mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git
synced 2024-11-15 16:24:28 +08:00
ff35b1d2e9
This addresses a situation when a boolean type is represented by an integer and performing a left shift on a boolean causes an integer overflow. This fixes the following runtime error: "left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'"
1064 lines
24 KiB
C
1064 lines
24 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
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/*
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*
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* BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
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*
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*
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include <config.h>
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#endif
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <ell/ell.h>
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#include "mesh/mesh-defs.h"
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#include "mesh/net.h"
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#include "mesh/crypto.h"
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/* Multiply used Zero array */
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static const uint8_t zero[16] = { 0, };
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static bool aes_ecb_one(const uint8_t key[16], const uint8_t in[16],
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uint8_t out[16])
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{
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void *cipher;
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bool result = false;
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cipher = l_cipher_new(L_CIPHER_AES, key, 16);
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if (cipher) {
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result = l_cipher_encrypt(cipher, in, out, 16);
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l_cipher_free(cipher);
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}
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return result;
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}
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static bool aes_cmac(void *checksum, const uint8_t *msg,
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size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
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{
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if (!l_checksum_update(checksum, msg, msg_len))
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return false;
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if (16 == l_checksum_get_digest(checksum, res, 16))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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static bool aes_cmac_one(const uint8_t key[16], const void *msg,
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size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
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{
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void *checksum;
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bool result;
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checksum = l_checksum_new_cmac_aes(key, 16);
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if (!checksum)
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return false;
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result = l_checksum_update(checksum, msg, msg_len);
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if (result) {
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ssize_t len = l_checksum_get_digest(checksum, res, 16);
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result = !!(len == 16);
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}
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l_checksum_free(checksum);
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return result;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_aes_cmac(const uint8_t key[16], const uint8_t *msg,
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size_t msg_len, uint8_t res[16])
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{
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return aes_cmac_one(key, msg, msg_len, res);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(const uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t key[16],
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const uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
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const void *msg, uint16_t msg_len,
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void *out_msg,
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void *out_mic, size_t mic_size)
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{
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void *cipher;
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bool result;
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cipher = l_aead_cipher_new(L_AEAD_CIPHER_AES_CCM, key, 16, mic_size);
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result = l_aead_cipher_encrypt(cipher, msg, msg_len, aad, aad_len,
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nonce, 13, out_msg, msg_len + mic_size);
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if (result && out_mic) {
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if (mic_size == 4)
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*(uint32_t *)out_mic = l_get_be32(out_msg + msg_len);
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else
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*(uint64_t *)out_mic = l_get_be64(out_msg + msg_len);
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}
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l_aead_cipher_free(cipher);
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return result;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(const uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t key[16],
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const uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
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const void *enc_msg, uint16_t enc_msg_len,
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void *out_msg,
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void *out_mic, size_t mic_size)
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{
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void *cipher;
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bool result;
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size_t out_msg_len = enc_msg_len - mic_size;
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cipher = l_aead_cipher_new(L_AEAD_CIPHER_AES_CCM, key, 16, mic_size);
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result = l_aead_cipher_decrypt(cipher, enc_msg, enc_msg_len,
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aad, aad_len, nonce, 13,
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out_msg, out_msg_len);
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if (result && out_mic) {
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if (mic_size == 4)
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*(uint32_t *)out_mic =
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l_get_be32(enc_msg + enc_msg_len - mic_size);
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else
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*(uint64_t *)out_mic =
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l_get_be64(enc_msg + enc_msg_len - mic_size);
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}
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l_aead_cipher_free(cipher);
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return result;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_k1(const uint8_t ikm[16], const uint8_t salt[16],
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const void *info, size_t info_len, uint8_t okm[16])
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{
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uint8_t res[16];
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if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, ikm, 16, res))
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return false;
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return aes_cmac_one(res, info, info_len, okm);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_k2(const uint8_t n[16], const uint8_t *p, size_t p_len,
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uint8_t net_id[1],
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uint8_t enc_key[16],
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uint8_t priv_key[16])
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{
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void *checksum;
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uint8_t output[16];
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uint8_t t[16];
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uint8_t *stage;
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bool success = false;
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stage = l_malloc(sizeof(output) + p_len + 1);
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if (!stage)
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return false;
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if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk2", 4, stage))
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goto fail;
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if (!aes_cmac_one(stage, n, 16, t))
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goto fail;
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checksum = l_checksum_new_cmac_aes(t, 16);
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if (!checksum)
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goto fail;
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memcpy(stage, p, p_len);
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stage[p_len] = 1;
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if (!aes_cmac(checksum, stage, p_len + 1, output))
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goto done;
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net_id[0] = output[15] & 0x7f;
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memcpy(stage, output, 16);
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memcpy(stage + 16, p, p_len);
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stage[p_len + 16] = 2;
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if (!aes_cmac(checksum, stage, p_len + 16 + 1, output))
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goto done;
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memcpy(enc_key, output, 16);
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memcpy(stage, output, 16);
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memcpy(stage + 16, p, p_len);
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stage[p_len + 16] = 3;
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if (!aes_cmac(checksum, stage, p_len + 16 + 1, output))
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goto done;
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memcpy(priv_key, output, 16);
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success = true;
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done:
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l_checksum_free(checksum);
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fail:
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l_free(stage);
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return success;
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}
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static bool crypto_128(const uint8_t n[16], const char *s, uint8_t out128[16])
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{
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const uint8_t id128[] = { 'i', 'd', '1', '2', '8', 0x01 };
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uint8_t salt[16];
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if (!mesh_crypto_s1(s, 4, salt))
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return false;
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return mesh_crypto_k1(n, salt, id128, sizeof(id128), out128);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_nkik(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t identity_key[16])
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{
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return crypto_128(n, "nkik", identity_key);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_identity(const uint8_t net_key[16], uint16_t addr,
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uint8_t id[16])
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{
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uint8_t id_key[16];
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uint8_t tmp[16];
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if (!mesh_crypto_nkik(net_key, id_key))
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return false;
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if (!l_get_be64(id + 8))
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l_getrandom(id + 8, 8);
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memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
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memcpy(tmp + 6, id + 8, 8);
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l_put_be16(addr, tmp + 14);
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if (!aes_ecb_one(id_key, tmp, tmp))
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return false;
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memcpy(id, tmp + 8, 8);
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return true;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_nkbk(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t beacon_key[16])
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{
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return crypto_128(n, "nkbk", beacon_key);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_nkpk(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t proxy_key[16])
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{
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return crypto_128(n, "nkpk", proxy_key);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_k3(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t out64[8])
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{
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const uint8_t id64[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', '4', 0x01 };
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uint8_t tmp[16];
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uint8_t t[16];
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if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk3", 4, tmp))
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return false;
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if (!aes_cmac_one(tmp, n, 16, t))
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return false;
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if (!aes_cmac_one(t, id64, sizeof(id64), tmp))
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return false;
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memcpy(out64, tmp + 8, 8);
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return true;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_k4(const uint8_t a[16], uint8_t out6[1])
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{
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const uint8_t id6[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', 0x01 };
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uint8_t tmp[16];
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uint8_t t[16];
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if (!mesh_crypto_s1("smk4", 4, tmp))
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return false;
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if (!aes_cmac_one(tmp, a, 16, t))
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return false;
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if (!aes_cmac_one(t, id6, sizeof(id6), tmp))
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return false;
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out6[0] = tmp[15] & 0x3f;
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return true;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_beacon_cmac(const uint8_t encryption_key[16],
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const uint8_t network_id[8],
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uint32_t iv_index, bool kr, bool iu,
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uint64_t *cmac)
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{
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uint8_t msg[13], tmp[16];
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if (!cmac)
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return false;
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msg[0] = kr ? 0x01 : 0x00;
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msg[0] |= iu ? 0x02 : 0x00;
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memcpy(msg + 1, network_id, 8);
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l_put_be32(iv_index, msg + 9);
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if (!aes_cmac_one(encryption_key, msg, 13, tmp))
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return false;
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*cmac = l_get_be64(tmp);
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return true;
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}
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static void mesh_crypto_network_nonce(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
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uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
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uint32_t iv_index, uint8_t nonce[13])
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{
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nonce[0] = 0x00;
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nonce[1] = (ttl & TTL_MASK) | (ctl ? CTL : 0x00);
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nonce[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xff;
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nonce[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xff;
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nonce[4] = seq & 0xff;
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l_put_be16(src, nonce + 5);
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l_put_be16(0, nonce + 7);
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l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
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}
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static void mesh_crypto_application_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
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uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
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bool aszmic, uint8_t nonce[13])
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{
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nonce[0] = 0x01;
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nonce[1] = aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
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nonce[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xff;
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nonce[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xff;
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nonce[4] = seq & 0xff;
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l_put_be16(src, nonce + 5);
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l_put_be16(dst, nonce + 7);
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l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
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}
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static void mesh_crypto_device_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
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uint16_t dst, uint32_t iv_index,
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bool aszmic, uint8_t nonce[13])
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{
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nonce[0] = 0x02;
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nonce[1] = aszmic ? 0x80 : 0x00;
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nonce[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xff;
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nonce[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xff;
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nonce[4] = seq & 0xff;
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l_put_be16(src, nonce + 5);
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l_put_be16(dst, nonce + 7);
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l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
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}
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static void mesh_crypto_proxy_nonce(uint32_t seq, uint16_t src,
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uint32_t iv_index, uint8_t nonce[13])
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{
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nonce[0] = 0x03;
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nonce[1] = 0;
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nonce[2] = (seq >> 16) & 0xff;
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nonce[3] = (seq >> 8) & 0xff;
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nonce[4] = seq & 0xff;
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l_put_be16(src, nonce + 5);
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l_put_be16(0, nonce + 7);
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l_put_be32(iv_index, nonce + 9);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_session_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
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const uint8_t salt[16],
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uint8_t session_key[16])
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{
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const uint8_t prsk[4] = "prsk";
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if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, session_key))
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return false;
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return aes_cmac_one(session_key, prsk, 4, session_key);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_nonce(const uint8_t secret[32],
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const uint8_t salt[16],
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uint8_t nonce[13])
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{
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const uint8_t prsn[4] = "prsn";
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uint8_t tmp[16];
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bool result;
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if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, tmp))
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return false;
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result = aes_cmac_one(tmp, prsn, 4, tmp);
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if (result)
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memcpy(nonce, tmp + 3, 13);
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return result;
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_s1(const void *info, size_t len, uint8_t salt[16])
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{
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return aes_cmac_one(zero, info, len, salt);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_prov_prov_salt(const uint8_t conf_salt[16],
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const uint8_t prov_rand[16],
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const uint8_t dev_rand[16],
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uint8_t prov_salt[16])
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{
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uint8_t tmp[16 * 3];
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memcpy(tmp, conf_salt, 16);
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memcpy(tmp + 16, prov_rand, 16);
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memcpy(tmp + 32, dev_rand, 16);
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return aes_cmac_one(zero, tmp, sizeof(tmp), prov_salt);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_prov_conf_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
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const uint8_t salt[16],
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uint8_t conf_key[16])
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{
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const uint8_t prck[4] = "prck";
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if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, conf_key))
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return false;
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return aes_cmac_one(conf_key, prck, 4, conf_key);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_device_key(const uint8_t secret[32],
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const uint8_t salt[16],
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uint8_t device_key[16])
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{
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const uint8_t prdk[4] = "prdk";
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if (!aes_cmac_one(salt, secret, 32, device_key))
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return false;
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return aes_cmac_one(device_key, prdk, 4, device_key);
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}
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bool mesh_crypto_virtual_addr(const uint8_t virtual_label[16],
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uint16_t *addr)
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{
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uint8_t tmp[16];
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if (!mesh_crypto_s1("vtad", 4, tmp))
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return false;
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if (!addr || !aes_cmac_one(tmp, virtual_label, 16, tmp))
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return false;
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*addr = (l_get_be16(tmp + 14) & 0x3fff) | 0x8000;
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return true;
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}
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static void mesh_crypto_privacy_counter(uint32_t iv_index,
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const uint8_t *payload,
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uint8_t privacy_counter[16])
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{
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memset(privacy_counter, 0, 5);
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l_put_be32(iv_index, privacy_counter + 5);
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memcpy(privacy_counter + 9, payload, 7);
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}
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static bool mesh_crypto_pecb(const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
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uint32_t iv_index,
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const uint8_t *payload,
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uint8_t pecb[16])
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{
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mesh_crypto_privacy_counter(iv_index, payload, pecb);
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return aes_ecb_one(privacy_key, pecb, pecb);
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}
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static bool mesh_crypto_network_obfuscate(uint8_t *packet,
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const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
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uint32_t iv_index,
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bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
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uint32_t seq, uint16_t src)
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{
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uint8_t pecb[16];
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uint8_t *net_hdr = packet + 1;
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int i;
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if (!mesh_crypto_pecb(privacy_key, iv_index, packet + 7, pecb))
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return false;
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l_put_be16(src, net_hdr + 4);
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l_put_be32(seq & SEQ_MASK, net_hdr);
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net_hdr[0] = ((!!ctl) << 7) | (ttl & TTL_MASK);
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for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
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net_hdr[i] = pecb[i] ^ net_hdr[i];
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return true;
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}
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static bool mesh_crypto_network_clarify(uint8_t *packet,
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const uint8_t privacy_key[16],
|
|
uint32_t iv_index,
|
|
bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl,
|
|
uint32_t *seq, uint16_t *src)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t pecb[16];
|
|
uint8_t *net_hdr = packet + 1;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_pecb(privacy_key, iv_index, packet + 7, pecb))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
|
|
net_hdr[i] = pecb[i] ^ net_hdr[i];
|
|
|
|
*src = l_get_be16(net_hdr + 4);
|
|
*seq = l_get_be32(net_hdr) & SEQ_MASK;
|
|
*ttl = net_hdr[0] & TTL_MASK;
|
|
*ctl = !!(net_hdr[0] & CTL);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_packet_build(bool ctl, uint8_t ttl,
|
|
uint32_t seq,
|
|
uint16_t src, uint16_t dst,
|
|
uint8_t opcode,
|
|
bool segmented, uint8_t key_aid,
|
|
bool szmic, bool relay, uint16_t seqZero,
|
|
uint8_t segO, uint8_t segN,
|
|
const uint8_t *payload, uint8_t payload_len,
|
|
uint8_t *packet, uint8_t *packet_len)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t hdr;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
|
|
if (seq > SEQ_MASK)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
packet[0] = 0;
|
|
l_put_be32(seq, packet + 1);
|
|
packet[1] = (ctl ? CTL : 0) | (ttl & TTL_MASK);
|
|
|
|
l_put_be16(src, packet + 5);
|
|
l_put_be16(dst, packet + 7);
|
|
n = 9;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctl) {
|
|
uint32_t tmp = segmented ? 0x1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
hdr = tmp << SEG_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
hdr |= (key_aid & KEY_ID_MASK) << KEY_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
if (segmented) {
|
|
hdr |= szmic << SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
hdr |= (seqZero & SEQ_ZERO_MASK) << SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
hdr |= (segO & SEG_MASK) << SEGO_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
hdr |= (segN & SEG_MASK) << SEGN_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
}
|
|
l_put_be32(hdr, packet + n);
|
|
|
|
/* Only first octet is valid for unsegmented messages */
|
|
if (segmented)
|
|
n += 4;
|
|
else
|
|
n += 1;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(packet + n, payload, payload_len);
|
|
|
|
l_put_be32(0x00000000, packet + payload_len + n);
|
|
if (packet_len)
|
|
*packet_len = payload_len + n + 4;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((opcode & OPCODE_MASK) != opcode)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
hdr = opcode << KEY_HDR_SHIFT;
|
|
l_put_be32(hdr, packet + n);
|
|
n += 1;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(packet + n, payload, payload_len);
|
|
n += payload_len;
|
|
|
|
l_put_be64(0x0000000000000000, packet + n);
|
|
if (packet_len)
|
|
*packet_len = n + 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool network_header_parse(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl, uint32_t *seq,
|
|
uint16_t *src, uint16_t *dst)
|
|
{
|
|
if (packet_len < 10)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* Try to keep bits in the order they exist within the packet */
|
|
if (ctl)
|
|
*ctl = !!(packet[1] & CTL);
|
|
|
|
if (ttl)
|
|
*ttl = packet[1] & TTL_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (seq)
|
|
*seq = l_get_be32(packet + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (src)
|
|
*src = l_get_be16(packet + 5);
|
|
|
|
if (dst)
|
|
*dst = l_get_be16(packet + 7);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_packet_parse(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
bool *ctl, uint8_t *ttl, uint32_t *seq,
|
|
uint16_t *src, uint16_t *dst,
|
|
uint32_t *cookie, uint8_t *opcode,
|
|
bool *segmented, uint8_t *key_aid,
|
|
bool *szmic, bool *relay, uint16_t *seqZero,
|
|
uint8_t *segO, uint8_t *segN,
|
|
const uint8_t **payload, uint8_t *payload_len)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t hdr;
|
|
uint16_t this_dst;
|
|
bool is_segmented;
|
|
|
|
if (!network_header_parse(packet, packet_len,
|
|
ctl, ttl, seq, src, &this_dst))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (dst)
|
|
*dst = this_dst;
|
|
|
|
hdr = l_get_be32(packet + 9);
|
|
|
|
is_segmented = !!((hdr >> SEG_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
|
|
if (segmented)
|
|
*segmented = is_segmented;
|
|
|
|
if (packet[1] & CTL) {
|
|
uint8_t this_opcode = packet[9] & OPCODE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (cookie)
|
|
*cookie = l_get_be32(packet + 2) ^ packet[6];
|
|
|
|
if (opcode)
|
|
*opcode = this_opcode;
|
|
|
|
if (this_dst && this_opcode == NET_OP_SEG_ACKNOWLEDGE) {
|
|
if (relay)
|
|
*relay = !!((hdr >> RELAY_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
|
|
|
|
if (seqZero)
|
|
*seqZero = (hdr >> SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT) &
|
|
SEQ_ZERO_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (payload)
|
|
*payload = packet + 9;
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len)
|
|
*payload_len = packet_len - 9;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (payload)
|
|
*payload = packet + 10;
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len)
|
|
*payload_len = packet_len - 10;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (cookie)
|
|
*cookie = l_get_be32(packet + packet_len - 8);
|
|
|
|
if (key_aid)
|
|
*key_aid = (hdr >> KEY_HDR_SHIFT) & KEY_ID_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (is_segmented) {
|
|
if (szmic)
|
|
*szmic = !!((hdr >> SZMIC_HDR_SHIFT) & true);
|
|
|
|
if (seqZero)
|
|
*seqZero = (hdr >> SEQ_ZERO_HDR_SHIFT) &
|
|
SEQ_ZERO_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (segO)
|
|
*segO = (hdr >> SEGO_HDR_SHIFT) & SEG_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (segN)
|
|
*segN = (hdr >> SEGN_HDR_SHIFT) & SEG_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (payload)
|
|
*payload = packet + 13;
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len)
|
|
*payload_len = packet_len - 13;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (payload)
|
|
*payload = packet + 10;
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len)
|
|
*payload_len = packet_len - 10;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_payload_encrypt(uint8_t *aad, const uint8_t *payload,
|
|
uint8_t *out, uint16_t payload_len,
|
|
uint16_t src, uint16_t dst, uint8_t key_aid,
|
|
uint32_t seq, uint32_t iv_index,
|
|
bool aszmic,
|
|
const uint8_t app_key[16])
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nonce[13];
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len < 1)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (key_aid == APP_AID_DEV)
|
|
mesh_crypto_device_nonce(seq, src, dst, iv_index, aszmic,
|
|
nonce);
|
|
else
|
|
mesh_crypto_application_nonce(seq, src, dst, iv_index, aszmic,
|
|
nonce);
|
|
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, app_key,
|
|
aad, aad ? 16 : 0,
|
|
payload, payload_len,
|
|
out, NULL,
|
|
aszmic ? 8 : 4))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_payload_decrypt(uint8_t *aad, uint16_t aad_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *payload, uint16_t payload_len,
|
|
bool aszmic,
|
|
uint16_t src, uint16_t dst,
|
|
uint8_t key_aid, uint32_t seq,
|
|
uint32_t iv_index, uint8_t *out,
|
|
const uint8_t app_key[16])
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nonce[13];
|
|
uint32_t mic32;
|
|
uint64_t mic64;
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len < 5 || !out)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (key_aid == APP_AID_DEV)
|
|
mesh_crypto_device_nonce(seq, src, dst, iv_index, aszmic,
|
|
nonce);
|
|
else
|
|
mesh_crypto_application_nonce(seq, src, dst, iv_index, aszmic,
|
|
nonce);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(out, payload, payload_len);
|
|
|
|
if (aszmic) {
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, app_key,
|
|
aad, aad_len,
|
|
payload, payload_len,
|
|
out, &mic64, sizeof(mic64)))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
mic64 ^= l_get_be64(out + payload_len - 8);
|
|
l_put_be64(mic64, out + payload_len - 8);
|
|
|
|
if (mic64)
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, app_key,
|
|
aad, aad_len,
|
|
payload, payload_len,
|
|
out, &mic32, sizeof(mic32)))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
mic32 ^= l_get_be32(out + payload_len - 4);
|
|
l_put_be32(mic32, out + payload_len - 4);
|
|
|
|
if (mic32)
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool mesh_crypto_packet_encrypt(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
const uint8_t network_key[16],
|
|
uint32_t iv_index, bool proxy,
|
|
bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint32_t seq,
|
|
uint16_t src)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nonce[13];
|
|
|
|
/* Detect Proxy packet by CTL == true && DST == 0x0000 */
|
|
if (ctl && proxy)
|
|
mesh_crypto_proxy_nonce(seq, src, iv_index, nonce);
|
|
else
|
|
mesh_crypto_network_nonce(ctl, ttl, seq, src, iv_index, nonce);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for Long net-MIC */
|
|
if (ctl) {
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, network_key,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
packet + 7, packet_len - 7 - 8,
|
|
packet + 7, NULL, 8))
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_encrypt(nonce, network_key,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
packet + 7, packet_len - 7 - 4,
|
|
packet + 7, NULL, 4))
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_packet_encode(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
uint32_t iv_index,
|
|
const uint8_t network_key[16],
|
|
const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
|
|
{
|
|
bool ctl;
|
|
uint8_t ttl;
|
|
uint32_t seq;
|
|
uint16_t src;
|
|
uint16_t dst;
|
|
|
|
if (!network_header_parse(packet, packet_len,
|
|
&ctl, &ttl, &seq, &src, &dst))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_packet_encrypt(packet, packet_len, network_key,
|
|
iv_index, !dst,
|
|
ctl, ttl, seq, src))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return mesh_crypto_network_obfuscate(packet, privacy_key, iv_index,
|
|
ctl, ttl, seq, src);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool mesh_crypto_packet_decrypt(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
const uint8_t network_key[16],
|
|
uint32_t iv_index, bool proxy,
|
|
bool ctl, uint8_t ttl, uint32_t seq,
|
|
uint16_t src)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nonce[13];
|
|
|
|
/* Pre-check SRC address for illegal values */
|
|
if (!IS_UNICAST(src))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* Detect Proxy packet by CTL == true && proxy == true */
|
|
if (ctl & proxy)
|
|
mesh_crypto_proxy_nonce(seq, src, iv_index, nonce);
|
|
else
|
|
mesh_crypto_network_nonce(ctl, ttl, seq, src, iv_index, nonce);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for Long MIC */
|
|
if (ctl) {
|
|
uint64_t mic;
|
|
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, network_key,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
packet + 7, packet_len - 7,
|
|
packet + 7, &mic, sizeof(mic)))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
mic ^= l_get_be64(packet + packet_len - 8);
|
|
l_put_be64(mic, packet + packet_len - 8);
|
|
|
|
if (mic)
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
uint32_t mic;
|
|
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_aes_ccm_decrypt(nonce, network_key,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
packet + 7, packet_len - 7,
|
|
packet + 7, &mic, sizeof(mic)))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
mic ^= l_get_be32(packet + packet_len - 4);
|
|
l_put_be32(mic, packet + packet_len - 4);
|
|
|
|
if (mic)
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_packet_decode(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
bool proxy, uint8_t *out, uint32_t iv_index,
|
|
const uint8_t network_key[16],
|
|
const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
|
|
{
|
|
bool ctl;
|
|
uint8_t ttl;
|
|
uint32_t seq;
|
|
uint16_t src;
|
|
|
|
if (packet_len < 14)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(out, packet, packet_len);
|
|
|
|
if (!mesh_crypto_network_clarify(out, privacy_key, iv_index,
|
|
&ctl, &ttl, &seq, &src))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return mesh_crypto_packet_decrypt(out, packet_len, network_key,
|
|
iv_index, proxy,
|
|
ctl, ttl, seq, src);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_packet_label(uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
uint16_t iv_index, uint8_t network_id)
|
|
{
|
|
packet[0] = (iv_index & 0x0001) << 7 | (network_id & 0x7f);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* reversed, 8-bit, poly=0x07 */
|
|
static const uint8_t crc_table[256] = {
|
|
0x00, 0x91, 0xe3, 0x72, 0x07, 0x96, 0xe4, 0x75,
|
|
0x0e, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7c, 0x09, 0x98, 0xea, 0x7b,
|
|
0x1c, 0x8d, 0xff, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0x8a, 0xf8, 0x69,
|
|
0x12, 0x83, 0xf1, 0x60, 0x15, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x67,
|
|
|
|
0x38, 0xa9, 0xdb, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0xae, 0xdc, 0x4d,
|
|
0x36, 0xa7, 0xd5, 0x44, 0x31, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0x43,
|
|
0x24, 0xb5, 0xc7, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb2, 0xc0, 0x51,
|
|
0x2a, 0xbb, 0xc9, 0x58, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0xce, 0x5f,
|
|
|
|
0x70, 0xe1, 0x93, 0x02, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x94, 0x05,
|
|
0x7e, 0xef, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x0b,
|
|
0x6c, 0xfd, 0x8f, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x88, 0x19,
|
|
0x62, 0xf3, 0x81, 0x10, 0x65, 0xf4, 0x86, 0x17,
|
|
|
|
0x48, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0xde, 0xac, 0x3d,
|
|
0x46, 0xd7, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x41, 0xd0, 0xa2, 0x33,
|
|
0x54, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x26, 0x53, 0xc2, 0xb0, 0x21,
|
|
0x5a, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x28, 0x5d, 0xcc, 0xbe, 0x2f,
|
|
|
|
0xe0, 0x71, 0x03, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x76, 0x04, 0x95,
|
|
0xee, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x78, 0x0a, 0x9b,
|
|
0xfc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x18, 0x89,
|
|
0xf2, 0x63, 0x11, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x64, 0x16, 0x87,
|
|
|
|
0xd8, 0x49, 0x3b, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xad,
|
|
0xd6, 0x47, 0x35, 0xa4, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x32, 0xa3,
|
|
0xc4, 0x55, 0x27, 0xb6, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x20, 0xb1,
|
|
0xca, 0x5b, 0x29, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0x5c, 0x2e, 0xbf,
|
|
|
|
0x90, 0x01, 0x73, 0xe2, 0x97, 0x06, 0x74, 0xe5,
|
|
0x9e, 0x0f, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x99, 0x08, 0x7a, 0xeb,
|
|
0x8c, 0x1d, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x68, 0xf9,
|
|
0x82, 0x13, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x14, 0x66, 0xf7,
|
|
|
|
0xa8, 0x39, 0x4b, 0xda, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xdd,
|
|
0xa6, 0x37, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xa1, 0x30, 0x42, 0xd3,
|
|
0xb4, 0x25, 0x57, 0xc6, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x50, 0xc1,
|
|
0xba, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x2c, 0x5e, 0xcf
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
uint8_t mesh_crypto_compute_fcs(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < packet_len; i++)
|
|
fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ packet[i]];
|
|
|
|
return 0xff - fcs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_check_fcs(const uint8_t *packet, uint8_t packet_len,
|
|
uint8_t received_fcs)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < packet_len; i++)
|
|
fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ packet[i]];
|
|
|
|
fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ received_fcs];
|
|
|
|
return fcs == 0xcf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function performs a quick-check of ELL and Kernel AEAD encryption.
|
|
* Some kernel versions before v4.9 have a known AEAD bug. If the system
|
|
* running this test is using a v4.8 or earlier kernel, a failure here is
|
|
* likely unless AEAD encryption has been backported.
|
|
*/
|
|
static const uint8_t crypto_test_result[] = {
|
|
0x75, 0x03, 0x7e, 0xe2, 0x89, 0x81, 0xbe, 0x59,
|
|
0xbc, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x23, 0x63, 0x5b, 0x16, 0x61,
|
|
0xb7, 0x23, 0x92, 0xd4, 0x86, 0xee, 0x84, 0x29,
|
|
0x9a, 0x2a, 0xbf, 0x96
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bool mesh_crypto_check_avail()
|
|
{
|
|
void *cipher;
|
|
bool result;
|
|
uint8_t i;
|
|
union {
|
|
struct {
|
|
uint8_t key[16];
|
|
uint8_t aad[16];
|
|
uint8_t nonce[13];
|
|
uint8_t data[20];
|
|
uint8_t mic[8];
|
|
} crypto;
|
|
uint8_t bytes[73];
|
|
} u;
|
|
uint8_t out_msg[sizeof(u.crypto.data) + sizeof(u.crypto.mic)];
|
|
|
|
l_debug("Testing Crypto");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(u); i++) {
|
|
u.bytes[i] = 0x60 + i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cipher = l_aead_cipher_new(L_AEAD_CIPHER_AES_CCM, u.crypto.key,
|
|
sizeof(u.crypto.key), sizeof(u.crypto.mic));
|
|
|
|
if (!cipher)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
result = l_aead_cipher_encrypt(cipher,
|
|
u.crypto.data, sizeof(u.crypto.data),
|
|
u.crypto.aad, sizeof(u.crypto.aad),
|
|
u.crypto.nonce, sizeof(u.crypto.nonce),
|
|
out_msg, sizeof(out_msg));
|
|
|
|
if (result)
|
|
result = !memcmp(out_msg, crypto_test_result, sizeof(out_msg));
|
|
|
|
l_aead_cipher_free(cipher);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|