2019-05-19 20:07:45 +08:00
|
|
|
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
# This config refers to the generic KASAN mode.
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
|
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS
|
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS
|
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
|
kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.
Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.
This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.
This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
- https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822
In terms of implementation details:
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!
This patch (of 4):
Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.
This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am
currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.
The full benchmark results are:
Performance
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68
full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89
random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04
fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75
align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86
pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12
Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82
Sequential, 2 cpus
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05
random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16
align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08
pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43
Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11
fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06
random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15
align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57
pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10
Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11
[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 09:54:50 +08:00
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
|
|
kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation
Patch series "KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN", v16.
Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported KASAN
to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU. I've been trying this
for a while, but we keep having collisions between the kasan code in the
mm tree and the code I want to put in to the ppc tree.
This series just contains the kasan core changes that we need. There
should be no noticeable changes to other platforms.
This patch (of 4):
For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
instrumentation on powerpc64.*
Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have an arch
force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding code
that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
* on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT
would unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't
have set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the
arch to be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline
mode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29 10:40:39 +08:00
|
|
|
config ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
|
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Disables both inline and stack instrumentation. Selected by
|
|
|
|
|
architectures that do not support these instrumentation types.
|
kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation
Patch series "KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN", v16.
Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported KASAN
to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU. I've been trying this
for a while, but we keep having collisions between the kasan code in the
mm tree and the code I want to put in to the ppc tree.
This series just contains the kasan core changes that we need. There
should be no noticeable changes to other platforms.
This patch (of 4):
For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
instrumentation on powerpc64.*
Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have an arch
force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding code
that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
* on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT
would unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't
have set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the
arch to be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline
mode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29 10:40:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS
|
|
|
|
|
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress)
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
# This option is only required for software KASAN modes.
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
# Old GCC versions do not have proper support for no_sanitize_address.
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
# See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=89124 for details.
|
2020-06-04 13:58:10 +08:00
|
|
|
config CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS
|
2020-06-23 19:24:48 +08:00
|
|
|
def_bool !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 80300
|
2020-06-04 13:58:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-07 14:24:28 +08:00
|
|
|
menuconfig KASAN
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
bool "KASAN: dynamic memory safety error detector"
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on (((HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC) || \
|
|
|
|
|
(HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
|
|
|
|
|
CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS) || \
|
|
|
|
|
HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS
|
2023-10-02 21:43:03 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on SYSFS && !SLUB_TINY
|
lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc()
Currently, enabling CONFIG_STACKDEPOT means its stack_table will be
allocated from memblock, even if stack depot ends up not actually used.
The default size of stack_table is 4MB on 32-bit, 8MB on 64-bit.
This is fine for use-cases such as KASAN which is also a config option
and has overhead on its own. But it's an issue for functionality that
has to be actually enabled on boot (page_owner) or depends on hardware
(GPU drivers) and thus the memory might be wasted. This was raised as
an issue [1] when attempting to add stackdepot support for SLUB's debug
object tracking functionality. It's common to build kernels with
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and enable slub_debug on boot only when needed, or
create only specific kmem caches with debugging for testing purposes.
It would thus be more efficient if stackdepot's table was allocated only
when actually going to be used. This patch thus makes the allocation
(and whole stack_depot_init() call) optional:
- Add a CONFIG_STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT flag to keep using the current
well-defined point of allocation as part of mem_init(). Make
CONFIG_KASAN select this flag.
- Other users have to call stack_depot_init() as part of their own init
when it's determined that stack depot will actually be used. This may
depend on both config and runtime conditions. Convert current users
which are page_owner and several in the DRM subsystem. Same will be
done for SLUB later.
- Because the init might now be called after the boot-time memblock
allocation has given all memory to the buddy allocator, change
stack_depot_init() to allocate stack_table with kvmalloc() when
memblock is no longer available. Also handle allocation failure by
disabling stackdepot (could have theoretically happened even with
memblock allocation previously), and don't unnecessarily align the
memblock allocation to its own size anymore.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMuHMdW=eoVzM1Re5FVoEN87nKfiLmM2+Ah7eNu2KXEhCvbZyA@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211013073005.11351-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> # stackdepot
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: fix spelling mistake and grammar in pr_err message
There is a spelling mistake of the work allocation so fix this and
re-phrase the message to make it easier to read.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015104159.11282-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup
On FLATMEM, we call page_ext_init_flatmem_late() just before
kmem_cache_init() which means stack_depot_init() (called by page owner
init) will not recognize properly it should use kvmalloc() and not
memblock_alloc(). memblock_alloc() will also not issue a warning and
return a block memory that can be invalid and cause kernel page fault when
saving stacks, as reported by the kernel test robot [1].
Fix this by moving page_ext_init_flatmem_late() below kmem_cache_init() so
that slab_is_available() is true during stack_depot_init(). SPARSEMEM
doesn't have this issue, as it doesn't do page_ext_init_flatmem_late(),
but a different page_ext_init() even later in the boot process.
Thanks to Mike Rapoport for pointing out the FLATMEM init ordering issue.
While at it, also actually resolve a checkpatch warning in stack_depot_init()
from DRM CI, which was supposed to be in the original patch already.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211014085450.GC18719@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6abd9213-19a9-6d58-cedc-2414386d2d81@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup3
Due to cd06ab2fd48f ("drm/locking: add backtrace for locking contended
locks without backoff") landing recently to -next adding a new stack depot
user in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c we need to add an appropriate
call to stack_depot_init() there as well.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a692365-cfa1-64f2-34e0-8aa5674dce5e@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup4
Due to 4e66934eaadc ("lib: add reference counting tracking
infrastructure") landing recently to net-next adding a new stack depot
user in lib/ref_tracker.c we need to add an appropriate call to
stack_depot_init() there as well.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/45c1b738-1a2f-5b5f-2f6d-86fab206d01c@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Slab <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-22 14:14:27 +08:00
|
|
|
select STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Enables KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) - a dynamic memory safety
|
|
|
|
|
error detector designed to find out-of-bounds and use-after-free bugs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
See Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst for details.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
For better error reports, also enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-07 14:24:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if KASAN
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-02-24 16:59:40 +08:00
|
|
|
config CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX
|
|
|
|
|
def_bool (CC_IS_CLANG && $(cc-option,-fsanitize=kernel-address -mllvm -asan-kernel-mem-intrinsic-prefix=1)) || \
|
|
|
|
|
(CC_IS_GCC && $(cc-option,-fsanitize=kernel-address --param asan-kernel-mem-intrinsic-prefix=1))
|
|
|
|
|
# Don't define it if we don't need it: compilation of the test uses
|
|
|
|
|
# this variable to decide how the compiler should treat builtins.
|
|
|
|
|
depends on !KASAN_HW_TAGS
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
The compiler is able to prefix memintrinsics with __asan or __hwasan.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
choice
|
|
|
|
|
prompt "KASAN mode"
|
|
|
|
|
default KASAN_GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
KASAN has three modes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
1. Generic KASAN (supported by many architectures, enabled with
|
|
|
|
|
CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, similar to userspace ASan),
|
|
|
|
|
2. Software Tag-Based KASAN (arm64 only, based on software memory
|
|
|
|
|
tagging, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, similar to userspace
|
|
|
|
|
HWASan), and
|
|
|
|
|
3. Hardware Tag-Based KASAN (arm64 only, based on hardware memory
|
|
|
|
|
tagging, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS).
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
See Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst for details about each mode.
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config KASAN_GENERIC
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
bool "Generic KASAN"
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
|
2021-09-25 06:43:23 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS
|
2023-10-02 21:43:03 +08:00
|
|
|
select SLUB_DEBUG
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
select CONSTRUCTORS
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Enables Generic KASAN.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Requires GCC 8.3.0+ or Clang.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Consumes about 1/8th of available memory at kernel start and adds an
|
|
|
|
|
overhead of ~50% for dynamic allocations.
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
The performance slowdown is ~x3.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_SW_TAGS
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
bool "Software Tag-Based KASAN"
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS
|
2021-09-25 06:43:23 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS
|
2023-10-02 21:43:03 +08:00
|
|
|
select SLUB_DEBUG
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
select CONSTRUCTORS
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Enables Software Tag-Based KASAN.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Requires GCC 11+ or Clang.
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Supported only on arm64 CPUs and relies on Top Byte Ignore.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Consumes about 1/16th of available memory at kernel start and
|
|
|
|
|
add an overhead of ~20% for dynamic allocations.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
May potentially introduce problems related to pointer casting and
|
|
|
|
|
comparison, as it embeds a tag into the top byte of each pointer.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_HW_TAGS
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
bool "Hardware Tag-Based KASAN"
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Enables Hardware Tag-Based KASAN.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Requires GCC 10+ or Clang 12+.
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Supported only on arm64 CPUs starting from ARMv8.5 and relies on
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Tagging Extension and Top Byte Ignore.
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Consumes about 1/32nd of available memory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
May potentially introduce problems related to pointer casting and
|
|
|
|
|
comparison, as it embeds a tag into the top byte of each pointer.
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:29:53 +08:00
|
|
|
endchoice
|
|
|
|
|
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
choice
|
|
|
|
|
prompt "Instrumentation type"
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
|
2023-11-09 23:51:00 +08:00
|
|
|
default KASAN_INLINE if !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config KASAN_OUTLINE
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Outline instrumentation"
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Makes the compiler insert function calls that check whether the memory
|
|
|
|
|
is accessible before each memory access. Slower than KASAN_INLINE, but
|
|
|
|
|
does not bloat the size of the kernel's .text section so much.
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config KASAN_INLINE
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Inline instrumentation"
|
kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation
Patch series "KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN", v16.
Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported KASAN
to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU. I've been trying this
for a while, but we keep having collisions between the kasan code in the
mm tree and the code I want to put in to the ppc tree.
This series just contains the kasan core changes that we need. There
should be no noticeable changes to other platforms.
This patch (of 4):
For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
instrumentation on powerpc64.*
Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have an arch
force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding code
that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
* on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT
would unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't
have set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the
arch to be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline
mode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29 10:40:39 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Makes the compiler directly insert memory accessibility checks before
|
|
|
|
|
each memory access. Faster than KASAN_OUTLINE (gives ~x2 boost for
|
|
|
|
|
some workloads), but makes the kernel's .text size much bigger.
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
endchoice
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-17 06:46:00 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_STACK
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
bool "Stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
|
2020-12-23 04:01:20 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
|
kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation
Patch series "KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN", v16.
Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported KASAN
to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU. I've been trying this
for a while, but we keep having collisions between the kasan code in the
mm tree and the code I want to put in to the ppc tree.
This series just contains the kasan core changes that we need. There
should be no noticeable changes to other platforms.
This patch (of 4):
For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
instrumentation on powerpc64.*
Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have an arch
force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding code
that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
* on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT
would unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't
have set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the
arch to be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline
mode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29 10:40:39 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
|
2021-04-17 06:46:00 +08:00
|
|
|
default y if CC_IS_GCC
|
kasan: turn off asan-stack for clang-8 and earlier
Building an arm64 allmodconfig kernel with clang results in over 140
warnings about overly large stack frames, the worst ones being:
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-sitronix-st7789v.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 20224 bytes in function 'st7789v_prepare'
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/displays/panel-tpo-td028ttec1.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 13120 bytes in function 'td028ttec1_panel_enable'
drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c:1395:1: error: stack frame size of 10048 bytes in function 'max3421_spi_thread'
drivers/net/wan/slic_ds26522.c:209:12: error: stack frame size of 9664 bytes in function 'slic_ds26522_probe'
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c:2434:5: error: stack frame size of 8832 bytes in function 'ccp_run_cmd'
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0367.c:1005:12: error: stack frame size of 7840 bytes in function 'stv0367ter_algo'
None of these happen with gcc today, and almost all of these are the
result of a single known issue in llvm. Hopefully it will eventually
get fixed with the clang-9 release.
In the meantime, the best idea I have is to turn off asan-stack for
clang-8 and earlier, so we can produce a kernel that is safe to run.
I have posted three patches that address the frame overflow warnings
that are not addressed by turning off asan-stack, so in combination with
this change, we get much closer to a clean allmodconfig build, which in
turn is necessary to do meaningful build regression testing.
It is still possible to turn on the CONFIG_ASAN_STACK option on all
versions of clang, and it's always enabled for gcc, but when
CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set, the option remains invisible, so
allmodconfig and randconfig builds (which are normally done with a
forced CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST) will still result in a mostly clean build.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190222222950.3997333-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-01 08:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Disables stack instrumentation and thus KASAN's ability to detect
|
|
|
|
|
out-of-bounds bugs in stack variables.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With Clang, stack instrumentation has a problem that causes excessive
|
2024-01-10 06:16:31 +08:00
|
|
|
stack usage, see https://llvm.org/pr38809. Thus,
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
with Clang, this option is deemed unsafe.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is always disabled when compile-testing with Clang to
|
|
|
|
|
avoid cluttering the log with stack overflow warnings.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With GCC, enabling stack instrumentation is assumed to be safe.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the architecture disables inline instrumentation via
|
|
|
|
|
ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE, stack instrumentation gets disabled
|
|
|
|
|
as well, as it adds inline-style instrumentation that is run
|
|
|
|
|
unconditionally.
|
kasan: turn off asan-stack for clang-8 and earlier
Building an arm64 allmodconfig kernel with clang results in over 140
warnings about overly large stack frames, the worst ones being:
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-sitronix-st7789v.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 20224 bytes in function 'st7789v_prepare'
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/displays/panel-tpo-td028ttec1.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 13120 bytes in function 'td028ttec1_panel_enable'
drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c:1395:1: error: stack frame size of 10048 bytes in function 'max3421_spi_thread'
drivers/net/wan/slic_ds26522.c:209:12: error: stack frame size of 9664 bytes in function 'slic_ds26522_probe'
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c:2434:5: error: stack frame size of 8832 bytes in function 'ccp_run_cmd'
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0367.c:1005:12: error: stack frame size of 7840 bytes in function 'stv0367ter_algo'
None of these happen with gcc today, and almost all of these are the
result of a single known issue in llvm. Hopefully it will eventually
get fixed with the clang-9 release.
In the meantime, the best idea I have is to turn off asan-stack for
clang-8 and earlier, so we can produce a kernel that is safe to run.
I have posted three patches that address the frame overflow warnings
that are not addressed by turning off asan-stack, so in combination with
this change, we get much closer to a clean allmodconfig build, which in
turn is necessary to do meaningful build regression testing.
It is still possible to turn on the CONFIG_ASAN_STACK option on all
versions of clang, and it's always enabled for gcc, but when
CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set, the option remains invisible, so
allmodconfig and randconfig builds (which are normally done with a
forced CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST) will still result in a mostly clean build.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190222222950.3997333-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-01 08:21:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.
Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.
This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.
This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
- https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822
In terms of implementation details:
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!
This patch (of 4):
Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.
This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am
currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.
The full benchmark results are:
Performance
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68
full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89
random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04
fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75
align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86
pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12
Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82
Sequential, 2 cpus
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05
random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16
align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08
pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43
Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11
fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06
random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15
align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57
pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10
Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11
[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 09:54:50 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_VMALLOC
|
2022-03-25 09:11:50 +08:00
|
|
|
bool "Check accesses to vmalloc allocations"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
|
kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.
Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.
This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.
This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
- https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822
In terms of implementation details:
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!
This patch (of 4):
Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.
This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am
currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.
The full benchmark results are:
Performance
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68
full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89
random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04
fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75
align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86
pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12
Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82
Sequential, 2 cpus
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05
random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16
align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08
pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43
Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11
fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06
random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15
align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57
pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10
Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11
[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 09:54:50 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
Makes KASAN check the validity of accesses to vmalloc allocations.
|
2022-03-25 09:11:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
With software KASAN modes, all types vmalloc allocations are
|
|
|
|
|
checked. Enabling this option leads to higher memory usage.
|
2022-03-25 09:11:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
With Hardware Tag-Based KASAN, only non-executable VM_ALLOC mappings
|
|
|
|
|
are checked. There is no additional memory usage.
|
kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.
Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.
This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.
This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
- https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822
In terms of implementation details:
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!
This patch (of 4):
Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.
This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am
currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.
The full benchmark results are:
Performance
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68
full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89
random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04
fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75
align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86
pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12
Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82
Sequential, 2 cpus
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05
random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16
align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08
pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43
Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11
fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06
random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15
align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57
pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10
Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11
[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 09:54:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_KUNIT_TEST
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "KUnit-compatible tests of KASAN bug detection capabilities" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
|
2022-09-28 01:09:09 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on KASAN && KUNIT && TRACEPOINTS
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
|
2015-02-14 06:39:53 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
A KUnit-based KASAN test suite. Triggers different kinds of
|
|
|
|
|
out-of-bounds and use-after-free accesses. Useful for testing whether
|
|
|
|
|
KASAN can detect certain bug types.
|
2020-08-07 14:24:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general, please refer
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-25 04:05:29 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_MODULE_TEST
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
tristate "KUnit-incompatible tests of KASAN bug detection capabilities"
|
2021-02-25 04:05:26 +08:00
|
|
|
depends on m && KASAN && !KASAN_HW_TAGS
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
help
|
2022-05-13 11:23:09 +08:00
|
|
|
A part of the KASAN test suite that is not integrated with KUnit.
|
|
|
|
|
Incompatible with Hardware Tag-Based KASAN.
|
2020-10-14 07:55:06 +08:00
|
|
|
|
kasan: record and report more information
Record and report more information to help us find the cause of the bug
and to help us correlate the error with other system events.
This patch adds recording and showing CPU number and timestamp at
allocation and free (controlled by CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA_INFO). The
timestamps in the report use the same format and source as printk.
Error occurrence timestamp is already implicit in the printk log, and CPU
number is already shown by dump_stack_lvl, so there is no need to add it.
In order to record CPU number and timestamp at allocation and free,
corresponding members need to be added to the relevant data structures,
which will lead to increased memory consumption.
In Generic KASAN, members are added to struct kasan_track. Since in most
cases, alloc meta is stored in the redzone and free meta is stored in the
object or the redzone, memory consumption will not increase much.
In SW_TAGS KASAN and HW_TAGS KASAN, members are added to struct
kasan_stack_ring_entry. Memory consumption increases as the size of
struct kasan_stack_ring_entry increases (this part of the memory is
allocated by memblock), but since this is configurable, it is up to the
user to choose.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/VI1P193MB0752BD991325D10E4AB1913599BDA@VI1P193MB0752.EURP193.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Signed-off-by: Juntong Deng <juntong.deng@outlook.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-11-28 05:17:31 +08:00
|
|
|
config KASAN_EXTRA_INFO
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Record and report more information"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on KASAN
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Record and report more information to help us find the cause of the
|
|
|
|
|
bug and to help us correlate the error with other system events.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Currently, the CPU number and timestamp are additionally
|
|
|
|
|
recorded for each heap block at allocation and free time, and
|
|
|
|
|
8 bytes will be added to each metadata structure that records
|
|
|
|
|
allocation or free information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In Generic KASAN, each kmalloc-8 and kmalloc-16 object will add
|
|
|
|
|
16 bytes of additional memory consumption, and each kmalloc-32
|
|
|
|
|
object will add 8 bytes of additional memory consumption, not
|
|
|
|
|
affecting other larger objects.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In SW_TAGS KASAN and HW_TAGS KASAN, depending on the stack_ring_size
|
|
|
|
|
boot parameter, it will add 8 * stack_ring_size bytes of additional
|
|
|
|
|
memory consumption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-07 14:24:28 +08:00
|
|
|
endif # KASAN
|
