linux/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
*
* Authors: Hollis Blanchard <hollisb@us.ibm.com>
* Christian Ehrhardt <ehrhardt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/irqbypass.h>
#include <linux/kvm_irqfd.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <asm/cputable.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/kvm_ppc.h>
KVM: PPC: Allow book3s_hv guests to use SMT processor modes This lifts the restriction that book3s_hv guests can only run one hardware thread per core, and allows them to use up to 4 threads per core on POWER7. The host still has to run single-threaded. This capability is advertised to qemu through a new KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability. The return value of the ioctl querying this capability is the number of vcpus per virtual CPU core (vcore), currently 4. To use this, the host kernel should be booted with all threads active, and then all the secondary threads should be offlined. This will put the secondary threads into nap mode. KVM will then wake them from nap mode and use them for running guest code (while they are still offline). To wake the secondary threads, we send them an IPI using a new xics_wake_cpu() function, implemented in arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-native.c. In other words, at this stage we assume that the platform has a XICS interrupt controller and we are using icp-native.c to drive it. Since the woken thread will need to acknowledge and clear the IPI, we also export the base physical address of the XICS registers using kvmppc_set_xics_phys() for use in the low-level KVM book3s code. When a vcpu is created, it is assigned to a virtual CPU core. The vcore number is obtained by dividing the vcpu number by the number of threads per core in the host. This number is exported to userspace via the KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability. If qemu wishes to run the guest in single-threaded mode, it should make all vcpu numbers be multiples of the number of threads per core. We distinguish three states of a vcpu: runnable (i.e., ready to execute the guest), blocked (that is, idle), and busy in host. We currently implement a policy that the vcore can run only when all its threads are runnable or blocked. This way, if a vcpu needs to execute elsewhere in the kernel or in qemu, it can do so without being starved of CPU by the other vcpus. When a vcore starts to run, it executes in the context of one of the vcpu threads. The other vcpu threads all go to sleep and stay asleep until something happens requiring the vcpu thread to return to qemu, or to wake up to run the vcore (this can happen when another vcpu thread goes from busy in host state to blocked). It can happen that a vcpu goes from blocked to runnable state (e.g. because of an interrupt), and the vcore it belongs to is already running. In that case it can start to run immediately as long as the none of the vcpus in the vcore have started to exit the guest. We send the next free thread in the vcore an IPI to get it to start to execute the guest. It synchronizes with the other threads via the vcore->entry_exit_count field to make sure that it doesn't go into the guest if the other vcpus are exiting by the time that it is ready to actually enter the guest. Note that there is no fixed relationship between the hardware thread number and the vcpu number. Hardware threads are assigned to vcpus as they become runnable, so we will always use the lower-numbered hardware threads in preference to higher-numbered threads if not all the vcpus in the vcore are runnable, regardless of which vcpus are runnable. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:23:08 +08:00
#include <asm/cputhreads.h>
#include <asm/irqflags.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/switch_to.h>
#include <asm/xive.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
#include <asm/hvcall.h>
#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
#endif
#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include "timing.h"
#include "../mm/mmu_decl.h"
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "trace.h"
struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_hv_ops);
struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_pr_ops;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_pr_ops);
int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
return !!(v->arch.pending_exceptions) || kvm_request_pending(v);
}
2019-08-05 10:03:19 +08:00
bool kvm_arch_dy_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu);
}
bool kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return false;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return 1;
}
/*
* Common checks before entering the guest world. Call with interrupts
* disabled.
*
* returns:
*
* == 1 if we're ready to go into guest state
* <= 0 if we need to go back to the host with return value
*/
int kvmppc_prepare_to_enter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
WARN_ON(irqs_disabled());
hard_irq_disable();
while (true) {
if (need_resched()) {
local_irq_enable();
cond_resched();
hard_irq_disable();
continue;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
kvmppc_account_exit(vcpu, SIGNAL_EXITS);
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
r = -EINTR;
break;
}
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
/*
* Reading vcpu->requests must happen after setting vcpu->mode,
* so we don't miss a request because the requester sees
* OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE and assumes we'll be checking requests
* before next entering the guest (and thus doesn't IPI).
* This also orders the write to mode from any reads
* to the page tables done while the VCPU is running.
* Please see the comment in kvm_flush_remote_tlbs.
*/
smp_mb();
if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) {
/* Make sure we process requests preemptable */
local_irq_enable();
trace_kvm_check_requests(vcpu);
r = kvmppc_core_check_requests(vcpu);
hard_irq_disable();
if (r > 0)
continue;
break;
}
if (kvmppc_core_prepare_to_enter(vcpu)) {
/* interrupts got enabled in between, so we
are back at square 1 */
continue;
}
guest_enter_irqoff();
return 1;
}
/* return to host */
local_irq_enable();
return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_prepare_to_enter);
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_PR_POSSIBLE)
static void kvmppc_swab_shared(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_vcpu_arch_shared *shared = vcpu->arch.shared;
int i;
shared->sprg0 = swab64(shared->sprg0);
shared->sprg1 = swab64(shared->sprg1);
shared->sprg2 = swab64(shared->sprg2);
shared->sprg3 = swab64(shared->sprg3);
shared->srr0 = swab64(shared->srr0);
shared->srr1 = swab64(shared->srr1);
shared->dar = swab64(shared->dar);
shared->msr = swab64(shared->msr);
shared->dsisr = swab32(shared->dsisr);
shared->int_pending = swab32(shared->int_pending);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(shared->sr); i++)
shared->sr[i] = swab32(shared->sr[i]);
}
#endif
int kvmppc_kvm_pv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int nr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 11);
int r;
unsigned long __maybe_unused param1 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 3);
unsigned long __maybe_unused param2 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4);
unsigned long __maybe_unused param3 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5);
unsigned long __maybe_unused param4 = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6);
unsigned long r2 = 0;
if (!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_SF)) {
/* 32 bit mode */
param1 &= 0xffffffff;
param2 &= 0xffffffff;
param3 &= 0xffffffff;
param4 &= 0xffffffff;
}
switch (nr) {
case KVM_HCALL_TOKEN(KVM_HC_PPC_MAP_MAGIC_PAGE):
{
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_PR_POSSIBLE)
/* Book3S can be little endian, find it out here */
int shared_big_endian = true;
if (vcpu->arch.intr_msr & MSR_LE)
shared_big_endian = false;
if (shared_big_endian != vcpu->arch.shared_big_endian)
kvmppc_swab_shared(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.shared_big_endian = shared_big_endian;
#endif
if (!(param2 & MAGIC_PAGE_FLAG_NOT_MAPPED_NX)) {
/*
* Older versions of the Linux magic page code had
* a bug where they would map their trampoline code
* NX. If that's the case, remove !PR NX capability.
*/
vcpu->arch.disable_kernel_nx = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
}
vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa = param1 & ~0xfffULL;
vcpu->arch.magic_page_ea = param2 & ~0xfffULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
/*
* Make sure our 4k magic page is in the same window of a 64k
* page within the guest and within the host's page.
*/
if ((vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & 0xf000) !=
((ulong)vcpu->arch.shared & 0xf000)) {
void *old_shared = vcpu->arch.shared;
ulong shared = (ulong)vcpu->arch.shared;
void *new_shared;
shared &= PAGE_MASK;
shared |= vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & 0xf000;
new_shared = (void*)shared;
memcpy(new_shared, old_shared, 0x1000);
vcpu->arch.shared = new_shared;
}
#endif
r2 = KVM_MAGIC_FEAT_SR | KVM_MAGIC_FEAT_MAS0_TO_SPRG7;
r = EV_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case KVM_HCALL_TOKEN(KVM_HC_FEATURES):
r = EV_SUCCESS;
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S) || defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500V2)
r2 |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_MAGIC_PAGE);
#endif
/* Second return value is in r4 */
break;
case EV_HCALL_TOKEN(EV_IDLE):
r = EV_SUCCESS;
kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
break;
default:
r = EV_UNIMPLEMENTED;
break;
}
kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4, r2);
return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_kvm_pv);
int kvmppc_sanity_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r = false;
/* We have to know what CPU to virtualize */
if (!vcpu->arch.pvr)
goto out;
/* PAPR only works with book3s_64 */
if ((vcpu->arch.cpu_type != KVM_CPU_3S_64) && vcpu->arch.papr_enabled)
goto out;
/* HV KVM can only do PAPR mode for now */
if (!vcpu->arch.papr_enabled && is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
goto out;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOKE_HV
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV))
goto out;
#endif
r = true;
out:
vcpu->arch.sane = r;
return r ? 0 : -EINVAL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_sanity_check);
int kvmppc_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
enum emulation_result er;
int r;
er = kvmppc_emulate_loadstore(vcpu);
switch (er) {
case EMULATE_DONE:
/* Future optimization: only reload non-volatiles if they were
* actually modified. */
r = RESUME_GUEST_NV;
break;
case EMULATE_AGAIN:
r = RESUME_GUEST;
break;
case EMULATE_DO_MMIO:
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
/* We must reload nonvolatiles because "update" load/store
* instructions modify register state. */
/* Future optimization: only reload non-volatiles if they were
* actually modified. */
r = RESUME_HOST_NV;
break;
case EMULATE_FAIL:
{
ppc_inst_t last_inst;
kvmppc_get_last_inst(vcpu, INST_GENERIC, &last_inst);
kvm_debug_ratelimited("Guest access to device memory using unsupported instruction (opcode: %#08x)\n",
ppc_inst_val(last_inst));
/*
* Injecting a Data Storage here is a bit more
* accurate since the instruction that caused the
* access could still be a valid one.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOKE)) {
ulong dsisr = DSISR_BADACCESS;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
dsisr |= DSISR_ISSTORE;
kvmppc_core_queue_data_storage(vcpu,
kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & SRR1_PREFIXED,
vcpu->arch.vaddr_accessed, dsisr);
} else {
/*
* BookE does not send a SIGBUS on a bad
* fault, so use a Program interrupt instead
* to avoid a fault loop.
*/
kvmppc_core_queue_program(vcpu, 0);
}
r = RESUME_GUEST;
break;
}
default:
WARN_ON(1);
r = RESUME_GUEST;
}
return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_emulate_mmio);
int kvmppc_st(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *eaddr, int size, void *ptr,
bool data)
{
ulong mp_pa = vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK;
struct kvmppc_pte pte;
int r = -EINVAL;
vcpu->stat.st++;
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops && vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->store_to_eaddr)
r = vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->store_to_eaddr(vcpu, eaddr, ptr,
size);
if ((!r) || (r == -EAGAIN))
return r;
r = kvmppc_xlate(vcpu, *eaddr, data ? XLATE_DATA : XLATE_INST,
XLATE_WRITE, &pte);
if (r < 0)
return r;
*eaddr = pte.raddr;
if (!pte.may_write)
return -EPERM;
/* Magic page override */
if (kvmppc_supports_magic_page(vcpu) && mp_pa &&
((pte.raddr & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK) == mp_pa) &&
!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_PR)) {
void *magic = vcpu->arch.shared;
magic += pte.eaddr & 0xfff;
memcpy(magic, ptr, size);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
if (kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, pte.raddr, ptr, size))
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_st);
int kvmppc_ld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *eaddr, int size, void *ptr,
bool data)
{
ulong mp_pa = vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK;
struct kvmppc_pte pte;
int rc = -EINVAL;
vcpu->stat.ld++;
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops && vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->load_from_eaddr)
rc = vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->load_from_eaddr(vcpu, eaddr, ptr,
size);
if ((!rc) || (rc == -EAGAIN))
return rc;
rc = kvmppc_xlate(vcpu, *eaddr, data ? XLATE_DATA : XLATE_INST,
XLATE_READ, &pte);
if (rc)
return rc;
*eaddr = pte.raddr;
if (!pte.may_read)
return -EPERM;
if (!data && !pte.may_execute)
return -ENOEXEC;
/* Magic page override */
if (kvmppc_supports_magic_page(vcpu) && mp_pa &&
((pte.raddr & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK) == mp_pa) &&
!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_PR)) {
void *magic = vcpu->arch.shared;
magic += pte.eaddr & 0xfff;
memcpy(ptr, magic, size);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
KVM: PPC: Protect kvm_vcpu_read_guest with srcu locks The kvm_vcpu_read_guest/kvm_vcpu_write_guest used for nested guests eventually call srcu_dereference_check to dereference a memslot and lockdep produces a warning as neither kvm->slots_lock nor kvm->srcu lock is held and kvm->users_count is above zero (>100 in fact). This wraps mentioned VCPU read/write helpers in srcu read lock/unlock as it is done in other places. This uses vcpu->srcu_idx when possible. These helpers are only used for nested KVM so this may explain why we did not see these before. Here is an example of a warning: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.7.0-rc3-le_dma-bypass.3.2_a+fstn1 #897 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:633 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by qemu-system-ppc/2752: #0: c000200359016be0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x144/0xd80 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 80 PID: 2752 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.7.0-rc3-le_dma-bypass.3.2_a+fstn1 #897 Call Trace: [c0002003591ab240] [c000000000b23ab4] dump_stack+0x190/0x25c (unreliable) [c0002003591ab2b0] [c00000000023f954] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x164 [c0002003591ab330] [c008000004a445f8] kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x4c0/0x510 [kvm] [c0002003591ab3a0] [c008000004a44c18] kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0xa0/0x180 [kvm] [c0002003591ab410] [c008000004ff9bd8] kvmhv_enter_nested_guest+0x90/0xb80 [kvm_hv] [c0002003591ab980] [c008000004fe07bc] kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall+0x7b4/0x1c30 [kvm_hv] [c0002003591aba10] [c008000004fe5d30] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x10a8/0x1a30 [kvm_hv] [c0002003591abae0] [c008000004a5d954] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x4c/0x70 [kvm] [c0002003591abb10] [c008000004a56e54] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x56c/0x7c0 [kvm] [c0002003591abba0] [c008000004a3ddc4] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ac/0xd80 [kvm] [c0002003591abd20] [c0000000006ebb58] ksys_ioctl+0x188/0x210 [c0002003591abd70] [c0000000006ebc28] sys_ioctl+0x48/0xb0 [c0002003591abdb0] [c000000000042764] system_call_exception+0x1d4/0x2e0 [c0002003591abe20] [c00000000000cce8] system_call_common+0xe8/0x214 Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2020-06-09 10:12:29 +08:00
rc = kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, pte.raddr, ptr, size);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
KVM: PPC: Protect kvm_vcpu_read_guest with srcu locks The kvm_vcpu_read_guest/kvm_vcpu_write_guest used for nested guests eventually call srcu_dereference_check to dereference a memslot and lockdep produces a warning as neither kvm->slots_lock nor kvm->srcu lock is held and kvm->users_count is above zero (>100 in fact). This wraps mentioned VCPU read/write helpers in srcu read lock/unlock as it is done in other places. This uses vcpu->srcu_idx when possible. These helpers are only used for nested KVM so this may explain why we did not see these before. Here is an example of a warning: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.7.0-rc3-le_dma-bypass.3.2_a+fstn1 #897 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:633 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by qemu-system-ppc/2752: #0: c000200359016be0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x144/0xd80 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 80 PID: 2752 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.7.0-rc3-le_dma-bypass.3.2_a+fstn1 #897 Call Trace: [c0002003591ab240] [c000000000b23ab4] dump_stack+0x190/0x25c (unreliable) [c0002003591ab2b0] [c00000000023f954] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x164 [c0002003591ab330] [c008000004a445f8] kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x4c0/0x510 [kvm] [c0002003591ab3a0] [c008000004a44c18] kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0xa0/0x180 [kvm] [c0002003591ab410] [c008000004ff9bd8] kvmhv_enter_nested_guest+0x90/0xb80 [kvm_hv] [c0002003591ab980] [c008000004fe07bc] kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall+0x7b4/0x1c30 [kvm_hv] [c0002003591aba10] [c008000004fe5d30] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x10a8/0x1a30 [kvm_hv] [c0002003591abae0] [c008000004a5d954] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x4c/0x70 [kvm] [c0002003591abb10] [c008000004a56e54] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x56c/0x7c0 [kvm] [c0002003591abba0] [c008000004a3ddc4] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ac/0xd80 [kvm] [c0002003591abd20] [c0000000006ebb58] ksys_ioctl+0x188/0x210 [c0002003591abd70] [c0000000006ebc28] sys_ioctl+0x48/0xb0 [c0002003591abdb0] [c000000000042764] system_call_exception+0x1d4/0x2e0 [c0002003591abe20] [c00000000000cce8] system_call_common+0xe8/0x214 Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2020-06-09 10:12:29 +08:00
if (rc)
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_ld);
int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
{
struct kvmppc_ops *kvm_ops = NULL;
int r;
/*
* if we have both HV and PR enabled, default is HV
*/
if (type == 0) {
if (kvmppc_hv_ops)
kvm_ops = kvmppc_hv_ops;
else
kvm_ops = kvmppc_pr_ops;
if (!kvm_ops)
goto err_out;
} else if (type == KVM_VM_PPC_HV) {
if (!kvmppc_hv_ops)
goto err_out;
kvm_ops = kvmppc_hv_ops;
} else if (type == KVM_VM_PPC_PR) {
if (!kvmppc_pr_ops)
goto err_out;
kvm_ops = kvmppc_pr_ops;
} else
goto err_out;
if (!try_module_get(kvm_ops->owner))
return -ENOENT;
kvm->arch.kvm_ops = kvm_ops;
r = kvmppc_core_init_vm(kvm);
if (r)
module_put(kvm_ops->owner);
return r;
err_out:
return -EINVAL;
}
void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
/*
* We call kick_all_cpus_sync() to ensure that all
* CPUs have executed any pending IPIs before we
* continue and free VCPUs structures below.
*/
if (is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(kvm))
kick_all_cpus_sync();
#endif
kvm_destroy_vcpus(kvm);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
kvmppc_core_destroy_vm(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
/* drop the module reference */
module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
}
int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
{
int r;
/* Assume we're using HV mode when the HV module is loaded */
int hv_enabled = kvmppc_hv_ops ? 1 : 0;
if (kvm) {
/*
* Hooray - we know which VM type we're running on. Depend on
* that rather than the guess above.
*/
hv_enabled = is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(kvm);
}
switch (ext) {
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
case KVM_CAP_PPC_BOOKE_SREGS:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_BOOKE_WATCHDOG:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_EPR:
#else
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SEGSTATE:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_HIOR:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_PAPR:
#endif
case KVM_CAP_PPC_UNSET_IRQ:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_IRQ_LEVEL:
case KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP:
case KVM_CAP_ONE_REG:
case KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD:
case KVM_CAP_IMMEDIATE_EXIT:
case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG:
KVM: PPC: Add support for Book3S processors in hypervisor mode This adds support for KVM running on 64-bit Book 3S processors, specifically POWER7, in hypervisor mode. Using hypervisor mode means that the guest can use the processor's supervisor mode. That means that the guest can execute privileged instructions and access privileged registers itself without trapping to the host. This gives excellent performance, but does mean that KVM cannot emulate a processor architecture other than the one that the hardware implements. This code assumes that the guest is running paravirtualized using the PAPR (Power Architecture Platform Requirements) interface, which is the interface that IBM's PowerVM hypervisor uses. That means that existing Linux distributions that run on IBM pSeries machines will also run under KVM without modification. In order to communicate the PAPR hypercalls to qemu, this adds a new KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL exit code to include/linux/kvm.h. Currently the choice between book3s_hv support and book3s_pr support (i.e. the existing code, which runs the guest in user mode) has to be made at kernel configuration time, so a given kernel binary can only do one or the other. This new book3s_hv code doesn't support MMIO emulation at present. Since we are running paravirtualized guests, this isn't a serious restriction. With the guest running in supervisor mode, most exceptions go straight to the guest. We will never get data or instruction storage or segment interrupts, alignment interrupts, decrementer interrupts, program interrupts, single-step interrupts, etc., coming to the hypervisor from the guest. Therefore this introduces a new KVMTEST_NONHV macro for the exception entry path so that we don't have to do the KVM test on entry to those exception handlers. We do however get hypervisor decrementer, hypervisor data storage, hypervisor instruction storage, and hypervisor emulation assist interrupts, so we have to handle those. In hypervisor mode, real-mode accesses can access all of RAM, not just a limited amount. Therefore we put all the guest state in the vcpu.arch and use the shadow_vcpu in the PACA only for temporary scratch space. We allocate the vcpu with kzalloc rather than vzalloc, and we don't use anything in the kvmppc_vcpu_book3s struct, so we don't allocate it. We don't have a shared page with the guest, but we still need a kvm_vcpu_arch_shared struct to store the values of various registers, so we include one in the vcpu_arch struct. The POWER7 processor has a restriction that all threads in a core have to be in the same partition. MMU-on kernel code counts as a partition (partition 0), so we have to do a partition switch on every entry to and exit from the guest. At present we require the host and guest to run in single-thread mode because of this hardware restriction. This code allocates a hashed page table for the guest and initializes it with HPTEs for the guest's Virtual Real Memory Area (VRMA). We require that the guest memory is allocated using 16MB huge pages, in order to simplify the low-level memory management. This also means that we can get away without tracking paging activity in the host for now, since huge pages can't be paged or swapped. This also adds a few new exports needed by the book3s_hv code. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:21:34 +08:00
r = 1;
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_GUEST_DEBUG_SSTEP:
KVM: PPC: Add support for Book3S processors in hypervisor mode This adds support for KVM running on 64-bit Book 3S processors, specifically POWER7, in hypervisor mode. Using hypervisor mode means that the guest can use the processor's supervisor mode. That means that the guest can execute privileged instructions and access privileged registers itself without trapping to the host. This gives excellent performance, but does mean that KVM cannot emulate a processor architecture other than the one that the hardware implements. This code assumes that the guest is running paravirtualized using the PAPR (Power Architecture Platform Requirements) interface, which is the interface that IBM's PowerVM hypervisor uses. That means that existing Linux distributions that run on IBM pSeries machines will also run under KVM without modification. In order to communicate the PAPR hypercalls to qemu, this adds a new KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL exit code to include/linux/kvm.h. Currently the choice between book3s_hv support and book3s_pr support (i.e. the existing code, which runs the guest in user mode) has to be made at kernel configuration time, so a given kernel binary can only do one or the other. This new book3s_hv code doesn't support MMIO emulation at present. Since we are running paravirtualized guests, this isn't a serious restriction. With the guest running in supervisor mode, most exceptions go straight to the guest. We will never get data or instruction storage or segment interrupts, alignment interrupts, decrementer interrupts, program interrupts, single-step interrupts, etc., coming to the hypervisor from the guest. Therefore this introduces a new KVMTEST_NONHV macro for the exception entry path so that we don't have to do the KVM test on entry to those exception handlers. We do however get hypervisor decrementer, hypervisor data storage, hypervisor instruction storage, and hypervisor emulation assist interrupts, so we have to handle those. In hypervisor mode, real-mode accesses can access all of RAM, not just a limited amount. Therefore we put all the guest state in the vcpu.arch and use the shadow_vcpu in the PACA only for temporary scratch space. We allocate the vcpu with kzalloc rather than vzalloc, and we don't use anything in the kvmppc_vcpu_book3s struct, so we don't allocate it. We don't have a shared page with the guest, but we still need a kvm_vcpu_arch_shared struct to store the values of various registers, so we include one in the vcpu_arch struct. The POWER7 processor has a restriction that all threads in a core have to be in the same partition. MMU-on kernel code counts as a partition (partition 0), so we have to do a partition switch on every entry to and exit from the guest. At present we require the host and guest to run in single-thread mode because of this hardware restriction. This code allocates a hashed page table for the guest and initializes it with HPTEs for the guest's Virtual Real Memory Area (VRMA). We require that the guest memory is allocated using 16MB huge pages, in order to simplify the low-level memory management. This also means that we can get away without tracking paging activity in the host for now, since huge pages can't be paged or swapped. This also adds a few new exports needed by the book3s_hv code. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:21:34 +08:00
case KVM_CAP_PPC_PAIRED_SINGLES:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_OSI:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_PVINFO:
#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500V2) || defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500MC)
case KVM_CAP_SW_TLB:
#endif
/* We support this only for PR */
r = !hv_enabled;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MPIC
case KVM_CAP_IRQ_MPIC:
r = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
case KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE:
case KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE_64:
r = 1;
break;
KVM: PPC: VFIO: Add in-kernel acceleration for VFIO This allows the host kernel to handle H_PUT_TCE, H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT and H_STUFF_TCE requests targeted an IOMMU TCE table used for VFIO without passing them to user space which saves time on switching to user space and back. This adds H_PUT_TCE/H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT/H_STUFF_TCE handlers to KVM. KVM tries to handle a TCE request in the real mode, if failed it passes the request to the virtual mode to complete the operation. If it a virtual mode handler fails, the request is passed to the user space; this is not expected to happen though. To avoid dealing with page use counters (which is tricky in real mode), this only accelerates SPAPR TCE IOMMU v2 clients which are required to pre-register the userspace memory. The very first TCE request will be handled in the VFIO SPAPR TCE driver anyway as the userspace view of the TCE table (iommu_table::it_userspace) is not allocated till the very first mapping happens and we cannot call vmalloc in real mode. If we fail to update a hardware IOMMU table unexpected reason, we just clear it and move on as there is nothing really we can do about it - for example, if we hot plug a VFIO device to a guest, existing TCE tables will be mirrored automatically to the hardware and there is no interface to report to the guest about possible failures. This adds new attribute - KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_SET_SPAPR_TCE - to the VFIO KVM device. It takes a VFIO group fd and SPAPR TCE table fd and associates a physical IOMMU table with the SPAPR TCE table (which is a guest view of the hardware IOMMU table). The iommu_table object is cached and referenced so we do not have to look up for it in real mode. This does not implement the UNSET counterpart as there is no use for it - once the acceleration is enabled, the existing userspace won't disable it unless a VFIO container is destroyed; this adds necessary cleanup to the KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_DEL handler. This advertises the new KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE_VFIO capability to the user space. This adds real mode version of WARN_ON_ONCE() as the generic version causes problems with rcu_sched. Since we testing what vmalloc_to_phys() returns in the code, this also adds a check for already existing vmalloc_to_phys() call in kvmppc_rm_h_put_tce_indirect(). This finally makes use of vfio_external_user_iommu_id() which was introduced quite some time ago and was considered for removal. Tests show that this patch increases transmission speed from 220MB/s to 750..1020MB/s on 10Gb network (Chelsea CXGB3 10Gb ethernet card). Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2017-03-22 12:21:56 +08:00
case KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE_VFIO:
r = !!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE);
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_RTAS:
case KVM_CAP_PPC_FIXUP_HCALL:
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Controls for in-kernel sPAPR hypercall handling This provides a way for userspace controls which sPAPR hcalls get handled in the kernel. Each hcall can be individually enabled or disabled for in-kernel handling, except for H_RTAS. The exception for H_RTAS is because userspace can already control whether individual RTAS functions are handled in-kernel or not via the KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN ioctl, and because the numeric value for H_RTAS is out of the normal sequence of hcall numbers. Hcalls are enabled or disabled using the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl for the KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability on the file descriptor for the VM. The args field of the struct kvm_enable_cap specifies the hcall number in args[0] and the enable/disable flag in args[1]; 0 means disable in-kernel handling (so that the hcall will always cause an exit to userspace) and 1 means enable. Enabling or disabling in-kernel handling of an hcall is effective across the whole VM. The ability for KVM_ENABLE_CAP to be used on a VM file descriptor on PowerPC is new, added by this commit. The KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM capability advertises that this ability exists. When a VM is created, an initial set of hcalls are enabled for in-kernel handling. The set that is enabled is the set that have an in-kernel implementation at this point. Any new hcall implementations from this point onwards should not be added to the default set without a good reason. No distinction is made between real-mode and virtual-mode hcall implementations; the one setting controls them both. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-06-02 09:02:59 +08:00
case KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL:
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
case KVM_CAP_IRQ_XICS:
#endif
case KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR:
r = 1;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XIVE
case KVM_CAP_PPC_IRQ_XIVE:
/*
* We need XIVE to be enabled on the platform (implies
* a POWER9 processor) and the PowerNV platform, as
* nested is not yet supported.
*/
r = xive_enabled() && !!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE) &&
kvmppc_xive_native_supported();
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQCHIP
case KVM_CAP_IRQFD_RESAMPLE:
r = !xive_enabled();
break;
#endif
case KVM_CAP_PPC_ALLOC_HTAB:
r = hv_enabled;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
KVM: PPC: Allow book3s_hv guests to use SMT processor modes This lifts the restriction that book3s_hv guests can only run one hardware thread per core, and allows them to use up to 4 threads per core on POWER7. The host still has to run single-threaded. This capability is advertised to qemu through a new KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability. The return value of the ioctl querying this capability is the number of vcpus per virtual CPU core (vcore), currently 4. To use this, the host kernel should be booted with all threads active, and then all the secondary threads should be offlined. This will put the secondary threads into nap mode. KVM will then wake them from nap mode and use them for running guest code (while they are still offline). To wake the secondary threads, we send them an IPI using a new xics_wake_cpu() function, implemented in arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-native.c. In other words, at this stage we assume that the platform has a XICS interrupt controller and we are using icp-native.c to drive it. Since the woken thread will need to acknowledge and clear the IPI, we also export the base physical address of the XICS registers using kvmppc_set_xics_phys() for use in the low-level KVM book3s code. When a vcpu is created, it is assigned to a virtual CPU core. The vcore number is obtained by dividing the vcpu number by the number of threads per core in the host. This number is exported to userspace via the KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability. If qemu wishes to run the guest in single-threaded mode, it should make all vcpu numbers be multiples of the number of threads per core. We distinguish three states of a vcpu: runnable (i.e., ready to execute the guest), blocked (that is, idle), and busy in host. We currently implement a policy that the vcore can run only when all its threads are runnable or blocked. This way, if a vcpu needs to execute elsewhere in the kernel or in qemu, it can do so without being starved of CPU by the other vcpus. When a vcore starts to run, it executes in the context of one of the vcpu threads. The other vcpu threads all go to sleep and stay asleep until something happens requiring the vcpu thread to return to qemu, or to wake up to run the vcore (this can happen when another vcpu thread goes from busy in host state to blocked). It can happen that a vcpu goes from blocked to runnable state (e.g. because of an interrupt), and the vcore it belongs to is already running. In that case it can start to run immediately as long as the none of the vcpus in the vcore have started to exit the guest. We send the next free thread in the vcore an IPI to get it to start to execute the guest. It synchronizes with the other threads via the vcore->entry_exit_count field to make sure that it doesn't go into the guest if the other vcpus are exiting by the time that it is ready to actually enter the guest. Note that there is no fixed relationship between the hardware thread number and the vcpu number. Hardware threads are assigned to vcpus as they become runnable, so we will always use the lower-numbered hardware threads in preference to higher-numbered threads if not all the vcpus in the vcore are runnable, regardless of which vcpus are runnable. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:23:08 +08:00
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Treat POWER9 CPU threads as independent subcores With POWER9, each CPU thread has its own MMU context and can be in the host or a guest independently of the other threads; there is still however a restriction that all threads must use the same type of address translation, either radix tree or hashed page table (HPT). Since we only support HPT guests on a HPT host at this point, we can treat the threads as being independent, and avoid all of the work of coordinating the CPU threads. To make this simpler, we introduce a new threads_per_vcore() function that returns 1 on POWER9 and threads_per_subcore on POWER7/8, and use that instead of threads_per_subcore or threads_per_core in various places. This also changes the value of the KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability on POWER9 systems from 4 to 1, so that userspace will not try to create VMs with multiple vcpus per vcore. (If userspace did create a VM that thought it was in an SMT mode, the VM might try to use the msgsndp instruction, which will not work as expected. In future it may be possible to trap and emulate msgsndp in order to allow VMs to think they are in an SMT mode, if only for the purpose of allowing migration from POWER8 systems.) With all this, we can now run guests on POWER9 as long as the host is running with HPT translation. Since userspace currently has no way to request radix tree translation for the guest, the guest has no choice but to use HPT translation. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2016-11-18 14:43:30 +08:00
r = 0;
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Virtualize doorbell facility on POWER9 On POWER9, we no longer have the restriction that we had on POWER8 where all threads in a core have to be in the same partition, so the CPU threads are now independent. However, we still want to be able to run guests with a virtual SMT topology, if only to allow migration of guests from POWER8 systems to POWER9. A guest that has a virtual SMT mode greater than 1 will expect to be able to use the doorbell facility; it will expect the msgsndp and msgclrp instructions to work appropriately and to be able to read sensible values from the TIR (thread identification register) and DPDES (directed privileged doorbell exception status) special-purpose registers. However, since each CPU thread is a separate sub-processor in POWER9, these instructions and registers can only be used within a single CPU thread. In order for these instructions to appear to act correctly according to the guest's virtual SMT mode, we have to trap and emulate them. We cause them to trap by clearing the HFSCR_MSGP bit in the HFSCR register. The emulation is triggered by the hypervisor facility unavailable interrupt that occurs when the guest uses them. To cause a doorbell interrupt to occur within the guest, we set the DPDES register to 1. If the guest has interrupts enabled, the CPU will generate a doorbell interrupt and clear the DPDES register in hardware. The DPDES hardware register for the guest is saved in the vcpu->arch.vcore->dpdes field. Since this gets written by the guest exit code, other VCPUs wishing to cause a doorbell interrupt don't write that field directly, but instead set a vcpu->arch.doorbell_request flag. This is consumed and set to 0 by the guest entry code, which then sets DPDES to 1. Emulating reads of the DPDES register is somewhat involved, because it requires reading the doorbell pending interrupt status of all of the VCPU threads in the virtual core, and if any of those VCPUs are running, their doorbell status is only up-to-date in the hardware DPDES registers of the CPUs where they are running. In order to get a reasonable approximation of the current doorbell status, we send those CPUs an IPI, causing an exit from the guest which will update the vcpu->arch.vcore->dpdes field. We then use that value in constructing the emulated DPDES register value. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2017-05-16 14:41:20 +08:00
if (kvm) {
if (kvm->arch.emul_smt_mode > 1)
r = kvm->arch.emul_smt_mode;
else
r = kvm->arch.smt_mode;
} else if (hv_enabled) {
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Treat POWER9 CPU threads as independent subcores With POWER9, each CPU thread has its own MMU context and can be in the host or a guest independently of the other threads; there is still however a restriction that all threads must use the same type of address translation, either radix tree or hashed page table (HPT). Since we only support HPT guests on a HPT host at this point, we can treat the threads as being independent, and avoid all of the work of coordinating the CPU threads. To make this simpler, we introduce a new threads_per_vcore() function that returns 1 on POWER9 and threads_per_subcore on POWER7/8, and use that instead of threads_per_subcore or threads_per_core in various places. This also changes the value of the KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability on POWER9 systems from 4 to 1, so that userspace will not try to create VMs with multiple vcpus per vcore. (If userspace did create a VM that thought it was in an SMT mode, the VM might try to use the msgsndp instruction, which will not work as expected. In future it may be possible to trap and emulate msgsndp in order to allow VMs to think they are in an SMT mode, if only for the purpose of allowing migration from POWER8 systems.) With all this, we can now run guests on POWER9 as long as the host is running with HPT translation. Since userspace currently has no way to request radix tree translation for the guest, the guest has no choice but to use HPT translation. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2016-11-18 14:43:30 +08:00
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
r = 1;
else
r = threads_per_subcore;
}
KVM: PPC: Allow book3s_hv guests to use SMT processor modes This lifts the restriction that book3s_hv guests can only run one hardware thread per core, and allows them to use up to 4 threads per core on POWER7. The host still has to run single-threaded. This capability is advertised to qemu through a new KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability. The return value of the ioctl querying this capability is the number of vcpus per virtual CPU core (vcore), currently 4. To use this, the host kernel should be booted with all threads active, and then all the secondary threads should be offlined. This will put the secondary threads into nap mode. KVM will then wake them from nap mode and use them for running guest code (while they are still offline). To wake the secondary threads, we send them an IPI using a new xics_wake_cpu() function, implemented in arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/icp-native.c. In other words, at this stage we assume that the platform has a XICS interrupt controller and we are using icp-native.c to drive it. Since the woken thread will need to acknowledge and clear the IPI, we also export the base physical address of the XICS registers using kvmppc_set_xics_phys() for use in the low-level KVM book3s code. When a vcpu is created, it is assigned to a virtual CPU core. The vcore number is obtained by dividing the vcpu number by the number of threads per core in the host. This number is exported to userspace via the KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability. If qemu wishes to run the guest in single-threaded mode, it should make all vcpu numbers be multiples of the number of threads per core. We distinguish three states of a vcpu: runnable (i.e., ready to execute the guest), blocked (that is, idle), and busy in host. We currently implement a policy that the vcore can run only when all its threads are runnable or blocked. This way, if a vcpu needs to execute elsewhere in the kernel or in qemu, it can do so without being starved of CPU by the other vcpus. When a vcore starts to run, it executes in the context of one of the vcpu threads. The other vcpu threads all go to sleep and stay asleep until something happens requiring the vcpu thread to return to qemu, or to wake up to run the vcore (this can happen when another vcpu thread goes from busy in host state to blocked). It can happen that a vcpu goes from blocked to runnable state (e.g. because of an interrupt), and the vcore it belongs to is already running. In that case it can start to run immediately as long as the none of the vcpus in the vcore have started to exit the guest. We send the next free thread in the vcore an IPI to get it to start to execute the guest. It synchronizes with the other threads via the vcore->entry_exit_count field to make sure that it doesn't go into the guest if the other vcpus are exiting by the time that it is ready to actually enter the guest. Note that there is no fixed relationship between the hardware thread number and the vcpu number. Hardware threads are assigned to vcpus as they become runnable, so we will always use the lower-numbered hardware threads in preference to higher-numbered threads if not all the vcpus in the vcore are runnable, regardless of which vcpus are runnable. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:23:08 +08:00
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT_POSSIBLE:
r = 1;
if (hv_enabled) {
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
r = ((threads_per_subcore << 1) - 1);
else
/* P9 can emulate dbells, so allow any mode */
r = 8 | 4 | 2 | 1;
}
break;
KVM: PPC: Allocate RMAs (Real Mode Areas) at boot for use by guests This adds infrastructure which will be needed to allow book3s_hv KVM to run on older POWER processors, including PPC970, which don't support the Virtual Real Mode Area (VRMA) facility, but only the Real Mode Offset (RMO) facility. These processors require a physically contiguous, aligned area of memory for each guest. When the guest does an access in real mode (MMU off), the address is compared against a limit value, and if it is lower, the address is ORed with an offset value (from the Real Mode Offset Register (RMOR)) and the result becomes the real address for the access. The size of the RMA has to be one of a set of supported values, which usually includes 64MB, 128MB, 256MB and some larger powers of 2. Since we are unlikely to be able to allocate 64MB or more of physically contiguous memory after the kernel has been running for a while, we allocate a pool of RMAs at boot time using the bootmem allocator. The size and number of the RMAs can be set using the kvm_rma_size=xx and kvm_rma_count=xx kernel command line options. KVM exports a new capability, KVM_CAP_PPC_RMA, to signal the availability of the pool of preallocated RMAs. The capability value is 1 if the processor can use an RMA but doesn't require one (because it supports the VRMA facility), or 2 if the processor requires an RMA for each guest. This adds a new ioctl, KVM_ALLOCATE_RMA, which allocates an RMA from the pool and returns a file descriptor which can be used to map the RMA. It also returns the size of the RMA in the argument structure. Having an RMA means we will get multiple KMV_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl calls from userspace. To cope with this, we now preallocate the kvm->arch.ram_pginfo array when the VM is created with a size sufficient for up to 64GB of guest memory. Subsequently we will get rid of this array and use memory associated with each memslot instead. This moves most of the code that translates the user addresses into host pfns (page frame numbers) out of kvmppc_prepare_vrma up one level to kvmppc_core_prepare_memory_region. Also, instead of having to look up the VMA for each page in order to check the page size, we now check that the pages we get are compound pages of 16MB. However, if we are adding memory that is mapped to an RMA, we don't bother with calling get_user_pages_fast and instead just offset from the base pfn for the RMA. Typically the RMA gets added after vcpus are created, which makes it inconvenient to have the LPCR (logical partition control register) value in the vcpu->arch struct, since the LPCR controls whether the processor uses RMA or VRMA for the guest. This moves the LPCR value into the kvm->arch struct and arranges for the MER (mediated external request) bit, which is the only bit that varies between vcpus, to be set in assembly code when going into the guest if there is a pending external interrupt request. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:25:44 +08:00
case KVM_CAP_PPC_RMA:
r = 0;
KVM: PPC: Allocate RMAs (Real Mode Areas) at boot for use by guests This adds infrastructure which will be needed to allow book3s_hv KVM to run on older POWER processors, including PPC970, which don't support the Virtual Real Mode Area (VRMA) facility, but only the Real Mode Offset (RMO) facility. These processors require a physically contiguous, aligned area of memory for each guest. When the guest does an access in real mode (MMU off), the address is compared against a limit value, and if it is lower, the address is ORed with an offset value (from the Real Mode Offset Register (RMOR)) and the result becomes the real address for the access. The size of the RMA has to be one of a set of supported values, which usually includes 64MB, 128MB, 256MB and some larger powers of 2. Since we are unlikely to be able to allocate 64MB or more of physically contiguous memory after the kernel has been running for a while, we allocate a pool of RMAs at boot time using the bootmem allocator. The size and number of the RMAs can be set using the kvm_rma_size=xx and kvm_rma_count=xx kernel command line options. KVM exports a new capability, KVM_CAP_PPC_RMA, to signal the availability of the pool of preallocated RMAs. The capability value is 1 if the processor can use an RMA but doesn't require one (because it supports the VRMA facility), or 2 if the processor requires an RMA for each guest. This adds a new ioctl, KVM_ALLOCATE_RMA, which allocates an RMA from the pool and returns a file descriptor which can be used to map the RMA. It also returns the size of the RMA in the argument structure. Having an RMA means we will get multiple KMV_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl calls from userspace. To cope with this, we now preallocate the kvm->arch.ram_pginfo array when the VM is created with a size sufficient for up to 64GB of guest memory. Subsequently we will get rid of this array and use memory associated with each memslot instead. This moves most of the code that translates the user addresses into host pfns (page frame numbers) out of kvmppc_prepare_vrma up one level to kvmppc_core_prepare_memory_region. Also, instead of having to look up the VMA for each page in order to check the page size, we now check that the pages we get are compound pages of 16MB. However, if we are adding memory that is mapped to an RMA, we don't bother with calling get_user_pages_fast and instead just offset from the base pfn for the RMA. Typically the RMA gets added after vcpus are created, which makes it inconvenient to have the LPCR (logical partition control register) value in the vcpu->arch struct, since the LPCR controls whether the processor uses RMA or VRMA for the guest. This moves the LPCR value into the kvm->arch struct and arranges for the MER (mediated external request) bit, which is the only bit that varies between vcpus, to be set in assembly code when going into the guest if there is a pending external interrupt request. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:25:44 +08:00
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_HWRNG:
r = kvmppc_hwrng_present();
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIX:
r = !!(hv_enabled && radix_enabled());
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3:
r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->hash_v3_possible &&
kvmppc_hv_ops->hash_v3_possible());
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV:
r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_nested &&
!kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_nested(NULL));
break;
#endif
case KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU:
BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER));
r = 1;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Provide a method for userspace to read and write the HPT A new ioctl, KVM_PPC_GET_HTAB_FD, returns a file descriptor. Reads on this fd return the contents of the HPT (hashed page table), writes create and/or remove entries in the HPT. There is a new capability, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTAB_FD, to indicate the presence of the ioctl. The ioctl takes an argument structure with the index of the first HPT entry to read out and a set of flags. The flags indicate whether the user is intending to read or write the HPT, and whether to return all entries or only the "bolted" entries (those with the bolted bit, 0x10, set in the first doubleword). This is intended for use in implementing qemu's savevm/loadvm and for live migration. Therefore, on reads, the first pass returns information about all HPTEs (or all bolted HPTEs). When the first pass reaches the end of the HPT, it returns from the read. Subsequent reads only return information about HPTEs that have changed since they were last read. A read that finds no changed HPTEs in the HPT following where the last read finished will return 0 bytes. The format of the data provides a simple run-length compression of the invalid entries. Each block of data starts with a header that indicates the index (position in the HPT, which is just an array), the number of valid entries starting at that index (may be zero), and the number of invalid entries following those valid entries. The valid entries, 16 bytes each, follow the header. The invalid entries are not explicitly represented. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> [agraf: fix documentation] Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2012-11-20 06:57:20 +08:00
case KVM_CAP_PPC_HTAB_FD:
r = hv_enabled;
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Provide a method for userspace to read and write the HPT A new ioctl, KVM_PPC_GET_HTAB_FD, returns a file descriptor. Reads on this fd return the contents of the HPT (hashed page table), writes create and/or remove entries in the HPT. There is a new capability, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTAB_FD, to indicate the presence of the ioctl. The ioctl takes an argument structure with the index of the first HPT entry to read out and a set of flags. The flags indicate whether the user is intending to read or write the HPT, and whether to return all entries or only the "bolted" entries (those with the bolted bit, 0x10, set in the first doubleword). This is intended for use in implementing qemu's savevm/loadvm and for live migration. Therefore, on reads, the first pass returns information about all HPTEs (or all bolted HPTEs). When the first pass reaches the end of the HPT, it returns from the read. Subsequent reads only return information about HPTEs that have changed since they were last read. A read that finds no changed HPTEs in the HPT following where the last read finished will return 0 bytes. The format of the data provides a simple run-length compression of the invalid entries. Each block of data starts with a header that indicates the index (position in the HPT, which is just an array), the number of valid entries starting at that index (may be zero), and the number of invalid entries following those valid entries. The valid entries, 16 bytes each, follow the header. The invalid entries are not explicitly represented. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> [agraf: fix documentation] Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2012-11-20 06:57:20 +08:00
break;
KVM: PPC: Add support for Book3S processors in hypervisor mode This adds support for KVM running on 64-bit Book 3S processors, specifically POWER7, in hypervisor mode. Using hypervisor mode means that the guest can use the processor's supervisor mode. That means that the guest can execute privileged instructions and access privileged registers itself without trapping to the host. This gives excellent performance, but does mean that KVM cannot emulate a processor architecture other than the one that the hardware implements. This code assumes that the guest is running paravirtualized using the PAPR (Power Architecture Platform Requirements) interface, which is the interface that IBM's PowerVM hypervisor uses. That means that existing Linux distributions that run on IBM pSeries machines will also run under KVM without modification. In order to communicate the PAPR hypercalls to qemu, this adds a new KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL exit code to include/linux/kvm.h. Currently the choice between book3s_hv support and book3s_pr support (i.e. the existing code, which runs the guest in user mode) has to be made at kernel configuration time, so a given kernel binary can only do one or the other. This new book3s_hv code doesn't support MMIO emulation at present. Since we are running paravirtualized guests, this isn't a serious restriction. With the guest running in supervisor mode, most exceptions go straight to the guest. We will never get data or instruction storage or segment interrupts, alignment interrupts, decrementer interrupts, program interrupts, single-step interrupts, etc., coming to the hypervisor from the guest. Therefore this introduces a new KVMTEST_NONHV macro for the exception entry path so that we don't have to do the KVM test on entry to those exception handlers. We do however get hypervisor decrementer, hypervisor data storage, hypervisor instruction storage, and hypervisor emulation assist interrupts, so we have to handle those. In hypervisor mode, real-mode accesses can access all of RAM, not just a limited amount. Therefore we put all the guest state in the vcpu.arch and use the shadow_vcpu in the PACA only for temporary scratch space. We allocate the vcpu with kzalloc rather than vzalloc, and we don't use anything in the kvmppc_vcpu_book3s struct, so we don't allocate it. We don't have a shared page with the guest, but we still need a kvm_vcpu_arch_shared struct to store the values of various registers, so we include one in the vcpu_arch struct. The POWER7 processor has a restriction that all threads in a core have to be in the same partition. MMU-on kernel code counts as a partition (partition 0), so we have to do a partition switch on every entry to and exit from the guest. At present we require the host and guest to run in single-thread mode because of this hardware restriction. This code allocates a hashed page table for the guest and initializes it with HPTEs for the guest's Virtual Real Memory Area (VRMA). We require that the guest memory is allocated using 16MB huge pages, in order to simplify the low-level memory management. This also means that we can get away without tracking paging activity in the host for now, since huge pages can't be paged or swapped. This also adds a few new exports needed by the book3s_hv code. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:21:34 +08:00
#endif
case KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS:
/*
* Recommending a number of CPUs is somewhat arbitrary; we
* return the number of present CPUs for -HV (since a host
* will have secondary threads "offline"), and for other KVM
* implementations just count online CPUs.
*/
if (hv_enabled)
r = min_t(unsigned int, num_present_cpus(), KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
else
r = min_t(unsigned int, num_online_cpus(), KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
break;
case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
break;
case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
case KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO:
r = 1;
break;
case KVM_CAP_SPAPR_MULTITCE:
r = 1;
break;
case KVM_CAP_SPAPR_RESIZE_HPT:
r = !!hv_enabled;
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
case KVM_CAP_PPC_FWNMI:
r = hv_enabled;
break;
#endif
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9 POWER9 has hardware bugs relating to transactional memory and thread reconfiguration (changes to hardware SMT mode). Specifically, the core does not have enough storage to store a complete checkpoint of all the architected state for all four threads. The DD2.2 version of POWER9 includes hardware modifications designed to allow hypervisor software to implement workarounds for these problems. This patch implements those workarounds in KVM code so that KVM guests see a full, working transactional memory implementation. The problems center around the use of TM suspended state, where the CPU has a checkpointed state but execution is not transactional. The workaround is to implement a "fake suspend" state, which looks to the guest like suspended state but the CPU does not store a checkpoint. In this state, any instruction that would cause a transition to transactional state (rfid, rfebb, mtmsrd, tresume) or would use the checkpointed state (treclaim) causes a "soft patch" interrupt (vector 0x1500) to the hypervisor so that it can be emulated. The trechkpt instruction also causes a soft patch interrupt. On POWER9 DD2.2, we avoid returning to the guest in any state which would require a checkpoint to be present. The trechkpt in the guest entry path which would normally create that checkpoint is replaced by either a transition to fake suspend state, if the guest is in suspend state, or a rollback to the pre-transactional state if the guest is in transactional state. Fake suspend state is indicated by a flag in the PACA plus a new bit in the PSSCR. The new PSSCR bit is write-only and reads back as 0. On exit from the guest, if the guest is in fake suspend state, we still do the treclaim instruction as we would in real suspend state, in order to get into non-transactional state, but we do not save the resulting register state since there was no checkpoint. Emulation of the instructions that cause a softpatch interrupt is handled in two paths. If the guest is in real suspend mode, we call kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early() to handle the cases where the guest is transitioning to transactional state. This is called before we do the treclaim in the guest exit path; because we haven't done treclaim, we can get back to the guest with the transaction still active. If the instruction is a case that kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early() doesn't handle, or if the guest is in fake suspend state, then we proceed to do the complete guest exit path and subsequently call kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation() in host context with the MMU on. This handles all the cases including the cases that generate program interrupts (illegal instruction or TM Bad Thing) and facility unavailable interrupts. The emulation is reasonably straightforward and is mostly concerned with checking for exception conditions and updating the state of registers such as MSR and CR0. The treclaim emulation takes care to ensure that the TEXASR register gets updated as if it were the guest treclaim instruction that had done failure recording, not the treclaim done in hypervisor state in the guest exit path. With this, the KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM capability returns true (1) even if transactional memory is not available to host userspace. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-03-21 18:32:01 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
case KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM:
r = !!(cur_cpu_spec->cpu_user_features2 & PPC_FEATURE2_HTM) ||
(hv_enabled && cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST));
break;
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE)
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST:
r = hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_svm &&
!kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_svm(NULL);
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1:
r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_dawr1 &&
!kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_dawr1(NULL));
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_RPT_INVALIDATE:
r = 1;
break;
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9 POWER9 has hardware bugs relating to transactional memory and thread reconfiguration (changes to hardware SMT mode). Specifically, the core does not have enough storage to store a complete checkpoint of all the architected state for all four threads. The DD2.2 version of POWER9 includes hardware modifications designed to allow hypervisor software to implement workarounds for these problems. This patch implements those workarounds in KVM code so that KVM guests see a full, working transactional memory implementation. The problems center around the use of TM suspended state, where the CPU has a checkpointed state but execution is not transactional. The workaround is to implement a "fake suspend" state, which looks to the guest like suspended state but the CPU does not store a checkpoint. In this state, any instruction that would cause a transition to transactional state (rfid, rfebb, mtmsrd, tresume) or would use the checkpointed state (treclaim) causes a "soft patch" interrupt (vector 0x1500) to the hypervisor so that it can be emulated. The trechkpt instruction also causes a soft patch interrupt. On POWER9 DD2.2, we avoid returning to the guest in any state which would require a checkpoint to be present. The trechkpt in the guest entry path which would normally create that checkpoint is replaced by either a transition to fake suspend state, if the guest is in suspend state, or a rollback to the pre-transactional state if the guest is in transactional state. Fake suspend state is indicated by a flag in the PACA plus a new bit in the PSSCR. The new PSSCR bit is write-only and reads back as 0. On exit from the guest, if the guest is in fake suspend state, we still do the treclaim instruction as we would in real suspend state, in order to get into non-transactional state, but we do not save the resulting register state since there was no checkpoint. Emulation of the instructions that cause a softpatch interrupt is handled in two paths. If the guest is in real suspend mode, we call kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early() to handle the cases where the guest is transitioning to transactional state. This is called before we do the treclaim in the guest exit path; because we haven't done treclaim, we can get back to the guest with the transaction still active. If the instruction is a case that kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early() doesn't handle, or if the guest is in fake suspend state, then we proceed to do the complete guest exit path and subsequently call kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation() in host context with the MMU on. This handles all the cases including the cases that generate program interrupts (illegal instruction or TM Bad Thing) and facility unavailable interrupts. The emulation is reasonably straightforward and is mostly concerned with checking for exception conditions and updating the state of registers such as MSR and CR0. The treclaim emulation takes care to ensure that the TEXASR register gets updated as if it were the guest treclaim instruction that had done failure recording, not the treclaim done in hypervisor state in the guest exit path. With this, the KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM capability returns true (1) even if transactional memory is not available to host userspace. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-03-21 18:32:01 +08:00
#endif
case KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3:
r = 0;
/*
* KVM PR, POWER7, and some POWER9s don't support AIL=3 mode.
* The POWER9s can support it if the guest runs in hash mode,
* but QEMU doesn't necessarily query the capability in time.
*/
if (hv_enabled) {
if (kvmhv_on_pseries()) {
if (pseries_reloc_on_exception())
r = 1;
} else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) &&
!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_P9_RADIX_PREFETCH_BUG)) {
r = 1;
}
}
break;
default:
r = 0;
break;
}
return r;
}
long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
void kvm_arch_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
kvmppc_core_free_memslot(kvm, slot);
}
int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *old,
struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
return kvmppc_core_prepare_memory_region(kvm, old, new, change);
}
void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *old,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
kvmppc_core_commit_memory_region(kvm, old, new, change);
}
void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
kvmppc_core_flush_memslot(kvm, slot);
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
return 0;
}
static enum hrtimer_restart kvmppc_decrementer_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
vcpu = container_of(timer, struct kvm_vcpu, arch.dec_timer);
kvmppc_decrementer_func(vcpu);
return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int err;
hrtimer_init(&vcpu->arch.dec_timer, CLOCK_REALTIME, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
vcpu->arch.dec_timer.function = kvmppc_decrementer_wakeup;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXIT_TIMING
mutex_init(&vcpu->arch.exit_timing_lock);
#endif
err = kvmppc_subarch_vcpu_init(vcpu);
if (err)
return err;
err = kvmppc_core_vcpu_create(vcpu);
if (err)
goto out_vcpu_uninit;
rcuwait_init(&vcpu->arch.wait);
vcpu->arch.waitp = &vcpu->arch.wait;
return 0;
out_vcpu_uninit:
kvmppc_subarch_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
return err;
}
void kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
}
void kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* Make sure we're not using the vcpu anymore */
hrtimer_cancel(&vcpu->arch.dec_timer);
switch (vcpu->arch.irq_type) {
case KVMPPC_IRQ_MPIC:
kvmppc_mpic_disconnect_vcpu(vcpu->arch.mpic, vcpu);
break;
case KVMPPC_IRQ_XICS:
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Allow XICS emulation to work in nested hosts using XIVE Currently, the KVM code assumes that if the host kernel is using the XIVE interrupt controller (the new interrupt controller that first appeared in POWER9 systems), then the in-kernel XICS emulation will use the XIVE hardware to deliver interrupts to the guest. However, this only works when the host is running in hypervisor mode and has full access to all of the XIVE functionality. It doesn't work in any nested virtualization scenario, either with PR KVM or nested-HV KVM, because the XICS-on-XIVE code calls directly into the native-XIVE routines, which are not initialized and cannot function correctly because they use OPAL calls, and OPAL is not available in a guest. This means that using the in-kernel XICS emulation in a nested hypervisor that is using XIVE as its interrupt controller will cause a (nested) host kernel crash. To fix this, we change most of the places where the current code calls xive_enabled() to select between the XICS-on-XIVE emulation and the plain XICS emulation to call a new function, xics_on_xive(), which returns false in a guest. However, there is a further twist. The plain XICS emulation has some functions which are used in real mode and access the underlying XICS controller (the interrupt controller of the host) directly. In the case of a nested hypervisor, this means doing XICS hypercalls directly. When the nested host is using XIVE as its interrupt controller, these hypercalls will fail. Therefore this also adds checks in the places where the XICS emulation wants to access the underlying interrupt controller directly, and if that is XIVE, makes the code use the virtual mode fallback paths, which call generic kernel infrastructure rather than doing direct XICS access. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2019-02-04 19:07:20 +08:00
if (xics_on_xive())
kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu(vcpu);
else
kvmppc_xics_free_icp(vcpu);
break;
case KVMPPC_IRQ_XIVE:
kvmppc_xive_native_cleanup_vcpu(vcpu);
break;
}
kvmppc_core_vcpu_free(vcpu);
kvmppc_subarch_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
}
int kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvmppc_core_pending_dec(vcpu);
}
void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
/*
* vrsave (formerly usprg0) isn't used by Linux, but may
* be used by the guest.
*
* On non-booke this is associated with Altivec and
* is handled by code in book3s.c.
*/
mtspr(SPRN_VRSAVE, vcpu->arch.vrsave);
#endif
kvmppc_core_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvmppc_core_vcpu_put(vcpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
vcpu->arch.vrsave = mfspr(SPRN_VRSAVE);
#endif
}
/*
* irq_bypass_add_producer and irq_bypass_del_producer are only
* useful if the architecture supports PCI passthrough.
* irq_bypass_stop and irq_bypass_start are not needed and so
* kvm_ops are not defined for them.
*/
bool kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass(void)
{
return ((kvmppc_hv_ops && kvmppc_hv_ops->irq_bypass_add_producer) ||
(kvmppc_pr_ops && kvmppc_pr_ops->irq_bypass_add_producer));
}
int kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd =
container_of(cons, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd, consumer);
struct kvm *kvm = irqfd->kvm;
if (kvm->arch.kvm_ops->irq_bypass_add_producer)
return kvm->arch.kvm_ops->irq_bypass_add_producer(cons, prod);
return 0;
}
void kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd =
container_of(cons, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd, consumer);
struct kvm *kvm = irqfd->kvm;
if (kvm->arch.kvm_ops->irq_bypass_del_producer)
kvm->arch.kvm_ops->irq_bypass_del_producer(cons, prod);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
static inline int kvmppc_get_vsr_dword_offset(int index)
{
int offset;
if ((index != 0) && (index != 1))
return -1;
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
offset = index;
#else
offset = 1 - index;
#endif
return offset;
}
static inline int kvmppc_get_vsr_word_offset(int index)
{
int offset;
if ((index > 3) || (index < 0))
return -1;
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
offset = index;
#else
offset = 3 - index;
#endif
return offset;
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vsr_dword(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 gpr)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vsr_dword_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (offset == -1)
return;
if (index >= 32) {
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
val.vsxval[offset] = gpr;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
} else {
kvmppc_set_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, offset, gpr);
}
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vsr_dword_dump(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 gpr)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (index >= 32) {
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
val.vsxval[0] = gpr;
val.vsxval[1] = gpr;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
} else {
kvmppc_set_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, 0, gpr);
kvmppc_set_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, 1, gpr);
}
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vsr_word_dump(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 gpr)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (index >= 32) {
val.vsx32val[0] = gpr;
val.vsx32val[1] = gpr;
val.vsx32val[2] = gpr;
val.vsx32val[3] = gpr;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
} else {
val.vsx32val[0] = gpr;
val.vsx32val[1] = gpr;
kvmppc_set_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, 0, val.vsxval[0]);
kvmppc_set_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, 1, val.vsxval[0]);
}
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vsr_word(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 gpr32)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vsr_word_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
int dword_offset, word_offset;
if (offset == -1)
return;
if (index >= 32) {
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
val.vsx32val[offset] = gpr32;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index - 32, &val.vval);
} else {
dword_offset = offset / 2;
word_offset = offset % 2;
val.vsxval[0] = kvmppc_get_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, dword_offset);
val.vsx32val[word_offset] = gpr32;
kvmppc_set_vsx_fpr(vcpu, index, dword_offset, val.vsxval[0]);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
static inline int kvmppc_get_vmx_offset_generic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int index, int element_size)
{
int offset;
int elts = sizeof(vector128)/element_size;
if ((index < 0) || (index >= elts))
return -1;
if (kvmppc_need_byteswap(vcpu))
offset = elts - index - 1;
else
offset = index;
return offset;
}
static inline int kvmppc_get_vmx_dword_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int index)
{
return kvmppc_get_vmx_offset_generic(vcpu, index, 8);
}
static inline int kvmppc_get_vmx_word_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int index)
{
return kvmppc_get_vmx_offset_generic(vcpu, index, 4);
}
static inline int kvmppc_get_vmx_hword_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int index)
{
return kvmppc_get_vmx_offset_generic(vcpu, index, 2);
}
static inline int kvmppc_get_vmx_byte_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int index)
{
return kvmppc_get_vmx_offset_generic(vcpu, index, 1);
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vmx_dword(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 gpr)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vmx_dword_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (offset == -1)
return;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
val.vsxval[offset] = gpr;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vmx_word(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 gpr32)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vmx_word_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (offset == -1)
return;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
val.vsx32val[offset] = gpr32;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vmx_hword(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u16 gpr16)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vmx_hword_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (offset == -1)
return;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
val.vsx16val[offset] = gpr16;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
}
static inline void kvmppc_set_vmx_byte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u8 gpr8)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vmx_byte_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
if (offset == -1)
return;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
val.vsx8val[offset] = gpr8;
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &val.vval);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FPU
static inline u64 sp_to_dp(u32 fprs)
{
u64 fprd;
preempt_disable();
enable_kernel_fp();
asm ("lfs%U1%X1 0,%1; stfd%U0%X0 0,%0" : "=m<>" (fprd) : "m<>" (fprs)
: "fr0");
preempt_enable();
return fprd;
}
static inline u32 dp_to_sp(u64 fprd)
{
u32 fprs;
preempt_disable();
enable_kernel_fp();
asm ("lfd%U1%X1 0,%1; stfs%U0%X0 0,%0" : "=m<>" (fprs) : "m<>" (fprd)
: "fr0");
preempt_enable();
return fprs;
}
#else
#define sp_to_dp(x) (x)
#define dp_to_sp(x) (x)
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FPU */
static void kvmppc_complete_mmio_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1] (or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings (e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized, either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes. In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining needless uses with the following script: git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \ xargs perl -pi -e \ 's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g; s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;' drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid pathological white-space. No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0 for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64, alpha, and m68k. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/ [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5 Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-04 04:09:38 +08:00
u64 gpr;
if (run->mmio.len > sizeof(gpr))
return;
if (!vcpu->arch.mmio_host_swabbed) {
switch (run->mmio.len) {
case 8: gpr = *(u64 *)run->mmio.data; break;
case 4: gpr = *(u32 *)run->mmio.data; break;
case 2: gpr = *(u16 *)run->mmio.data; break;
case 1: gpr = *(u8 *)run->mmio.data; break;
}
} else {
switch (run->mmio.len) {
case 8: gpr = swab64(*(u64 *)run->mmio.data); break;
case 4: gpr = swab32(*(u32 *)run->mmio.data); break;
case 2: gpr = swab16(*(u16 *)run->mmio.data); break;
case 1: gpr = *(u8 *)run->mmio.data; break;
}
}
/* conversion between single and double precision */
if ((vcpu->arch.mmio_sp64_extend) && (run->mmio.len == 4))
gpr = sp_to_dp(gpr);
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_sign_extend) {
switch (run->mmio.len) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
case 4:
gpr = (s64)(s32)gpr;
break;
#endif
case 2:
gpr = (s64)(s16)gpr;
break;
case 1:
gpr = (s64)(s8)gpr;
break;
}
}
switch (vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_EXT_MASK) {
case KVM_MMIO_REG_GPR:
kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, vcpu->arch.io_gpr, gpr);
break;
case KVM_MMIO_REG_FPR:
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->giveup_ext)
vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->giveup_ext(vcpu, MSR_FP);
kvmppc_set_fpr(vcpu, vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK, gpr);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S
case KVM_MMIO_REG_QPR:
vcpu->arch.qpr[vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK] = gpr;
break;
case KVM_MMIO_REG_FQPR:
kvmppc_set_fpr(vcpu, vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK, gpr);
vcpu->arch.qpr[vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK] = gpr;
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
case KVM_MMIO_REG_VSX:
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->giveup_ext)
vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->giveup_ext(vcpu, MSR_VSX);
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type == KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_DWORD)
kvmppc_set_vsr_dword(vcpu, gpr);
else if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type == KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_WORD)
kvmppc_set_vsr_word(vcpu, gpr);
else if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type ==
KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_DWORD_LOAD_DUMP)
kvmppc_set_vsr_dword_dump(vcpu, gpr);
else if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type ==
KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_WORD_LOAD_DUMP)
kvmppc_set_vsr_word_dump(vcpu, gpr);
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
case KVM_MMIO_REG_VMX:
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->giveup_ext)
vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->giveup_ext(vcpu, MSR_VEC);
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type == KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_DWORD)
kvmppc_set_vmx_dword(vcpu, gpr);
else if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type == KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_WORD)
kvmppc_set_vmx_word(vcpu, gpr);
else if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type ==
KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_HWORD)
kvmppc_set_vmx_hword(vcpu, gpr);
else if (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type ==
KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_BYTE)
kvmppc_set_vmx_byte(vcpu, gpr);
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
case KVM_MMIO_REG_NESTED_GPR:
if (kvmppc_need_byteswap(vcpu))
gpr = swab64(gpr);
kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.nested_io_gpr, &gpr,
sizeof(gpr));
break;
#endif
default:
BUG();
}
}
static int __kvmppc_handle_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int rt, unsigned int bytes,
int is_default_endian, int sign_extend)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
int idx, ret;
bool host_swabbed;
/* Pity C doesn't have a logical XOR operator */
if (kvmppc_need_byteswap(vcpu)) {
host_swabbed = is_default_endian;
} else {
host_swabbed = !is_default_endian;
}
if (bytes > sizeof(run->mmio.data))
return EMULATE_FAIL;
run->mmio.phys_addr = vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed;
run->mmio.len = bytes;
run->mmio.is_write = 0;
vcpu->arch.io_gpr = rt;
vcpu->arch.mmio_host_swabbed = host_swabbed;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->mmio_is_write = 0;
vcpu->arch.mmio_sign_extend = sign_extend;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, run->mmio.phys_addr,
bytes, &run->mmio.data);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
if (!ret) {
kvmppc_complete_mmio_load(vcpu);
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
}
int kvmppc_handle_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int rt, unsigned int bytes,
int is_default_endian)
{
return __kvmppc_handle_load(vcpu, rt, bytes, is_default_endian, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_handle_load);
/* Same as above, but sign extends */
int kvmppc_handle_loads(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int rt, unsigned int bytes,
int is_default_endian)
{
return __kvmppc_handle_load(vcpu, rt, bytes, is_default_endian, 1);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
int kvmppc_handle_vsx_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int rt, unsigned int bytes,
int is_default_endian, int mmio_sign_extend)
{
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_DONE;
/* Currently, mmio_vsx_copy_nums only allowed to be 4 or less */
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums > 4)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
while (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums) {
emulated = __kvmppc_handle_load(vcpu, rt, bytes,
is_default_endian, mmio_sign_extend);
if (emulated != EMULATE_DONE)
break;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += vcpu->run->mmio.len;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums--;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset++;
}
return emulated;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
int kvmppc_handle_store(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 val, unsigned int bytes, int is_default_endian)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
void *data = run->mmio.data;
int idx, ret;
bool host_swabbed;
/* Pity C doesn't have a logical XOR operator */
if (kvmppc_need_byteswap(vcpu)) {
host_swabbed = is_default_endian;
} else {
host_swabbed = !is_default_endian;
}
if (bytes > sizeof(run->mmio.data))
return EMULATE_FAIL;
run->mmio.phys_addr = vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed;
run->mmio.len = bytes;
run->mmio.is_write = 1;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->mmio_is_write = 1;
if ((vcpu->arch.mmio_sp64_extend) && (bytes == 4))
val = dp_to_sp(val);
/* Store the value at the lowest bytes in 'data'. */
if (!host_swabbed) {
switch (bytes) {
case 8: *(u64 *)data = val; break;
case 4: *(u32 *)data = val; break;
case 2: *(u16 *)data = val; break;
case 1: *(u8 *)data = val; break;
}
} else {
switch (bytes) {
case 8: *(u64 *)data = swab64(val); break;
case 4: *(u32 *)data = swab32(val); break;
case 2: *(u16 *)data = swab16(val); break;
case 1: *(u8 *)data = val; break;
}
}
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, run->mmio.phys_addr,
bytes, &run->mmio.data);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
if (!ret) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_handle_store);
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
static inline int kvmppc_get_vsr_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int rs, u64 *val)
{
u32 dword_offset, word_offset;
union kvmppc_one_reg reg;
int vsx_offset = 0;
int copy_type = vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type;
int result = 0;
switch (copy_type) {
case KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_DWORD:
vsx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vsr_dword_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
if (vsx_offset == -1) {
result = -1;
break;
}
if (rs < 32) {
*val = kvmppc_get_vsx_fpr(vcpu, rs, vsx_offset);
} else {
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, rs - 32, &reg.vval);
*val = reg.vsxval[vsx_offset];
}
break;
case KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_WORD:
vsx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vsr_word_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
if (vsx_offset == -1) {
result = -1;
break;
}
if (rs < 32) {
dword_offset = vsx_offset / 2;
word_offset = vsx_offset % 2;
reg.vsxval[0] = kvmppc_get_vsx_fpr(vcpu, rs, dword_offset);
*val = reg.vsx32val[word_offset];
} else {
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, rs - 32, &reg.vval);
*val = reg.vsx32val[vsx_offset];
}
break;
default:
result = -1;
break;
}
return result;
}
int kvmppc_handle_vsx_store(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int rs, unsigned int bytes, int is_default_endian)
{
u64 val;
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_DONE;
vcpu->arch.io_gpr = rs;
/* Currently, mmio_vsx_copy_nums only allowed to be 4 or less */
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums > 4)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
while (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums) {
if (kvmppc_get_vsr_data(vcpu, rs, &val) == -1)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
emulated = kvmppc_handle_store(vcpu,
val, bytes, is_default_endian);
if (emulated != EMULATE_DONE)
break;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += vcpu->run->mmio.len;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums--;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset++;
}
return emulated;
}
static int kvmppc_emulate_mmio_vsx_loadstore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_FAIL;
int r;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += run->mmio.len;
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write) {
emulated = kvmppc_handle_vsx_load(vcpu, vcpu->arch.io_gpr,
run->mmio.len, 1, vcpu->arch.mmio_sign_extend);
} else {
emulated = kvmppc_handle_vsx_store(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.io_gpr, run->mmio.len, 1);
}
switch (emulated) {
case EMULATE_DO_MMIO:
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
case EMULATE_FAIL:
pr_info("KVM: MMIO emulation failed (VSX repeat)\n");
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
default:
r = RESUME_GUEST;
break;
}
return r;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
int kvmppc_handle_vmx_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int rt, unsigned int bytes, int is_default_endian)
{
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_DONE;
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums > 2)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
while (vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums) {
emulated = __kvmppc_handle_load(vcpu, rt, bytes,
is_default_endian, 0);
if (emulated != EMULATE_DONE)
break;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += vcpu->run->mmio.len;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums--;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset++;
}
return emulated;
}
static int kvmppc_get_vmx_dword(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index, u64 *val)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg reg;
int vmx_offset = 0;
int result = 0;
vmx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vmx_dword_offset(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
if (vmx_offset == -1)
return -1;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &reg.vval);
*val = reg.vsxval[vmx_offset];
return result;
}
static int kvmppc_get_vmx_word(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index, u64 *val)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg reg;
int vmx_offset = 0;
int result = 0;
vmx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vmx_word_offset(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
if (vmx_offset == -1)
return -1;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &reg.vval);
*val = reg.vsx32val[vmx_offset];
return result;
}
static int kvmppc_get_vmx_hword(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index, u64 *val)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg reg;
int vmx_offset = 0;
int result = 0;
vmx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vmx_hword_offset(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
if (vmx_offset == -1)
return -1;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &reg.vval);
*val = reg.vsx16val[vmx_offset];
return result;
}
static int kvmppc_get_vmx_byte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index, u64 *val)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg reg;
int vmx_offset = 0;
int result = 0;
vmx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vmx_byte_offset(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset);
if (vmx_offset == -1)
return -1;
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, index, &reg.vval);
*val = reg.vsx8val[vmx_offset];
return result;
}
int kvmppc_handle_vmx_store(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned int rs, unsigned int bytes, int is_default_endian)
{
u64 val = 0;
unsigned int index = rs & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_DONE;
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums > 2)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
vcpu->arch.io_gpr = rs;
while (vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums) {
switch (vcpu->arch.mmio_copy_type) {
case KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_DWORD:
if (kvmppc_get_vmx_dword(vcpu, index, &val) == -1)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
break;
case KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_WORD:
if (kvmppc_get_vmx_word(vcpu, index, &val) == -1)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
break;
case KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_HWORD:
if (kvmppc_get_vmx_hword(vcpu, index, &val) == -1)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
break;
case KVMPPC_VMX_COPY_BYTE:
if (kvmppc_get_vmx_byte(vcpu, index, &val) == -1)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
break;
default:
return EMULATE_FAIL;
}
emulated = kvmppc_handle_store(vcpu, val, bytes,
is_default_endian);
if (emulated != EMULATE_DONE)
break;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += vcpu->run->mmio.len;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums--;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset++;
}
return emulated;
}
static int kvmppc_emulate_mmio_vmx_loadstore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
enum emulation_result emulated = EMULATE_FAIL;
int r;
vcpu->arch.paddr_accessed += run->mmio.len;
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write) {
emulated = kvmppc_handle_vmx_load(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.io_gpr, run->mmio.len, 1);
} else {
emulated = kvmppc_handle_vmx_store(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.io_gpr, run->mmio.len, 1);
}
switch (emulated) {
case EMULATE_DO_MMIO:
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
case EMULATE_FAIL:
pr_info("KVM: MMIO emulation failed (VMX repeat)\n");
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
r = RESUME_HOST;
break;
default:
r = RESUME_GUEST;
break;
}
return r;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_one_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
int r = 0;
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int size;
size = one_reg_size(reg->id);
if (size > sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
r = kvmppc_get_one_reg(vcpu, reg->id, &val);
if (r == -EINVAL) {
r = 0;
switch (reg->id) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
case KVM_REG_PPC_VR0 ... KVM_REG_PPC_VR31:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
kvmppc_get_vsx_vr(vcpu, reg->id - KVM_REG_PPC_VR0, &val.vval);
break;
case KVM_REG_PPC_VSCR:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
val = get_reg_val(reg->id, kvmppc_get_vscr(vcpu));
break;
case KVM_REG_PPC_VRSAVE:
val = get_reg_val(reg->id, kvmppc_get_vrsave(vcpu));
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (r)
return r;
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr, &val, size))
r = -EFAULT;
return r;
}
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_one_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
int r;
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int size;
size = one_reg_size(reg->id);
if (size > sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, (char __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr, size))
return -EFAULT;
r = kvmppc_set_one_reg(vcpu, reg->id, &val);
if (r == -EINVAL) {
r = 0;
switch (reg->id) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
case KVM_REG_PPC_VR0 ... KVM_REG_PPC_VR31:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
kvmppc_set_vsx_vr(vcpu, reg->id - KVM_REG_PPC_VR0, &val.vval);
break;
case KVM_REG_PPC_VSCR:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
kvmppc_set_vscr(vcpu, set_reg_val(reg->id, val));
break;
case KVM_REG_PPC_VRSAVE:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
kvmppc_set_vrsave(vcpu, set_reg_val(reg->id, val));
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
return r;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
int r;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (vcpu->mmio_needed) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
kvmppc_complete_mmio_load(vcpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums > 0) {
vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums--;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset++;
}
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_nums > 0) {
r = kvmppc_emulate_mmio_vsx_loadstore(vcpu);
if (r == RESUME_HOST) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
goto out;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums > 0) {
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums--;
vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_offset++;
}
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vmx_copy_nums > 0) {
r = kvmppc_emulate_mmio_vmx_loadstore(vcpu);
if (r == RESUME_HOST) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
goto out;
}
}
#endif
} else if (vcpu->arch.osi_needed) {
u64 *gprs = run->osi.gprs;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, i, gprs[i]);
vcpu->arch.osi_needed = 0;
KVM: PPC: Add support for Book3S processors in hypervisor mode This adds support for KVM running on 64-bit Book 3S processors, specifically POWER7, in hypervisor mode. Using hypervisor mode means that the guest can use the processor's supervisor mode. That means that the guest can execute privileged instructions and access privileged registers itself without trapping to the host. This gives excellent performance, but does mean that KVM cannot emulate a processor architecture other than the one that the hardware implements. This code assumes that the guest is running paravirtualized using the PAPR (Power Architecture Platform Requirements) interface, which is the interface that IBM's PowerVM hypervisor uses. That means that existing Linux distributions that run on IBM pSeries machines will also run under KVM without modification. In order to communicate the PAPR hypercalls to qemu, this adds a new KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL exit code to include/linux/kvm.h. Currently the choice between book3s_hv support and book3s_pr support (i.e. the existing code, which runs the guest in user mode) has to be made at kernel configuration time, so a given kernel binary can only do one or the other. This new book3s_hv code doesn't support MMIO emulation at present. Since we are running paravirtualized guests, this isn't a serious restriction. With the guest running in supervisor mode, most exceptions go straight to the guest. We will never get data or instruction storage or segment interrupts, alignment interrupts, decrementer interrupts, program interrupts, single-step interrupts, etc., coming to the hypervisor from the guest. Therefore this introduces a new KVMTEST_NONHV macro for the exception entry path so that we don't have to do the KVM test on entry to those exception handlers. We do however get hypervisor decrementer, hypervisor data storage, hypervisor instruction storage, and hypervisor emulation assist interrupts, so we have to handle those. In hypervisor mode, real-mode accesses can access all of RAM, not just a limited amount. Therefore we put all the guest state in the vcpu.arch and use the shadow_vcpu in the PACA only for temporary scratch space. We allocate the vcpu with kzalloc rather than vzalloc, and we don't use anything in the kvmppc_vcpu_book3s struct, so we don't allocate it. We don't have a shared page with the guest, but we still need a kvm_vcpu_arch_shared struct to store the values of various registers, so we include one in the vcpu_arch struct. The POWER7 processor has a restriction that all threads in a core have to be in the same partition. MMU-on kernel code counts as a partition (partition 0), so we have to do a partition switch on every entry to and exit from the guest. At present we require the host and guest to run in single-thread mode because of this hardware restriction. This code allocates a hashed page table for the guest and initializes it with HPTEs for the guest's Virtual Real Memory Area (VRMA). We require that the guest memory is allocated using 16MB huge pages, in order to simplify the low-level memory management. This also means that we can get away without tracking paging activity in the host for now, since huge pages can't be paged or swapped. This also adds a few new exports needed by the book3s_hv code. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-06-29 08:21:34 +08:00
} else if (vcpu->arch.hcall_needed) {
int i;
kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 3, run->papr_hcall.ret);
for (i = 0; i < 9; ++i)
kvmppc_set_gpr(vcpu, 4 + i, run->papr_hcall.args[i]);
vcpu->arch.hcall_needed = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
} else if (vcpu->arch.epr_needed) {
kvmppc_set_epr(vcpu, run->epr.epr);
vcpu->arch.epr_needed = 0;
#endif
}
kvm_sigset_activate(vcpu);
if (!vcpu->wants_to_run)
r = -EINTR;
else
r = kvmppc_vcpu_run(vcpu);
kvm_sigset_deactivate(vcpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
out:
#endif
/*
* We're already returning to userspace, don't pass the
* RESUME_HOST flags along.
*/
if (r > 0)
r = 0;
vcpu_put(vcpu);
return r;
}
int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_interrupt *irq)
{
KVM: PPC: Implement H_CEDE hcall for book3s_hv in real-mode code With a KVM guest operating in SMT4 mode (i.e. 4 hardware threads per core), whenever a CPU goes idle, we have to pull all the other hardware threads in the core out of the guest, because the H_CEDE hcall is handled in the kernel. This is inefficient. This adds code to book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S to handle the H_CEDE hcall in real mode. When a guest vcpu does an H_CEDE hcall, we now only exit to the kernel if all the other vcpus in the same core are also idle. Otherwise we mark this vcpu as napping, save state that could be lost in nap mode (mainly GPRs and FPRs), and execute the nap instruction. When the thread wakes up, because of a decrementer or external interrupt, we come back in at kvm_start_guest (from the system reset interrupt vector), find the `napping' flag set in the paca, and go to the resume path. This has some other ramifications. First, when starting a core, we now start all the threads, both those that are immediately runnable and those that are idle. This is so that we don't have to pull all the threads out of the guest when an idle thread gets a decrementer interrupt and wants to start running. In fact the idle threads will all start with the H_CEDE hcall returning; being idle they will just do another H_CEDE immediately and go to nap mode. This required some changes to kvmppc_run_core() and kvmppc_run_vcpu(). These functions have been restructured to make them simpler and clearer. We introduce a level of indirection in the wait queue that gets woken when external and decrementer interrupts get generated for a vcpu, so that we can have the 4 vcpus in a vcore using the same wait queue. We need this because the 4 vcpus are being handled by one thread. Secondly, when we need to exit from the guest to the kernel, we now have to generate an IPI for any napping threads, because an HDEC interrupt doesn't wake up a napping thread. Thirdly, we now need to be able to handle virtual external interrupts and decrementer interrupts becoming pending while a thread is napping, and deliver those interrupts to the guest when the thread wakes. This is done in kvmppc_cede_reentry, just before fast_guest_return. Finally, since we are not using the generic kvm_vcpu_block for book3s_hv, and hence not calling kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable, we can remove the #ifdef from kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-07-23 15:42:46 +08:00
if (irq->irq == KVM_INTERRUPT_UNSET) {
kvmppc_core_dequeue_external(vcpu);
KVM: PPC: Implement H_CEDE hcall for book3s_hv in real-mode code With a KVM guest operating in SMT4 mode (i.e. 4 hardware threads per core), whenever a CPU goes idle, we have to pull all the other hardware threads in the core out of the guest, because the H_CEDE hcall is handled in the kernel. This is inefficient. This adds code to book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S to handle the H_CEDE hcall in real mode. When a guest vcpu does an H_CEDE hcall, we now only exit to the kernel if all the other vcpus in the same core are also idle. Otherwise we mark this vcpu as napping, save state that could be lost in nap mode (mainly GPRs and FPRs), and execute the nap instruction. When the thread wakes up, because of a decrementer or external interrupt, we come back in at kvm_start_guest (from the system reset interrupt vector), find the `napping' flag set in the paca, and go to the resume path. This has some other ramifications. First, when starting a core, we now start all the threads, both those that are immediately runnable and those that are idle. This is so that we don't have to pull all the threads out of the guest when an idle thread gets a decrementer interrupt and wants to start running. In fact the idle threads will all start with the H_CEDE hcall returning; being idle they will just do another H_CEDE immediately and go to nap mode. This required some changes to kvmppc_run_core() and kvmppc_run_vcpu(). These functions have been restructured to make them simpler and clearer. We introduce a level of indirection in the wait queue that gets woken when external and decrementer interrupts get generated for a vcpu, so that we can have the 4 vcpus in a vcore using the same wait queue. We need this because the 4 vcpus are being handled by one thread. Secondly, when we need to exit from the guest to the kernel, we now have to generate an IPI for any napping threads, because an HDEC interrupt doesn't wake up a napping thread. Thirdly, we now need to be able to handle virtual external interrupts and decrementer interrupts becoming pending while a thread is napping, and deliver those interrupts to the guest when the thread wakes. This is done in kvmppc_cede_reentry, just before fast_guest_return. Finally, since we are not using the generic kvm_vcpu_block for book3s_hv, and hence not calling kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable, we can remove the #ifdef from kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2011-07-23 15:42:46 +08:00
return 0;
}
kvmppc_core_queue_external(vcpu, irq);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
return 0;
}
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
{
int r;
if (cap->flags)
return -EINVAL;
switch (cap->cap) {
case KVM_CAP_PPC_OSI:
r = 0;
vcpu->arch.osi_enabled = true;
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_PAPR:
r = 0;
vcpu->arch.papr_enabled = true;
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_EPR:
r = 0;
if (cap->args[0])
vcpu->arch.epr_flags |= KVMPPC_EPR_USER;
else
vcpu->arch.epr_flags &= ~KVMPPC_EPR_USER;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
case KVM_CAP_PPC_BOOKE_WATCHDOG:
r = 0;
vcpu->arch.watchdog_enabled = true;
break;
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500V2) || defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500MC)
case KVM_CAP_SW_TLB: {
struct kvm_config_tlb cfg;
void __user *user_ptr = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)cap->args[0];
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cfg, user_ptr, sizeof(cfg)))
break;
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_config_tlb(vcpu, &cfg);
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MPIC
case KVM_CAP_IRQ_MPIC: {
struct fd f;
struct kvm_device *dev;
r = -EBADF;
f = fdget(cap->args[0]);
if (!fd_file(f))
break;
r = -EPERM;
dev = kvm_device_from_filp(fd_file(f));
if (dev)
r = kvmppc_mpic_connect_vcpu(dev, vcpu, cap->args[1]);
fdput(f);
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
case KVM_CAP_IRQ_XICS: {
struct fd f;
struct kvm_device *dev;
r = -EBADF;
f = fdget(cap->args[0]);
if (!fd_file(f))
break;
r = -EPERM;
dev = kvm_device_from_filp(fd_file(f));
if (dev) {
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Allow XICS emulation to work in nested hosts using XIVE Currently, the KVM code assumes that if the host kernel is using the XIVE interrupt controller (the new interrupt controller that first appeared in POWER9 systems), then the in-kernel XICS emulation will use the XIVE hardware to deliver interrupts to the guest. However, this only works when the host is running in hypervisor mode and has full access to all of the XIVE functionality. It doesn't work in any nested virtualization scenario, either with PR KVM or nested-HV KVM, because the XICS-on-XIVE code calls directly into the native-XIVE routines, which are not initialized and cannot function correctly because they use OPAL calls, and OPAL is not available in a guest. This means that using the in-kernel XICS emulation in a nested hypervisor that is using XIVE as its interrupt controller will cause a (nested) host kernel crash. To fix this, we change most of the places where the current code calls xive_enabled() to select between the XICS-on-XIVE emulation and the plain XICS emulation to call a new function, xics_on_xive(), which returns false in a guest. However, there is a further twist. The plain XICS emulation has some functions which are used in real mode and access the underlying XICS controller (the interrupt controller of the host) directly. In the case of a nested hypervisor, this means doing XICS hypercalls directly. When the nested host is using XIVE as its interrupt controller, these hypercalls will fail. Therefore this also adds checks in the places where the XICS emulation wants to access the underlying interrupt controller directly, and if that is XIVE, makes the code use the virtual mode fallback paths, which call generic kernel infrastructure rather than doing direct XICS access. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2019-02-04 19:07:20 +08:00
if (xics_on_xive())
r = kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu(dev, vcpu, cap->args[1]);
else
r = kvmppc_xics_connect_vcpu(dev, vcpu, cap->args[1]);
}
fdput(f);
break;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_XICS */
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XIVE
case KVM_CAP_PPC_IRQ_XIVE: {
struct fd f;
struct kvm_device *dev;
r = -EBADF;
f = fdget(cap->args[0]);
if (!fd_file(f))
break;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!xive_enabled()) {
fdput(f);
break;
}
r = -EPERM;
dev = kvm_device_from_filp(fd_file(f));
if (dev)
r = kvmppc_xive_native_connect_vcpu(dev, vcpu,
cap->args[1]);
fdput(f);
break;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_XIVE */
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
case KVM_CAP_PPC_FWNMI:
r = -EINVAL;
if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
break;
r = 0;
vcpu->kvm->arch.fwnmi_enabled = true;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE */
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!r)
r = kvmppc_sanity_check(vcpu);
return r;
}
bool kvm_arch_intc_initialized(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MPIC
if (kvm->arch.mpic)
return true;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
if (kvm->arch.xics || kvm->arch.xive)
return true;
#endif
return false;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
long kvm_arch_vcpu_async_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
if (ioctl == KVM_INTERRUPT) {
struct kvm_interrupt irq;
if (copy_from_user(&irq, argp, sizeof(irq)))
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(vcpu, &irq);
}
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
long r;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_ENABLE_CAP:
{
struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cap, argp, sizeof(cap)))
goto out;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(vcpu, &cap);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_ONE_REG:
case KVM_GET_ONE_REG:
{
struct kvm_one_reg reg;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&reg, argp, sizeof(reg)))
goto out;
if (ioctl == KVM_SET_ONE_REG)
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_one_reg(vcpu, &reg);
else
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_one_reg(vcpu, &reg);
break;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500V2) || defined(CONFIG_KVM_E500MC)
case KVM_DIRTY_TLB: {
struct kvm_dirty_tlb dirty;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&dirty, argp, sizeof(dirty)))
goto out;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_dirty_tlb(vcpu, &dirty);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
break;
}
#endif
default:
r = -EINVAL;
}
out:
return r;
}
vm_fault_t kvm_arch_vcpu_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pvinfo(struct kvm_ppc_pvinfo *pvinfo)
{
u32 inst_nop = 0x60000000;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOKE_HV
u32 inst_sc1 = 0x44000022;
pvinfo->hcall[0] = cpu_to_be32(inst_sc1);
pvinfo->hcall[1] = cpu_to_be32(inst_nop);
pvinfo->hcall[2] = cpu_to_be32(inst_nop);
pvinfo->hcall[3] = cpu_to_be32(inst_nop);
#else
u32 inst_lis = 0x3c000000;
u32 inst_ori = 0x60000000;
u32 inst_sc = 0x44000002;
u32 inst_imm_mask = 0xffff;
/*
* The hypercall to get into KVM from within guest context is as
* follows:
*
* lis r0, r0, KVM_SC_MAGIC_R0@h
* ori r0, KVM_SC_MAGIC_R0@l
* sc
* nop
*/
pvinfo->hcall[0] = cpu_to_be32(inst_lis | ((KVM_SC_MAGIC_R0 >> 16) & inst_imm_mask));
pvinfo->hcall[1] = cpu_to_be32(inst_ori | (KVM_SC_MAGIC_R0 & inst_imm_mask));
pvinfo->hcall[2] = cpu_to_be32(inst_sc);
pvinfo->hcall[3] = cpu_to_be32(inst_nop);
#endif
pvinfo->flags = KVM_PPC_PVINFO_FLAGS_EV_IDLE;
return 0;
}
bool kvm_arch_irqchip_in_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int ret = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MPIC
ret = ret || (kvm->arch.mpic != NULL);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
ret = ret || (kvm->arch.xics != NULL);
ret = ret || (kvm->arch.xive != NULL);
#endif
smp_rmb();
return ret;
}
int kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_level *irq_event,
bool line_status)
{
if (!kvm_arch_irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
return -ENXIO;
irq_event->status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event->irq, irq_event->level,
line_status);
return 0;
}
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Controls for in-kernel sPAPR hypercall handling This provides a way for userspace controls which sPAPR hcalls get handled in the kernel. Each hcall can be individually enabled or disabled for in-kernel handling, except for H_RTAS. The exception for H_RTAS is because userspace can already control whether individual RTAS functions are handled in-kernel or not via the KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN ioctl, and because the numeric value for H_RTAS is out of the normal sequence of hcall numbers. Hcalls are enabled or disabled using the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl for the KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability on the file descriptor for the VM. The args field of the struct kvm_enable_cap specifies the hcall number in args[0] and the enable/disable flag in args[1]; 0 means disable in-kernel handling (so that the hcall will always cause an exit to userspace) and 1 means enable. Enabling or disabling in-kernel handling of an hcall is effective across the whole VM. The ability for KVM_ENABLE_CAP to be used on a VM file descriptor on PowerPC is new, added by this commit. The KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM capability advertises that this ability exists. When a VM is created, an initial set of hcalls are enabled for in-kernel handling. The set that is enabled is the set that have an in-kernel implementation at this point. Any new hcall implementations from this point onwards should not be added to the default set without a good reason. No distinction is made between real-mode and virtual-mode hcall implementations; the one setting controls them both. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-06-02 09:02:59 +08:00
int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Controls for in-kernel sPAPR hypercall handling This provides a way for userspace controls which sPAPR hcalls get handled in the kernel. Each hcall can be individually enabled or disabled for in-kernel handling, except for H_RTAS. The exception for H_RTAS is because userspace can already control whether individual RTAS functions are handled in-kernel or not via the KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN ioctl, and because the numeric value for H_RTAS is out of the normal sequence of hcall numbers. Hcalls are enabled or disabled using the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl for the KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability on the file descriptor for the VM. The args field of the struct kvm_enable_cap specifies the hcall number in args[0] and the enable/disable flag in args[1]; 0 means disable in-kernel handling (so that the hcall will always cause an exit to userspace) and 1 means enable. Enabling or disabling in-kernel handling of an hcall is effective across the whole VM. The ability for KVM_ENABLE_CAP to be used on a VM file descriptor on PowerPC is new, added by this commit. The KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM capability advertises that this ability exists. When a VM is created, an initial set of hcalls are enabled for in-kernel handling. The set that is enabled is the set that have an in-kernel implementation at this point. Any new hcall implementations from this point onwards should not be added to the default set without a good reason. No distinction is made between real-mode and virtual-mode hcall implementations; the one setting controls them both. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-06-02 09:02:59 +08:00
{
int r;
if (cap->flags)
return -EINVAL;
switch (cap->cap) {
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_64_HANDLER
case KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL: {
unsigned long hcall = cap->args[0];
r = -EINVAL;
if (hcall > MAX_HCALL_OPCODE || (hcall & 3) ||
cap->args[1] > 1)
break;
if (!kvmppc_book3s_hcall_implemented(kvm, hcall))
break;
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Controls for in-kernel sPAPR hypercall handling This provides a way for userspace controls which sPAPR hcalls get handled in the kernel. Each hcall can be individually enabled or disabled for in-kernel handling, except for H_RTAS. The exception for H_RTAS is because userspace can already control whether individual RTAS functions are handled in-kernel or not via the KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN ioctl, and because the numeric value for H_RTAS is out of the normal sequence of hcall numbers. Hcalls are enabled or disabled using the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl for the KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability on the file descriptor for the VM. The args field of the struct kvm_enable_cap specifies the hcall number in args[0] and the enable/disable flag in args[1]; 0 means disable in-kernel handling (so that the hcall will always cause an exit to userspace) and 1 means enable. Enabling or disabling in-kernel handling of an hcall is effective across the whole VM. The ability for KVM_ENABLE_CAP to be used on a VM file descriptor on PowerPC is new, added by this commit. The KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM capability advertises that this ability exists. When a VM is created, an initial set of hcalls are enabled for in-kernel handling. The set that is enabled is the set that have an in-kernel implementation at this point. Any new hcall implementations from this point onwards should not be added to the default set without a good reason. No distinction is made between real-mode and virtual-mode hcall implementations; the one setting controls them both. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-06-02 09:02:59 +08:00
if (cap->args[1])
set_bit(hcall / 4, kvm->arch.enabled_hcalls);
else
clear_bit(hcall / 4, kvm->arch.enabled_hcalls);
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT: {
unsigned long mode = cap->args[0];
unsigned long flags = cap->args[1];
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.kvm_ops->set_smt_mode)
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->set_smt_mode(kvm, mode, flags);
break;
}
case KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV:
r = -EINVAL;
if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(kvm) ||
!kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_nested)
break;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_nested(kvm);
break;
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE)
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST:
r = -EINVAL;
if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(kvm) || !kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm)
break;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm(kvm);
break;
case KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1:
r = -EINVAL;
if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(kvm) || !kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_dawr1)
break;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_dawr1(kvm);
break;
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Controls for in-kernel sPAPR hypercall handling This provides a way for userspace controls which sPAPR hcalls get handled in the kernel. Each hcall can be individually enabled or disabled for in-kernel handling, except for H_RTAS. The exception for H_RTAS is because userspace can already control whether individual RTAS functions are handled in-kernel or not via the KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN ioctl, and because the numeric value for H_RTAS is out of the normal sequence of hcall numbers. Hcalls are enabled or disabled using the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl for the KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability on the file descriptor for the VM. The args field of the struct kvm_enable_cap specifies the hcall number in args[0] and the enable/disable flag in args[1]; 0 means disable in-kernel handling (so that the hcall will always cause an exit to userspace) and 1 means enable. Enabling or disabling in-kernel handling of an hcall is effective across the whole VM. The ability for KVM_ENABLE_CAP to be used on a VM file descriptor on PowerPC is new, added by this commit. The KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM capability advertises that this ability exists. When a VM is created, an initial set of hcalls are enabled for in-kernel handling. The set that is enabled is the set that have an in-kernel implementation at this point. Any new hcall implementations from this point onwards should not be added to the default set without a good reason. No distinction is made between real-mode and virtual-mode hcall implementations; the one setting controls them both. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-06-02 09:02:59 +08:00
#endif
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return r;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
/*
* These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe
* against attacks based on observing the effects of speculatively
* executed instructions, and whether it supplies instructions for
* use in workarounds. The information comes from firmware, either
* via the device tree on powernv platforms or from an hcall on
* pseries platforms.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
static int pseries_get_cpu_char(struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char *cp)
{
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
unsigned long rc;
if (!machine_is(pseries))
return -ENOTTY;
rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
cp->character = c.character;
cp->behaviour = c.behaviour;
cp->character_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BR_HINT_HONOURED |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_MTTRIG_THR_RECONF |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST;
cp->behaviour_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY |
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR |
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR |
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE;
}
return 0;
}
#else
static int pseries_get_cpu_char(struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char *cp)
{
return -ENOTTY;
}
#endif
static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features,
const char *state, const char *name)
{
struct device_node *np;
bool r = false;
np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name);
if (np) {
r = of_property_read_bool(np, state);
of_node_put(np);
}
return r;
}
static int kvmppc_get_cpu_char(struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char *cp)
{
struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
int r;
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
r = pseries_get_cpu_char(cp);
if (r != -ENOTTY)
return r;
np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
if (np) {
fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-features");
of_node_put(np);
if (!fw_features)
return 0;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"inst-spec-barrier-ori31,31,0"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"fw-bcctrl-serialized"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"inst-l1d-flush-trig2"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"fw-l1d-thread-split"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"fw-count-cache-disabled"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"fw-count-cache-flush-bcctr2,0,0"))
cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST;
cp->character_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS |
KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"speculation-policy-favor-security"))
cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY;
if (!have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled",
"needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1"))
cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR;
if (!have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled",
"needs-spec-barrier-for-bound-checks"))
cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR;
if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
"needs-count-cache-flush-on-context-switch"))
cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE;
cp->behaviour_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY |
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR |
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR |
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE;
of_node_put(fw_features);
}
return 0;
}
#endif
int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm __maybe_unused = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_PPC_GET_PVINFO: {
struct kvm_ppc_pvinfo pvinfo;
memset(&pvinfo, 0, sizeof(pvinfo));
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pvinfo(&pvinfo);
if (copy_to_user(argp, &pvinfo, sizeof(pvinfo))) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
case KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE_64: {
struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_64 create_tce_64;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&create_tce_64, argp, sizeof(create_tce_64)))
goto out;
if (create_tce_64.flags) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce(kvm, &create_tce_64);
goto out;
}
case KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE: {
struct kvm_create_spapr_tce create_tce;
struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_64 create_tce_64;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&create_tce, argp, sizeof(create_tce)))
goto out;
create_tce_64.liobn = create_tce.liobn;
create_tce_64.page_shift = IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
create_tce_64.offset = 0;
create_tce_64.size = create_tce.window_size >>
IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
create_tce_64.flags = 0;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce(kvm, &create_tce_64);
goto out;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
case KVM_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO: {
struct kvm_ppc_smmu_info info;
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->get_smmu_info(kvm, &info);
if (r >= 0 && copy_to_user(argp, &info, sizeof(info)))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
case KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN: {
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_rtas_define_token(kvm, argp);
break;
}
case KVM_PPC_CONFIGURE_V3_MMU: {
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
struct kvm_ppc_mmuv3_cfg cfg;
r = -EINVAL;
if (!kvm->arch.kvm_ops->configure_mmu)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cfg, argp, sizeof(cfg)))
goto out;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->configure_mmu(kvm, &cfg);
break;
}
case KVM_PPC_GET_RMMU_INFO: {
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info info;
r = -EINVAL;
if (!kvm->arch.kvm_ops->get_rmmu_info)
goto out;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->get_rmmu_info(kvm, &info);
if (r >= 0 && copy_to_user(argp, &info, sizeof(info)))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
case KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR: {
struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char cpuchar;
r = kvmppc_get_cpu_char(&cpuchar);
if (r >= 0 && copy_to_user(argp, &cpuchar, sizeof(cpuchar)))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
case KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF: {
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
r = 0;
if (!kvm->arch.kvm_ops->svm_off)
goto out;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->svm_off(kvm);
break;
}
default: {
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->arch_vm_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
}
#else /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
default:
r = -ENOTTY;
#endif
}
out:
return r;
}
static DEFINE_IDA(lpid_inuse);
static unsigned long nr_lpids;
long kvmppc_alloc_lpid(void)
{
int lpid;
/* The host LPID must always be 0 (allocation starts at 1) */
lpid = ida_alloc_range(&lpid_inuse, 1, nr_lpids - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (lpid < 0) {
if (lpid == -ENOMEM)
pr_err("%s: Out of memory\n", __func__);
else
pr_err("%s: No LPIDs free\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return lpid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_alloc_lpid);
void kvmppc_free_lpid(long lpid)
{
ida_free(&lpid_inuse, lpid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_free_lpid);
/* nr_lpids_param includes the host LPID */
void kvmppc_init_lpid(unsigned long nr_lpids_param)
{
nr_lpids = nr_lpids_param;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_init_lpid);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_ppc_instr);
KVM: PPC: Merge powerpc's debugfs entry content into generic entry At the moment KVM on PPC creates 4 types of entries under the kvm debugfs: 1) "%pid-%fd" per a KVM instance (for all platforms); 2) "vm%pid" (for PPC Book3s HV KVM); 3) "vm%u_vcpu%u_timing" (for PPC Book3e KVM); 4) "kvm-xive-%p" (for XIVE PPC Book3s KVM, the same for XICS); The problem with this is that multiple VMs per process is not allowed for 2) and 3) which makes it possible for userspace to trigger errors when creating duplicated debugfs entries. This merges all these into 1). This defines kvm_arch_create_kvm_debugfs() similar to kvm_arch_create_vcpu_debugfs(). This defines 2 hooks in kvmppc_ops that allow specific KVM implementations add necessary entries, this adds the _e500 suffix to kvmppc_create_vcpu_debugfs_e500() to make it clear what platform it is for. This makes use of already existing kvm_arch_create_vcpu_debugfs() on PPC. This removes no more used debugfs_dir pointers from PPC kvm_arch structs. This stops removing vcpu entries as once created vcpus stay around for the entire life of a VM and removed when the KVM instance is closed, see commit d56f5136b010 ("KVM: let kvm_destroy_vm_debugfs clean up vCPU debugfs directories"). Suggested-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220111005404.162219-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
2022-01-11 08:54:04 +08:00
void kvm_arch_create_vcpu_debugfs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct dentry *debugfs_dentry)
{
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->create_vcpu_debugfs)
vcpu->kvm->arch.kvm_ops->create_vcpu_debugfs(vcpu, debugfs_dentry);
}
void kvm_arch_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm)
KVM: PPC: Merge powerpc's debugfs entry content into generic entry At the moment KVM on PPC creates 4 types of entries under the kvm debugfs: 1) "%pid-%fd" per a KVM instance (for all platforms); 2) "vm%pid" (for PPC Book3s HV KVM); 3) "vm%u_vcpu%u_timing" (for PPC Book3e KVM); 4) "kvm-xive-%p" (for XIVE PPC Book3s KVM, the same for XICS); The problem with this is that multiple VMs per process is not allowed for 2) and 3) which makes it possible for userspace to trigger errors when creating duplicated debugfs entries. This merges all these into 1). This defines kvm_arch_create_kvm_debugfs() similar to kvm_arch_create_vcpu_debugfs(). This defines 2 hooks in kvmppc_ops that allow specific KVM implementations add necessary entries, this adds the _e500 suffix to kvmppc_create_vcpu_debugfs_e500() to make it clear what platform it is for. This makes use of already existing kvm_arch_create_vcpu_debugfs() on PPC. This removes no more used debugfs_dir pointers from PPC kvm_arch structs. This stops removing vcpu entries as once created vcpus stay around for the entire life of a VM and removed when the KVM instance is closed, see commit d56f5136b010 ("KVM: let kvm_destroy_vm_debugfs clean up vCPU debugfs directories"). Suggested-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220111005404.162219-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
2022-01-11 08:54:04 +08:00
{
if (kvm->arch.kvm_ops->create_vm_debugfs)
kvm->arch.kvm_ops->create_vm_debugfs(kvm);
}