2019-06-03 13:44:50 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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/*
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* Based on arch/arm/kernel/setup.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1995-2001 Russell King
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* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
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*/
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ARM64 / ACPI: Get RSDP and ACPI boot-time tables
As we want to get ACPI tables to parse and then use the information
for system initialization, we should get the RSDP (Root System
Description Pointer) first, it then locates Extended Root Description
Table (XSDT) which contains all the 64-bit physical address that
pointer to other boot-time tables.
Introduce acpi.c and its related head file in this patch to provide
fundamental needs of extern variables and functions for ACPI core,
and then get boot-time tables as needed.
- asm/acenv.h for arch specific ACPICA environments and
implementation, It is needed unconditionally by ACPI core;
- asm/acpi.h for arch specific variables and functions needed by
ACPI driver core;
- acpi.c for ARM64 related ACPI implementation for ACPI driver
core;
acpi_boot_table_init() is introduced to get RSDP and boot-time tables,
it will be called in setup_arch() before paging_init(), so we should
use eary_memremap() mechanism here to get the RSDP and all the table
pointers.
FADT Major.Minor version was introduced in ACPI 5.1, it is the same
as ACPI version.
In ACPI 5.1, some major gaps are fixed for ARM, such as updates in
MADT table for GIC and SMP init, without those updates, we can not
get the MPIDR for SMP init, and GICv2/3 related init information, so
we can't boot arm64 ACPI properly with table versions predating 5.1.
If firmware provides ACPI tables with ACPI version less than 5.1,
OS has no way to retrieve the configuration data that is necessary
to init SMP boot protocol and the GIC properly, so disable ACPI if
we get an FADT table with version less that 5.1 when acpi_boot_table_init()
called.
CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Stone <al.stone@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Graeme Gregory <graeme.gregory@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 22:02:37 +08:00
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#include <linux/acpi.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/stddef.h>
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#include <linux/ioport.h>
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#include <linux/delay.h>
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#include <linux/initrd.h>
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#include <linux/console.h>
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2014-04-04 00:48:54 +08:00
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#include <linux/cache.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <linux/screen_info.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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#include <linux/root_dev.h>
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#include <linux/cpu.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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2021-07-01 09:54:59 +08:00
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#include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
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#include <linux/memblock.h>
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#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
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2014-04-16 09:59:30 +08:00
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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2015-07-31 22:46:16 +08:00
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#include <linux/psci.h>
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2017-02-04 08:20:53 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/task.h>
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2017-01-11 05:35:49 +08:00
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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ARM64 / ACPI: Get RSDP and ACPI boot-time tables
As we want to get ACPI tables to parse and then use the information
for system initialization, we should get the RSDP (Root System
Description Pointer) first, it then locates Extended Root Description
Table (XSDT) which contains all the 64-bit physical address that
pointer to other boot-time tables.
Introduce acpi.c and its related head file in this patch to provide
fundamental needs of extern variables and functions for ACPI core,
and then get boot-time tables as needed.
- asm/acenv.h for arch specific ACPICA environments and
implementation, It is needed unconditionally by ACPI core;
- asm/acpi.h for arch specific variables and functions needed by
ACPI driver core;
- acpi.c for ARM64 related ACPI implementation for ACPI driver
core;
acpi_boot_table_init() is introduced to get RSDP and boot-time tables,
it will be called in setup_arch() before paging_init(), so we should
use eary_memremap() mechanism here to get the RSDP and all the table
pointers.
FADT Major.Minor version was introduced in ACPI 5.1, it is the same
as ACPI version.
In ACPI 5.1, some major gaps are fixed for ARM, such as updates in
MADT table for GIC and SMP init, without those updates, we can not
get the MPIDR for SMP init, and GICv2/3 related init information, so
we can't boot arm64 ACPI properly with table versions predating 5.1.
If firmware provides ACPI tables with ACPI version less than 5.1,
OS has no way to retrieve the configuration data that is necessary
to init SMP boot protocol and the GIC properly, so disable ACPI if
we get an FADT table with version less that 5.1 when acpi_boot_table_init()
called.
CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Stone <al.stone@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Graeme Gregory <graeme.gregory@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 22:02:37 +08:00
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#include <asm/acpi.h>
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2014-04-08 06:39:52 +08:00
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#include <asm/fixmap.h>
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2014-07-16 23:32:44 +08:00
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#include <asm/cpu.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <asm/cputype.h>
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2017-11-02 20:12:36 +08:00
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#include <asm/daifflags.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <asm/elf.h>
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2014-11-14 23:54:07 +08:00
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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2013-10-25 03:30:17 +08:00
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#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
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2015-10-12 23:52:58 +08:00
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#include <asm/kasan.h>
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2016-04-09 06:50:27 +08:00
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#include <asm/numa.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <asm/sections.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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2012-08-29 16:47:19 +08:00
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#include <asm/smp_plat.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
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#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
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#include <asm/traps.h>
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2014-04-16 09:59:30 +08:00
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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2015-05-06 22:13:31 +08:00
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#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
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2016-01-25 19:44:58 +08:00
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#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
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static int num_standard_resources;
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static struct resource *standard_resources;
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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phys_addr_t __fdt_pointer __initdata;
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/*
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* Standard memory resources
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*/
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static struct resource mem_res[] = {
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{
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.name = "Kernel code",
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.start = 0,
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.end = 0,
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2016-01-27 04:57:22 +08:00
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.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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},
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{
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.name = "Kernel data",
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.start = 0,
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.end = 0,
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2016-01-27 04:57:22 +08:00
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.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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}
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};
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#define kernel_code mem_res[0]
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#define kernel_data mem_res[1]
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2015-03-17 17:55:12 +08:00
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/*
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* The recorded values of x0 .. x3 upon kernel entry.
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*/
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u64 __cacheline_aligned boot_args[4];
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2013-11-06 02:10:47 +08:00
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void __init smp_setup_processor_id(void)
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{
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2014-11-04 18:50:16 +08:00
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u64 mpidr = read_cpuid_mpidr() & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
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2020-07-27 23:29:38 +08:00
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set_cpu_logical_map(0, mpidr);
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2014-11-04 18:50:16 +08:00
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2017-09-27 21:50:38 +08:00
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pr_info("Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x%010lx [0x%08x]\n",
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(unsigned long)mpidr, read_cpuid_id());
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2013-11-06 02:10:47 +08:00
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}
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2013-10-21 20:29:42 +08:00
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bool arch_match_cpu_phys_id(int cpu, u64 phys_id)
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{
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return phys_id == cpu_logical_map(cpu);
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}
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arm64: kernel: build MPIDR_EL1 hash function data structure
On ARM64 SMP systems, cores are identified by their MPIDR_EL1 register.
The MPIDR_EL1 guidelines in the ARM ARM do not provide strict enforcement of
MPIDR_EL1 layout, only recommendations that, if followed, split the MPIDR_EL1
on ARM 64 bit platforms in four affinity levels. In multi-cluster
systems like big.LITTLE, if the affinity guidelines are followed, the
MPIDR_EL1 can not be considered a linear index. This means that the
association between logical CPU in the kernel and the HW CPU identifier
becomes somewhat more complicated requiring methods like hashing to
associate a given MPIDR_EL1 to a CPU logical index, in order for the look-up
to be carried out in an efficient and scalable way.
This patch provides a function in the kernel that starting from the
cpu_logical_map, implement collision-free hashing of MPIDR_EL1 values by
checking all significative bits of MPIDR_EL1 affinity level bitfields.
The hashing can then be carried out through bits shifting and ORing; the
resulting hash algorithm is a collision-free though not minimal hash that can
be executed with few assembly instructions. The mpidr_el1 is filtered through a
mpidr mask that is built by checking all bits that toggle in the set of
MPIDR_EL1s corresponding to possible CPUs. Bits that do not toggle do not
carry information so they do not contribute to the resulting hash.
Pseudo code:
/* check all bits that toggle, so they are required */
for (i = 1, mpidr_el1_mask = 0; i < num_possible_cpus(); i++)
mpidr_el1_mask |= (cpu_logical_map(i) ^ cpu_logical_map(0));
/*
* Build shifts to be applied to aff0, aff1, aff2, aff3 values to hash the
* mpidr_el1
* fls() returns the last bit set in a word, 0 if none
* ffs() returns the first bit set in a word, 0 if none
*/
fs0 = mpidr_el1_mask[7:0] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]) - 1 : 0;
fs1 = mpidr_el1_mask[15:8] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]) - 1 : 0;
fs2 = mpidr_el1_mask[23:16] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]) - 1 : 0;
fs3 = mpidr_el1_mask[39:32] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]) - 1 : 0;
ls0 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]);
ls1 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]);
ls2 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]);
ls3 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]);
bits0 = ls0 - fs0;
bits1 = ls1 - fs1;
bits2 = ls2 - fs2;
bits3 = ls3 - fs3;
aff0_shift = fs0;
aff1_shift = 8 + fs1 - bits0;
aff2_shift = 16 + fs2 - (bits0 + bits1);
aff3_shift = 32 + fs3 - (bits0 + bits1 + bits2);
u32 hash(u64 mpidr_el1) {
u32 l[4];
u64 mpidr_el1_masked = mpidr_el1 & mpidr_el1_mask;
l[0] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff;
l[1] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00;
l[2] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff0000;
l[3] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00000000;
return (l[0] >> aff0_shift | l[1] >> aff1_shift | l[2] >> aff2_shift |
l[3] >> aff3_shift);
}
The hashing algorithm relies on the inherent properties set in the ARM ARM
recommendations for the MPIDR_EL1. Exotic configurations, where for instance
the MPIDR_EL1 values at a given affinity level have large holes, can end up
requiring big hash tables since the compression of values that can be achieved
through shifting is somewhat crippled when holes are present. Kernel warns if
the number of buckets of the resulting hash table exceeds the number of
possible CPUs by a factor of 4, which is a symptom of a very sparse HW
MPIDR_EL1 configuration.
The hash algorithm is quite simple and can easily be implemented in assembly
code, to be used in code paths where the kernel virtual address space is
not set-up (ie cpu_resume) and instruction and data fetches are strongly
ordered so code must be compact and must carry out few data accesses.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
2013-05-16 17:32:09 +08:00
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struct mpidr_hash mpidr_hash;
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/**
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* smp_build_mpidr_hash - Pre-compute shifts required at each affinity
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* level in order to build a linear index from an
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* MPIDR value. Resulting algorithm is a collision
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* free hash carried out through shifting and ORing
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*/
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static void __init smp_build_mpidr_hash(void)
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{
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u32 i, affinity, fs[4], bits[4], ls;
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u64 mask = 0;
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/*
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* Pre-scan the list of MPIDRS and filter out bits that do
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* not contribute to affinity levels, ie they never toggle.
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*/
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for_each_possible_cpu(i)
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mask |= (cpu_logical_map(i) ^ cpu_logical_map(0));
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pr_debug("mask of set bits %#llx\n", mask);
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/*
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* Find and stash the last and first bit set at all affinity levels to
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* check how many bits are required to represent them.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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affinity = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mask, i);
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/*
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* Find the MSB bit and LSB bits position
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* to determine how many bits are required
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* to express the affinity level.
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*/
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ls = fls(affinity);
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fs[i] = affinity ? ffs(affinity) - 1 : 0;
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bits[i] = ls - fs[i];
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}
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/*
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* An index can be created from the MPIDR_EL1 by isolating the
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* significant bits at each affinity level and by shifting
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* them in order to compress the 32 bits values space to a
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* compressed set of values. This is equivalent to hashing
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* the MPIDR_EL1 through shifting and ORing. It is a collision free
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* hash though not minimal since some levels might contain a number
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* of CPUs that is not an exact power of 2 and their bit
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* representation might contain holes, eg MPIDR_EL1[7:0] = {0x2, 0x80}.
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*/
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[0] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(0) + fs[0];
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[1] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(1) + fs[1] - bits[0];
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[2] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(2) + fs[2] -
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(bits[1] + bits[0]);
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[3] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(3) +
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fs[3] - (bits[2] + bits[1] + bits[0]);
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mpidr_hash.mask = mask;
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mpidr_hash.bits = bits[3] + bits[2] + bits[1] + bits[0];
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pr_debug("MPIDR hash: aff0[%u] aff1[%u] aff2[%u] aff3[%u] mask[%#llx] bits[%u]\n",
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[0],
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[1],
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[2],
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mpidr_hash.shift_aff[3],
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mpidr_hash.mask,
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mpidr_hash.bits);
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/*
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* 4x is an arbitrary value used to warn on a hash table much bigger
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* than expected on most systems.
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*/
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if (mpidr_hash_size() > 4 * num_possible_cpus())
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pr_warn("Large number of MPIDR hash buckets detected\n");
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}
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2015-03-14 00:14:34 +08:00
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2021-02-08 17:57:21 +08:00
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static void *early_fdt_ptr __initdata;
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void __init *get_early_fdt_ptr(void)
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{
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return early_fdt_ptr;
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}
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asmlinkage void __init early_fdt_map(u64 dt_phys)
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{
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int fdt_size;
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early_fixmap_init();
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early_fdt_ptr = fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &fdt_size, PAGE_KERNEL);
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}
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2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
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static void __init setup_machine_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys)
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{
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2019-08-23 14:24:50 +08:00
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int size;
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void *dt_virt = fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL);
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2017-04-27 20:33:05 +08:00
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const char *name;
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2015-06-01 19:40:32 +08:00
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2019-08-23 14:24:50 +08:00
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if (dt_virt)
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|
|
|
memblock_reserve(dt_phys, size);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-01 19:40:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!dt_virt || !early_init_dt_scan(dt_virt)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_crit("\n"
|
2021-12-21 23:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
"Error: invalid device tree blob at physical address %pa (virtual address 0x%px)\n"
|
2015-06-01 19:40:32 +08:00
|
|
|
"The dtb must be 8-byte aligned and must not exceed 2 MB in size\n"
|
|
|
|
"\nPlease check your bootloader.",
|
|
|
|
&dt_phys, dt_virt);
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2021-12-21 23:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note that in this _really_ early stage we cannot even BUG()
|
|
|
|
* or oops, so the least terrible thing to do is cpu_relax(),
|
|
|
|
* or else we could end-up printing non-initialized data, etc.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
while (true)
|
|
|
|
cpu_relax();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-09-01 22:47:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-23 14:24:50 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Early fixups are done, map the FDT as read-only now */
|
|
|
|
fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-27 20:33:05 +08:00
|
|
|
name = of_flat_dt_get_machine_name();
|
2017-05-16 15:36:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-27 20:33:05 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_info("Machine model: %s\n", name);
|
|
|
|
dump_stack_set_arch_desc("%s (DT)", name);
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __init request_standard_resources(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct memblock_region *region;
|
|
|
|
struct resource *res;
|
2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long i = 0;
|
2019-03-12 14:30:31 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t res_size;
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
arm64: omit [_text, _stext) from permanent kernel mapping
In a previous patch, we increased the size of the EFI PE/COFF header
to 64 KB, which resulted in the _stext symbol to appear at a fixed
offset of 64 KB into the image.
Since 64 KB is also the largest page size we support, this completely
removes the need to map the first 64 KB of the kernel image, given that
it only contains the arm64 Image header and the EFI header, neither of
which we ever access again after booting the kernel. More importantly,
we should avoid an executable mapping of non-executable and not entirely
predictable data, to deal with the unlikely event that we inadvertently
emitted something that looks like an opcode that could be used as a
gadget for speculative execution.
So let's limit the kernel mapping of .text to the [_stext, _etext)
region, which matches the view of generic code (such as kallsyms) when
it reasons about the boundaries of the kernel's .text section.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117124729.12642-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2020-11-17 20:47:27 +08:00
|
|
|
kernel_code.start = __pa_symbol(_stext);
|
2017-01-11 05:35:49 +08:00
|
|
|
kernel_code.end = __pa_symbol(__init_begin - 1);
|
|
|
|
kernel_data.start = __pa_symbol(_sdata);
|
|
|
|
kernel_data.end = __pa_symbol(_end - 1);
|
2022-05-06 19:43:58 +08:00
|
|
|
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &kernel_code);
|
|
|
|
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &kernel_data);
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
|
|
|
num_standard_resources = memblock.memory.cnt;
|
2019-03-12 14:30:31 +08:00
|
|
|
res_size = num_standard_resources * sizeof(*standard_resources);
|
arm64: replace memblock_alloc_low with memblock_alloc
If we use "crashkernel=Y[@X]" and the start address is above 4G,
the arm64 kdump capture kernel may call memblock_alloc_low() failure
in request_standard_resources(). Replacing memblock_alloc_low() with
memblock_alloc().
[ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration:
[ 0.000000] memory size = 0x0000000040650000 reserved size = 0x0000000004db7f39
[ 0.000000] memory.cnt = 0x6
[ 0.000000] memory[0x0] [0x00000000395f0000-0x000000003968ffff], 0x00000000000a0000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4
[ 0.000000] memory[0x1] [0x0000000039730000-0x000000003973ffff], 0x0000000000010000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4
[ 0.000000] memory[0x2] [0x0000000039780000-0x000000003986ffff], 0x00000000000f0000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4
[ 0.000000] memory[0x3] [0x0000000039890000-0x0000000039d0ffff], 0x0000000000480000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4
[ 0.000000] memory[0x4] [0x000000003ed00000-0x000000003ed2ffff], 0x0000000000030000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4
[ 0.000000] memory[0x5] [0x0000002040000000-0x000000207fffffff], 0x0000000040000000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved.cnt = 0x7
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x0] [0x0000002040080000-0x0000002041c4dfff], 0x0000000001bce000 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x1] [0x0000002041c53000-0x0000002042c203f8], 0x0000000000fcd3f9 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x2] [0x000000207da00000-0x000000207dbfffff], 0x0000000000200000 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x3] [0x000000207ddef000-0x000000207fbfffff], 0x0000000001e11000 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000207fdf2b00-0x000000207fdfc03f], 0x0000000000009540 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x000000207fdfd000-0x000000207ffff3ff], 0x0000000000202400 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] reserved[0x6] [0x000000207ffffe00-0x000000207fffffff], 0x0000000000000200 bytes flags: 0x0
[ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: request_standard_resources: Failed to allocate 384 bytes
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.1.0-next-20190321+ #4
[ 0.000000] Call trace:
[ 0.000000] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
[ 0.000000] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 0.000000] dump_stack+0xa8/0xcc
[ 0.000000] panic+0x14c/0x31c
[ 0.000000] setup_arch+0x2b0/0x5e0
[ 0.000000] start_kernel+0x90/0x52c
[ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: request_standard_resources: Failed to allocate 384 bytes ]---
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg715293.html
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2019-03-27 21:51:16 +08:00
|
|
|
standard_resources = memblock_alloc(res_size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
|
2019-03-12 14:30:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!standard_resources)
|
|
|
|
panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, res_size);
|
2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-14 07:58:30 +08:00
|
|
|
for_each_mem_region(region) {
|
2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
|
|
|
res = &standard_resources[i++];
|
2016-08-22 14:55:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (memblock_is_nomap(region)) {
|
|
|
|
res->name = "reserved";
|
2017-01-25 01:11:40 +08:00
|
|
|
res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
|
2021-10-22 15:06:46 +08:00
|
|
|
res->start = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_reserved_base_pfn(region));
|
|
|
|
res->end = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_reserved_end_pfn(region)) - 1;
|
2016-08-22 14:55:24 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
res->name = "System RAM";
|
|
|
|
res->flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
|
2021-10-22 15:06:46 +08:00
|
|
|
res->start = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_memory_base_pfn(region));
|
|
|
|
res->end = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_memory_end_pfn(region)) - 1;
|
2016-08-22 14:55:24 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-06 19:43:58 +08:00
|
|
|
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, res);
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-23 09:57:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init reserve_memblock_reserved_regions(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_standard_resources; ++i) {
|
|
|
|
struct resource *mem = &standard_resources[i];
|
|
|
|
phys_addr_t r_start, r_end, mem_size = resource_size(mem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!memblock_is_region_reserved(mem->start, mem_size))
|
2018-07-23 09:57:28 +08:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-14 07:58:25 +08:00
|
|
|
for_each_reserved_mem_range(j, &r_start, &r_end) {
|
2018-10-11 18:29:14 +08:00
|
|
|
resource_size_t start, end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start = max(PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(r_start)), mem->start);
|
|
|
|
end = min(PFN_PHYS(PFN_UP(r_end)) - 1, mem->end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (start > mem->end || end < mem->start)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reserve_region_with_split(mem, start, end, "reserved");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-07-23 09:57:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arch_initcall(reserve_memblock_reserved_regions);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-29 16:47:19 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 __cpu_logical_map[NR_CPUS] = { [0 ... NR_CPUS-1] = INVALID_HWID };
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-03 02:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
u64 cpu_logical_map(unsigned int cpu)
|
2020-07-27 23:29:38 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return __cpu_logical_map[cpu];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-07 14:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-07-08 09:08:31 +08:00
|
|
|
setup_initial_init_mm(_stext, _etext, _edata, _end);
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*cmdline_p = boot_command_line;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-10 02:12:17 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If know now we are going to need KPTI then use non-global
|
|
|
|
* mappings from the start, avoiding the cost of rewriting
|
|
|
|
* everything later.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
arm64_use_ng_mappings = kaslr_requires_kpti();
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-22 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
early_fixmap_init();
|
2014-04-08 06:39:52 +08:00
|
|
|
early_ioremap_init();
|
2014-04-08 06:39:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-06-15 21:22:38 +08:00
|
|
|
setup_machine_fdt(__fdt_pointer);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-12 11:59:15 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialise the static keys early as they may be enabled by the
|
2022-06-15 21:22:38 +08:00
|
|
|
* cpufeature code and early parameters.
|
2019-07-12 11:59:15 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
jump_label_init();
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
parse_early_param();
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-27 04:23:38 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-11-02 20:12:36 +08:00
|
|
|
* Unmask asynchronous aborts and fiq after bringing up possible
|
|
|
|
* earlycon. (Report possible System Errors once we can report this
|
|
|
|
* occurred).
|
2014-08-27 04:23:38 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-11-02 20:12:36 +08:00
|
|
|
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX_NOIRQ);
|
2014-08-27 04:23:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-25 19:44:59 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* TTBR0 is only used for the identity mapping at this stage. Make it
|
|
|
|
* point to zero page to avoid speculatively fetching new entries.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cpu_uninstall_idmap();
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-07 20:03:28 +08:00
|
|
|
xen_early_init();
|
2014-04-16 09:59:30 +08:00
|
|
|
efi_init();
|
2020-06-11 20:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && ((u64)_text % MIN_KIMG_ALIGN) != 0)
|
|
|
|
pr_warn(FW_BUG "Kernel image misaligned at boot, please fix your bootloader!");
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
arm64_memblock_init();
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-20 18:56:13 +08:00
|
|
|
paging_init();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
acpi_table_upgrade();
|
|
|
|
|
ARM64 / ACPI: Get RSDP and ACPI boot-time tables
As we want to get ACPI tables to parse and then use the information
for system initialization, we should get the RSDP (Root System
Description Pointer) first, it then locates Extended Root Description
Table (XSDT) which contains all the 64-bit physical address that
pointer to other boot-time tables.
Introduce acpi.c and its related head file in this patch to provide
fundamental needs of extern variables and functions for ACPI core,
and then get boot-time tables as needed.
- asm/acenv.h for arch specific ACPICA environments and
implementation, It is needed unconditionally by ACPI core;
- asm/acpi.h for arch specific variables and functions needed by
ACPI driver core;
- acpi.c for ARM64 related ACPI implementation for ACPI driver
core;
acpi_boot_table_init() is introduced to get RSDP and boot-time tables,
it will be called in setup_arch() before paging_init(), so we should
use eary_memremap() mechanism here to get the RSDP and all the table
pointers.
FADT Major.Minor version was introduced in ACPI 5.1, it is the same
as ACPI version.
In ACPI 5.1, some major gaps are fixed for ARM, such as updates in
MADT table for GIC and SMP init, without those updates, we can not
get the MPIDR for SMP init, and GICv2/3 related init information, so
we can't boot arm64 ACPI properly with table versions predating 5.1.
If firmware provides ACPI tables with ACPI version less than 5.1,
OS has no way to retrieve the configuration data that is necessary
to init SMP boot protocol and the GIC properly, so disable ACPI if
we get an FADT table with version less that 5.1 when acpi_boot_table_init()
called.
CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Stone <al.stone@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Graeme Gregory <graeme.gregory@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 22:02:37 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time configuration */
|
|
|
|
acpi_boot_table_init();
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-09 06:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (acpi_disabled)
|
|
|
|
unflatten_device_tree();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bootmem_init();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-12 23:52:58 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_init();
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
request_standard_resources();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-08 17:54:58 +08:00
|
|
|
early_ioremap_reset();
|
2014-04-16 09:59:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-09 06:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (acpi_disabled)
|
2015-03-24 22:02:43 +08:00
|
|
|
psci_dt_init();
|
2016-04-09 06:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2015-03-24 22:02:43 +08:00
|
|
|
psci_acpi_init();
|
2016-04-09 06:50:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-19 07:01:43 +08:00
|
|
|
init_bootcpu_ops();
|
2015-05-13 21:12:47 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_init_cpus();
|
arm64: kernel: build MPIDR_EL1 hash function data structure
On ARM64 SMP systems, cores are identified by their MPIDR_EL1 register.
The MPIDR_EL1 guidelines in the ARM ARM do not provide strict enforcement of
MPIDR_EL1 layout, only recommendations that, if followed, split the MPIDR_EL1
on ARM 64 bit platforms in four affinity levels. In multi-cluster
systems like big.LITTLE, if the affinity guidelines are followed, the
MPIDR_EL1 can not be considered a linear index. This means that the
association between logical CPU in the kernel and the HW CPU identifier
becomes somewhat more complicated requiring methods like hashing to
associate a given MPIDR_EL1 to a CPU logical index, in order for the look-up
to be carried out in an efficient and scalable way.
This patch provides a function in the kernel that starting from the
cpu_logical_map, implement collision-free hashing of MPIDR_EL1 values by
checking all significative bits of MPIDR_EL1 affinity level bitfields.
The hashing can then be carried out through bits shifting and ORing; the
resulting hash algorithm is a collision-free though not minimal hash that can
be executed with few assembly instructions. The mpidr_el1 is filtered through a
mpidr mask that is built by checking all bits that toggle in the set of
MPIDR_EL1s corresponding to possible CPUs. Bits that do not toggle do not
carry information so they do not contribute to the resulting hash.
Pseudo code:
/* check all bits that toggle, so they are required */
for (i = 1, mpidr_el1_mask = 0; i < num_possible_cpus(); i++)
mpidr_el1_mask |= (cpu_logical_map(i) ^ cpu_logical_map(0));
/*
* Build shifts to be applied to aff0, aff1, aff2, aff3 values to hash the
* mpidr_el1
* fls() returns the last bit set in a word, 0 if none
* ffs() returns the first bit set in a word, 0 if none
*/
fs0 = mpidr_el1_mask[7:0] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]) - 1 : 0;
fs1 = mpidr_el1_mask[15:8] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]) - 1 : 0;
fs2 = mpidr_el1_mask[23:16] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]) - 1 : 0;
fs3 = mpidr_el1_mask[39:32] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]) - 1 : 0;
ls0 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]);
ls1 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]);
ls2 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]);
ls3 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]);
bits0 = ls0 - fs0;
bits1 = ls1 - fs1;
bits2 = ls2 - fs2;
bits3 = ls3 - fs3;
aff0_shift = fs0;
aff1_shift = 8 + fs1 - bits0;
aff2_shift = 16 + fs2 - (bits0 + bits1);
aff3_shift = 32 + fs3 - (bits0 + bits1 + bits2);
u32 hash(u64 mpidr_el1) {
u32 l[4];
u64 mpidr_el1_masked = mpidr_el1 & mpidr_el1_mask;
l[0] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff;
l[1] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00;
l[2] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff0000;
l[3] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00000000;
return (l[0] >> aff0_shift | l[1] >> aff1_shift | l[2] >> aff2_shift |
l[3] >> aff3_shift);
}
The hashing algorithm relies on the inherent properties set in the ARM ARM
recommendations for the MPIDR_EL1. Exotic configurations, where for instance
the MPIDR_EL1 values at a given affinity level have large holes, can end up
requiring big hash tables since the compression of values that can be achieved
through shifting is somewhat crippled when holes are present. Kernel warns if
the number of buckets of the resulting hash table exceeds the number of
possible CPUs by a factor of 4, which is a symptom of a very sparse HW
MPIDR_EL1 configuration.
The hash algorithm is quite simple and can easily be implemented in assembly
code, to be used in code paths where the kernel virtual address space is
not set-up (ie cpu_resume) and instruction and data fetches are strongly
ordered so code must be compact and must carry out few data accesses.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
2013-05-16 17:32:09 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_build_mpidr_hash();
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-21 14:20:15 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Init percpu seeds for random tags after cpus are set up. */
|
2020-12-23 04:01:03 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_init_sw_tags();
|
2019-02-21 14:20:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-02 21:54:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make sure init_thread_info.ttbr0 always generates translation
|
|
|
|
* faults in case uaccess_enable() is inadvertently called by the init
|
|
|
|
* thread.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-06-15 17:32:58 +08:00
|
|
|
init_task.thread_info.ttbr0 = phys_to_ttbr(__pa_symbol(reserved_pg_dir));
|
2016-09-02 21:54:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 17:55:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if (boot_args[1] || boot_args[2] || boot_args[3]) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("WARNING: x1-x3 nonzero in violation of boot protocol:\n"
|
|
|
|
"\tx1: %016llx\n\tx2: %016llx\n\tx3: %016llx\n"
|
|
|
|
"This indicates a broken bootloader or old kernel\n",
|
|
|
|
boot_args[1], boot_args[2], boot_args[3]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-12 20:51:37 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline bool cpu_can_disable(unsigned int cpu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
|
2020-03-19 07:01:44 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct cpu_operations *ops = get_cpu_ops(cpu);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ops && ops->cpu_can_disable)
|
|
|
|
return ops->cpu_can_disable(cpu);
|
2019-06-12 20:51:37 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init topology_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
|
2014-07-16 23:32:44 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cpu *cpu = &per_cpu(cpu_data.cpu, i);
|
2019-06-12 20:51:37 +08:00
|
|
|
cpu->hotpluggable = cpu_can_disable(i);
|
2012-03-05 19:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
register_cpu(cpu, i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subsys_initcall(topology_init);
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-29 12:38:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static void dump_kernel_offset(void)
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-12-20 08:23:06 +08:00
|
|
|
const unsigned long offset = kaslr_offset();
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-20 08:23:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && offset > 0) {
|
|
|
|
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: 0x%lx from 0x%lx\n",
|
|
|
|
offset, KIMAGE_VADDR);
|
2018-12-12 18:56:49 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_emerg("PHYS_OFFSET: 0x%llx\n", PHYS_OFFSET);
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: disabled\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-29 12:38:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int arm64_panic_block_dump(struct notifier_block *self,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long v, void *p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump_kernel_offset();
|
|
|
|
dump_cpu_features();
|
|
|
|
dump_mem_limit();
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-29 12:38:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct notifier_block arm64_panic_block = {
|
|
|
|
.notifier_call = arm64_panic_block_dump
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-29 12:38:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init register_arm64_panic_block(void)
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list,
|
2020-06-29 12:38:31 +08:00
|
|
|
&arm64_panic_block);
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 21:12:01 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-29 12:38:31 +08:00
|
|
|
device_initcall(register_arm64_panic_block);
|