2019-06-01 16:08:55 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
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* Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* File: ima_init.c
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* initialization and cleanup functions
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*/
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2014-02-25 05:59:56 +08:00
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2018-12-10 04:36:29 +08:00
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#include <linux/init.h>
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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#include <linux/err.h>
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IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-27 03:14:53 +08:00
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
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2014-10-30 18:39:39 +08:00
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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#include "ima.h"
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/* name for boot aggregate entry */
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2020-06-03 23:08:21 +08:00
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const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate";
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2018-06-27 03:09:32 +08:00
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struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
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* the PCR register.
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*
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2020-03-25 18:47:06 +08:00
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* Calculate the boot aggregate, a hash over tpm registers 0-7,
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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* assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not
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* exist. Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement
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* list and extend the PCR register.
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*
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* If a tpm chip does not exist, indicate the core root of trust is
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* not hardware based by invalidating the aggregate PCR value.
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* (The aggregate PCR value is invalidated by adding one value to
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* the measurement list and extending the aggregate PCR value with
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* a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
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* list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
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*/
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2014-09-13 01:35:53 +08:00
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static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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{
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2013-12-12 03:44:04 +08:00
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static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
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const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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struct ima_template_entry *entry;
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2013-06-07 18:16:28 +08:00
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struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
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2019-06-11 14:28:10 +08:00
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struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
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.filename = boot_aggregate_name };
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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int result = -ENOMEM;
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2013-06-07 18:16:28 +08:00
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int violation = 0;
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2013-06-07 18:16:25 +08:00
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struct {
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struct ima_digest_data hdr;
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2020-03-25 18:47:06 +08:00
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char digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
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2013-06-07 18:16:25 +08:00
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} hash;
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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2013-06-07 18:16:28 +08:00
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memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
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memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
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iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
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2020-03-25 18:47:06 +08:00
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iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
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iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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2020-03-25 18:47:06 +08:00
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/*
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* With TPM 2.0 hash agility, TPM chips could support multiple TPM
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* PCR banks, allowing firmware to configure and enable different
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* banks. The SHA1 bank is not necessarily enabled.
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*
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* Use the same hash algorithm for reading the TPM PCRs as for
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* calculating the boot aggregate digest. Preference is given to
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* the configured IMA default hash algorithm. Otherwise, use the
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* TCG required banks - SHA256 for TPM 2.0, SHA1 for TPM 1.2.
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* Ultimately select SHA1 also for TPM 2.0 if the SHA256 PCR bank
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* is not found.
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*/
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2018-06-27 03:09:33 +08:00
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if (ima_tpm_chip) {
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2013-06-07 18:16:25 +08:00
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result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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if (result < 0) {
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audit_cause = "hashing_error";
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goto err_out;
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}
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}
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2013-06-07 18:16:28 +08:00
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2019-06-20 06:46:11 +08:00
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result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL);
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2014-09-13 01:35:53 +08:00
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if (result < 0) {
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audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
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goto err_out;
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}
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2013-06-07 18:16:28 +08:00
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2013-06-07 18:16:27 +08:00
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result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
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2016-06-02 02:14:03 +08:00
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boot_aggregate_name,
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CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
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2014-09-13 01:35:53 +08:00
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if (result < 0) {
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2013-12-03 02:40:34 +08:00
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ima_free_template_entry(entry);
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2014-09-13 01:35:53 +08:00
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audit_cause = "store_entry";
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goto err_out;
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}
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return 0;
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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err_out:
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
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audit_cause, result, 0);
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2014-09-13 01:35:53 +08:00
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return result;
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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}
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2014-11-05 23:01:14 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
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void __init ima_load_x509(void)
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{
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int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
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ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
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2014-11-26 22:59:54 +08:00
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integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
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2021-05-14 23:27:43 +08:00
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/* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */
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evm_load_x509();
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2014-11-05 23:01:14 +08:00
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ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
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}
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#endif
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2009-05-22 03:43:32 +08:00
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int __init ima_init(void)
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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{
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int rc;
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2018-06-27 03:09:32 +08:00
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ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
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2018-06-27 03:09:33 +08:00
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if (!ima_tpm_chip)
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2018-06-27 03:09:32 +08:00
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pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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2015-10-23 02:26:10 +08:00
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rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
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2014-06-27 18:01:32 +08:00
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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2012-06-08 15:42:30 +08:00
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rc = ima_init_crypto();
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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ima: new templates management mechanism
The original 'ima' template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash
and pathname. The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1). The
pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters. To
overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is
necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional
templates.
The main reason to introduce this feature is that, each time a new
template is defined, the functions that generate and display the
measurement list would include the code for handling a new format and,
thus, would significantly grow over time.
This patch set solves this problem by separating the template management
from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the definition
of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine which
information should be included in the measurement list, and a template
field, to generate and display data of a given type.
To define a new template field, developers define the field identifier
and implement two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate
and display measurement entries. Initially, this patch set defines the
following template fields (support for additional data types will be
added later):
- 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file),
calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
- 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to
255 bytes;
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations.
Defining a new template descriptor requires specifying the template format,
a string of field identifiers separated by the '|' character. This patch
set defines the following template descriptors:
- "ima": its format is 'd|n';
- "ima-ng" (default): its format is 'd-ng|n-ng'
Further details about the new template architecture can be found in
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt.
Changelog:
- don't defer calling ima_init_template() - Mimi
- don't define ima_lookup_template_desc() until used - Mimi
- squashed with documentation patch - Mimi
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-06-07 18:16:29 +08:00
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rc = ima_init_template();
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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2019-02-07 00:24:52 +08:00
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/* It can be called before ima_init_digests(), it does not use TPM. */
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2016-12-20 08:22:35 +08:00
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ima_load_kexec_buffer();
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2019-02-07 00:24:52 +08:00
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rc = ima_init_digests();
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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2014-09-13 01:35:53 +08:00
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rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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2009-02-04 22:06:58 +08:00
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ima_init_policy();
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2009-02-04 22:06:59 +08:00
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2020-01-23 09:32:06 +08:00
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rc = ima_fs_init();
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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ima_init_key_queue();
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IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-27 03:14:53 +08:00
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ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
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2021-07-23 16:53:04 +08:00
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UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false,
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NULL, 0);
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IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-27 03:14:53 +08:00
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2020-01-23 09:32:06 +08:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2009-02-04 22:06:59 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|