask.flow_label)) >= BIT(20) ||
(ntohl(ib_spec->ipv6.val.flow_label)) >= BIT(20))
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_TCP:
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_UDP:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_tcp_udp_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_tcp_udp);
memcpy(&ib_spec->tcp_udp.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->tcp_udp.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_VXLAN_TUNNEL:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_tunnel_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->tunnel.size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_tunnel);
memcpy(&ib_spec->tunnel.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->tunnel.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
if ((ntohl(ib_spec->tunnel.mask.tunnel_id)) >= BIT(24) ||
(ntohl(ib_spec->tunnel.val.tunnel_id)) >= BIT(24))
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_ESP:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_esp_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->esp.size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_esp);
memcpy(&ib_spec->esp.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->esp.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_GRE:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_gre_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->gre.size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_gre);
memcpy(&ib_spec->gre.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->gre.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
break;
case IB_FLOW_SPEC_MPLS:
ib_filter_sz = offsetof(struct ib_flow_mpls_filter, real_sz);
actual_filter_sz = spec_filter_size(kern_spec_mask,
kern_filter_sz,
ib_filter_sz);
if (actual_filter_sz <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ib_spec->mpls.size = sizeof(struct ib_flow_spec_mpls);
memcpy(&ib_spec->mpls.val, kern_spec_val, actual_filter_sz);
memcpy(&ib_spec->mpls.mask, kern_spec_mask, actual_filter_sz);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static int kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec *kern_spec,
union ib_flow_spec *ib_spec)
{
RDMA/core: Fix invalid memory access in spec_filter_size Add a check that the size specified in the flow spec header doesn't cause an overflow when calculating the filter size, and thus prevent access to invalid memory. The following crash from syzkaller revealed it. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 17834 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memchr_inv+0xd3/0x330 Code: 89 f9 89 f5 83 e1 07 0f 85 f9 00 00 00 49 89 d5 49 c1 ed 03 45 85 ed 74 6f 48 89 d9 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 0d 02 00 00 44 0f b6 e5 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a13fa50 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 7fff88810de9d820 RCX: 0ffff11021bd3b04 RDX: 000000000000fff8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 7fff88810de9d820 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888110d69018 R09: 0000000000000009 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed10236267cc R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000000000001fff R14: ffff88810de9d820 R15: 0000000000000040 FS: 00007f9ee0e51700(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000115ea0006 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: spec_filter_size.part.16+0x34/0x50 ib_uverbs_kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter+0x691/0x770 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x9ea/0x1b40 ib_uverbs_write+0xaa5/0xdf0 __vfs_write+0x7c/0x100 vfs_write+0x168/0x4a0 ksys_write+0xc8/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x465b49 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f9ee0e50c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000465b49 RDX: 00000000000003a0 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9ee0e516bc R13: 00000000004ca2da R14: 000000000070deb8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Modules linked in: Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Fixes: 94e03f11ad1f ("IB/uverbs: Add support for flow tag") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126171500.4623-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Avihai Horon <avihaih@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-01-27 01:15:00 +08:00
size_t kern_filter_sz;
void *kern_spec_mask;
void *kern_spec_val;
RDMA/core: Fix invalid memory access in spec_filter_size Add a check that the size specified in the flow spec header doesn't cause an overflow when calculating the filter size, and thus prevent access to invalid memory. The following crash from syzkaller revealed it. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 17834 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memchr_inv+0xd3/0x330 Code: 89 f9 89 f5 83 e1 07 0f 85 f9 00 00 00 49 89 d5 49 c1 ed 03 45 85 ed 74 6f 48 89 d9 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 0d 02 00 00 44 0f b6 e5 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a13fa50 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 7fff88810de9d820 RCX: 0ffff11021bd3b04 RDX: 000000000000fff8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 7fff88810de9d820 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888110d69018 R09: 0000000000000009 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed10236267cc R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000000000001fff R14: ffff88810de9d820 R15: 0000000000000040 FS: 00007f9ee0e51700(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000115ea0006 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: spec_filter_size.part.16+0x34/0x50 ib_uverbs_kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter+0x691/0x770 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x9ea/0x1b40 ib_uverbs_write+0xaa5/0xdf0 __vfs_write+0x7c/0x100 vfs_write+0x168/0x4a0 ksys_write+0xc8/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x465b49 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f9ee0e50c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000465b49 RDX: 00000000000003a0 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9ee0e516bc R13: 00000000004ca2da R14: 000000000070deb8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Modules linked in: Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Fixes: 94e03f11ad1f ("IB/uverbs: Add support for flow tag") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126171500.4623-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Avihai Horon <avihaih@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2020-01-27 01:15:00 +08:00
if (check_sub_overflow((size_t)kern_spec->hdr.size,
sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_hdr),
&kern_filter_sz))
return -EINVAL;
kern_filter_sz /= 2;
kern_spec_val = (void *)kern_spec +
sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_hdr);
kern_spec_mask = kern_spec_val + kern_filter_sz;
return ib_uverbs_kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter(kern_spec->type,
kern_spec_mask,
kern_spec_val,
kern_filter_sz, ib_spec);
}
static int kern_spec_to_ib_spec(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec *kern_spec,
union ib_flow_spec *ib_spec,
struct ib_uflow_resources *uflow_res)
{
if (kern_spec->reserved)
return -EINVAL;
if (kern_spec->type >= IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_TAG)
return kern_spec_to_ib_spec_action(attrs, kern_spec, ib_spec,
uflow_res);
else
return kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter(kern_spec, ib_spec);
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uwq_object *obj;
int err = 0;
struct ib_cq *cq;
struct ib_pd *pd;
struct ib_wq *wq;
struct ib_wq_init_attr wq_init_attr = {};
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
err = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (err)
return err;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
obj = (struct ib_uwq_object *)uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_WQ, attrs,
&ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(obj))
return PTR_ERR(obj);
pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd.pd_handle, attrs);
if (!pd) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_uobj;
}
cq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, cmd.cq_handle, attrs);
if (!cq) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_put_pd;
}
wq_init_attr.cq = cq;
wq_init_attr.max_sge = cmd.max_sge;
wq_init_attr.max_wr = cmd.max_wr;
wq_init_attr.wq_type = cmd.wq_type;
wq_init_attr.event_handler = ib_uverbs_wq_event_handler;
wq_init_attr.create_flags = cmd.create_flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->uevent.event_list);
obj->uevent.uobject.user_handle = cmd.user_handle;
wq = pd->device->ops.create_wq(pd, &wq_init_attr, &attrs->driver_udata);
if (IS_ERR(wq)) {
err = PTR_ERR(wq);
goto err_put_cq;
}
wq->uobject = obj;
obj->uevent.uobject.object = wq;
wq->wq_type = wq_init_attr.wq_type;
wq->cq = cq;
wq->pd = pd;
wq->device = pd->device;
atomic_set(&wq->usecnt, 0);
atomic_inc(&pd->usecnt);
atomic_inc(&cq->usecnt);
obj->uevent.event_file = READ_ONCE(attrs->ufile->default_async_file);
if (obj->uevent.event_file)
uverbs_uobject_get(&obj->uevent.event_file->uobj);
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
resp.wq_handle = obj->uevent.uobject.id;
resp.max_sge = wq_init_attr.max_sge;
resp.max_wr = wq_init_attr.max_wr;
resp.wqn = wq->wq_num;
resp.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp));
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_put_cq:
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
err_put_pd:
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
err_uobj:
uobj_alloc_abort(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
return err;
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_wq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_wq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_wq_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_uwq_object *obj;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
resp.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp));
uobj = uobj_get_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_WQ, cmd.wq_handle, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
obj = container_of(uobj, struct ib_uwq_object, uevent.uobject);
resp.events_reported = obj->uevent.events_reported;
uobj_put_destroy(uobj);
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_modify_wq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_wq cmd;
struct ib_wq *wq;
struct ib_wq_attr wq_attr = {};
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!cmd.attr_mask)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.attr_mask > (IB_WQ_STATE | IB_WQ_CUR_STATE | IB_WQ_FLAGS))
return -EINVAL;
wq = uobj_get_obj_read(wq, UVERBS_OBJECT_WQ, cmd.wq_handle, attrs);
if (!wq)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.attr_mask & IB_WQ_FLAGS) {
wq_attr.flags = cmd.flags;
wq_attr.flags_mask = cmd.flags_mask;
}
if (cmd.attr_mask & IB_WQ_CUR_STATE) {
if (cmd.curr_wq_state > IB_WQS_ERR)
return -EINVAL;
wq_attr.curr_wq_state = cmd.curr_wq_state;
} else {
wq_attr.curr_wq_state = wq->state;
}
if (cmd.attr_mask & IB_WQ_STATE) {
if (cmd.wq_state > IB_WQS_ERR)
return -EINVAL;
wq_attr.wq_state = cmd.wq_state;
} else {
wq_attr.wq_state = wq_attr.curr_wq_state;
}
ret = wq->device->ops.modify_wq(wq, &wq_attr, cmd.attr_mask,
&attrs->driver_udata);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&wq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_create_rwq_ind_table(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_rwq_ind_table cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_rwq_ind_table_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
int err;
struct ib_rwq_ind_table_init_attr init_attr = {};
struct ib_rwq_ind_table *rwq_ind_tbl;
struct ib_wq **wqs = NULL;
u32 *wqs_handles = NULL;
struct ib_wq *wq = NULL;
int i, num_read_wqs;
u32 num_wq_handles;
struct uverbs_req_iter iter;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
err = uverbs_request_start(attrs, &iter, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (err)
return err;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (cmd.log_ind_tbl_size > IB_USER_VERBS_MAX_LOG_IND_TBL_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
num_wq_handles = 1 << cmd.log_ind_tbl_size;
wqs_handles = kcalloc(num_wq_handles, sizeof(*wqs_handles),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!wqs_handles)
return -ENOMEM;
err = uverbs_request_next(&iter, wqs_handles,
num_wq_handles * sizeof(__u32));
if (err)
goto err_free;
err = uverbs_request_finish(&iter);
if (err)
goto err_free;
wqs = kcalloc(num_wq_handles, sizeof(*wqs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!wqs) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free;
}
for (num_read_wqs = 0; num_read_wqs < num_wq_handles;
num_read_wqs++) {
wq = uobj_get_obj_read(wq, UVERBS_OBJECT_WQ,
wqs_handles[num_read_wqs], attrs);
if (!wq) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto put_wqs;
}
wqs[num_read_wqs] = wq;
atomic_inc(&wqs[num_read_wqs]->usecnt);
}
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_RWQ_IND_TBL, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj)) {
err = PTR_ERR(uobj);
goto put_wqs;
}
rwq_ind_tbl = rdma_zalloc_drv_obj(ib_dev, ib_rwq_ind_table);
if (!rwq_ind_tbl) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_uobj;
}
init_attr.log_ind_tbl_size = cmd.log_ind_tbl_size;
init_attr.ind_tbl = wqs;
rwq_ind_tbl->ind_tbl = wqs;
rwq_ind_tbl->log_ind_tbl_size = init_attr.log_ind_tbl_size;
rwq_ind_tbl->uobject = uobj;
uobj->object = rwq_ind_tbl;
rwq_ind_tbl->device = ib_dev;
atomic_set(&rwq_ind_tbl->usecnt, 0);
err = ib_dev->ops.create_rwq_ind_table(rwq_ind_tbl, &init_attr,
&attrs->driver_udata);
if (err)
goto err_create;
for (i = 0; i < num_wq_handles; i++)
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&wqs[i]->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
kfree(wqs_handles);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.ind_tbl_handle = uobj->id;
resp.ind_tbl_num = rwq_ind_tbl->ind_tbl_num;
resp.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp));
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_create:
kfree(rwq_ind_tbl);
err_uobj:
uobj_alloc_abort(uobj, attrs);
put_wqs:
for (i = 0; i < num_read_wqs; i++) {
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&wqs[i]->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
atomic_dec(&wqs[i]->usecnt);
}
err_free:
kfree(wqs_handles);
kfree(wqs);
return err;
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_rwq_ind_table(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_rwq_ind_table cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_RWQ_IND_TBL,
cmd.ind_tbl_handle, attrs);
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_flow cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_create_flow_resp resp = {};
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_flow *flow_id;
struct ib_uverbs_flow_attr *kern_flow_attr;
struct ib_flow_attr *flow_attr;
struct ib_qp *qp;
struct ib_uflow_resources *uflow_res;
RDMA/uverbs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow The check of cmd.flow_attr.size should check into account the size of the reserved field (2 bytes), otherwise user can provide a size which will cause a slab-out-of-bounds warning below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 Read of size 2 at addr ffff880068dff1a6 by task syz-executor775/269 CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syz-executor775 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #245 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xef/0x17e print_address_description+0x83/0x3b0 kasan_report+0x18d/0x4d0 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x433899 Code: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 91 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2724db58 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020006880 RCX: 0000000000433899 RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000020002480 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006d7018 R08: 00000000004002f8 R09: 00000000004002f8 R10: 00000000004002f8 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000040cd20 R14: 000000000040cdb0 R15: 0000000000000006 Allocated by task 269: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x1a9/0x510 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x26c/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 kfree+0x159/0x630 detach_buf+0x559/0x7a0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x3cc/0xab0 virtblk_done+0x1eb/0x3d0 vring_interrupt+0x16d/0x2b0 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x10a/0x980 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x190 handle_irq_event+0xc6/0x1a0 handle_edge_irq+0x211/0xd80 handle_irq+0x3d/0x60 do_IRQ+0x9b/0x220 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068dff180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 38 bytes inside of 64-byte region [ffff880068dff180, ffff880068dff1c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a37fc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88006c401780 index:0x0 flags: 0x4000000000000100(slab) raw: 4000000000000100 ffffea0001a31100 0000001100000011 ffff88006c401780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000802a002a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880068dff080: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880068dff100: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff880068dff180: 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880068dff200: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ffff880068dff280: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 Fixes: f88482743872 ("IB/core: clarify overflow/underflow checks on ib_create/destroy_flow") Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-06-24 16:23:53 +08:00
struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_hdr *kern_spec;
struct uverbs_req_iter iter;
int err;
void *ib_spec;
int i;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
err = uverbs_request_start(attrs, &iter, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
IB/core: extended command: an improved infrastructure for uverbs commands Commit 400dbc96583f ("IB/core: Infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands") added an infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands while later commit 436f2ad05a0b ("IB/core: Export ib_create/destroy_flow through uverbs") exported ib_create_flow()/ib_destroy_flow() functions using this new infrastructure. According to the commit 400dbc96583f, the purpose of this infrastructure is to support passing around provider (eg. hardware) specific buffers when userspace issue commands to the kernel, so that it would be possible to extend uverbs (eg. core) buffers independently from the provider buffers. But the new kernel command function prototypes were not modified to take advantage of this extension. This issue was exposed by Roland Dreier in a previous review[1]. So the following patch is an attempt to a revised extensible command infrastructure. This improved extensible command infrastructure distinguish between core (eg. legacy)'s command/response buffers from provider (eg. hardware)'s command/response buffers: each extended command implementing function is given a struct ib_udata to hold core (eg. uverbs) input and output buffers, and another struct ib_udata to hold the hw (eg. provider) input and output buffers. Having those buffers identified separately make it easier to increase one buffer to support extension without having to add some code to guess the exact size of each command/response parts: This should make the extended functions more reliable. Additionally, instead of relying on command identifier being greater than IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_THRESHOLD, the proposed infrastructure rely on unused bits in command field: on the 32 bits provided by command field, only 6 bits are really needed to encode the identifier of commands currently supported by the kernel. (Even using only 6 bits leaves room for about 23 new commands). So this patch makes use of some high order bits in command field to store flags, leaving enough room for more command identifiers than one will ever need (eg. 256). The new flags are used to specify if the command should be processed as an extended one or a legacy one. While designing the new command format, care was taken to make usage of flags itself extensible. Using high order bits of the commands field ensure that newer libibverbs on older kernel will properly fail when trying to call extended commands. On the other hand, older libibverbs on newer kernel will never be able to issue calls to extended commands. The extended command header includes the optional response pointer so that output buffer length and output buffer pointer are located together in the command, allowing proper parameters checking. This should make implementing functions easier and safer. Additionally the extended header ensure 64bits alignment, while making all sizes multiple of 8 bytes, extending the maximum buffer size: legacy extended Maximum command buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) Maximum response buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) For the purpose of doing proper buffer size accounting, the headers size are no more taken in account in "in_words". One of the odds of the current extensible infrastructure, reading twice the "legacy" command header, is fixed by removing the "legacy" command header from the extended command header: they are processed as two different parts of the command: memory is read once and information are not duplicated: it's making clear that's an extended command scheme and not a different command scheme. The proposed scheme will format input (command) and output (response) buffers this way: - command: legacy header + extended header + command data (core + hw): +----------------------------------------+ | flags | 00 00 | command | | in_words | out_words | +----------------------------------------+ | response | | response | | provider_in_words | provider_out_words | | padding | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs input> . . (in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider input> . . (provider_in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ - response, if present: +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs output space> . . (out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider output space> . . (provider_out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ The overall design is to ensure that the extensible infrastructure is itself extensible while begin more reliable with more input and bound checking. Note: The unused field in the extended header would be perfect candidate to hold the command "comp_mask" (eg. bit field used to handle compatibility). This was suggested by Roland Dreier in a previous review[2]. But "comp_mask" field is likely to be present in the uverb input and/or provider input, likewise for the response, as noted by Matan Barak[3], so it doesn't make sense to put "comp_mask" in the header. [1]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDWxmM17W2o_era24A-TTDeKyoL6u3NRu_=t_dhV_ZA9MA@mail.gmail.com [2]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDXJtrc849M6_XNZT5xO1+ybKtLWGq6yg6LhoSsKpsmkYA@mail.gmail.com [3]: http://marc.info/?i=525C1149.6000701@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Link: http://marc.info/?i=cover.1383773832.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com [ Convert "ret ? ret : 0" to the equivalent "ret". - Roland ] Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2013-11-07 06:21:49 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd.flow_attr.flags >= IB_FLOW_ATTR_FLAGS_RESERVED)
return -EINVAL;
if ((cmd.flow_attr.flags & IB_FLOW_ATTR_FLAGS_DONT_TRAP) &&
((cmd.flow_attr.type == IB_FLOW_ATTR_ALL_DEFAULT) ||
(cmd.flow_attr.type == IB_FLOW_ATTR_MC_DEFAULT)))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs > IB_FLOW_SPEC_SUPPORT_LAYERS)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flow_attr.size >
(cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs * sizeof(struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec)))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flow_attr.reserved[0] ||
cmd.flow_attr.reserved[1])
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs) {
kern_flow_attr = kmalloc(sizeof(*kern_flow_attr) + cmd.flow_attr.size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kern_flow_attr)
return -ENOMEM;
RDMA/uverbs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow The check of cmd.flow_attr.size should check into account the size of the reserved field (2 bytes), otherwise user can provide a size which will cause a slab-out-of-bounds warning below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 Read of size 2 at addr ffff880068dff1a6 by task syz-executor775/269 CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syz-executor775 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #245 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xef/0x17e print_address_description+0x83/0x3b0 kasan_report+0x18d/0x4d0 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x433899 Code: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 91 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2724db58 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020006880 RCX: 0000000000433899 RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000020002480 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006d7018 R08: 00000000004002f8 R09: 00000000004002f8 R10: 00000000004002f8 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000040cd20 R14: 000000000040cdb0 R15: 0000000000000006 Allocated by task 269: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x1a9/0x510 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x26c/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 kfree+0x159/0x630 detach_buf+0x559/0x7a0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x3cc/0xab0 virtblk_done+0x1eb/0x3d0 vring_interrupt+0x16d/0x2b0 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x10a/0x980 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x190 handle_irq_event+0xc6/0x1a0 handle_edge_irq+0x211/0xd80 handle_irq+0x3d/0x60 do_IRQ+0x9b/0x220 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068dff180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 38 bytes inside of 64-byte region [ffff880068dff180, ffff880068dff1c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a37fc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88006c401780 index:0x0 flags: 0x4000000000000100(slab) raw: 4000000000000100 ffffea0001a31100 0000001100000011 ffff88006c401780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000802a002a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880068dff080: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880068dff100: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff880068dff180: 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880068dff200: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ffff880068dff280: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 Fixes: f88482743872 ("IB/core: clarify overflow/underflow checks on ib_create/destroy_flow") Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-06-24 16:23:53 +08:00
*kern_flow_attr = cmd.flow_attr;
err = uverbs_request_next(&iter, &kern_flow_attr->flow_specs,
cmd.flow_attr.size);
IB/core: extended command: an improved infrastructure for uverbs commands Commit 400dbc96583f ("IB/core: Infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands") added an infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands while later commit 436f2ad05a0b ("IB/core: Export ib_create/destroy_flow through uverbs") exported ib_create_flow()/ib_destroy_flow() functions using this new infrastructure. According to the commit 400dbc96583f, the purpose of this infrastructure is to support passing around provider (eg. hardware) specific buffers when userspace issue commands to the kernel, so that it would be possible to extend uverbs (eg. core) buffers independently from the provider buffers. But the new kernel command function prototypes were not modified to take advantage of this extension. This issue was exposed by Roland Dreier in a previous review[1]. So the following patch is an attempt to a revised extensible command infrastructure. This improved extensible command infrastructure distinguish between core (eg. legacy)'s command/response buffers from provider (eg. hardware)'s command/response buffers: each extended command implementing function is given a struct ib_udata to hold core (eg. uverbs) input and output buffers, and another struct ib_udata to hold the hw (eg. provider) input and output buffers. Having those buffers identified separately make it easier to increase one buffer to support extension without having to add some code to guess the exact size of each command/response parts: This should make the extended functions more reliable. Additionally, instead of relying on command identifier being greater than IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_THRESHOLD, the proposed infrastructure rely on unused bits in command field: on the 32 bits provided by command field, only 6 bits are really needed to encode the identifier of commands currently supported by the kernel. (Even using only 6 bits leaves room for about 23 new commands). So this patch makes use of some high order bits in command field to store flags, leaving enough room for more command identifiers than one will ever need (eg. 256). The new flags are used to specify if the command should be processed as an extended one or a legacy one. While designing the new command format, care was taken to make usage of flags itself extensible. Using high order bits of the commands field ensure that newer libibverbs on older kernel will properly fail when trying to call extended commands. On the other hand, older libibverbs on newer kernel will never be able to issue calls to extended commands. The extended command header includes the optional response pointer so that output buffer length and output buffer pointer are located together in the command, allowing proper parameters checking. This should make implementing functions easier and safer. Additionally the extended header ensure 64bits alignment, while making all sizes multiple of 8 bytes, extending the maximum buffer size: legacy extended Maximum command buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) Maximum response buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) For the purpose of doing proper buffer size accounting, the headers size are no more taken in account in "in_words". One of the odds of the current extensible infrastructure, reading twice the "legacy" command header, is fixed by removing the "legacy" command header from the extended command header: they are processed as two different parts of the command: memory is read once and information are not duplicated: it's making clear that's an extended command scheme and not a different command scheme. The proposed scheme will format input (command) and output (response) buffers this way: - command: legacy header + extended header + command data (core + hw): +----------------------------------------+ | flags | 00 00 | command | | in_words | out_words | +----------------------------------------+ | response | | response | | provider_in_words | provider_out_words | | padding | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs input> . . (in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider input> . . (provider_in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ - response, if present: +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs output space> . . (out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider output space> . . (provider_out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ The overall design is to ensure that the extensible infrastructure is itself extensible while begin more reliable with more input and bound checking. Note: The unused field in the extended header would be perfect candidate to hold the command "comp_mask" (eg. bit field used to handle compatibility). This was suggested by Roland Dreier in a previous review[2]. But "comp_mask" field is likely to be present in the uverb input and/or provider input, likewise for the response, as noted by Matan Barak[3], so it doesn't make sense to put "comp_mask" in the header. [1]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDWxmM17W2o_era24A-TTDeKyoL6u3NRu_=t_dhV_ZA9MA@mail.gmail.com [2]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDXJtrc849M6_XNZT5xO1+ybKtLWGq6yg6LhoSsKpsmkYA@mail.gmail.com [3]: http://marc.info/?i=525C1149.6000701@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Link: http://marc.info/?i=cover.1383773832.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com [ Convert "ret ? ret : 0" to the equivalent "ret". - Roland ] Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2013-11-07 06:21:49 +08:00
if (err)
goto err_free_attr;
} else {
kern_flow_attr = &cmd.flow_attr;
}
err = uverbs_request_finish(&iter);
if (err)
goto err_free_attr;
uobj = uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_FLOW, attrs, &ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(uobj)) {
err = PTR_ERR(uobj);
goto err_free_attr;
}
if (!rdma_is_port_valid(uobj->context->device, cmd.flow_attr.port)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_uobj;
}
qp = uobj_get_obj_read(qp, UVERBS_OBJECT_QP, cmd.qp_handle, attrs);
if (!qp) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_uobj;
}
if (qp->qp_type != IB_QPT_UD && qp->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
flow_attr = kzalloc(struct_size(flow_attr, flows,
cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!flow_attr) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_put;
}
uflow_res = flow_resources_alloc(cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs);
if (!uflow_res) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_flow_attr;
}
flow_attr->type = kern_flow_attr->type;
flow_attr->priority = kern_flow_attr->priority;
flow_attr->num_of_specs = kern_flow_attr->num_of_specs;
flow_attr->port = kern_flow_attr->port;
flow_attr->flags = kern_flow_attr->flags;
flow_attr->size = sizeof(*flow_attr);
RDMA/uverbs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow The check of cmd.flow_attr.size should check into account the size of the reserved field (2 bytes), otherwise user can provide a size which will cause a slab-out-of-bounds warning below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 Read of size 2 at addr ffff880068dff1a6 by task syz-executor775/269 CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syz-executor775 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #245 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xef/0x17e print_address_description+0x83/0x3b0 kasan_report+0x18d/0x4d0 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x433899 Code: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 91 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2724db58 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020006880 RCX: 0000000000433899 RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000020002480 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006d7018 R08: 00000000004002f8 R09: 00000000004002f8 R10: 00000000004002f8 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000040cd20 R14: 000000000040cdb0 R15: 0000000000000006 Allocated by task 269: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x1a9/0x510 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x26c/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 kfree+0x159/0x630 detach_buf+0x559/0x7a0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x3cc/0xab0 virtblk_done+0x1eb/0x3d0 vring_interrupt+0x16d/0x2b0 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x10a/0x980 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x190 handle_irq_event+0xc6/0x1a0 handle_edge_irq+0x211/0xd80 handle_irq+0x3d/0x60 do_IRQ+0x9b/0x220 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068dff180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 38 bytes inside of 64-byte region [ffff880068dff180, ffff880068dff1c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a37fc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88006c401780 index:0x0 flags: 0x4000000000000100(slab) raw: 4000000000000100 ffffea0001a31100 0000001100000011 ffff88006c401780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000802a002a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880068dff080: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880068dff100: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff880068dff180: 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880068dff200: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ffff880068dff280: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 Fixes: f88482743872 ("IB/core: clarify overflow/underflow checks on ib_create/destroy_flow") Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-06-24 16:23:53 +08:00
kern_spec = kern_flow_attr->flow_specs;
ib_spec = flow_attr + 1;
for (i = 0; i < flow_attr->num_of_specs &&
cmd.flow_attr.size >= sizeof(*kern_spec) &&
RDMA/uverbs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow The check of cmd.flow_attr.size should check into account the size of the reserved field (2 bytes), otherwise user can provide a size which will cause a slab-out-of-bounds warning below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 Read of size 2 at addr ffff880068dff1a6 by task syz-executor775/269 CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syz-executor775 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #245 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xef/0x17e print_address_description+0x83/0x3b0 kasan_report+0x18d/0x4d0 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x433899 Code: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 91 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2724db58 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020006880 RCX: 0000000000433899 RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000020002480 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006d7018 R08: 00000000004002f8 R09: 00000000004002f8 R10: 00000000004002f8 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000040cd20 R14: 000000000040cdb0 R15: 0000000000000006 Allocated by task 269: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x1a9/0x510 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x26c/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 kfree+0x159/0x630 detach_buf+0x559/0x7a0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x3cc/0xab0 virtblk_done+0x1eb/0x3d0 vring_interrupt+0x16d/0x2b0 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x10a/0x980 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x190 handle_irq_event+0xc6/0x1a0 handle_edge_irq+0x211/0xd80 handle_irq+0x3d/0x60 do_IRQ+0x9b/0x220 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068dff180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 38 bytes inside of 64-byte region [ffff880068dff180, ffff880068dff1c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a37fc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88006c401780 index:0x0 flags: 0x4000000000000100(slab) raw: 4000000000000100 ffffea0001a31100 0000001100000011 ffff88006c401780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000802a002a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880068dff080: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880068dff100: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff880068dff180: 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880068dff200: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ffff880068dff280: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 Fixes: f88482743872 ("IB/core: clarify overflow/underflow checks on ib_create/destroy_flow") Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-06-24 16:23:53 +08:00
cmd.flow_attr.size >= kern_spec->size;
i++) {
err = kern_spec_to_ib_spec(
attrs, (struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec *)kern_spec,
RDMA/uverbs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow The check of cmd.flow_attr.size should check into account the size of the reserved field (2 bytes), otherwise user can provide a size which will cause a slab-out-of-bounds warning below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 Read of size 2 at addr ffff880068dff1a6 by task syz-executor775/269 CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syz-executor775 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #245 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xef/0x17e print_address_description+0x83/0x3b0 kasan_report+0x18d/0x4d0 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x433899 Code: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 91 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2724db58 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020006880 RCX: 0000000000433899 RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000020002480 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006d7018 R08: 00000000004002f8 R09: 00000000004002f8 R10: 00000000004002f8 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000040cd20 R14: 000000000040cdb0 R15: 0000000000000006 Allocated by task 269: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x1a9/0x510 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x26c/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 kfree+0x159/0x630 detach_buf+0x559/0x7a0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x3cc/0xab0 virtblk_done+0x1eb/0x3d0 vring_interrupt+0x16d/0x2b0 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x10a/0x980 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x190 handle_irq_event+0xc6/0x1a0 handle_edge_irq+0x211/0xd80 handle_irq+0x3d/0x60 do_IRQ+0x9b/0x220 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068dff180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 38 bytes inside of 64-byte region [ffff880068dff180, ffff880068dff1c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a37fc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88006c401780 index:0x0 flags: 0x4000000000000100(slab) raw: 4000000000000100 ffffea0001a31100 0000001100000011 ffff88006c401780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000802a002a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880068dff080: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880068dff100: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff880068dff180: 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880068dff200: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ffff880068dff280: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 Fixes: f88482743872 ("IB/core: clarify overflow/underflow checks on ib_create/destroy_flow") Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-06-24 16:23:53 +08:00
ib_spec, uflow_res);
if (err)
goto err_free;
flow_attr->size +=
((union ib_flow_spec *) ib_spec)->size;
RDMA/uverbs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow The check of cmd.flow_attr.size should check into account the size of the reserved field (2 bytes), otherwise user can provide a size which will cause a slab-out-of-bounds warning below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 Read of size 2 at addr ffff880068dff1a6 by task syz-executor775/269 CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syz-executor775 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #245 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xef/0x17e print_address_description+0x83/0x3b0 kasan_report+0x18d/0x4d0 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x1740/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x433899 Code: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 91 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc2724db58 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020006880 RCX: 0000000000433899 RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000020002480 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006d7018 R08: 00000000004002f8 R09: 00000000004002f8 R10: 00000000004002f8 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000040cd20 R14: 000000000040cdb0 R15: 0000000000000006 Allocated by task 269: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x1a9/0x510 ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x26c/0x1d00 ib_uverbs_write+0x923/0x1010 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x720 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 ksys_write+0xc6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 kfree+0x159/0x630 detach_buf+0x559/0x7a0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x3cc/0xab0 virtblk_done+0x1eb/0x3d0 vring_interrupt+0x16d/0x2b0 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x10a/0x980 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x190 handle_irq_event+0xc6/0x1a0 handle_edge_irq+0x211/0xd80 handle_irq+0x3d/0x60 do_IRQ+0x9b/0x220 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880068dff180 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 38 bytes inside of 64-byte region [ffff880068dff180, ffff880068dff1c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a37fc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88006c401780 index:0x0 flags: 0x4000000000000100(slab) raw: 4000000000000100 ffffea0001a31100 0000001100000011 ffff88006c401780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000802a002a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880068dff080: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880068dff100: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff880068dff180: 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880068dff200: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc ffff880068dff280: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 Fixes: f88482743872 ("IB/core: clarify overflow/underflow checks on ib_create/destroy_flow") Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-06-24 16:23:53 +08:00
cmd.flow_attr.size -= kern_spec->size;
kern_spec = ((void *)kern_spec) + kern_spec->size;
ib_spec += ((union ib_flow_spec *) ib_spec)->size;
}
if (cmd.flow_attr.size || (i != flow_attr->num_of_specs)) {
pr_warn("create flow failed, flow %d: %u bytes left from uverb cmd\n",
i, cmd.flow_attr.size);
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
flow_id = qp->device->ops.create_flow(qp, flow_attr,
&attrs->driver_udata);
if (IS_ERR(flow_id)) {
err = PTR_ERR(flow_id);
goto err_free;
}
ib_set_flow(uobj, flow_id, qp, qp->device, uflow_res);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
kfree(flow_attr);
if (cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs)
kfree(kern_flow_attr);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(uobj, attrs);
resp.flow_handle = uobj->id;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_free:
ib_uverbs_flow_resources_free(uflow_res);
err_free_flow_attr:
kfree(flow_attr);
err_put:
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&qp->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
err_uobj:
uobj_alloc_abort(uobj, attrs);
err_free_attr:
if (cmd.flow_attr.num_of_specs)
kfree(kern_flow_attr);
return err;
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_flow(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
IB/core: extended command: an improved infrastructure for uverbs commands Commit 400dbc96583f ("IB/core: Infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands") added an infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands while later commit 436f2ad05a0b ("IB/core: Export ib_create/destroy_flow through uverbs") exported ib_create_flow()/ib_destroy_flow() functions using this new infrastructure. According to the commit 400dbc96583f, the purpose of this infrastructure is to support passing around provider (eg. hardware) specific buffers when userspace issue commands to the kernel, so that it would be possible to extend uverbs (eg. core) buffers independently from the provider buffers. But the new kernel command function prototypes were not modified to take advantage of this extension. This issue was exposed by Roland Dreier in a previous review[1]. So the following patch is an attempt to a revised extensible command infrastructure. This improved extensible command infrastructure distinguish between core (eg. legacy)'s command/response buffers from provider (eg. hardware)'s command/response buffers: each extended command implementing function is given a struct ib_udata to hold core (eg. uverbs) input and output buffers, and another struct ib_udata to hold the hw (eg. provider) input and output buffers. Having those buffers identified separately make it easier to increase one buffer to support extension without having to add some code to guess the exact size of each command/response parts: This should make the extended functions more reliable. Additionally, instead of relying on command identifier being greater than IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_THRESHOLD, the proposed infrastructure rely on unused bits in command field: on the 32 bits provided by command field, only 6 bits are really needed to encode the identifier of commands currently supported by the kernel. (Even using only 6 bits leaves room for about 23 new commands). So this patch makes use of some high order bits in command field to store flags, leaving enough room for more command identifiers than one will ever need (eg. 256). The new flags are used to specify if the command should be processed as an extended one or a legacy one. While designing the new command format, care was taken to make usage of flags itself extensible. Using high order bits of the commands field ensure that newer libibverbs on older kernel will properly fail when trying to call extended commands. On the other hand, older libibverbs on newer kernel will never be able to issue calls to extended commands. The extended command header includes the optional response pointer so that output buffer length and output buffer pointer are located together in the command, allowing proper parameters checking. This should make implementing functions easier and safer. Additionally the extended header ensure 64bits alignment, while making all sizes multiple of 8 bytes, extending the maximum buffer size: legacy extended Maximum command buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) Maximum response buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) For the purpose of doing proper buffer size accounting, the headers size are no more taken in account in "in_words". One of the odds of the current extensible infrastructure, reading twice the "legacy" command header, is fixed by removing the "legacy" command header from the extended command header: they are processed as two different parts of the command: memory is read once and information are not duplicated: it's making clear that's an extended command scheme and not a different command scheme. The proposed scheme will format input (command) and output (response) buffers this way: - command: legacy header + extended header + command data (core + hw): +----------------------------------------+ | flags | 00 00 | command | | in_words | out_words | +----------------------------------------+ | response | | response | | provider_in_words | provider_out_words | | padding | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs input> . . (in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider input> . . (provider_in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ - response, if present: +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs output space> . . (out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider output space> . . (provider_out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ The overall design is to ensure that the extensible infrastructure is itself extensible while begin more reliable with more input and bound checking. Note: The unused field in the extended header would be perfect candidate to hold the command "comp_mask" (eg. bit field used to handle compatibility). This was suggested by Roland Dreier in a previous review[2]. But "comp_mask" field is likely to be present in the uverb input and/or provider input, likewise for the response, as noted by Matan Barak[3], so it doesn't make sense to put "comp_mask" in the header. [1]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDWxmM17W2o_era24A-TTDeKyoL6u3NRu_=t_dhV_ZA9MA@mail.gmail.com [2]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDXJtrc849M6_XNZT5xO1+ybKtLWGq6yg6LhoSsKpsmkYA@mail.gmail.com [3]: http://marc.info/?i=525C1149.6000701@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Link: http://marc.info/?i=cover.1383773832.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com [ Convert "ret ? ret : 0" to the equivalent "ret". - Roland ] Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2013-11-07 06:21:49 +08:00
{
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_flow cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
IB/core: extended command: an improved infrastructure for uverbs commands Commit 400dbc96583f ("IB/core: Infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands") added an infrastructure for extensible uverbs commands while later commit 436f2ad05a0b ("IB/core: Export ib_create/destroy_flow through uverbs") exported ib_create_flow()/ib_destroy_flow() functions using this new infrastructure. According to the commit 400dbc96583f, the purpose of this infrastructure is to support passing around provider (eg. hardware) specific buffers when userspace issue commands to the kernel, so that it would be possible to extend uverbs (eg. core) buffers independently from the provider buffers. But the new kernel command function prototypes were not modified to take advantage of this extension. This issue was exposed by Roland Dreier in a previous review[1]. So the following patch is an attempt to a revised extensible command infrastructure. This improved extensible command infrastructure distinguish between core (eg. legacy)'s command/response buffers from provider (eg. hardware)'s command/response buffers: each extended command implementing function is given a struct ib_udata to hold core (eg. uverbs) input and output buffers, and another struct ib_udata to hold the hw (eg. provider) input and output buffers. Having those buffers identified separately make it easier to increase one buffer to support extension without having to add some code to guess the exact size of each command/response parts: This should make the extended functions more reliable. Additionally, instead of relying on command identifier being greater than IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_THRESHOLD, the proposed infrastructure rely on unused bits in command field: on the 32 bits provided by command field, only 6 bits are really needed to encode the identifier of commands currently supported by the kernel. (Even using only 6 bits leaves room for about 23 new commands). So this patch makes use of some high order bits in command field to store flags, leaving enough room for more command identifiers than one will ever need (eg. 256). The new flags are used to specify if the command should be processed as an extended one or a legacy one. While designing the new command format, care was taken to make usage of flags itself extensible. Using high order bits of the commands field ensure that newer libibverbs on older kernel will properly fail when trying to call extended commands. On the other hand, older libibverbs on newer kernel will never be able to issue calls to extended commands. The extended command header includes the optional response pointer so that output buffer length and output buffer pointer are located together in the command, allowing proper parameters checking. This should make implementing functions easier and safer. Additionally the extended header ensure 64bits alignment, while making all sizes multiple of 8 bytes, extending the maximum buffer size: legacy extended Maximum command buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) Maximum response buffer: 256KBytes 1024KBytes (512KBytes + 512KBytes) For the purpose of doing proper buffer size accounting, the headers size are no more taken in account in "in_words". One of the odds of the current extensible infrastructure, reading twice the "legacy" command header, is fixed by removing the "legacy" command header from the extended command header: they are processed as two different parts of the command: memory is read once and information are not duplicated: it's making clear that's an extended command scheme and not a different command scheme. The proposed scheme will format input (command) and output (response) buffers this way: - command: legacy header + extended header + command data (core + hw): +----------------------------------------+ | flags | 00 00 | command | | in_words | out_words | +----------------------------------------+ | response | | response | | provider_in_words | provider_out_words | | padding | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs input> . . (in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider input> . . (provider_in_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ - response, if present: +----------------------------------------+ | | . <uverbs output space> . . (out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ | | . <provider output space> . . (provider_out_words * 8) . | | +----------------------------------------+ The overall design is to ensure that the extensible infrastructure is itself extensible while begin more reliable with more input and bound checking. Note: The unused field in the extended header would be perfect candidate to hold the command "comp_mask" (eg. bit field used to handle compatibility). This was suggested by Roland Dreier in a previous review[2]. But "comp_mask" field is likely to be present in the uverb input and/or provider input, likewise for the response, as noted by Matan Barak[3], so it doesn't make sense to put "comp_mask" in the header. [1]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDWxmM17W2o_era24A-TTDeKyoL6u3NRu_=t_dhV_ZA9MA@mail.gmail.com [2]: http://marc.info/?i=CAL1RGDXJtrc849M6_XNZT5xO1+ybKtLWGq6yg6LhoSsKpsmkYA@mail.gmail.com [3]: http://marc.info/?i=525C1149.6000701@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Link: http://marc.info/?i=cover.1383773832.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com [ Convert "ret ? ret : 0" to the equivalent "ret". - Roland ] Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2013-11-07 06:21:49 +08:00
if (ret)
return ret;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EINVAL;
return uobj_perform_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_FLOW, cmd.flow_handle, attrs);
}
static int __uverbs_create_xsrq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs,
struct ib_uverbs_create_xsrq *cmd,
struct ib_udata *udata)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_srq_resp resp = {};
struct ib_usrq_object *obj;
struct ib_pd *pd;
struct ib_srq *srq;
struct ib_srq_init_attr attr;
int ret;
struct ib_uobject *xrcd_uobj;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
obj = (struct ib_usrq_object *)uobj_alloc(UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ, attrs,
&ib_dev);
if (IS_ERR(obj))
return PTR_ERR(obj);
if (cmd->srq_type == IB_SRQT_TM)
attr.ext.tag_matching.max_num_tags = cmd->max_num_tags;
if (cmd->srq_type == IB_SRQT_XRC) {
xrcd_uobj = uobj_get_read(UVERBS_OBJECT_XRCD, cmd->xrcd_handle,
attrs);
if (IS_ERR(xrcd_uobj)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
goto err;
}
attr.ext.xrc.xrcd = (struct ib_xrcd *)xrcd_uobj->object;
if (!attr.ext.xrc.xrcd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put_xrcd;
}
obj->uxrcd = container_of(xrcd_uobj, struct ib_uxrcd_object, uobject);
atomic_inc(&obj->uxrcd->refcnt);
}
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
if (ib_srq_has_cq(cmd->srq_type)) {
attr.ext.cq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ,
cmd->cq_handle, attrs);
if (!attr.ext.cq) {
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put_xrcd;
}
}
pd = uobj_get_obj_read(pd, UVERBS_OBJECT_PD, cmd->pd_handle, attrs);
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
if (!pd) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_put_cq;
}
attr.event_handler = ib_uverbs_srq_event_handler;
attr.srq_type = cmd->srq_type;
attr.attr.max_wr = cmd->max_wr;
attr.attr.max_sge = cmd->max_sge;
attr.attr.srq_limit = cmd->srq_limit;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&obj->uevent.event_list);
obj->uevent.uobject.user_handle = cmd->user_handle;
srq = ib_create_srq_user(pd, &attr, obj, udata);
if (IS_ERR(srq)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(srq);
goto err_put_pd;
}
obj->uevent.uobject.object = srq;
obj->uevent.uobject.user_handle = cmd->user_handle;
obj->uevent.event_file = READ_ONCE(attrs->ufile->default_async_file);
if (obj->uevent.event_file)
uverbs_uobject_get(&obj->uevent.event_file->uobj);
if (cmd->srq_type == IB_SRQT_XRC)
resp.srqn = srq->ext.xrc.srq_num;
if (cmd->srq_type == IB_SRQT_XRC)
uobj_put_read(xrcd_uobj);
if (ib_srq_has_cq(cmd->srq_type))
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&attr.ext.cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
uobj_finalize_uobj_create(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
resp.srq_handle = obj->uevent.uobject.id;
resp.max_wr = attr.attr.max_wr;
resp.max_sge = attr.attr.max_sge;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
err_put_pd:
uobj_put_obj_read(pd);
err_put_cq:
if (ib_srq_has_cq(cmd->srq_type))
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&attr.ext.cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
err_put_xrcd:
if (cmd->srq_type == IB_SRQT_XRC) {
atomic_dec(&obj->uxrcd->refcnt);
uobj_put_read(xrcd_uobj);
IB/uverbs: Lock SRQ / CQ / PD objects in a consistent order Since XRC support was added, the uverbs code has locked SRQ, CQ and PD objects needed during QP and SRQ creation in different orders depending on the the code path. This leads to the (at least theoretical) possibility of deadlock, and triggers the lockdep splat below. Fix this by making sure we always lock the SRQ first, then CQs and finally the PD. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ibv_srq_pingpon/2484 is trying to acquire lock: (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] but task is already holding lock: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (CQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b16c3>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x180/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #1 (PD-uobj){++++++}: [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af8ad>] __uverbs_create_xsrq+0x96/0x386 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b31b9>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x1cd/0x1e6 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (SRQ-uobj){+++++.}: [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: SRQ-uobj --> PD-uobj --> CQ-uobj Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(CQ-uobj); lock(PD-uobj); lock(CQ-uobj); lock(SRQ-uobj); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ibv_srq_pingpon/2484: #0: (QP-uobj){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa00b162c>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xe9/0x684 [ib_uverbs] #1: (PD-uobj){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] #2: (CQ-uobj){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] stack backtrace: Pid: 2484, comm: ibv_srq_pingpon Not tainted 3.4.0-rc5+ #34 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8137eff0>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81070898>] __lock_acquire+0xa29/0xd06 [<ffffffffa00af37c>] ? __idr_get_uobj+0x20/0x5e [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fd0>] lock_acquire+0xbf/0xfe [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070eee>] ? lock_release+0x166/0x189 [<ffffffff81384f28>] down_read+0x34/0x43 [<ffffffffa00af51b>] ? idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af51b>] idr_read_uobj+0x2f/0x4d [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00af542>] idr_read_obj+0x9/0x19 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffffa00b1728>] ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x1e5/0x684 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff81070fec>] ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0xfe [<ffffffff81070c09>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x94/0x213 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff810d470f>] ? might_fault+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffffa00ae3dd>] ib_uverbs_write+0xb7/0xc2 [ib_uverbs] [<ffffffff810fe47f>] vfs_write+0xa7/0xee [<ffffffff810ff736>] ? fget_light+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff810fe65f>] sys_write+0x45/0x69 [<ffffffff8138cdf9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2012-05-01 03:51:50 +08:00
}
err:
uobj_alloc_abort(&obj->uevent.uobject, attrs);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_create_srq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_srq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_create_xsrq xcmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&xcmd, 0, sizeof(xcmd));
xcmd.response = cmd.response;
xcmd.user_handle = cmd.user_handle;
xcmd.srq_type = IB_SRQT_BASIC;
xcmd.pd_handle = cmd.pd_handle;
xcmd.max_wr = cmd.max_wr;
xcmd.max_sge = cmd.max_sge;
xcmd.srq_limit = cmd.srq_limit;
return __uverbs_create_xsrq(attrs, &xcmd, &attrs->driver_udata);
}
static int ib_uverbs_create_xsrq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_create_xsrq cmd;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
return __uverbs_create_xsrq(attrs, &cmd, &attrs->driver_udata);
}
static int ib_uverbs_modify_srq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_modify_srq cmd;
struct ib_srq *srq;
struct ib_srq_attr attr;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
srq = uobj_get_obj_read(srq, UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ, cmd.srq_handle, attrs);
if (!srq)
return -EINVAL;
attr.max_wr = cmd.max_wr;
attr.srq_limit = cmd.srq_limit;
ret = srq->device->ops.modify_srq(srq, &attr, cmd.attr_mask,
&attrs->driver_udata);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&srq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
static int ib_uverbs_query_srq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_query_srq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_query_srq_resp resp;
struct ib_srq_attr attr;
struct ib_srq *srq;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
srq = uobj_get_obj_read(srq, UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ, cmd.srq_handle, attrs);
if (!srq)
return -EINVAL;
ret = ib_query_srq(srq, &attr);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&srq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp);
resp.max_wr = attr.max_wr;
resp.max_sge = attr.max_sge;
resp.srq_limit = attr.srq_limit;
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
static int ib_uverbs_destroy_srq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_srq cmd;
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_srq_resp resp;
struct ib_uobject *uobj;
struct ib_uevent_object *obj;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
uobj = uobj_get_destroy(UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ, cmd.srq_handle, attrs);
if (IS_ERR(uobj))
return PTR_ERR(uobj);
obj = container_of(uobj, struct ib_uevent_object, uobject);
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.events_reported = obj->events_reported;
uobj_put_destroy(uobj);
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
static int ib_uverbs_ex_query_device(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_query_device_resp resp = {};
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
struct ib_uverbs_ex_query_device cmd;
struct ib_device_attr attr = {0};
struct ib_ucontext *ucontext;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
int err;
ucontext = ib_uverbs_get_ucontext(attrs);
if (IS_ERR(ucontext))
return PTR_ERR(ucontext);
ib_dev = ucontext->device;
err = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
if (cmd.comp_mask)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.reserved)
return -EINVAL;
err = ib_dev->ops.query_device(ib_dev, &attr, &attrs->driver_udata);
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
copy_query_dev_fields(ucontext, &resp.base, &attr);
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
resp.odp_caps.general_caps = attr.odp_caps.general_caps;
resp.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.rc_odp_caps =
attr.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.rc_odp_caps;
resp.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.uc_odp_caps =
attr.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.uc_odp_caps;
resp.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.ud_odp_caps =
attr.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.ud_odp_caps;
resp.xrc_odp_caps = attr.odp_caps.per_transport_caps.xrc_odp_caps;
resp.timestamp_mask = attr.timestamp_mask;
resp.hca_core_clock = attr.hca_core_clock;
resp.device_cap_flags_ex = attr.device_cap_flags;
resp.rss_caps.supported_qpts = attr.rss_caps.supported_qpts;
resp.rss_caps.max_rwq_indirection_tables =
attr.rss_caps.max_rwq_indirection_tables;
resp.rss_caps.max_rwq_indirection_table_size =
attr.rss_caps.max_rwq_indirection_table_size;
resp.max_wq_type_rq = attr.max_wq_type_rq;
resp.raw_packet_caps = attr.raw_packet_caps;
resp.tm_caps.max_rndv_hdr_size = attr.tm_caps.max_rndv_hdr_size;
resp.tm_caps.max_num_tags = attr.tm_caps.max_num_tags;
resp.tm_caps.max_ops = attr.tm_caps.max_ops;
resp.tm_caps.max_sge = attr.tm_caps.max_sge;
resp.tm_caps.flags = attr.tm_caps.flags;
resp.cq_moderation_caps.max_cq_moderation_count =
attr.cq_caps.max_cq_moderation_count;
resp.cq_moderation_caps.max_cq_moderation_period =
attr.cq_caps.max_cq_moderation_period;
resp.max_dm_size = attr.max_dm_size;
resp.response_length = uverbs_response_length(attrs, sizeof(resp));
return uverbs_response(attrs, &resp, sizeof(resp));
IB/core: Add support for extended query device caps Add extensible query device capabilities verb to allow adding new features. ib_uverbs_ex_query_device is added and copy_query_dev_fields is used to copy capability fields to be used by both ib_uverbs_query_device and ib_uverbs_ex_query_device. Following the discussion about this patch [1], the code now validates the command's comp_mask is zero, returning -EINVAL for unknown values, in order to allow extending the verb in the future. The verb also checks the user-space provided response buffer size and only fills in capabilities that will fit in the buffer. In attempt to follow the spirit of presentation [2] by Tzahi Oved that was presented during OpenFabrics Alliance International Developer Workshop 2013, the comp_mask bits will only describe which fields are valid. Furthermore, fields that can simply be cleared when they are not supported, do not require a comp_mask bit at all. The verb returns a response_length field containing the actual number of bytes written by the kernel, so that a newer version running on an older kernel can tell which fields were actually returned. [1] [PATCH v1 0/5] IB/core: extended query device caps cleanup for v3.19 http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.api/7889/ [2] https://www.openfabrics.org/images/docs/2013_Dev_Workshop/Tues_0423/2013_Workshop_Tues_0830_Tzahi_Oved-verbs_extensions_ofa_2013-tzahio.pdf Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
2015-02-08 19:28:50 +08:00
}
static int ib_uverbs_ex_modify_cq(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *attrs)
{
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_cq cmd;
struct ib_cq *cq;
int ret;
ret = uverbs_request(attrs, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!cmd.attr_mask || cmd.reserved)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd.attr_mask > IB_CQ_MODERATE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
cq = uobj_get_obj_read(cq, UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ, cmd.cq_handle, attrs);
if (!cq)
return -EINVAL;
ret = rdma_set_cq_moderation(cq, cmd.attr.cq_count, cmd.attr.cq_period);
rdma_lookup_put_uobject(&cq->uobject->uevent.uobject,
UVERBS_LOOKUP_READ);
return ret;
}
/*
* Describe the input structs for write(). Some write methods have an input
* only struct, most have an input and output. If the struct has an output then
* the 'response' u64 must be the first field in the request structure.
*
* If udata is present then both the request and response structs have a
* trailing driver_data flex array. In this case the size of the base struct
* cannot be changed.
*/
#define UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(req, resp) \
.write.has_resp = 1 + \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(offsetof(req, response) != 0) + \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(sizeof_field(req, response) != \
sizeof(u64)), \
.write.req_size = sizeof(req), .write.resp_size = sizeof(resp)
#define UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(req) .write.req_size = sizeof(req)
#define UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(req, resp) \
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(req, resp), \
.write.has_udata = \
1 + \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(offsetof(req, driver_data) != \
sizeof(req)) + \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(offsetof(resp, driver_data) != \
sizeof(resp))
#define UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_I(req) \
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(req), \
.write.has_udata = \
1 + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(offsetof(req, driver_data) != \
sizeof(req))
/*
* The _EX versions are for use with WRITE_EX and allow the last struct member
* to be specified. Buffers that do not include that member will be rejected.
*/
#define UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(req, req_last_member, resp, resp_last_member) \
.write.has_resp = 1, \
.write.req_size = offsetofend(req, req_last_member), \
.write.resp_size = offsetofend(resp, resp_last_member)
#define UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I_EX(req, req_last_member) \
.write.req_size = offsetofend(req, req_last_member)
const struct uapi_definition uverbs_def_write_intf[] = {
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_AH,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_AH,
ib_uverbs_create_ah,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_create_ah,
struct ib_uverbs_create_ah_resp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DESTROY_AH,
ib_uverbs_destroy_ah,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_destroy_ah)),
UAPI_DEF_OBJ_NEEDS_FN(create_user_ah),
UAPI_DEF_OBJ_NEEDS_FN(destroy_ah)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_COMP_CHANNEL,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_COMP_CHANNEL,
ib_uverbs_create_comp_channel,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_create_comp_channel,
struct ib_uverbs_create_comp_channel_resp))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_CQ,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_CQ,
ib_uverbs_create_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_create_cq,
struct ib_uverbs_create_cq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_cq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DESTROY_CQ,
ib_uverbs_destroy_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_destroy_cq,
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_cq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(destroy_cq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_POLL_CQ,
ib_uverbs_poll_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_poll_cq,
struct ib_uverbs_poll_cq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(poll_cq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_REQ_NOTIFY_CQ,
ib_uverbs_req_notify_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_req_notify_cq),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(req_notify_cq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_RESIZE_CQ,
ib_uverbs_resize_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_resize_cq,
struct ib_uverbs_resize_cq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(resize_cq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_CREATE_CQ,
ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq,
reserved,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_cq_resp,
response_length),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_cq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_MODIFY_CQ,
ib_uverbs_ex_modify_cq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_cq),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(modify_cq))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_DEVICE,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT,
ib_uverbs_get_context,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_get_context,
struct ib_uverbs_get_context_resp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_DEVICE,
ib_uverbs_query_device,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_query_device,
struct ib_uverbs_query_device_resp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_PORT,
ib_uverbs_query_port,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_query_port,
struct ib_uverbs_query_port_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(query_port)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_QUERY_DEVICE,
ib_uverbs_ex_query_device,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(
struct ib_uverbs_ex_query_device,
reserved,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_query_device_resp,
response_length),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(query_device)),
UAPI_DEF_OBJ_NEEDS_FN(alloc_ucontext),
UAPI_DEF_OBJ_NEEDS_FN(dealloc_ucontext)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_FLOW,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_CREATE_FLOW,
ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(struct ib_uverbs_create_flow,
flow_attr,
struct ib_uverbs_create_flow_resp,
flow_handle),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_flow)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_DESTROY_FLOW,
ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_flow,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_destroy_flow),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(destroy_flow))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_MR,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DEREG_MR,
ib_uverbs_dereg_mr,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_dereg_mr),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(dereg_mr)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_REG_MR,
ib_uverbs_reg_mr,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(struct ib_uverbs_reg_mr,
struct ib_uverbs_reg_mr_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(reg_user_mr)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_REREG_MR,
ib_uverbs_rereg_mr,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(struct ib_uverbs_rereg_mr,
struct ib_uverbs_rereg_mr_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(rereg_user_mr))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_MW,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_ALLOC_MW,
ib_uverbs_alloc_mw,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(struct ib_uverbs_alloc_mw,
struct ib_uverbs_alloc_mw_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(alloc_mw)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DEALLOC_MW,
ib_uverbs_dealloc_mw,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_dealloc_mw),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(dealloc_mw))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_PD,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_ALLOC_PD,
ib_uverbs_alloc_pd,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(struct ib_uverbs_alloc_pd,
struct ib_uverbs_alloc_pd_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(alloc_pd)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DEALLOC_PD,
ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(dealloc_pd))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_QP,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_ATTACH_MCAST,
ib_uverbs_attach_mcast,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_attach_mcast),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(attach_mcast),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(detach_mcast)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_QP,
ib_uverbs_create_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_create_qp,
struct ib_uverbs_create_qp_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_qp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DESTROY_QP,
ib_uverbs_destroy_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_destroy_qp,
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_qp_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(destroy_qp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DETACH_MCAST,
ib_uverbs_detach_mcast,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_detach_mcast),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(detach_mcast)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_MODIFY_QP,
ib_uverbs_modify_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_modify_qp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(modify_qp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_POST_RECV,
ib_uverbs_post_recv,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_post_recv,
struct ib_uverbs_post_recv_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(post_recv)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_POST_SEND,
ib_uverbs_post_send,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_post_send,
struct ib_uverbs_post_send_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(post_send)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_QP,
ib_uverbs_query_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_query_qp,
struct ib_uverbs_query_qp_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(query_qp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_CREATE_QP,
ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp,
comp_mask,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp_resp,
response_length),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_qp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_MODIFY_QP,
ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp,
base,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_qp_resp,
response_length),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(modify_qp))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_RWQ_IND_TBL,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_CREATE_RWQ_IND_TBL,
ib_uverbs_ex_create_rwq_ind_table,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_rwq_ind_table,
log_ind_tbl_size,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_rwq_ind_table_resp,
ind_tbl_num),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_rwq_ind_table)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_DESTROY_RWQ_IND_TBL,
ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_rwq_ind_table,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(
struct ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_rwq_ind_table),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(destroy_rwq_ind_table))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_WQ,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_CREATE_WQ,
ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq,
max_sge,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq_resp,
wqn),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_wq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_DESTROY_WQ,
ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_wq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO_EX(struct ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_wq,
wq_handle,
struct ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_wq_resp,
reserved),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(destroy_wq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE_EX(
IB_USER_VERBS_EX_CMD_MODIFY_WQ,
ib_uverbs_ex_modify_wq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I_EX(struct ib_uverbs_ex_modify_wq,
curr_wq_state),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(modify_wq))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_SRQ,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_SRQ,
ib_uverbs_create_srq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_create_srq,
struct ib_uverbs_create_srq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_srq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CREATE_XSRQ,
ib_uverbs_create_xsrq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_create_xsrq,
struct ib_uverbs_create_srq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(create_srq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_DESTROY_SRQ,
ib_uverbs_destroy_srq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_destroy_srq,
struct ib_uverbs_destroy_srq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(destroy_srq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_MODIFY_SRQ,
ib_uverbs_modify_srq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_I(struct ib_uverbs_modify_srq),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(modify_srq)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_POST_SRQ_RECV,
ib_uverbs_post_srq_recv,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_post_srq_recv,
struct ib_uverbs_post_srq_recv_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(post_srq_recv)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_QUERY_SRQ,
ib_uverbs_query_srq,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_IO(struct ib_uverbs_query_srq,
struct ib_uverbs_query_srq_resp),
UAPI_DEF_METHOD_NEEDS_FN(query_srq))),
DECLARE_UVERBS_OBJECT(
UVERBS_OBJECT_XRCD,
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_CLOSE_XRCD,
ib_uverbs_close_xrcd,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_I(struct ib_uverbs_close_xrcd)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_OPEN_QP,
ib_uverbs_open_qp,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_open_qp,
struct ib_uverbs_create_qp_resp)),
DECLARE_UVERBS_WRITE(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_OPEN_XRCD,
ib_uverbs_open_xrcd,
UAPI_DEF_WRITE_UDATA_IO(
struct ib_uverbs_open_xrcd,
struct ib_uverbs_open_xrcd_resp)),
UAPI_DEF_OBJ_NEEDS_FN(alloc_xrcd),
UAPI_DEF_OBJ_NEEDS_FN(dealloc_xrcd)),
{},
};